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American ^tateismen 



EDITED BY 



JOHN T. MORSE, JR. 



4 



3llnicrican ,i§>tate^men 



ANDREW JACKSON 



AS A PUBLIC MAN 



WHAT HE WAS, WHAT CHANCES HE HAD, AND 
WHAT HE DID WITH THEM 



BY 

WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 

.1 

PROFESSOR OP POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN YAJJE COLLEGE 




BOSTON 
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY 

NEW YORK: 11 EAST SEVENTEENTH STREET 

1888 




H-'^g':r 



c? 



'OC\5-4. 



Copyright, 1882, 
By WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER 



All rights reserved. 



Mj Transfer 
JUN I ^^f 



The Riverside Press, Cambrtdge: 
Stereotyped and Printed by II. 0. Iloughtou and Company 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER L 

PAQl 

The First Fortt-pivb Years op Jackson's Life 1 

CHAPTER II. 
The Creek. Wab and the War with England . 26 

CHAPTER in. 
Jackson in Florida , . • . • . 49 

CHAPTER IV. 
Election op 182* . • . • j ... 73 

CHAPTER V. 
Adams's Administration 100 

CHAPTER VI. 
The Reliep System op Kentucky . . • .119 

CHAPTER VII. 

(kternal History op Jackson's First Administra- 
tion 136 

CHAPTER VIII. 

Public Questions op Jackson's First Administra- 
liON — I. 164 

(a.) 1. "West India Trade ; 2. Spoliation Claims. 
(b.) I Federal Judiciary ; 2. Indians. 



vi CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER IX. 

PAfll 

Public Questions of Jackson's First Administra- 
tion. — II 184 

3. Land; 4. Internal Improvements; 5. Tariff. 

CHAPTER X. 

Public Questions of Jackson's First Administea- 
TION. — III 207 

6. Nullification. 

CHAPTER XL 

Public Questions of Jackson's First Administra- 
tion. — IV ... 224 

7. Bank. 

CHAPTER XIL 
The Campaign of 1832 250 

CHAPTER Xin. 

Tariff, Nullification, and Bank during Jackson's 
Second Administration 277 

CHAPTER XIV 

SrECULATiON, Distribution, Currency Legislation, 
AND End of the Bank of the United States . 322 

CHAPTER XV. 

Ihb New Spirit in Various Points of Foreign 
AND Domestic Policy 343 

CHAPTER XVL 
rHE Election of 1836. — End of Jackson's Career 374 

Pull Titles of Books rsferreb to in this Volume 387 
Index .393 



ANDREW JACKSON. 



CHAPTER I. 

THE mtST FOBTT-FIVB TEAKS OF JACKSON'S LIFE. 

In the middle of the last century a number of Scotch- 
men and Scotch-Irishmen migrated to the uplands of 
North and South Carolina. Among these was Andrew 
Jackson, who came over in 1765, with his wife and two 
sons, being accompanied also by several neighbors and 
connections from Carrickf ergus, County Antrim, Ireland. 
They appear to have been led to the spot at which they 
settled, on the upper waters of the Catawba river, by 
the fact that persons of their acquaintance in Ireland 
had previously found their way thither, under special 
inducements which were offered to immigrants.* The 
settlement was called the Waxhaw Settlement, and was 
in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina, but close to the 
South Carolina boundary. Andrew Jackson had no capi- 
tal, and never became an owner of land. In 1767 he 
died. His son Andrew was born within a few days of 
the father's death, March 15, 1767. Parton fixes his 
birthplace in Union County, North Carolina; Kendall 

1 2 Hewitt, 13, 268, 272. A bounty was offered equal to the 
20Bt of passage. Ship captains became immigration agents. (Foi 
full titles of books referred to see the list at the end of the vol 
lune.) 

1 



2 ANDREW JACKSON. 

in South Carolina. In Jackson's Proclamation of 1832, 
in a letter of December 24^ 1830,^ and in his will, he 
speaks of himself as a native of South Carolina. 

It appears that Andrew Jackson's mother abandoned 
the settlement which her husband had commenced, and 
it is probable that she owed much to the assistance of 
her relatives and connections while Andrew was a child. 
Circumstances of birth more humble than those of this 
child can scarcely be imagined. It was not, probably, 
hard to sustain life in such a frontier community. 
Coarse food was abundant ; but to get more out of life 
than beasts get when they have enough to eat was no 
doubt very difficult. The traditions of Jackson's educa- 
tion are vague and uncertain. Of book-learning and 
school-training he appears to have got very little indeed. 

The population of the district was heterogeneous, and, 
when the Revolutionary War broke out, the differences 
of nationality and creed divided the people by oppos- 
ing sympathies as to the war. The English penetrated 
the district several times in the hope of winning re- 
cruits and strengthening the tories. On one of these 
raids Andrew Jackson was wounded by an officer, who 
struck him because he refused to brush the officer's boots. 
He and his brother were taken prisoners to Camden. 
The war cost the lives of both Andrew's brothers, and 
also that of his mother, who died while on a journey to 
Charleston to help care for the prisoners there. An- 
drew Jackson accordingly came to entertain a vigorous 
hatred of the English from a very early age. In 1781 
he was alone in the world. What means of support he 
had we do not know, but, after trying the saddler's trade, 
he became, in 1784, a student of law at Salisbury, North 
1 39 Niles. 385. 



THE STUDY OF LAW. 2 

Carolina. The traditions collected by Parton of Jack- 
son's conduct at this time give us anything but the pict- 
ure, so familiar in political biography, of the orphan boy 
hewing his way up to the presidency by industry and 
Belf-denial. If the information is trustworthy, Jackson 
was gay, careless, rollicking, fond of horses, racing, 
cock-fighting, and mischief. Four years were spent in 
this way. 

It is necessary to note the significance of the fact that 
a young man situated as Jackson was should undertake 
to " study law." 

In the generation before the Revolution the intellectual 
activity of the young men, which had previously been 
expended in theology, began to be directed to the law. 
As capital increased and property rights became more 
complicated there was more need for legal training. In 
an agricultural community there was a great deal of 
leisure at certain seasons of the year, and the actual 
outlay required for an education was smaU. The stand- 
ard of attaiimients was low, and it was easy for a farm- 
er's boy of any diligence to acquire, in his winter's lei- 
sure, as much book-learning as the best colleges gave. 
In truth the range of ideas, among the best classes, 
.iftout law, history, political science, and political econ- 
omy, was narrow in the extreme. What the aspiring 
'lass of young men who were self-educated lacked, as 
compared with the technically " educated," was the bits 
of classical and theological dogmatism which the colleges 
taught by tradition, and the culture which is obtained 
by frequenting academical society, however meagre may 
be the positive instruction given by the institution. 
What the same aspiring youths had in excess of the 
regularly educated was self-confidence, bred by igno 



i ANDREW JACKSON. 

ranee of their own short-comings. They were therefore 
considered pushing and offensive by the colonial aris- 
tocracy of place-holders and established families, who 
considered that " the ministry " was the proper place 
for aspiring cleverness, and that it was intrusive when 
it pushed into civil life. The restiveness of the aspiring 
class under this repression was one of the great causes 
of the Revolution. The lawyers became the leaders in 
the revolt everywhere. The established classes were, aa 
classes, tories. After the war the way was clear for 
every one who wanted office, or influence, or notoriety, to 
attain these ends. The first step was to study law. If 
a young man heard a public speaker, and was fired by 
the love of public activity and applause, or if he became 
engaged in political controversy, and was regarded by 
his fellows as a good disputant, or if he chanced to read 
something which set him thinking, the result was very 
sure to be that he read some law. The men, whose bi- 
ographies we read because they rose to eminence, present 
us over and over again the same picture of a youth, with 
only a common school education, who spends his leisure 
in reading law, while he earns his living by teaching or 
by farm work. Those, however, whose biographies we 
read are only the select few who succeeded, out of the 
thousands who started on the same road, and were ar- 
rested by one circumstance or another, which threw 
them back into the ranks of farmers and store-keepers. 
We shall see that Andrew Jackson so fell back into the 
position of a farmer and store-keeper. Chance plays a 
great role in a new community, just as it does in a primi- 
tive civilization. Jhance had very much to do with 
fackson's career. We have no evidence that he was 
dissatisfied with his circumstances, and set himself to 



JACKSON GOES TO TENNESSEE. 5 

irork to get out of them, or that he had any stiong am- 
bition towards which the law was a step. There is no 
proof that he ever was an ambitious man ; but rather 
the contrary. He never learned any law, and never to 
the end of his life had a legal tone of mind ; even his 
admirer, Kendall, admits this.^ His study of law had 
no influence on his career, and no significance for his 
character, except that it shows him following the set or 
fashion of the better class of young men of his gener- 
ation. If conjecture may be allowed, it is most probable 
that he did not get on well with his relatives, and that 
he disliked the drudgery of farming or saddle-making. 
A journey which he made to Charleston offers a very 
possible chance for him to have had his mind opened 
to plans and ideas. 

In 1788, Jackson's friend, John McNairy, was ap- 
pointed judge of the Superior Court of the Western 
District of North Carolina {i. e., Tennessee), and Jack- 
son was appointed public prosecutor. Jackson arrived 
in Nashville in October, 1788. Tennessee was then a 
wild frontier country, in which the Whites and Indians 
were engaged in constant hostilities. It was shut off 
from connection with the Atlantic States by the mount- 
ains, and its best connection with civilization was down 
the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. Such frontier com- 
munities have always had a peculiar character. In 
them the white man has conformed, in no small degree, 
to the habits and occupations of the Indians. Cut off 
from tools, furniture, clothing, and other manufactured 
irticles such as civilized men use, he has been driven to 
such substitutes as he could produce by bringing hia 
•ntelligence to bear on the processes and materials u»«4 
1 Jackson, 109. 



6 ANDREW JACKSON. 

by the Indians. Living where game is abundant, and 
where the forests make agriculture difficult, he has often 
Bunk back to the verge of the hunting stage of civili- 
sation.^ The pioneers, so much lauded in song and 
story, were men who first broke the path into the wil- 
derness, but who derogated from the status of their race 
to do it. They became incapacitated for the steady 
labor of civilized industry, and when the country became 
80 filled up that game was scarce, agriculture a necessity, 
and " law " began to be recognized and employed, the 
pioneers moved on into the wilderness. In their habits 
they were idle and thriftless, and almost always too 
fond of strong drink. The class of settlers who suc- 
ceeded them were but little better in their habits, al- 
though they began to clear the forests and till the soil. 
They were always very litigious. Court day was an 
occasion which drew the men to the county town, form- 
ing an event in a monotonous existence, and offering 
society to people oppressed by isolated life. This con- 
course of people furnished occasion for gossip and news- 
mongering, and the discussion of everybody's affairs for 
miles around. " Public opinion " took control of every- 
thing. Local quarrels involved the whole county sooner 
or later. Friendships, alliances, feuds, and animosities 
grew up and were intensified in such a state of society. 
If there was an election pending the same concourse of 
people furnished an opportunity for speech-making and 
argument. The institution of '^ stump-speaking " was 
born and developed in these circumstances. In the 
iiourt itself the parties to the suits and the jury enjoyed 
H place before the public eye. The judge and the counsel 

1 See Collins'g Kentucky, Putnam's M>.idle Tennessee, aaai 
Kendall's Jackson, 74. 



FRONTIER SOCIETY. 7 

made reputation day by day. The lawyers, as actual 
or prospective candidates for office, were directly and 
constantly winning strength with the electors. They 
passed from the bar to the stump or the tavern parlor, 
and employed the influence which their eloquence had 
won in the court room to advance the interests which 
they favored in the election. There are features of 
American democracy which are inexplicable unless one 
understands this frontier society. Some of our greatest 
pohtical abuses have come from transferring to our now 
large and crowded cities maxims and usages which were 
convenient and harmless in backwoods county towns. 

Another feature of the frontier society which it is 
important to notice is, that in it the lack of capital and 
the intimacy of personal relations led to great abuses 
of credit. Idleness, drink, debt, and quarrels produced 
by gossip have been the curses of such society. The 
courts and the lawj'^ers were always busy with the per- 
sonal collisions which arose where no one was allowed 
to practise any personal reserve, where each one's busi- 
ness was everybody's business, where gossip never rested, 
and where each one was in debt to some others. 

In such a state of society the public prosecutor is the 
general of the advancing army of civilization. He has 
to try to introduce law and order, the fulfilment of con- 
tracts, and the recognition of rights into the infant so- 
ciety. This was the task which Jackson undertook in 
Tennessee. It required nerve and vigor. The western 
counties of North Carolina were in a state of anarchy, 
resulting from the attempt to set up the state of Frank- 
lin, and the population were so turbulent and lawless 
that the representative of legal order was at open wai 
Jvith them. The Indians and Whites were also engaged 



8 ANDREW JACKSON. 

In the final struggle of the former before yielding their 
hunting-grounds to the cultivation of the white man. 
Jackson had to travel up and down the country in the 
discharge of his duties, when he was in danger of his 
life upon the road. He brought all the required force 
and vh'tue to the discharge of the duties of this office. 
He pursued his way without fear and without relenting. 
He made strong enemies, and he won strong friends. 
Kendall says that Jackson settled at Nashville, because 
the debtors there tried to drive him away, he having 
taken some collection cases.^ His merits as prosecutor * 
are vouched for by the fact that Governor Blount said 
of him, in reference to certain intruders on Indian lands 
who were giving trouble, " Let the District Attorney, 
Mr. Jackson, be informed. He will be certain to do 
his duty, and the offenders will be punished." ® 

Among the earher settlers of Tennessee was John 
Donelson, who had been killed by the Indians before 
Jackson migrated to Tennessee.^ Jackson boarded with 
the widow Donelson. In the family there were also 
Mrs. Donelson's daughter, Rachel, and the latter's hus- 
band, Lewis Robards. Robards, who seems to have 
been of a violent and jealous disposition, had made in- 
jurious charges against his wife with reference to other 
persons, and he now made such charges with reference 
^o Jackson. Robards had been married in Kentucky 
uttider Virginia law. There was no law of divorce in 
Virginia. Robards, in 1791, petitioned the Legislature 

1 Kendall's Jackson, 90. 

'^ He was appointed district attorney by Washington in 179"" 
ifter the western counties of North Carolina were ceded. 
» Putnam, 351. 
* Putnam, 613 fg. 



JACKSON'S MARRIAGE. 9 

of Virginia to pass an act of divorce in his favor, mak- 
ing an affidavit that his wife had deserted him, and wa.. 
living in adultery with Jackson. The Legislature of Vir- 
ginia passed an act authorizing the Supreme Court of 
Kentucky to try the case with a jury, and, if the facts 
proved to be as alleged, to grant a divorce. Robards 
took no action for two years. September 27, 1793, he 
obtained a divorce from the Court of Quarter Sessions of 
Mercer County, Kentucky. In the mean time, Jackson 
and Mrs. Robards, upon information of the legislative act 
of 1791, which they assumed, or were informed, to be 
an act of divorce, were married at Natchez, in July or 
August, 1791. In January, 1794, upon hearing of the 
action of the Mercer County Court, they were married 
again.^ The circumstances of this marriage were such 
as to provoke scandal at the time, and the scandal, 
which in the case of a more obscure man would have 
died out during thirty years of honorable wedlock, came 
up over and over again during Jackson's career. It 
is plain that Jackson himself was to blame for contract- 
ing a marriage under ambiguous circumstances, and 
for not protecting his own wife's honor by proper pre- 
cautions, such as finding out the exact terms of the act 
of the Legislature of Virginia. He clung to this lady 
until her death, with rare single-mindedness and devo- 
tion, although she was not at all fitted to share the des- 
tiny which befell him. He cherished her memory until 
his own death in a fashion of high romance. An im- 
putation upon her, or a reflection upon the regularity of 
his marriage, always incensed nim more than any other 
personal attack. Having put her in a false position, 

^ Telegraph Extra, p. 33. Report of a Jackson committee ia 
828. 



10 ANDREW JACKSON. 

against which, as man and lawyer, he should have pro- 
tected her, he was afterward led by his education and 
the current ways of thinking in the society about hiiu 
to try to heal the defects in his marriage certificate by 
shooting any man who dared to state the truth, that 
said certificate was irregular. 

Jackson was a member of the convention which met 
at KnoxviEe, January 11, 1796, and framed a Constitu- 
tion for the State of Tennessee. There is a tradition 
that he proposed the name of the river as the name of 
the State.^ This Constitution established a freehold 
qualification for voting and holding the chief offices, and 
declared that the people of Tennessee had an inalien- 
able right to navigate the Mississippi river to its moutk. 
The federalists in Congress opposed the admission of 
Tennessee, because it was a raw frontier community ; 
but it was admitted June 1, 1796. In the autumn Jack- 
son was elected the first federal representative. A year 
later, Blount, one of the senators from Tennessee, hav- 
ing been expelled, Jackson was appointed senator in his 
place. He held this position only until April, 1798, 
when he resigned. 

In December, 1796, therefore, at the age of thirty, 
ackson first came in contact with a society as cultivated 
as that of Philadelphia then was. Except for the brief 
visit to Charleston in 1783, above referred to, he had 
seen no society but that of Western North Carolina and 
Tennessee. He came to Philadelphia just as the presi- 
dential election of 1796 was being decided. Tennessee 
voted for Jefferson, and we may believe that whatever 
Oolitical notions Jackson had were Jeffersonian. He 
identified himself with the opposition to Washington'! 
1 Ramsey, 655. 



IN CONGRESS. 1*1 

administration in the most factious and malicious act 
which it perpetrated, namely, the vote against the ad- 
dress to "Washington at the close of his administration. 
He and Edward Livingston were two out of twelve in 
the House who refused to vote for the address. It is 
not known what Jackson's reasons were. Some refused 
to vote that Washington's administration had been wise. 
Others objected to the hope that Washington's example 
would guide his successors.^ The grounds of objection 
to the administration were Jay's treaty and Hamilton's 
financial measures. In the hght of history the " irrec- 
oncilable " minority which opposed these measures to 
the bitter end must stand condemned. The republican 
party, in 1796, was filled with ill-informed and ill-regu- 
lated sympathy for the French Revolutionists, and, if it 
could have had its way, it would, under the lead of ref- 
ugee editors filled with rancor and ignorant zeal, have 
committed this country to close relations with France, 
and would, by importing Jacobinism into this country, 
have overthrown constitutional hbertyhere. The feder- 
alists, on the other hand, fell into a ^janic about sedition 
and sans-culottism quite similar to that which prevailed 
in England at the same time. Washington's adminis- 
tration had the hard task of maintaining statesman-like 
steadiness and wisdom between these two tendencies, 
and of establishing sound precedents for the details of 
the government under the Constitution. It succeeded 
so well in this task that the wider the perspective of 
history in which it is regarded the more clearly does the 

1 In 1830 Livingston attempted an elaborate defence of his 
rote. He tried to distinguish between. Washington and his ad 
Biinistration, a vicious and untenable distinction. Hunt's Lw 
mgatan, 340. 



12 ANDREW JACKSON. 

moderation, wisdom, and statesmanship of that adminis' 
tration appear. Jay's treaty was a masterpiece of di- 
plomacy, considering the time and the circumstances of 
this country. Those who objected to it could propose 
nothing but a policy of bluster, which the country was 
not prepared to follow up, or the imbecile device of a 
commercial war. Jefferson, in 1806, had a renewal of 
this treaty offered to him. He took the opposite course 
from that which Washington had taken : he rejected it. 
He tried the commercial war; adopting legislation as 
tyrannical as any that ever stained a statute-book in the 
effort to carry it out, subjecting the Union to the sever- 
est strain, accomplishing nothing, and finally leading to 
a fruitless war. 

As for Hamilton's funding scheme, few will now be 
found, whether lawyers, statesmen, or financiers, to ques- 
tion its propriety or the ingenuity and skill with which 
it was carried out. His bank is open to more question. 
He and the other federalists had too much of a feeling 
that they must invent artificial bonds and clamps to hold 
the Union together. They did not sufficiently perceive 
that the Union must consolidate itself in time by the ex- 
perience which the people would win of its inestimable 
value and political necessity. Public credit and Union, 
however, were then, as they always have been, insepa- 
rably bound up with each other. The history of the 
old bank is so obscure that it is difficult to form a judg- 
ment about it. In making any attempt to do so, it is 
necessary to bear in mind the fact that the currencies of 
Europe were nearly all confused and depreciated during 
the existence of this bank, and that this fact acted as a 
protection to save the Bank of the United States from 
Jie ordinary penalties of a certain measure of bad bank 



EARLl POLITICAL OPINIONS. 18 

ing. It is certain that there was a great deal of job- 
bing in the shares of the bank when it was first founded, 
and it very probably over-issued its notes. It did not 
publish statements of its affairs. After 1793 the risks 
of neutral commerce and its gains were both very great. 
American merchants made and lost fortunes by violat- 
ing belligerent regulations. In 1797 and 1798 these 
transactions culminated in a crisis and commercial panic 
here, connected, to judge from all the information we 
can obtain, with the crisis of 1797 and the bank re- 
striction in England. All this trouble was charged, 
without further discussion, to the bank. Every time 
since the formation of the Union, when the strain on the 
national finances has been great, we have been forced 
to have recourse to national banks ; — 1781, 1792, 1816, 
1863. 

History has not, therefore, justified the position on 
these great political questions taken by the party with 
which Jackson allied himself while he was in the na- 
tional legislature. 

In the Senate, Jackson voted, with only two others, 
against a bill to authorize the President to buy or lease 
cannon foundries, in view of possible war with France. 
He voted against a biU to authorize the arming; of mer- 
chant ships, in favor of an embargo, and against a pro- 
viso that the United States should not be bound to 
cancel the Indian title to land on behalf of any State.^ 

We know notliing of any activity or interest shown 
by Jackson in any measure save a claim of Hugh L. 
White, an 1 an act to reimburse Tennessee for expenses 
incurred in an Indian war. The latter case was one 
w^hich has been constantly renewed in the frontier Statea 
1 Annals of Congress ; 5th Congress, I. 485-532. 



14 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Tennessee thought that the federal government was slo-w 
and negligent about defending her against the Indians. 
The federal government thought that Tennessee was 
hasty and aggressive towards the Indians. Jackson 
gained this point on the claim of Tennessee while he 
was in the House, to the gi-eat advantage of his popu- 
larity at home. 

We must infer from his conduct that he did not enjoy 
political life and did not care for it. He certainly did 
not become engaged in it at aU, and he formed no ties 
which he fomid it hard to break at a moment's warn- 
ing. He does not appear to have made much impres- 
sion upon anybody at Philadelphia. GaUatin recalled 
him years afterwards as " a tall, lank, uncouth-looking 
personage, with long locks of hair hanging over his 
face, and a cue down his back tied in an eel-skin ; his 
dress singular, his manners and deportment that of a 
rough backwoodsman." ^ There is, however, ample tes- 
timony that Jackson, later in life, was distinguished and 
elegant in his bearing when he did not affect roughness 
and inelegance, and that he was able to command enco- 
miums upon his manners from the best bred ladies in 
the country. Jefferson said of him, in 1824 : " When I 
was President of the Senate he was a senator, and he 
could never speak on account of the rashness of his feel- 
ings. I have seen him attempt it repeatedly, and as 
often choke with rasre." ^ 

In 1798 Jackson was made judge of the Supreme 
Court of Tennessee. Nothing is known of his conduct 
in this position. No records or decisions of the cour* 
from that period remain. 

1 4 Hildreth, 692. 

2 1 Webster's Corr. 371. 



MAJOR-GENERAL OF MILITIA. 16 

While Jackson was on the bench of the Supreme 
Court, he and ex-Governor Sevier were in feud with each 
other. The origin of the quarrel is obscure and not 
worth picking out from the contradictory backwoods 
gossip in which it probably originated. It is enough to 
notice that the two men were too much alike in temper 
to be i)leased with each other. Sevier was fifty-seven 
years old in 1801, and had been a leading man in the 
country for years. Jackson was only thirty-four in that 
year, and a rising man, whose success interfered with 
Sevier's plans for himself. In 1801 the field officers of 
the militia tried to elect a major-general. Sevier and 
Jackson were the candidates. The election resulted in 
a tie. The governor, Archibald Roane, who had the 
casting vote, threw it for Jackson. Jackson had not 
taken part in the Nickajack expedition, or otherwise 
done military service, so far as is known, except as a 
private in an Indian fight in 1789. On that occasion 
one of his comrades described him as " bold, dashing, 
fearless, and mad upon his enemies." ^ In 1803 Sevier 
was elected governor, and he and the judge-major- 
general drew their weapons on each other when they 
met. P^ach had his faction of adherents, and it was 
only by the strenuous efforts of these persons that they 
were prevented from doiiig violence to each other. Ken- 
dall says that Jackson's popularity was increased by his 
quarrel with Sevier.'-^ In 1804 Jackson resigned his 
position as judge. Parton gives letters of Jackson from 
this period which are astonishingly illiterate for a man 
in his position, even when all the circumstances are 
taken into consideration. Jackson was made a trustee 
i>f the Nashville Academy in 1793.* 

• Putnam, 318. 2 Kendall's Jtfcitson, 108. 

» Putnam, 410. 



16 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Li 1804 Jackson was once more a private citizen, a 
planter, and a store-keeper. Neither politics nor law had 
apparently touched any chord of interest in him. The 
turning point in his career was the vote which made 
him major-general of militia, but the time had not yet 
arrived for him to show that all there was in him could 
be aroused when thea-e were public enemies to be crushed. 
He had been engaged in trade for six years or more 
before 1804, and was now embarrassed. He devoted 
himself to business for several years. 

Mention has already been made of the general abuse 
of credit in the frontier communities. Money is scarce 
because capital is scarce, and is so much needed that 
the community is unwilling to employ any of it in secur- 
ing a value currency. It is true that the people always 
have to pay for a value currency, whether they get it or 
not, but they always cheat themselves with the notion 
that cheaj) money is cheap. Food and fuel are abun- 
dant, but everything else is scarce and hard to get. 
Hoj^es are strong and expectations are great. Each 
man gives his note, which is a draft on the glorious 
future ; that is, every man makes his own currency a"? 
he wants it, and the freedom with which he draws his 
drafts is as unlimited as his own sanguine hopes. The 
hopes are not unfounded, but their fruition ig often de- 
layed. Continued renewals become necessary, and liqu 
dation is put ofiF until no man knows where he stands. 
A general liquidation, with a period of reaction and 
stagnation, therefore, ensues upon any shock to credit. 
In Tennessee, between 1790 and 1798, land was used as 
a kind of currency ; prices were set in it, and it was 
transferred in payment for goods and services. During 
che same period there was a great speculation in ne\f 



FRONTIER CODE. 17 

land throughout the country. Prices of land were in- 
flated, and extravagant notions of the value of raw lan<? 
prevailed.^ After the crisis of 1798 land fell in value all 
over the country, to the ruin of thousands of sjDeculators. 
Values measured in land all collapsed at the same time. 
Jackson was entangled in the system of credit and 
land investments, hat he seems to have worked out of 
his embarrassments during the next three or four years, 
after which he abandoned trade and became a planter 
only. 

Another feature of this early southwestern frontier 
society which excites the surprise and contempt of the 
modern reader is, that store-keepers and farmers and 
lav/yers, who lived by their labor, and had wives and 
cliildren dependent on them, are found constantly quar- 
relling, and in all their quarrels are found mouthing the 
" code of honor." The earlier backwoodsmen quarrelled 
and fought as above described, but they fought with fists 
and knives, on the spur of the moment, as the quarrel 
arose. It was a genteel step in advance, and marked 
a new phase of society, when the code of the pistol came 
into use, and the new higher social caste prided itself 
not a little on being " gentlemen," because they kept up 
in the backwoods a caricature drawn by tradition and 
hearsay from the manners of the swaggerers about the 
courts of France and England a century before. An- 
drew Jackson was a child of this society, an adherent 
of its doctrines, and in his t'irn a propagandist and ex- 
pounder of them. He proved himself a quarrelsome 
man. Instead of making peace he exhausted all the 
chances of conflict which offered themselves. He was 
remarkably genial and gentle when things went on to 

^ On the fallacies about the value of land, see p. 1 84. 
2 



18 ANDREW JACKSON. 

suit liim, and when he was satisfied with his companions. 
He was very chlvah'ous about taking up the cause of 
any one who was unjustly treated and was dependent. 
Yet he was combative and pugnacious and over-ready 
to adjust himself for a hostile collision whenever there 
was any real or fancied occasion. The society in wliich 
he lived developed, by its fashions, some of his natural 
faults. 

In 1795 he fought a duel with a fellow lawyer named 
Avery, over some sparring which had taken place be- 
tween them in a court room, when they were opposing 
counsel. His quarrel with Sevier has been mentioned. 
While on the bench he also quarrelled with liis old friend 
Judge McNairy, on account of an appointment made by 
the judge which injured an old friend of both.^ In 
1806 he fought a duel with Charles Dickinson, who had 
spoken disparagingly of Mrs. Jackson in the course of | 
a long quarrel which involved, besides Jackson, tlu'ee 
or four others, and which was a capital specimen of the i 
quarrels stirred up by the gossip and backbiting of men 
who had too much leisure. This was the real cause of | 
Jackson's anger, although on the surface the quarrel; 
was about a strained and artificial question of veracity; 
eoncerning a bet on a horse-race, and it was inflamed 
by some sarcastic letter-writing in the local newspa])er, 
and by some Insulting epithets. Jackson's friends de- 
clared that there was a plot to drive Jackson out of the 
country. Each man meant to kill the other. They] 
met May 30, 1806. Jackson was wounded by a bullet 
which grazed his breast and weakened him for life. 
Dickinson was mortally wounded, and died the sani* 
evening. 

Kendall's t/oc^son. 105. 



WESTERN FEELING ABOUT LOUISIANA. 19 

Jackson had made the acquaintance of Burr when in 
Congress. In 1805 Burr visited Jackson, and made a 
contract with him for boats for the expedition down the 
MississjiY. i'he people of KentucRj cvl^^2d Tennesbee 
had ahvays regarded it as a vital interest of then^o-s to 
have the free navigation of the Mississippi. So long as 
a foreio-n power held the mouth of the river, plots were 
formed" for separating the trans-Alleghany country from 
the Atlantic States, the strength of which plots lay m the 
fact that the tie of interest which made the basis of a 
I union with the holder of New Orleans was stronger than 
\ the tie of interest which united the two sides of the 
Alleghanies. In 1795 the United States by treaty with 
\ Spain secured a right of deposit at New Orleans for 
^ three years, and these separation plots lost aU then 
strenolh. The "Annual Register" for 1796 (anti-fed- 
eralist) very pertinently pointed out to the Western 
people the advantages tl>^. enjoyed from the Union. 
'^ If they had been ^^-^^^^^ "^*« ^^^ independent republic, 
- , f Tvt^tlrid would have scorned to grant such 

the court ot i) . j • ..if 4. . e 

o nation ^ (i. e., as it granted in the treaty ot 

a tree iiB''"'^ \ ^ o 

1 7QI5^ Spain ceded Louisiana to France by the secret 

^^,aty of St. Ildefonso, October 1, 1800. This treaty 
,jcame known in 1802 after the peace of Amiens. In 
the same year Spain, which still held possession of 
Louisiana, withdrew the right of deposit, and the West- 
ern country was thrown into great excitement. In 1803 
the wdiole matter of the navigation of the Mississippi 
was settled by the purchase of Louisiana by the United 
States, but then a new set of questions was opened. In 
the treaty of 1795 Spain had acknowdedged the parallel 
of 31° as the boundary of Florida from the ^lississippi 
i^/m. /Je^r. (1796) p. 83. 



20 ANDREW JACKSON. 

to the Chattahoochee, although she had been slow about 
surrendering posts held by her north of this line and 
east of the Mississippi. Hence there had been com- 
plaints and bad ^rcl'.xng. iNow a nevr^SS!:''"'' arose as 
to how. "lar Louisiana extended east of the Mississippi 
rr-iver, and this question was of great importance to the 
Gulf territories, because if, by the Louisiana purchase, 
the United States had become owner of the territory east 
as far as the Perdido, then the Gulf coast with the valu- 
able harbor of Mobile was available for the whole South- 
west. Spain denied that Louisiana included anything 
east of the Mississippi except the city of New Orleans'^ 
and the bit of territory south and west of the Iberville 
and the two lakes.^ The territory remained in dispute, 
and the relations between the two countries continued to 
be bad, until Florida was purchased in 1819. In 1802 
a treaty was made vKth Spain for the payment by her 
of claims held by American cVd.ens, but Spain did not 
ratify the treaty until 1818. She l^l her grievances 
also, at first about Miranda's expedition, \»^I afterwards 
about aid to her revolted colonies. In 1810 ih,. Presi- 
dent ordered the Governor of Orleans to occupy ^-^g 
territory as far as the Perdido, and to hold it in peace 
and order, subject to the final decision of the pending 
controversy with Spain. In 1812, Congress, by two 
acts, divided the country east as far as the Perdido into 
two parts, and added one part to Louisiana, wliich was 
admitted as a State, and the other part to the Missis- 
«mpi territory. 

It has seemed convenient to pursue these proceedings 
up to this point, because future reference to them wiL 

I See the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States 
la Foster v. Neilsou, 2 Peters, 253. 



BURR'S SCHEMES. 21 

be necessary. To re>turn now to Burr and liis expe- 
dition : — It will be understood what were the relations 
of the United States to Spain in 1805 and 1806, and 
especially what part of those relations peculiarly affected 
the people of the Southwest at that time. Their col- 
lisions with Spain no longer concerned New Orleans, 
but West Florida and Mobile. It is still a mystery 
what Burr really intended. Napoleon's career had fired 
the imagination of men of a military and romantic turn 
all over the world. It is quite as reasonable an expla- 
nation of Burr's scheme as any other that he was re- 
serving all his chances, and meant to do much or little, 
according to the turn of events, and that he did not 
himself define to himself what he was aiming at. His 
project had an unmistakable kinship with the old plans 
for setting up a republic of the Mississippi, with its 
capital at New Orleans. For that, however, he was ten 
years too late. If he had intended to go on a filibus- 
tering expedition against the Spaniards in Mexico, he 
would have obtained secret aid and sympathy in Ken- 
tucky and Tennessee, and the aid which he did get was 
given under that belief.^ If his scheme was aimed in 
any manner against the United States he could not find 
any aid for it. Since the purchase of Louisiana, and 
the accession to power in the Union of the party to 
which the great majority of the Western people be- 
longed, there was no feeling for Burr to work on.^ 

In 1805 Burr found a cordial welcome and aid. He 
was evidently trying to use Jackson without startlii^ 
him. His letter of March 24. 1806, which Part()n 
gives,* is a very crafty letter, for the purpose of engag- 

1 2 Amer. Reg. ('80/ ) 103, uoto. 

2 Of, Jefferson's Message of Jnnuarv 2'i, 1807. 
8 I Partoii. 313. 



£2 ANDREW JACKSON. 

ing Jackson's name and influence to raise troops for 
his enterprise without defining it. In 1806 Burr was 
again in Nashville. His proceedings then aroused sus- 
picion. It appears that Jackson was mystified. He did 
not know whether he ought to aid Burr or oppose him, 
or aid him secretly and oppose him openly. It seems 
to be very clear, however, that he took sides against 
Burr, if Burr was against the United States. January 
15th he wrote to Campbell, member of the House of 
Representatives, and gave November as the time when 
he first heard of a plan to seize New Orleans, conquer 
Mexico, carry away the Western States, and set up a 
great emjnre.^ He says that he was indignant at being 
tlie dupe of such an enterprise, and that he called Burr 
to account. Burr denounced and ridiculed the notion 
that he intended anything hostile to the United States.^ 
He claimed to have the secret countenance of the Sec- 
retary of War. It seems that Jackson must have been 
convinced afterwards that Burr had been calunmiated 
and unjustly treated. He was at Richmond as a witness 
in Burr's trial. He there made a public speech against 
Jefferson. Jackson had previously been ill-disposed to- 
wards Jefferson becHuse J<.»fferson did not give him the 
.office of Governor of Orleans, for which he had apphr^d. 
Jackson's strong personal contempt and dislike for Gen- 
eral Wilkinson, the commander at New Orleans, who 
appeared as Burr's accuser, also influenced his judg- 
ment.* Throughout his life he was unable to form an 
%^ Telefpa/ih Extra, 481 fg. 
2 When Burr was arrested in Kentucky he gave liis wcv^* ol 
honor to his counsel that he intended nothing against the United 
States. (Kendall's ./acfeon, 120.) 

^ flis hatred of Wilkinson was greatly strengthened after 
irards, but he shows it, and the influence of it, in his letter U 
TampbelL 



SILAS DINSMORE. 23 

anbiassed opinion on a question of fact or law, if he 
had any personal relations of friendship or enmity with 
the parties.^ 

From 1806 to 1811 Jackson appears to have led the 
life of a planter without any noticeable incident. The 
next we hear of him, however, he is committing another 
act of violence. Silas Dinsmore, the Indian agent, re- 
fused to allow persons to pass through the Indian coun- 
tiy with negroes unless they had passports for the ne- 
groes. It was his duty by law to enforce this rule. 
There were complaints that negroes ran away or were 
stolen. His regulation, however, interfered with the 
trade in negroes. This trade was then regarded as dis- 
honorable. It has been charged that Jackson was en- 
gaged in it, and the facts very easily bear that color. 
He passed through the Indian country with some ne- 
groes without hindrance, because Dinsmore was away, 
but he took up the quarrel with the agent, and wrote to 
Campbell to tell the Secretary of War that, if Dinsmore 
was not removed, the people of West Tennessee would 
bmn hun in his own agency. There is a great deal of 
fire in the letter, and not a little about liberty and free 
government.^ Dinsmore was susjDended, and things took 
-uch a turn that he lost his position and was reduced to 
poverty. Parton gives a story of an attempt by Dins- 
more, eight years later, to conciliate Jackson. This at- 
tempt was dignified, yet courteous and becoming. Jack- 
son repelled it in a very brutal and low-bred manner. 
Dinsmore did not know until 1828, when he was a p^ 
titioner at Washington, and the papers were called for, 
fliat Jackson had been the cause of his ruin.* 

* On Burr, see 2 Pickett, chau. xxix. 

« 34 Niles, 110. « 8 Adams. 61. 



24 ANDREW JACKSON. 

The time was now at hand, however, when Andrew 
Jackson would have a chance to show how he could 
Berve his country. At the age of forty-five he had com- 
menced no career. He was a prominent man in hia 
State, hut he had held no political offices in it, and had 
not, so far as we know, been active in any kind of pub- 
lic affairs, although we infer that he had discharged all 
his duties as general of mUitia. He had shown himself 
a faithful friend and an implacable enemy. Every man 
who has this character is self-centred. He need not 
be vain or conceited. Jackson was not vain or con- 
ceited. He never showed any marked selfishness. He 
had a great deal of amour propre. All things which 
interested him at all took on some relation to his person, 
and he engaged his personality in everything which in- 
terested him. An opinion or a prejudice became at 
once for him a personal right and interest. To approve 
it and further it was to win his gratitude and friend- 
ship. To refute or oppose it was to excite his animos- 
ity. There was an intensity and vigor about him which 
showed lack of training. His character had never been 
cultivated by the precepts and discipline of home, or by 
the discipline of a strict and close society, in which 
extravagances of behavior and excess of amour propre 
are promptly and severely restrained by harsh social 
penalties. There is, to be sure, a popular philosophy 
that home breeding and culture are of no importance. 
The fact, however, is not to be gainsaid that true honor, 
trutlifulness, suppression of undue personal feeling, seH 
control, and courtesy are inculcated best, if not exclu- 
isively, by the constant precept and example, in earlies* 
childhood, of high-bred parents and relatives. There 
Ib Dothing on earth which it costs more labor to produce 



STRONG PERSONAL FEELING. 26 

jhan a high-bred man. It is also indisputable that home 
discipline and training ingrain into the character of 
men the most solid and valuable elements, and that, 
without such training, more civilization means better 
food and clothes rather than better men. It is charac- 
teristic of barbarians to put their personality always at 
stake, and not to distinguish the man who disputes their 
notions from the man who violates their rights. It is 
possible, however, that the military virtues may flourish 
where moral and social training are lacking. Jackson 
was unfortunate in that the force of his will and the en- 
ergy of his executive powers had never been disciplined, 
but the outbreak of the second war with England af 
£orded him an arena on which his faults became yrt' 
Inet. 



CHAPTER n. 

IBE CREEK WAR AND THE WAR WITH BNGLANIX 

In no place in the world was Napoleon more ardently 
ftdmired than in the new States of this country. The 
popular enthusiasm about him in those States lasted 
long after he was rated much more nearly at his true 
value everywhere else in the world. The second war 
with England was brought on by the policy, the opin- 
ions, and the feelings of the South and West, repre- 
sented by a young and radical element in the Jeffer* 
sonian party. The opinion in the South and West, 
in 1811 and 1812, was that Napoleon was about ta 
unite the Continent for an attack on England, in which 
he was sure to succeed, and that he would thus become 
master of Europe and the world. It was thought that 
it would be weU to be in at the death on his side. It is 
not necessary to point out in any detail the grounds for 
this opinion which might have been put forward at that 
time, or to show the partial and distorted information 
on which it was founded. It is certain that the persons 
who held this notion were very ill-informed on Euro- 
pean politics, and their opinions were strongly biassed 
by party conflicts at home. For twenty years the do- 
mestic politics of the United States had been organized 
on sympathy with one or the other of the belligerent 
parties in Europe. This country was weak in a military 
point of view, but commercially it would have been a 



JEFFERSON'S POLICY. 27 

great advantage to either belligerent to have free inter- 
course with the United States, and to keep his enemy 
from it. The English policy towards the United States 
was arrogant and insolent. That of France was marked 
by duplicity and chicanery. Party spirit here took pos- 
session of the people to such an extent that the federal- 
ists made apology for any injury from England, no mat- 
ter how insolent, and the democrats could not see any 
wrong in the acts of Napoleon, in spite of the evident 
fact that he was using this country for his own selfish 
purposes while cajoling it with shameless lies. The 
course of the weak neutral between two such belligerents 
was very difficult. 

Washington succeeded in maintaining neutrality by 
Jay's treaty, but at the cost of bitter hostility at home. 
Adams was driven to the verge of war witli France by 
his party, but succeeded in averting war, although his 
party was destroyed by the reaction. Jefferson cannot 
be said to have had any plan. The statesmen of his 
party tried to act on the belligerents by destructive 
measures against domestic commerce and industry, chas- 
tising ourselves, as Plumer said, with scorpions, in order 
to beat the enemy with whips. They tried one measure 
after another. No measure had a rational oripin or 
effect calculated and adjusted to the circumstances of 
ne case. Each was a new blunder. The republican 
- ilers in France in 1792 could do notliing^ better for a 
man who claimed protection from the Jacobin mobs 
than to put him in prison, so that the mob could not get 
at him. Jefferson's embargo offelred the same kind of 
protection to American shipping. Before the embargo, 
merchants and ship-owners went to sea at great risk of 
eapture and destruction ; after it, they stayed at homf) 



28 ANDREW JAti^SON. 

and were sure of ruin. Jefferson has remained a popu* 
lar idol, and has never been held to the responsibility 
which belonged to him for his measures. The alien and 
sedition laws were not nearly so unjust and tyrannical ^ 
as the laws for enforcing the embargo, and they did not 
touch one man where the embargo laws touched hun- 
dreds. The commercial war was a device which, if it 
had been sensible and practical, would have attained 
national ends by sacrificing one group of interests and 
laying a much inferior burden on others. New England 
was denounced for want of patriotism because it re- 
sisted the use of its interests for national purposes, but 
as soon as the secondary effects of the embargo on agri- 
culture began to be felt, the agricultural States raised 
a cry which overthrew the device. Yet criticisms which 
are justified by the most conclusive testimony of history 
fall harmlessly from Jefferson's armor of popular plati- 
tudes and democratic sentiments. He showed the traits 
wliich we call womanish. He took counsel of his feel- 
ings and imagination ; he planned measures like the 
embargo, whose scope and effect he did not understand. 
He was fiery when deciding initiatory steps, like the re- 
jection of the EngUsh treaty ; vacillating and timid 
when he had to adopt measures for going forward in 
the path which he had chosen. His diplomacy, besides , 
being open to the charge that it was irregular and un- 
usual, was transparent and easily turned to ridicule. It 
was a diplomacy without lines of reserve or alternatives, 
80 that, in a certain very possible contingency it had no 
course open to it. Jefferson finally dropped the reins of 
government in despair, and, on a theory which would 

^ See Carey's Olive Branch, page 50, for the opinion of a dena 
ocrat on these laws after party spirit had cooled down. 



CAUSES OF THE SECOND WAR. 'J9 

make each presidential term last for three years and 
eight months, with an interregnum of four months, he 
left the task to his successor. He had succeeded in 
keeping out of war with either belligerent, but he had 
shaken the Union to its foundations. The extremists in 
the democratic party now came forward, and began to 
push Madison into a war with England, as the extreme 
federalists had pushed Adams into war with France. 
Madison, therefore, had to inherit the consequences of 
Jefferson's policy. An adherent of Jefferson describes 
the bequest as follows : " Jefferson's honest experiment, 
bequeathed to Madison, to govern without army or 
navy, and resist foreign enemies without war, proved 
total failures, more costly than war and much more 
odious to the people, and dangerous to the Union." ^ 

The young and radical democrats, amongst whom 
Clay was prominent, were restive under the predomi- 
nance of the older generation of democrats of revolu- 
tionary fame, and their favorites. The young democrats 
wanted to come forward without the patronage of the 
Virginia leaders. The presidential election of 1812 was 
the immediate occasion of their action. The Jefferso- 
nian policy had produced irritation at home and humili- 
ation abroad. The natural consequence was a strong 
War spirit. It was believed that the country would not 

eally be engaged in military operations, because Eng- 
land would be fully occupied in Europe ; that Canada 
could be conquered ; that we should co ne in on the win- 
ning side at the catastrophe of the great conflict in 
Europe ; and that all this would be verj popular in the 
South and West. Madison was compelled greatly against 

lis will to yield to the war party, as a condition of his 
1 IngersoU, 70 : — grammar of the onginal. 



k 



BO ANDREW JACKSON. 

reelection.^ England pointed out that Naj/oleon had 
not complied with the terms of the American demands 
on both belligerents, but had falsified a date and told a 
lie. She withdrew her orders in council, and there re- 
mained only impressment as the ostensible cause of war. 
September 12, 1812, Admiral Warren offered an armis- 
tice. Madison refused it unless the practice of impress- 
ment was suspended. Warren had not power to agree 
to this. For purposes of redress the war was, tlierefore, 
unnecessary, and the United States was duped into it by 
Nai)oleon, so far as its avowed causes were concerned.^ 

General Jackson offered his services, with those of 
2,500 volunteers, as soon as he heard of the declaration 
of war. January 7, 1813, he set out under orders for 
New Orleans, an attack on that place being regarded as 
a probable movement of the enemy. Jackson threw 
himself into the business with all his might, and at once 
disi)layed activity, vigilance, and skill. His letter to the 
Secretary of War when he started shows with what en- 
thusiasm he set to work. He assured the Secretary 
that his men had no " constitutional scruples," but 
would, if so directed, plant the American eagle on the 
walls of IMobile, Pensacola, and St. Augustine. In 
March he was at Natchez engaged in organizing his 
force, and waiting for orders. While there he had a 
quarrel with General Wilkinson on a question of rank. 
Thomas H. Benton, who was serving under Jackson, 
thought Jackson wrong on the j^oint in question. This 
produced discord between him and Jackson. 

Suddenly Jackson received orders to dismiss hii 
^oops, as it did not api)ear that the enemy were intend 

^ 1 Statesman's Manual. 348. 1 Colton's Clay, 161. 

* See 1 Gallatin's Writings, 517 ; 2 ditto, 196, 211, 499. 



QUARRKL WITH THE BENT0N8. 3) 

mg to attack New Orleans. He was, of course, greatly 
chagrined at this order. He was also enraged at the 
idea of disbanding his men, without pay or rations, five 
hundred miles from home, to find their way back as 
best they could. A subsequent order repaired part of 
this error by ordering pay and rations, but Jackson hired 
transportation on his own responsibility, and marched 
his men home in a body. Thomas H. Benton, in June 
following, succeeded in obtaining from the federal au- 
thorities reimbursement of the expenses which Jackson 
had incurred. 

This act of Benton would perhaps have extinguished 
the memory of the trouble about rank at Natchez, but, 
in the mean time, Jackson had stood second to another 
man in a duel with Jesse Benton, brother of Thomas. 
A feud was speedily created out of this by the gossip 
and tale-bearing already described. Up to this time 
Jackson had had as many enemies as friends, but his 
course in leading home the troops from Natchez had 
made him very popular, and his conduct in acting as 
second in the duel, although chivalrous in one point of 
view, was overbearing in another. He tlu'eatened to 
horsewhip Thomas Benton, and a rencontre between 
him and the two brothers took place in a tavern at 
Nashville. Blows and shots were exchanged, and Jack- 
son came away with a ball in his shoulder, which he car- 
ried for twenty years. This affair occurred September 
i, 1813. 

The great Indian chief Tecumseb had been trying for 

years to unite all the red men against the whites.* 

There would have been an Indian war if there had 

»een no war with England, out the latter war seemed 

^ Drake's Tecumseh. 



82 AADREW JACKSON. 

to be Tecumseh's opportunity. Among the southwest* 
ern Indians he found acceptance only with the Creeks, 
who were ah-eady on the verge of civil war, because 
some wanted to adopt civilized life, and others refused.' 
The latter became the war party, under Weatherford, 
a very able half-breed chief. The first outbreak in the 
Southwest, although there had been some earlier hos- 
tilities, was the massacre of the garrison and refugees 
at F'ort Miins, at the junction of the Alabama and Tom- 
bigbee rivers, August 30, 1813. There were 553 per- 
sons in the fort, of whom only five or six escaped.^ If 
Tecumseh had lived, and if the English had been able 
to give their attention to an alliance with him, he would 
have united the Indians from the Lakes to the Gulf, 
and the " young democrats " would have found out what 
sort of a business it may be to start a war for party 
effect. The result of the massacre at Fort Mims was 
that Alabama was almost abandoned by whites. Terror 
and desire for revenge took possession of Georgia and 
Tennessee. Sej^tember 25th the Tennessee Legislature 
voted to raise men and money to aid the people of the 
Mississippi territory against the Creeks. Jackson was 
still confined to liis bed by the wound which Benton had 
given him. He and Cocke were the two major-generals 
of the militia of Tennessee. They concerted measures. 
As soon as he possibly could, Jackson took the field. 
Georgia had a force in the field under General Floyd. 
General Claiborne was acting at the head of troops from 
Louisiana and Mississippi This Indian war had a 
ocal character and was outside the federal operations 
Jthough in the end it had a great effect upon, them 

' Folio State Papers, 1 Indian Affairs, 845 fg, 
« 2 Pickett, 266. 



r 



ANNOYANCES IN THE FIELD. 33 

Up to this time little had been known at Washington of 
Jackson, save that he had been a friend of Burr, an 
enemy of Jefferson, and that he had just acted in a 
somewhat insuuordinate manner at Natchez, reflecting 
on the administration and winning popularity for him- 
eelf. 

The Creek war ^ was remarkable for three thino-s : 
(1) the quarrels between the generals, and the want of 
concert of action ; (2) lack of provisions ; (3) insubor- 
dination in the ranks. Partly on account of the lack 
of provisions, for which he blamed General Cocke (aa 
it appears, unjustly), Jackson fell into a bitter quarrel 
with his colleague and junior officer. The lack of pro- 
visions, and consequent suffering of the men, was one 
cause of insubordination in the ranks, but the chief 
cause was differences as to the term of enlistment. The 
enlistment was generally for thi*ee months, and constant 
recruiting was necessary to keep up the army m the 
field. A great deal of nonsense has been wiitten and 
spoken about pioneer troops. Such troops were always 
insubordinate ^ and homesick, and very dependent for 
success on enthusiasm for their leader and a prosperous 
course of affairs. For these reasons the character of 
the commander was all-important to such an army. On 
three occasions Jackson had to use one part of his army 
to prevent another part from marching home, he and 
they differing on the construction of the terms of enhst- 
nient. He showed veiy strong qualities under these 
trying circumstances. He endured delay with impa- 
lence, but with fortitude, and without a suggestion of 

See Eaton's Jackson and Pickett's Alabama. 
2 See descriptions of Kentucky militis^ in Kendall's Autohiog 
\iphy, 124, 131. 

i 



34 ANDREW JACKSON. 

ftbaiidoning tlie enteri3rise,* although he was in wretched 
health all the time. He managed his soldiers with en« 
ergy and tact. He understood their dispositions. He 
knew how to be severe with them without bringing them 
to open revolt, and he knew how to make the most effi- 
cacious appeals to them. 

In the conduct of the movements against the enemy 
his energy was very remarkable. So long as there waa 
an enemy unsubdued Jackson could not rest, and could 
not give heed to anytliing else. Obstacles wliich lay in 
the way between him and such unsubdued enemy were 
not allowed to deter him. This restless and absorb- 
ing determination to reach and crush anything which 
was hostile was one of the most marked traits in Jack- 
son's character. It appeared in all his military opera- 
tions, and he carried it afterwards into his civil activity. 
He succeeded in his military movements. This gave 
him the confidence and adherence of his men. The 
young men of the State then hastened to enlist with him, 
and his ranks were kept well filled, because one who 
had fought a campaign with him, and had a story to tell, 
became a hero in the settlement. Jackson's military 
career and his popularity thus rapidly acquired mo- 
-mentum from all the circumstances of the case and all 
the forces at work. He was then able to enforce disci- 
pline and obedience, by measures which, as it seems, no 
other frontier commander would have dared to use. 

On the 14th of March, 1814, he ordered John Wood 
to be shot for insubordination and assault on an officer 
This was the first of the acts of severity committed by 

1 To Governor Blount, who proposed that he should retire from 
Ae expedition, Jacksou wrote a strenuous remonstrance, even av 
admonition. (Eaton's Jackson, 101.) 



EXECUTION OF WOOD. 35 

Jackson as a commanding officer, which were brought 
up against him in the presidential campaigns. Wood 
was technically guilty. He acted just as any man in- 
the frontier army, taught to reverence nobody and sub- 
mit to no authority, would have acted under the cir- 
cumstances. If it had not been for the great need of 
enforcing discipline, extenuating circumstances which 
existed would have demanded a mitigation of the sen- 
tence. Party newspa})ers during a presidential cam- 
paign are not a fair court of appeal to review the acts 
which a military connnander in the field may think 
necessary to maintain discipline. Jackson showed in 
tliis case that he was not afraid to do his duty, and that 
he would not sacrifice the public service to curry popu- 
lai'ity. 

At the end of March Jackson destroyed a body of 
the Creeks at Tohopeka, or Horse-Shoe Bend, in the 
northeast corner of the present Tallapoosa County, Ala- 
bama. With the least possible delay he pushed on to the 
last refuge of the Creeks, the Hickory Ground, at the 
confluence of the Coosa and Tallapoosa, and the Holy 
Ground a few miles distant. The medicine men, ap- 
pealing, to the superstition of the Indians, had taught 
them to believe that no white man could tread the latter 
ground and live. In April the remnant of the Creeks 
surrendered or fled to Florida, overcome as much by 
the impetuous and relentless character of the campaign 
against them as by actual blows. Fort Jackson was 
built on the Hickory Ground. The march down through 
Alabama was a great achievement, considering the cir-. 
cumstances of the country at the time. Major-General 
Thomas Pinckney, of the regular army, came to Fort 
Ta^pkson, April 20th, and took command. He gave t<i 



S6 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Jackson's acliievements the most generous recognition 
both on the spot and in his reports. April 21, 1814 
the West Tennessee militia were dismissed, and they 
marched home. 

The Creek campaign lasted only seven months. In 
itself considered, it was by no means an important In- 
dian war, but in its connection with other military 
movements it was very important. Tecumseh had been 
killed at the battle of the Thames in Canada, October 
5, 1813. His scheme of a race war died with him. 
The Creek campaign put an end to any danger of hos- 
tilities from the southwestern Indians, in alliance either 
with other Indians or with the English. It was hence- 
forth possible to plan military operations and pass 
through the Indian territory without regard to the dis- 
position of the Indians. This state of things had been 
brought about very summarily, while military events 
elsewhere had been discouraging. 

This campaign, therefore, was the beginning of Jack- 
eon's fame and popularity, and from it dates his career. 
He was forty-seven years old. On the 31st of May he 
>\'as appointed a major-general in the army of the United 
States, and was given command of the department of 
the South. He established his headquarters at Mobile 
in August, 1814. That town had been occupied by 
Wilkinson, April 13, 1813. There were fears of an at- 
tack either on Mobile or New Orleans. English forces 
appeared, and took post at Pensacola. Jackson natu 
rally desired to attack the enemy where he found him 
The relations of the parties must be borne in mind. 
Spain was a neutral and owned Florida, but the bounr 
iaries of Florida were in dispute between Spain and tht 
^ See page 20 



CAPTURE OF PEN SAC OLA. 37 

United States. Jackson would not have been a South- 
western man if he had not felt strongly about that 
disjDute. We have seen^ that one of Jackson's first 
thoughts when war with England broke out, was that 
Florida might be conquered. Now Spain allowed Eng- 
land to use Florida as a base of o2)erations. Jackson 
wrote to Washington for leave to attack Pensacola. Ii 
did not suit his temper to sit still under a great anxiety 
as to wliich spot on a long coast might be chosen by the 
enemy as the point of attack. The Secretary of War 
(Armstrong) rejjlied to Jackson's apj)lication that it 
was necessary, before invading SjDanish territory, to 
know certainly whether SjDain voluntarily yielded the 
use of her territory to England. This letter did not 
reach Jackson until the war was over. All Jackson's 
letters of this period to the state and federal authori- 
ties have a tone of lecturing which gives deep insight 
into the character of the man. He meant no disre- 
spect, but the case seemed so clear to him that he set 
it forth with an unconscious directness of language. 

Jackson had but a very small force at Mobile, very 
inadequately provided with any of the necessaries of war. 
The government at Washington was falling to pieces. 
On the 24th of August the English captured Washing- 
ton and burned the public buildings. Jackson could not 
obtain either assistance or orders. September 14th the 
English attacked Fort Bowyer, on Mobile Poitit, and 
were repulsed with energy and good fortune. They 
retired to Pensacola. Jackson advanced against Pen- 
sacola without orders from Washington, and reached 
that place November 6th, irith o,000 men. He easily 
Itormed the town. The Spaniards surrendered the forte 
1 See page 30. 



S8 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Dear the town. Tlie English blew up the fort at Bai> 
rancas and departed.^ .lackson immediately returned 
to Mobile, fearing a new attack there. This energetic ac- 
tion against Pensacola, which a timid conunander would 
have hesitated to take, although the propriety of it could 
not be seriously questioned, was the second great step 
in the war in the Southwest. If the Creeks had not 
been subdued, Mobile could not have been defended. 
If Pensacola had not been ca2)tured, New Orleans could 
not have been defended three months later. Jackson 
had extraordinary luck. All the accidents fell out in his 
favor, and all contributed to his final success. 

On the 2d of December, 1814, Jackson reached New 
Orleans, where he expected the next blow to fall. Noth- 
ing had been done there to prepare for defence, and no 
suppHes were there, — not even arms. Edward Liv- 
ingston and a Frenchman named Louaillier were alone 
active in preparing even the minds of the people for 
defence. Jackson declared martial law as a means of 
impressing soldiers and sailors, and began preparations 
for defending the city, in spite of discouragements and 
the lack of all i)roper means. He seemed to be pos- 
sessed by a kind of frenzy or fanaticism at the idea 
of any one '' invading " American territory. As soon 
as he heard of the landing effected by the English 
after they had destroyed the flotilla on the lakes, he set 
out to meet them Avith such forces as he had. He ar- 
rested their advance as far from the city as possible, 
pushed on his pre})arations with redoubled energy and 
activity, and was indefatigable in devising and combin- 
.ng means of defence. '' The energy manifested hy 
General Jackson spread, as it were, by contagion, an<l 
^ 7 Niles, 271. Latour, 44 fg. 



BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS. 39 

eommunicatecl itself to the whole army. I shall add, 
that there was nothing which those who composed it did 
not feel themselves capable of performing, if he ordered 
it to be done. It was enough that he expressed a wish, 
or threw out the slightest intimation, and immediately 
a crowd of volunteers offered themselves to carry his 
views into execution." ^ He made the utmost of all tlie 
means he possessed and devised substitutes for what he 
lacked. Thus, with every day that passed, his position 
became stronger. The enemy were veteran troops, 
amply provided with all the best appliances of war, but, 
as it appears, not well commanded. An energetic ad- 
vance on their part, at the first moment, would have won 
the city. It was, however, Jackson who made the en- 
ergetic advance at the first moment, and he never let 
tliem get any farther. The story of the battle which 
took place is a strange one. Everything fell out favor- 
ably for Jackson as if by magic. The Elnglish lost their 
way, fired into each other, adoj^ted foolish rumors, dis- 
obeyed orders, neglected precautions. The two parties 
built redoubts out of the same mud, and cannonaded 
each other all day through a dense smoke. At night the 
American works were hardly damaged, while the Eng- 
lish works were battered to pieces and the cannon dis- 
mounted. On the 8th of January, 1815, the English 
made their grand assault on Jackson's works. Latour 
says that they were over-confident, and that they disre- 
garded the obstacles. They were repulsed with great 
Blaughter. Their loss in general and field officers was 
especially remarkable. Onl^ on thfc west bank of the 
river did the English gain some advantage. General 
Jackson said then — and he aiA^ays afterwards refused 
^ Latour, Preface, p. 17. 



40 ANDREW JACKSON. 

to withdraw the assertion, in spite of the remonstrances 
of General Adair, and in spite of a long controversy -^ 
that the Kentucky troops on the west side " ingloriously 
fled." ^ This is worth noticing only because it shows 
that Jackson would not recede from what he thought 
true, either to soothe wounded pride or to win popular- 
ity. If the English had had a little larger force on the 
west side, they would have won that position, and would 
have more than counterbalanced all Jackson's success 
on the east bank, for the batteries on the west bank 
could easily have been made to command Jackson's 
camp and works. The English withdrew after their 
repulse. Their loss, January 8th, was over 2,000 killed, 
wounded, and missing ; Jackson's was seven killed and 
six wounded.^ The treaty o|^ peace had been signed at 
Ghent December 24, 1814, two weeks before the battle 
took place. Before the English attempted any further 
operations in Louisiana, the news of the peace was re- 
ceived. They captured Fort Bowyer in a second attack, 
February 12, 1815. 

A brilliant victory was the last thing any one in the 
United States had expected to hear of from New Or- 
leans. The expectations under which the war had been 
undertaken had all been disappointed. Canada had not 
been conquered. The United States had ranged itself 
with the defeated, and not with the successful party in 
Europe. The war had been more than nominal, but 
on land it had been anything but glorious. Only on tlie 
sea did the few frigates which the federalists had built, 
while they controlled the federal government, vindicate 

1 7 Niles, 373. Latour, App. 52. Latour makes an apologr 
l*r theKentuckians, p. 174. 

2 L.ataur, App. 55, 153. 



THE WAR AND THE WAR PARTY. 41 

:he national honor by brilliant successes. Jefferson's 
a priori navy of gunboats had disappeared and been for- 
gotten. The war party had looked upon Gallatin as 
their financier. He had told them in 1809 that war 
could be carried on without taxes, but they had squan- 
dered, against his remonstrances, resources on which 
he relied when he so declared, and they had refused to 
re-charter the bank as he desired. When the war broke 
out he went out to Russia as one of the peace commis- 
sioners. There was no one competent to succeed him, 
and the democrats never forgave him for the embar- 
rassments which they suffered in trjring to manage the 
finances.^ He did not resign his secretaryship, bu 
was superseded February 9, 1814. Good democrats 
thought that sending him abroad was a repetition of 
the course they had blamed in Jay's case.^ It certainly 
was a very strange policy to leave the treasuiy without 
a regular head in war-time. The banks suspended, the 
currency fell into confusion, heavy taxation became nec- 
essary, and the public finances were brought to the verge 
of bankiuptcy. The party which had made such an 
outcry about direct taxes, national bank, and eight per 
cent loans imitated Hamilton's system of direct taxes 
and excise throughout. They were discussing a big 
paper-money bank on the day (February 13th) when 
news of the Treaty of Ghent reached Washington, and 
they would have adopted it if the war had continued. 
They sold six per cent bonds for eighty and eighty -five 
in a currency of bank rags depreciated twenty or twenty- 
five per cent. A grand crnscription bill was also ir 
preparation, and the Hartford convention had just ad 

^ See Ingersoll, 74. 

a Carry's Olim Branch. 63. 



42 ANDREW JACKSON, 

journed, having done much or little according as peace 
or war might make it expedient to put one sense oi 
another on ambiguous phrases. When Napoleon fell, 
and England was left free to devote her attention to 
this country as her only remaining foe, the war took on 
a new aspect. June 13, 1814, Gallatin wrote home that 
a large force was fitting out in England against Amer- 
ica. Admiral Cochrane wi'ote to Monroe that he had 
orders to devastate the coasts of the United States. 
The first conditions of peace talked of by England in- 
volved cession of territory in Michigan and the Ohio 
territory, as well as concessions of trading privileges 
and navigation of the Mississi2:>pi, — terras which could 
not be accepted until after a great deal more hard 
fighting. The feeling here in the autumn of 1814 was 
one of deep despondency and gloom. ^ The victory of 
New Orleans was the cause of boundless delight, espec- 
ially because the news of it reached the North at just 
about the same time as the news of peace, and there 
was no anxiety about the future to mar the exultation. 
The victory was a great consolation to the national 
pride, which had been sorely wounded by military fail- 
ures, and by the capture of Washington. The power 
of Great Britain had been met and repulsed when put 
forth at its best, and when the American resources 
were scanty and poor. To the administration and the 
war party the victory was political salvation, The pub- 
lic plainly saw, however, that the federal administration 
had done nothing for the victory. Jackson had been 

1 See Niles's Register, vol. 7 ; Pres. Message, 1814 ; I Goodrich 
Letter XXX ; Carey's Olive Branch, preface 4th and 6th ed. In 
gersoll finds room for the opinion that the prospects for 1815 werj 
Krighk. 



RESULTS OF THE WAR. 43 

the soul of the defence from the beginning-, and to his 
energy and perseverance success was due. He therefore 
got all the credit of it, and the administration was only 
too glad to join in the plaudits, since attention was 
thereby diverted from its blunders and failure. These 
facts explain Jackson's popularity. In the space of 
time between September, 1813, and January, 1815, he 
had passed from the status of an obscure Tennessee 
planter to that of the most distinguished and popular 
man in the country. 

In the treaty of peace nothing was said about im- 
pressment, the " principle " of whicli was what the 
United States had been striving about ever since 1806, 
and which was the only cause of the war. The war 
was therefore entirely fruitless as to the causes which 
were alleged for it at the outset. Nevertheless, the 
second war with England was a great and beneficial 
event in our historv. What the course of things mioht 
have been, if a v/iser statesmanship had adopted Monroe 
and Pinkney's treaty, and pursued a steady course of 
peace and industrial growth, so far as the state of the 
world would allow, is a matter of speculation ; but, in 
the course which things did take, there are especial and 
valuable features of our history which are to be traced 
to the second w^ar with England as their origin. The 
discontent of New England faded away at once, and 
there was a stronger feeling of nationality and confi- 
dence throughout the country than there ever had been 
before.^ From that time on the Union had less of the 
character of a temporary experiment. The country had 
also v/on respect abroad, and was r3cognized in the 
family of nations as it had not beer^ oefore. From 1789 

1 Gallatin expressed this opinion. I Gallatin's Writings, 700. 

t4L 0, 



<-Mt 



r-c^ 



44 ANDREW JACKSON. 

to 1815 the European nations were absorbed by Euro* 
pean politics and war. At the end of this period they 
turned to find that a new natiojt had begun to grow up 
on the Western continent. The Americans had shown 
that tliey could build ships of war, and sail them, and 
fight them, on an equal footing. To the military states 
of Europe this was a fact which inspired respect. 

To return to our more immediate subject : There had 
been another dispute about terms of enlistment at Fort 
Jackson in September, 1814. About 200 men, some of 
whom broke open 'a store-house to get supplies, marched 
home without the consent of their commanding officer. 
Most of them came back : some being compelled, others 
thinking better of it, and others after assuaging their 
homesickness. Six were put under arrest and tried by 
court-martial. They were condemned to death, and, 
by Jackson's orders, were executed at Mobile, February 
21, 1815.^ The question of law involved was a difficult 
one. The men took the risk of acting on their own 
view of that question, while they were under military 
law. Jackson's reason for his course was to enforce 
discipline. There had never been such discipline in an 
American army,^ least of all in the West ; but that was 
just his contention. He said that there must be disci- 
pline, and that this was the only way to establish it. 
Some of the cases were very sad, and a less penalty 
would probably have accomplished all the purpose. 

After the English departed from New Orleans Jack- 
son relaxed none of his vigilance, but continued to 
itrengthen liis force by all the means at his command, 

^ The documents are given in 34 Niles, 55. 
2 Jackson's apologists made much of an alleged parallel cast 
andei Washington. 



MARTIAL LAW AT NEW ORLEANS. 45 

tn this he acted like a good and wise commander, •vrho 
did not mean to be caught. He could not assume that 
the enemy would not make another attack, and he knew 
nothing yet of the peace. He maintained the attitude 
of alert preparation until he was sure that the war was 
at an end. He maintained martial law in the city, and 
he administered it with rigor. The possession of abso- 
lute and arbitrary power did not have a good effect on 
him. The exhilaration and self-confidence of success 
and flattery affected his acts. It appears that he did not 
thorougldy respect all the inhabitants of the city. They 
were a motley crowd, and he thought that some of them 
were not ready to do what he thought they ought to do 
to defend the city.^ Any one who would not go to the 
last extreme for that object could count on Jackson's 
contempt. He meant to hold the city in such shape that 
he could make every man in it contribute to its defence, 
if the occasion should arise. Frenchmen had certain 
privileges for twelve years, under the treaty of 1803. 
They had generally cooperated in the defence, but, after 
the English departed, they sought certificates of nation- 
ality in order to secure the privileges and exemptions to 
which they were entitled. To Jackson this seemed like 
shirking a share of the common burdens. Livingston, 
who had been on an embassy to the English fleet, 
brought back news on the 18th of February ^ of the 
peace. Jackson would not alter his attitude or proceed 
ings on account of this intelligence, which came through 

1 See his defence in reply to Hall's writ, 8 Niles, 246. 

2 Latour says on the 10th. This date is important for the 
5uc^ttion whether Jackson knew, at leh.st unofficially, liefore he 
illowed the six militiamen to be executed, that peace had been 
made. 



16 ANDREW JACKSON. 

the enemy. On February 28th he ordered all who had 
certificates of French nationality to go to Baton Rouge 
before March 3d, on the ground that he would have no 
man in the city who was not bound to help defend it. 
March 8th he suspended this order, except as to the 
French consul. March 3d the same Louaillier who 
had been conspicuous as an advocate of energetic de- 
fence, wrote an article for a local paper, criticising the 
order of February 28th, and urging that martial law 
should be abolished. The editor, when called to ac- 
count for this article, gave up his contributor. Louail- 
lier was arrested March 5th. Judge Hall, of the United 
States District Court, issued a writ of habeas corpus for 
him. Jackson received news of the peace from Wash- 
ington on March 6th. but by some blunder the courier 
did not bring tlie document containing the official notifi- 
cation. On that day Jackson convened a court-martial 
to try Louaillier. He sent an officer to arrest Judge 
Hall, and to obtain from the clerk of the court the orig- 
inal writ of habeas corpus. On the 8th he disbanded 
the militia. The court-martial struck out all the charoes 
against Louaillier except one (illegal and improper con- 
duct), for want of jurisdiction, and acquitted him on 
that. Jackson disapproved of this finding, and defended 
his own proceedings. On the 11th of March he sent 
Hall four miles out of the city and released him. Lou- 
aillier was kept in prison until the official document an- 
nouncing the ])eace was received. On the 22d of March 
the United States District Court ordered Jackson to 
ehow cause why an attachment should not issue against 
aim for contempt of court in wresting an original docu- 
iient from the court, disobeying the writ of habeas jor- 
pus, and imprisoning the judge. Jackson refused U 



JACKSON'S FINE. 47 

answer save by a general vindication of his proceedings. 
This the judge refused to hear, and fined him $1,000.* 
In 1842 Tyler recommended Congress to refund this 
fine without reflecting on the court. J. Q. Adams said 
in a speech, January 6, 1843, that this was auctioneering 
for the presidency, all the factions desiring Jackson's 
Bupport.^ In 1844 Congress refunded the fine with 
interest, — total $2,700. In a letter to L. F. Linn, 
March 14, 1842,^ Jackson refers to the fine as having 
been laid because he declared martial law. 

In this incident Jackson displayed some of the faults 
of which he afterwards showed many instances. He 
spoiled his military success by this unnecessary collision 
with the civil authority. He proved himself wrong- 
headed and persistent in a course in which every step 
would have warned him of his error, if he had been 
willing to learn. Being committed by his first passion- 
ate and hasty step, he was determined to push through 
on the course he had adopted. He knew to a moral 
certainty from the 6th of March that the war was at an 
end. All these mischievous proceedings took place on 
and after that date. A very little concession and good 
will at any time would have avoided the whole trouble, 
but Jackson acted as if he was determined to grind out 
ef the opposing opinions all the friction of which they 
were capable. 

April 12th, Dallas, acting Secretary of War, wrote a 

1 Report of a committee of the House of Representatives; 64 
Niles, 61 (1843). Cf. the account in 8 Niles, 246, and Judge 
Hail's response, BiV/. 272 (1815). 

2 63 Niles, 312. 

« 62 Niles, 212. For Jackson's own story of the fine, see 62 
Niles, 326. 



is ANDREW JACKSON. 

dispatch to Jackson, expressing the President's "sur* 
prise and solicitude," and asking for explanations of the 
proceedings of which reports had reached Washington ; 
but as the matter was all past and dead, and no one 
desired to mar the exultation of the public or the per- 
sonal satisfaction of Jackson, it was allowed to drop. 

In the autumn of 1815 Jackson was in Washington ; 
conferring with the War Department about the peace 
footing of the army. In the spring of 1816 he was at 
New Orleans on business of his military department. 



CHAPTER in. 

JACKSON IN FLORIDA. 

Andrew Jackson took no important part in the elee* 
tion of 1816. He had favored Monroe in 1808, and be 
preferred him to the other candidates in 1816. Craw- 
ford was, at this time, Jackson's pet dislike. The 
reason for this was that Crawford, as Secretary of War, 
had modified Jackson's treaty with the Creeks, about 
which the Cherokees, deeming the terms unjust to them, 
had appealed to the President. Jackson resumed the 
negotiation, and bought again the lands ceded before. 
As the people of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama were 
interested in the cession, Jackson, by re-obtaining it 
after it had been given back, greatly increased liis pop- 
ularity.^ 

In October, 1816, a letter, signed by Jackson, was ad- 
dressed to Monroe, in anticipation of his election to the 
presidency, urging the appointment of Wm. Drayton, 
of South Carolina, as Secretary of War. Wm. B. Lewis, 
Jackson's neighbor and confidential friend, husband of 
one of JNIi's. Jackson's nieces, wrote this letter. As Par- 
ton says, one has no trouble in distinguishing those let- 
ters signed Jackson which have been copied and revised 
by I>ems, Lee, Livingston, and others, from those wliich 
have not been tlu'ough that process.^ It is difficult to 

1 11 Niles, 143. 

* A specimen of an unpolished Jackson letter may be Men ia 
the extract on page 384. 
4 



50 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Bee the significance of this letter and others which Jack- 
Bon wrote during this Avinter (1816-17), unless he waa 
being used to advance an intrigue on behalf of Drayton. 
Drayton had been a federahst. He belonged to the 
South Carolina aristocracy. No ties of any kind are 
known to have existed between him and Jackson, either 
before or after this time. Jackson said (in 1824) that 
he did not know Drayton in 1816.^ Drayton was not 
a))pointed. These well-composed letters failed entirely 
of their immediate object ; and they reposed in obscu- 
rity for seven years. Lewis was an astonishingly far- 
sighted man. We shall see abundant proofs, hereafter, 
of his power to put down a stake where he foresaw that 
it would be needed a little later, but it does not seem 
credible that he can have foreseen and prepared for the 
ultimate purpose which these letters served. In the 
course of his argument on behalf of Drayton, Jackson 
was led (in the letters) to discuss the general theory of 
appointments, and to urge Monroe to abandon the pro- 
scription of the federalists, to appoint them to office, 
and to promote reconciliation and good will. In the 
same letter he declared that he would have hung the 
leaders of the Hartford convention, if he had been in 
command in the eastern department in 1815. In 1823 
and 1824 the letters were used with great effect to draw 
federalists to the support of Jackson. They were de- 
lighted Avith the tone and sentiment of them,^ although 
a few winced at the reference to the Hartford conven- 
tion. In 1828 the other aspect of the letters rather 
predominated. The democrats were not quite pleased 
that Jackson should have urged Monroe to appoint fed 
*ralists and disregard party.* 

1 26 Niles, 162. 2 Binns, 249. 

* The whole correspondence, 26 Niles, 163 fg. See commcntj 



INSUBORDINATION. 61 

Monroe was being acted upon, when Jackson wrote ta 
him, from tlie other side, by those who wanted him to 
favor the Monroe faction in the repubhcan party. He 
had enouoh to do to maintain himself between the two 
demands. He answered Jackson, admitting the high 
principle of the course Jackson advocated, but setting 
forth a theory of appointments more conformable to the 
exigencies of party politics. 

Ajjril 22, 1817, Jackson published an order to liis 
department forbidding liis subordinates to obey any or- 
der from the "War Department not issued through him. 
He had been much and justly annoyed at incidents in 
the service under him, of which he had not been in- 
formed beforehand, and also by direct orders issued from 
Washington, wdiich interfered with his arrangements and 
frustrated them without his knowledge. On the merits 
of the question he was in the right, but his public " or- 
der " produced an unnecessary scandal and public col- 
lision in a case where a projDer private representation to 
the department would have answered every purpose. 
Crawford was transferred to the treasury in October, 
181G. There was difficulty in filling the i^osition of 
Secretary of War. Calhoun was appointed October 8, 
1817. He conceded the point claimed by Jackson, re- 
serving only the cases of emergency. 

Some persons informed Jackson that General Scott 
had animadverted upon his action in the matter just 
mentioned, and had characterized \f as mutiny. Sep- 
tember 8, 1817, Jackson wrote a fiery letter to Scott, 
tailing him to accouiit. Scott replied that, in private 
conversation, he had said that the order of April 22d 

quoted, Ibid. ]). 219. For the disapproval of the democrats, lei 
Biuns, 246. 



52 ANDREW JACKSON. 

was V lutinous as to the future, and a reflection on tlie 
President, the Commander-in-Chief, as to the past. He 
disclaimed any personal feeling. Jackson replied in a 
very insulting letter, in which the well-battered question, 
Who of us two is the gentleman ? did good service 
again, and wound up with a challenge to a duel. Scott 
decHned the obnllenge on the ground of religious scru- 
ples and patriotic duty. The correspondence was almost 
immediately pubUshed. It created another scandal, for 
the public was not edified to see two of the first officers 
of the army engaged in such a quarrel.^ Niles, who 
at this time greatly admired Jackson, and who is al- 
ways a good representative of the average citizens of 
his time, refrained from publishing the correspondence 
until April, 1819.^ In this case, again, Jackson showed 
evidence of an ungovernable temper and a willingness 
to profit by every opportunity for a quarrel. 

There was, however, more public fighting at hand. 

There were in Florida many refugee Indians of the 
Creek nation, who were hostile to the United States, and 
many runaway negroes. During the war the English 
had sought such aid as they could get from these per- 
sons in their operations against the United States. They 
had built a fort on the Appalachicola River, about fif- 
teen miles from its mouth, and had collected there an 
immense amount of arms and ammunition. The Ens:- 
lish officers who were operating in Florida acted with a 
great deal of arbitrary self-will. They were not under 
Btrict responsibility to their own government. They 
were operating on Spanish territory. They were stirring 
up Indians and negroes, and were not commanding 8 

1 14 Niles, 295 ; 4 Adams, 323. 
a 16 Niles, 121. 



THE NEGRO FORi\ 63 

regular or civilized force. It is difficult to understand 
some of their proceedings in any point of view, and 
other of their doings certainly would not have been 
sanctioned by the English government, if known. The 
officers were able to gratify their own malice without 
responsibility. 

When the war ended, the English left the arms and 
ammunition in the fort. The negroes seized the fort, 
and it became known as the " Negro Fort." The au- 
thorities of the United States sent General Gaines to the 
Florida frontier with troops, to establish peace on the 
border. The Negro Fort was a source of anxiety both 
to the military authorities and to the slave-owners of 
Georgia, and, according to some accounts, the first step 
was its investment. It is otherwise stated that the 
American authorities undertook to bring supplies up the 
Appalachicola for a fort which they were building in 
Georgia, and that the boats were fired on, after which 
the troops marched down from Georgia and invested the 
fort, having received permission to do so from the 
Spanish authorities at Pensacola, who also very unwill- 
ingly saw a great fortress established in their territory, 
and held by negroes and Indians.^ The fort was bom- 
barded. A hot shot penetrated one of the magazines, 
and the whole fort was blown to pieces, July 27, 1816. 
There were three hundred negro men, women, and chil- 
dren and twenty Choctaws in the -fort ; two hundred and 
seventy were killed. Only three came out unhui't,^ and 
these were killed by the allied Indians. 

Spain was engaged in hostilities with her revolted colo- 
nies in Ajuerica. Filibusters and privateers took advan- 
tage of this state of things to carrv on a certain grade of 
^ Document A, 55. ^ Document A, 69. 



54 ANDREW JACKSON. 

piracy and the slave-trade. Amelia Island, on the north- 
east coast of Florida, had been infested by smugglers, 
Blavers, and freebooters ever since the war with England. 
In 1817 the island Avas occupied by a filibuster named 
McGregor, and later by another named Aury. They 
pretended to desire to render Florida independent, and 
there was a measure of honest intention in their plans, 
but the island was a nest of outlaws and a nuisance. 
The troops of the United States took possession of the 
island and drove the freebooters out, because Spain was 
not able to do so. Old causes of annoyance have been 
described above.^ The hostile Indians and the free- 
booters were new causes of annoyance. The Georgians 
were also annoyed that their slaves found an easy ref- 
uge in Florida. It had been amply proven that Spain 
could not fulfil the duties which devolved upon her as 
owner of Florida. Yet she strenuously insisted that 
her sovereignty should be respected.^ For all these 
reasons the United States was very anxious to buy 
Florida. 

During 1817 there were frequent collisions on the 
frontiers between Whites and Indians. Ex-Governor 
Mitchell of Georgia, the Indian agent, the fairest and 
best informed witness who appeared before the cora- 
nittee of Congress in 1818-19, deposed that the blame 
or these collisions was equal, that one party was as 
often the aggressor as the other, and that the lawless 
persons in Florida were especially to blame for acts of 
injury which provoked retaliation,^ When Gaines wrote 
to the chief Kenhigee that his Indians had killed Whites, 
the chief replied that four Indians had been killed foi 

1 See page 20. ^ Document A, 55. 

* 16 Nilea, 85. 



ATTACK ON FOWLT OWN. 55 

every White.^ The reports which were sent North were, 
as usual in such cases, only such as tended to show an 
aggressive disposition on the part of the Indians.^ 

On the 20th of November, General Gaines sent a 
force of two hundred and fifty men to Fowltown, the 
headquarters of the chief of the '' Redsticks," or hos- 
tile Creeks. They approached the town in the early 
moi-ning, and were fired on. An engagement followed. 
The town was taken and burned. Gaines's dispatch to 
the Governor of Georgia puts the number of Indians 
killed at four.^ Ex-Governor Mitchell of Georgia, 
quoted above, said, " This fact was, I conceive, the 
cause of the Seminole war." It is, however, fair to say 
that Mitchell was unfriendly to Gaines and to Jackson.* 
The Indians of that section, after this, began general 
hostilities, attacked the boats which were ascending the 
Appalachicola, and massacred the persons in them. 
Gaines states no reason at all for sending a force against 
Fowltown, except that he had invited the chief to visit 
him, in order to find out " whether his hostile temper 
had abated." The chief refused to come. The friendly 
Indians said that the Fowltown Indians had been hos- 
tile ever since the last war. Therefore Gaines sent a 
force equal to the number of Indians in the town " to 
bring the chief and warriors, and, in the event of re- 
sistance, to treat them as enemies." When the Indians 
saw this force approaching they fii'ed on it, stood fii'e 
once, and then ran away. Thei?* property was then al] 
destroyed, and the United State? had an Indian war on 
Its hands. 

1 Document A, 140. 

2 See the items of news from Florida in 13 Nilea. 
» 13 Niles, 296. * 4S Niles, 80. 



56 ANDREW JACKSON. 

In December, on receipt of intelligence of the battle 
at Fowltown and the attack on the boats, Jackson was 
ordered to take command in Georgia. He wrote to 
President Monroe : " Let it be signified to me through 
any channel (say Mr. J. Rhea) that the possession of 
the Floridas would be desirable to the United States, 
and in sixty days it will be accompHshed." Much waa 
afterwards made to depend on this letter. Monroe was 
ill when it reached Washington, and he did not see or 
read it until a year afterward?, when some reference 
was made to it. Jackson construed the orders which 
he received from Calhoun with reference to this letter. 
He also afterwards afiirmed that Rhea wrote to him 
^hat the President approved of his suggestions,^ but he 
could not produce that letter. He had burned it. He 
certainly supposed, however, that he had the secret con- 
currence of the administration in conquering Florida. 

When the orders to take command reached Jackson, 
the Governor of Tennessee was absent from Nashville. 
Jackson proceeded to raise troops in Tennessee on his 
own responsibility ; he being authorized to call on the 
Governors of the States which were neighbors to the 
scene of war. He pushed on his preparations with great 
energy and celerity. His acts were approved both by 
the state and federal authorities. He advanced through 
Georgia with great haste, and was on the Florida fron- 
tier in March, 1818. He ordered part of his provisions 
Bent to Fort Scott by the Appalachicola, on which the 
Spaniards had no fort, and he sent word to the Spanish 
commander at Pensacola that if the fort at Barrancas 
hindered his supply boats from ascending the Escambi? 
le should consider it an act of hostility to the United 
^ 8 Adams, 404. 



NOTIONS ABOUT SPANIARDS. 57 

States. These were, to say the least, very aggressive 
proceedings against a nation with which we were at 
pea^; lor a man who had been thrown into paroxysms 
of rage and energy at the idea of a redcoat resting on 
the soil of Louisiana during a public war. Jackson im- 
mediately advanced to St. Mark's, which place he cap- 
tured. On his way down the Appalachicola he found 
the Indians and negroes at work in the fields, and un- 
conscious of any impending attack. Some of them fled 
to St. Mark's. His theory, in which he supposed that 
he was supported by the administration, was that he was 
to pursue the Indians until he daught them, wherever 
they might go ; that he was to respect Spanish rights as 
far as he could consistently with that purpose ; and that 
the excuse for his proceedings was that Spain could not 
police her own territory, or restrain the Indians. Jack- 
son's proceedings were based on two positive but arbi- 
trary assumptions : (1) That the Indians got aid and 
encouragement from St. Mark's and Pensacola. (This 
the Spaniards always denied, but perhaps a third as- 
sumption of Jackson might be mentioned : that the word 
of a Spanish official was of no value.) (2) That Great 
Britain kept paid emissaries employed in Florida to stir 
up trouble for the United States. This latter assump- 
tion was a matter of profound belief generally in the 
United States. Niles's reports and criticisms of events 
in Florida all proceed from that assumption.^ The 
English government disavowed every act of Colonel 
Nichols with the Indians which took definite shape and 
could be dealt with at all. The Indians whom he took 
ko England were kindly treated, but were not encouraged 
io look to England for any assistance or countena»»'«'» 
1 14 Niles ; all the articles 0:1 Florida. 



58 ANDREW JACKSON. 

It was not easy to break off the connections which had 
been established, and destroy the hopes which had been 
raised, during the war, but there is not the slightest 
evidence that the English government did not act in 
good faith, or that it was busy in such contemptible 
business as employing emissaries to stir up some 2,000 
savages to wage a frontier war on the United States. 
Jackson's assumption, however, had serious import for 
two unfortunate individuals. 

A Scotclmian, Alexander Arbuthnot, was found by 
Jackson in St. Mark's. When the fort was taken Ar- 
buthnot mounted his horse to ride away, but he was 
seized, and put in confinement. He was an Indian 
crader, who had been in Florida for many years. He 
had established as intimate and friendly relations as 
possible with the Indians for his own security and ad- 
vantage in trade. He had also sympathized with the 
Indians, and had exerted himself in theu' behalf in many 
quarters. 

Several American vessels of war lay in the bay of St. 
Mark's to cooperate with the land forces. By display- 
ing English colors on these ships, two Indian chiefs, 
Hillis Ha jo (or Francis) and Himollemico, were enticed 
on board and made prisoners. They were hung by 
Jackson's order. They had tortured and massacred 
prisoners after the Indian fashion, but no one has ever 
explained by what law or usage known in the service of 
the United States they were put to death, when thus 
captured by stratagem, and not even on the field of bat- 
tle. 

Jackson pushed on with the least possible delay to the 
Buwanee River, where were the headquarters of Boleck 
(Billy Bowlegs), the Seminole chief. Arbuthnot hao 



ARBUTHNOT AND AMBRlSTEn. 59 

A trading-post there. When he had heard of Jackson's 
advance, he had written to nis son, who was his agent 
at Boleck's village, to carry the goods across the river. 
Through this letter the Indians got warning in time to 
cross the river and take to the swamps. Their escape 
enraged Jackson. He had already regarded Arbuthnot 
as one of the British emissaries. He now considered 
Arbuthnot's letter an overt act of interference in the 
war. The town was burned by Jackson. In its neigh- 
borhood he captured an Englishman named Robert Am- 
brister, an ex-lieutenant in the British marines, and 
nephew of the Governor of New Providence. This man 
was taken prisoner to St. Mark's, the troops being on 
their way homewards, and the war being over. A 
court-martial was convened at St. Marks. Arbuthnot 
was tried for (1) inciting the Creek Indians to war 
against the United States ; (2) being a spy and aiding 
tlie enemy ; (3) inciting the Indians to murder two 
white men named. The court found him guilty of the 
first charge and of the second except of being a spy, and 
condemned him to be hung. There was no evidence at 
all against him on any charge.^ Hif: business in Florida 
was open and obvious. He had always advised the In- 
dians to peace and submission. His letter to his son 
was not open to censure. Can traders be executed if 
their information, not transmitted through the lines, 
frustrates military purposes ? As Arbuthnot construed 
the Treaty of Ghent the Indians were to have their 
lands r*>stored, and he told them so. There was so 
much room for this construction that diplomatic meas- 

^ Report of the trial in full, 15 Nilcs, 270. All the documents 
nbout the Negro Fort and the invasion oi Florida are in Doca 
nent A. 



60 ANDREW JACKSON. 

ures were necessary to set it aside. Peace had been 
made with, the Creeks before the Treaty of Ghent was 
made. 

Ambrister was tried for inciting the Indians and 
levying war. His case was different. He had no osten- 
sible business in Florida. He was an adventurer, and it 
is not clear what he hoped or intended. He threw him- 
Belf on the mercy of the court. He was condemned to be 
shot. This sentence was reconsidered, and he was then 
condemned to fifty lashes and a year of hard labor. 
Jackson disapproved of the reconsideration, revived the 
first sentence, and ordered both men to be executed. 
April 29, 1818, he left St. IMark's, having detached a 
force to hold that place and to execute the sentence. 
The same day both men were executed. Arbuthnot 
was seventy years old ; Ambrister was thirty-three. 

It was as a mere incident of his homeward march 
that Jackson turned aside and captured Pensacola, May 
24, 1818, because he was told that some Indians had 
taken refuge there. He deposed the Spanish govern- 
ment, set up a new one, and established a garrison. He 
then continued his march homewards. On his way he 
heard of an attack by Georgia militia on the villages of 
friendly and allied Indians, and he became engaged in a 
fiery correspondence with Governor Rabun of Georgia 
about that affair. He was in the right, but it was an- 
other case in which by violence he provoked anger and 
discord, when he might have accomplished much more 
by a temperaite remonstrance. 

In the whole Florida matter we see Jackson proceed- 
ing to summary measures on inadequate facts and in 
formation. He " knew " how the matter stood by the 
surreut prejudices and assumptions, not by evidence antf 



THE SEMINOLE CAMPAIGN. 61 

information. This was the tone of his mind. Notions 
and prepossessions which once effected a lodgment in his 
mind, because circumstances gave them a certain plausi- 
bility, or because they fell in with some general preju- 
dice or personal bias of liis, immediately gained for him 
the character of obvious facts or self-evident truths. He 
then pursued such notions and prepossessions to their 
last consequences, and woe to any one who stood in the 
way. 

General Jackson had, in five months, broken the In- 
dian power, established peace on the border, and sub- 
stantially conquered Florida. This five months and the 
eighteen months service in 1813-15 is all the actual 
service he ever saw. The Seminole war was in its re- 
lations and effects one of the most important events in 
our history, but in itself it was one of the most insignifi- 
cant of our Indian campaigns. Jackson had an over- 
whelming force. The report of the Senate committee of 
1819 puts liis force at 1,800 whites and 1,500 friendly 
Indians. The hostile Indians were never put by any- 
body at a higher number than 2,000. This committee 
put them at 1,000, not over half of whom, at any one 
time, were in front of Jackson. The allied Indians did 
all the fighting. They lost twenty men in the campaign. 
Not one white man was killed. The number of hostile 
Indians killed is put at sixty.^ 

The trouble with Jackson's achievements was that he 
had done too much. The statesmen and diplomatists 
could not keep up with him, and the tasks he threw on 
them were harder than those he performed in the field. 
The administration was not aware that it had authorized 
him to violate neutral territory. Federal administrations 
1 Perkins. 113. 



62 ANDREW JACKSON. 

in those days were always timid. They did not know the 
limits of their power, or what they dared do. Monroe 
was especially timid. His administration wanted to bny 
Florida, not conquer it. They did not thank Jackson 
for plunging them into such a difficulty with Congress 
and with England and Spain all at once. The two In- 
dian captives who had been hung had no friends, but 
their execution was an awkward thing to justify be- 
fore the civilized world. The execution of the two 
Englislimen was likely to provoke a great deal of diplo- 
matic trouble. Jackson had been perfectly sure about 
the law. He laid it down in the order for the execu- 
tion. " It is an established principle of the law of 
nations that any individual of a nation making war 
against the citizens of any other nation, they being at 
peace, forfeits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and 
a pirate." If the facts are admitted, such a person un- 
doubtedly forfeits his allegiance, and cannot demand the 
protection of his sovereign, whatever may happen to 
him. On this ground the English government took no 
steps in relation to the execution of Arbuthnot and Am- 
brister, beyond an inquiry into the facts of their alleged 
complicity in the war,^ and that inquiry was not pushed 
as we may hope that the government of the United 
States will push the inquiry, if an American citizen is 
ever executed as Arbuthnot was. The doctrine of Jack- 
Bon's order, that a person who engages in a war to which 
his country is not a party becomes an outlaw and pirate 
wiU not stand. As has been well said, there were a large 
number of foreigners in the American army during the 
Revolution, who, on this doctrine, would, if captured bj 

^ 1 Pinsh. 473. " War niiuht have been produced on this o« 
easion ' if the ministry had but held up a finger.' " (488.) 



JACKSON,^ INTERNATIONAL LAW. 63 

the English, have forfeited their lives. The Uaited 
States would have protected any such persons by retalia- 
tion or otherwise. The Creeks were not a nation in in- 
ternational law, they were not the possessors of the soil 
on which they lived and fought ; there had never been 
a declaration of war ; yet they were not rebels against 
the United States, and it could not be denied that they 
had some belligerent rights. Whatever rights they had, 
the Englishmen, even if they had been complete and un- 
questioned alHes, must also have been entitled to from 
the American authorities. If, then, the Indians were not 
to be hunted down like wild beasts, or executed by court- 
martial, if captured, for levying war on the United 
States, the Englishmen were executed without right or 
law. There never was any proof that anybody incited 
the Indians. The attack on Fowltown precipitated hos- 
tilities in a situation where lawless men and savages, by 
mutual annoyance, outrage, and retaliation, had prepared 
the warlike temper. When the matter was investigated 
this appeared, and it was seen that Jackson had acted 
unjustifiably, because without evidence or law. The 
popular feeling, however, would not allow him to be 
censured. Niles, who well represents the popular tem- 
per, believed in the emissary theory, and when that 
theory broke down he became angry.^ He also ex- 
pressed the popular feeling with great exactness in this 
paragraph : " The fact is that ninety-nine in a hundred 
of the people believe that General Jackson acted on 
every occasion for the good of his "-ountry, and success 
universally crowned his efforts. He has suffered more 
hardships and encountered higher responsibilities than 
any man living in the United States to serve us, and has 
^ ''^^^e his editorial. IH Ni!<',?4. 'lb. 



64 ANDREW JACKSON. 

his reward in the sanction of his government and the 
approbation of the people." With this dictum the case 
was dismissed, and the matter stood so that General 
Jackson, having done important public service, could 
not be called to account, although he had hung four 
persons without warrant of law. His popularity had 
already begun to exercise a dispensing power in his 
favor. A committee of the House of Representatives,^ 
at the next session, reported a vote of censure on him 
for the execution of the Englishmen, but the House, 
after a long debate, refused to pass it. 

Jackson's proceedings came up in Monroe's cabinet 
on the question what to do with him and his conquests. 
Calhoun was vexed at Jackson's insubordination to the 
War Department. He wanted Jackson censured. The 
President and the whole cabinet, with the exception of 
Adams, disapproved of Jackson's conduct in invading 
Florida, and were ready to disavow his proceedings and 
make reparation. On Adams would fall the labor of 
vindicating Jackson's proceedings diplomatically, if the 
administration should assume the responsibility for them. 
He avowed himself ready to undertake the task, and to 
perform it substantially on the grounds on which Jackson 
justified himself. It was agreed that Pensacola and St. 
Mark's should be restored to Spain, but that Jackson's 
course should be approved and defended on the grounds 
that he pursued his enemy to his refuge, and that Spain 
could not do the duty which devolved on her. The 
President, however, countermanded an order wliich 
Jackson had given to Gaines to seize St. Augustine be- 
cause some Indians had taken refuge there. All the 
members of the cabinet agreed to the policy decided 
1 15 Niles, 394. 



SEMINOLE WAR IN CONGRESS. 65 

jn, and all loyally adhered to it, the secret of their fii'st 
opinion being preserved for ten years. Calhoun wi'ote 
to Jackson in accordance with the agreement, congratu- 
lating and approving. Jackson inferred that Calhoun 
had been his friend in the cabinet all the time, and that 
his old enemy, Crawford, had been the head of the hos- 
tile party. The political history of this country was 
permanently affected by the personal relations of Jack- 
son to Calhoun and Crawford on that matter. Monroe 
had a long correspondence with Jackson to try to rec- 
oncile him to the surrender of the forts to Spain. In 
that correspondence Jackson did not mention the Rhea 
letter. 

At the next session of Congress (1818-19) the pro- 
ceedings in Florida were made the subject of inquiry, 
and were at once involved in the politics of the day. 
Clay was in opposition to the administration because he 
had not been made Secretary of State. He refused the 
War Department and the mission to England. His 
opposition was factious. After the administration as- 
sumed the responsibility for Jackson's doings, Clay 
opened the attack on them. Here began the feud be- 
tween Clay and Jackson. The latter was in a doubly 
irritable state of mind between the flatterers on one side 
and the critics on the other. The personal element 
came to the front. Any one who approved of his acts 
was his friend ; any one who criticised was his enemy ; 
whether any personal feeling was brought to the dis- 
cussion of a question of law and fact or not. There are 
some facts which look as if Clay and Crawford had be- 
gun to regard Jackson as a possible competitor for the 
presidency. Crawford was in communication with the 
committees on the Seminole war, apparently instigating 



66 ANDREW JACKSON. 

action, while Calhoun tried to quell the excitement and 
avert action, out of loyalty to the decision adopted by 
the administration of which he was a member.* The 
Georgian friends of Crawford in Congress led the attack 
on Jackson.^ Crawford and Calhoun were enemies. 
Adams was writing dispatches and preparing instruc- 
tions, by which, both with England and Spain, he suc- 
ceeded in vindicating Jackson's proceedings. He and 
Jackson were, at this time, friends, and one scheme waa 
to make Jackson Vice-President on a ticket with Adams.' 
Adams's defence of Jackson was very plausible, and it 
was fortified line by line with references to the docu- 
mentary proofs, yet if it had been worth any one's while, 
either in England or this country, to examine the al- 
leged proofs, all the case against Arbuthnot would have 
been found baseless. Adams quotes a certain letter as 
proof that Arbuthnot was not truly a trader, but had 
concealed purposes. The letter bears no testimony at 
all to the fact alleged.^ Rush cited to the English 
minister another proof of this, which is equally frail, and 
only proves that Arbuthnot had taken trouble to try to 
serve the Indians out of pity for them.^ His letter to his 
son, besides warning him to save as much as possible of 
their property, contained a message to Boleck not to 

1 See Lacock's letter of June 25, 1832, in answer to Jackson's 
interrogatories. (43 Niles, 79.) 

2 8 Adams, 240. 

^ Adams said (in 1824) that the vice-presidency would be a 
nice pliK'c for Jackson's old age. Jackson was four months older 
than Adams. This is not so ridiculous as it would be if Jacksor. 
had not pleaded old age and illness as a reason why he should 
act go to the Senate in 1823. (See 6 Adams, 633.) 

* Document A, 20, cf. 147. 

» 2 Rush, 52, of. Document A, 215. 



PURCHASE OF FLORIDA. 67 

resist the Americans.^ The Senate committee reported 
February 24, 1819 (Lacock's Report), strongly against 
Jackson on all the points from the independent recruit- 
ing down to the taking of Pensacola.'^ No action was 
taken. Jackson had been in Washington during the 
winter watching the proceedings. In February he made 
an excursion as far north as New York. He was re- 
ceived everywhere with eniliusiasin. There was a story 
that he was so angry at some of the proceedings in 
censure of him that he went to the Senate chamber 
to waylay some persons who had displeased him. He 
denied this. 

In 1819 the purchase of Florida was effected, al- 
though the treaty was not ratified until February 22, 
1821. In this treaty the western boundary of the 
Louisiana purchase was for the first time defined. 
Adams, while the negotiations were pending, called oa 
Jackson, and consulted liim about the boundary to be 
contended for.^ Jackson's interest then centred in 
Florida, and he cared compai'atively little for the wilder- 
ness of Texas. He thought that the line of the Sabine 
might well be accepted, if Florida coidd thereby be 
secured. Monroe and his cabinet seem to have cared 
just as little for Texas. Adams's diary shows that he 
was not heartily supported in the efforts he was willing 
to make to push the line westward. Jackson's opinion 
about claiming Texas was of no value, but the fact that 
he was consulted showed the amount of respect and con- 
sideration Avhich the administration was willing to pay 
liim. In 1836, and again in 184S, \dams, citing his 
diary, declared that Jackson had been consulted, and 
had ai)proved the Florida treaty. Jackson contradicted 
l,nd denied it in a violent and insulting manner. 

1 Dofiimflnt A 1 ^7 2 ]fi xiles. 33. « 8 Adams, 238-9. 



68 ANDREW JACKSON. 

In the spring of 1821 Jackson was appointed Gov. 
ernor of Florida, under the belief that the public would 
be glad to see him so honored. On July 21st of the 
same year he published general orders,^ taking leave of 
his army, a reduction having been made by which he 
had been thrown out. In these orders, or in a post- 
script to them, he managed to come into coUision with 
his colleague and senior, Major-General Brown, then 
chief in command of the army of the United States, by 
taking up and criticising an order " signed Jacob 
Brown," especially in regard to the punishment for 
desertion. Brown was a New York militia general, 
some eight years younger than Jackson, who had dis- 
tinguished himself, in the general ill-success of the war, 
by some small successes on the northern frontier. He 
seemed to be the coming military hero of the war until 
he was eclipsed by Jackson. He took precedence of 
Jackson by seniority of appointment, and so became 
chief in command. It had become evident now that 
Jackson needed much room in tlie world for all liis 
jealousies and animosities, and that his fellow-men must 
put up with a great deal of arrogance and misbehavior 
on his part. His popularity shielded him. He had 
become a privileged person, like a great nobleman of 
the last century. To offend him was to incur extraor- 
dinary penalties. To get in his way was to expose 
one's self to assaults which could not be resented as 
they would be if they came from another man. All 
this he had won by military success. One is led, then, 
to inquire, what was the measure of this military ser- 
vi(^e ? It was but a little over two years of Indiat 
fighting, with only one battle against a civihzed foe 
1 21 Niles, 53. 



GOVERNOR OF FLORIDA. 69 

A-t least it seemed fair to expect that he would obser?^e 
military discipline and decorum. Bvit he did not do so, 
Wid no one dared call him to account. 

Congress did not have time to legislate for the terri- 
tory of Florida, after the treaty was ratified, before the 
end of the session. An act was passed extending to the 
new territory only the revenue laws and the law a.gainst 
the slave-trade. Jackson was appointed Governor in 
April, with all the powers of the Captain-General of 
Cuba and the Spanish Governors of Florida, except that 
he could not lay taxes or grant land. His position was 
therefore a very anomalous one, — an American Gov- 
ernor, under Spanish law, of an American territory not 
yet under the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. Long delays, due to dilatoriness and inef- 
ficiency, postponed the actual cession until July 17tli. 
Meanwhile Jackson was chafing and fuming, and 
strengthening his detestation of all Spaniards. 

In September certain persons rej)resented to Jackson 
that papers wliich were necessary for the protection of 
their interests were being packed up, and would be car- 
ried away by the Spanish ex-Governor, contrary to the 
ti'eaty. There were five or six sets of papers about 
property and land grants ^ which were in demand. 
There had been complaints against the Spaniards for 
granting lands belonging to the crown between the 
making and the ratification of the treaty. Jackson no 
doubt believed the worst against them. The persons 
who claimed his aid were weak and poor. With charac- 
teristic chivalry and impetuosity he sent an officer to 
seize the papers. Tlie ex-GoY3r:LDr, Callava, refused 
X) ^ve up any papers unless they were described, and 
1 21 NileH, 150. 



70 ANDREW JACKSON. 

a demand for them was addressed to him as Spanish 
commissioner. He and Jackson seem to have worked 
at cross-purposes unnecessarily. It is hard to make 
out what the misunderstanding was (although the use 
of two languages might partly account for it), unless 
Jackson was acting under his anti-Spanish bias. Jack- 
son ended by sending Callava to the calaboose. Parton, 
who gives some special and interesting details derived 
from Brackenridge, the alcalde and interpreter, says that 
Callava saw the ridiculous side of the affair, and that 
he and his friends "made a nighl: of it " in the calaboose. 
Jackson sent an officer to Callg^va's house to take the 
papers, and then ordered Callava to be discharged. 

Eligius Fromentin, of Louisiana, had been appointed 
judge of the western district of Florida. He, upon 
application, issued a writ of habeas corpus for Callava. 
Jackson summoned Fromentin before him to show cause 
why he had interfered with Jackson's authority as Gov- 
ernor of the Floridas with the powers of the Captain- 
General of Cuba, as " Supreme Judge," and as " Chan- 
cellor." Fromentin sent an excuse on the ground of 
illness. The next day he went to see Jackson, and after 
a fierce interview each prepared a " statement " to send 
to Washington. Callava went to Washington to seek 
satisfaction. Some of his friends published, at Pensa 
cola, a statement in his defence. Thereupon Jackson 
ordered them out of Florida at four days' notice, on 
pain of arrest for contempt and disobedience, if they 
•'vere found there later. After all, the heirs of Vidal, 
who stirred up the whole trouble, were, according to 
Parton, indebted to the Forbes firm, against wliich they 
iranted to protect themsekes.^ This would not affeo* 
1 2 Parton, 638. 



AFFAIR OF CALLAVA. 71 

their right and interest in securing papers properly 
theirs. Whether the papers were being carried away^ 
and did properly belong to the claimants, is not known.^ 

About the time of the trouble with Callava, Worth- 
ington, the Secretary and acting Governor of East Flor- 
ida, was having a contest with Coppinger, the Spanish 
Governor of East Florida, about papers which the former 
seized under Jackson's orders. 

Here, then, was another trouble which Jackson had 
prepared in about six montlis' service for his unhappy 
superiors. He was ill and disgusted with his office. 
He resigned and went home in October. It is plain 
that he had acted from a good motive against Callava, 
and, being sure of his motive, he had disregarded diplo- 
matic obligations, evidence, law, propriety, and forms 
of procedure. Those things only enraged him because 
they balked him of the quick purpose, born of his sense 
of justice and of his sympathy with an ex parte appeal 
to his power. Such a man is a dangerous person to be 
endowed with civil power. As to liis quarrel with Fro- 
mentin, it was a farce. If Jackson had been a man of 
any introspection, he must have had, ever after, more 
2harity for the whole class of Spanish governors, when 
he saw what an arrogant fool he had made of himself 
while endowed with indefinite and irresponsible power. 

Monroe's cabinet unanimously agreed that, as the only 
laws which had been extended to Florida were the rev- 
enue laws and those against the slave-trade, Fromentin's 
jurisdiction was limited to those laws,^ and he could not 

1 All the documents are in Folio State Papers, 2 Miscdlan. 
r99. Th€ importaut papers jire in 21 Niles. 

2 For Fromentin's own thee -r of tis action, which was plainly 
ftrroneous, see 21 Niles, 252. 



72 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Issue a writ of habeas corpus. The President, Calhoun, 
and Wirt thought that he was not amenable for his er- 
ror to Jackson. Adams took Jackson's part in this 
matter also. He said that Fromentin had violated Jack- 
son's authority.^ The cabinet discussed the subject for 
thi'ee days without reacliing a decision. They were 
greatly perplexed as to the law and justice of the mat- 
ter, and also as to its political effect. Congress took it 
up, and the newspapers were filled with it. At first the 
tide of opinion was against Jackson, but his popularity 
reacted against it, and the affair did not hurt him. 

In 1823 Jackson was offered the mission to Mexico. 
He declined it. Soon afterwards he published in the 
Mobile " Register " a letter stating his reasons for de- 
clining. These reasons were a reflection on the adminis- 
tration, because they showed cause why no mission ought 
to be sent. The letter was calculated to win capital out 
of the appointment at the expense of the administra- 
tion which had made it.^ Monroe must have been often 
reminded of what Jefferson said to him, in 1818, when 
he asked whether it would not be wise to give Jackson 
the mission to Russia : " Why, good G — d, he would 
breed you a quarrel before he had been there a month ! " • 

1 5 Adams, 359, 368 to 380. 2 24 Niles, 280. 

8 4 Adams, 76. 



CHAPTER IV. 

ELECTION OF 1824. 

The congressional caucus met April 8, -1820. The 
question was whether to nominate any candidates for 
President and Vice-President. Adams says that the 
caucus was called as part of a plan to nominate Clay 
for Vice-President. About forty members of Congress 
attended. R. M. Johnson offered a resolution that it 
was inexpedient to nominate candidates. This resolu- 
tion was adopted, and the caucus adjourned.^ Monroe 
received, at the election, every electoral vote save one, 
which was cast by Plumer, in New Hampshire, for 
Adams. Tomkins was reelected Vice-President, but he 
received fourteen less votes than Monroe. His repu- 
tation was declining. In raising money for the pub- 
lic service during the war he had engaged his own 
security. His book-keeping was bad, and his accounts 
and the public accounts became so entangled that he 
could not separate them.^ On the one hand, he claimed 
that he was a creditor and heavy loser by the steps 
which he had taken out of patriotic zeal for the pub- 
lic service, which steps had been of great benefit to 
the country. On the other hand, the controller of the 
State of New York found that Tomkins could not ac- 
count for all the money which had passed through his 
hands, and which amounted to over three million dol- 
1 6 Adams, 58, 60. 2 j Hammond, 508 fg. 



74 ANDREW JACKSON. 

lars. The affair was immediately entangled in the fac- 
tion fights of New York, the Bucktails takmg sides with 
Tonikins, and the Clintonians against him. The con- 
troller of the State and the Vice-President of the United 
States were engaged, in 1818 and 1819, in a bitter cor- 
respondence.^ Tomkins became bankruj)t, and acquired 
the reputation of a defaulter. Finally, in 1821, an act 
was passed by the state Legislature to balance his ac« 
counts witho*ut payment either way.^ He was not able 
for some years to draw his salary as Vice-President, 
because he stood a defaulter also on the books of the 
federal treasury. He stood a suit in 1822 in the United 
States District Court and won it.^ In 1823 a committee 
of the House reported in his favor,* and an act appropri- 
ating $35,190 for his relief was passed. In April, 1824, 
Monroe sent in a message, the matter having been re- 
ferred to him, in which he found $60,239 ^ due Tom- 
kins. The trouble was that, in order to show himself a 
creditor, Tomkins had to include in his accounts interest, 
commissions, damages, allowances, etc., with interest on 
them all ; that is, all the ordinary and extraordinary 
charges which a broker would make for finding funds 
lor an embarrassed client. If these charges were all 
allowed, Tomkins could claim no credit for patriotism. 
If he was to keep the credit of extraordinary patriotism, 
he was a debtor. In 1816 he was very popular and had 
high hopes of the presidency. In 1825 he retired neg- 
lected and forgotten. He died in June, 1825. 

During Monroe's second term each of the personal 
factions was intinguing on behalf of its chief, and striv 

1 15 Nilos, 425; 17 Niles, 21. 2 j Hammond, 542. - 

8 22 Niles, 242. ■» 23 Niles, 406. 

• 26 Niles, 168. 



TARIFF IN 1820. 75 

ing to kill off all the others. There were no real issues. 
On the retui'n of peace in 1815, the industries which had 
grown up here during the war to supply needs, which 
could not, under the then existing laws, be supplied 
by importation, found themselves threatened with ruin. 
The tariff of 1816, although its rates were of course far 
below the " double duties " which had been levied dur- 
ing the war, was supposed at the time to be amply pro- 
tective. It had been planned to that end. The embargo, 
non-intercourse, and war had created entirely artificial 
circumstances, which were a heavy burden on the nar 
tion as a whole, but which had given security and favor 
to certain manufacturing industries. There was no way 
to " protect " the industries after peace returned except 
to reproduce by taxes the same hardship for everybody 
else, and the same special circumstances for the favored 
industries, as had been produced by embargo and war. 
In 1819 a great commercial crisis occurred, which pros- 
trated all the industry of the country for four or five 
years. So long as vicious and depreciated currencies 
existed in Europe, there was less penalty for a vicious 
currency here ; but as fast as European currencies im- 
proved after the return of peace, gold and silver began 
to go to the countries of improving currency, and away 
from the countries where the currency still remained 
bad. The " hard times " were made an argument to 
show that more protection was needed ; that is, that the 
country had been prosperous during war, and that the 
return of peace had ruined it, unless taxes could be de- 
vised which should press as hard as the war had done. 
,rhe taxes had not indeed been made so heavy as that, 
and so more were needed. Currency theorists also arose 
to anticipate aU the wisdom of later days. Th^y proved 



76 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Jial <6e people of the United States, with a great conti- 
nent at their disposal, could not get out of the continent 
an abundance of food, clothing, shelter, and fuel be- 
cause they had not enough bits of paper stamped " one 
dollar" at their disposal. The currency whims, how- 
ever, hardly got into politics at that period. 

In 1820 a strong attempt was made to increase the 
tariff, to do away with credit for duties, and to put a 
check on sales at auction. As the presidential election 
was uncontested, power to carry these bills could not be 
concentrated. In 1824 the case was different. No fac- 
tion dared vote against the higher tariff for fear of losing 
suppoi*t.^ The tariff was not, therefore, a party ques- 
tion. The act was passed May 22, 1824, by a combi- 
nation of Middle and Western States against New Eng- 
land, and on a combination of the iron, wool, hemp, 
whiskey, and sugar interests. New England, as the 
commercial district, was then for free trade. 

Jackson had been elected to the Senate in the winter 
of 1823-24. Parton brings the invaluable testimony of 
William B. Lewis as to the reason why and the way in 
which Jackson was elected.^ John Williams had been 
senator. His term expired. He was an opponent of 
Jackson. He was a candidate for reelection, and was 
BO strong that no Jackson man but Jackson himself 
could defeat him. Hence the men who were planning 
to make Jackson President, of whom Lewis was the 
chief, secured Jackson's election to the Senate. While 
the tariff question was pending, a convenient person 
— Dr. Coleman, of Warrenton, Va. - — was found to in- 
terrogate Jackson about it. His letter in reply was tlie 
first of the adroit letters or manifestoes by means o^ 
1 24 Niles, 324. 2 3 Parton, 21. 



WIRE-PULLING 77 

irhich the Jackson managers carried on the campaign iu 
Jackson's favor. They developed this art of electioneer- 
ing in a way then not conceived of by other factions. 
The Coleman letter was a model letter of its kind. It 
Baid nothing clear or to the point on the matter in ques- 
tion. It used some ambiguous phrases wliich the reader 
could interpret to suit his own taste. It muddled the 
question by contradictory suggestions, bearing upon it 
from a greater or less distance, and from all points of 
view, and it failed not to introduce enough glittering 
platitudes to make the whole pass current. Jackson 
voted for the tariff and for a number of internal im- 
provement schemes, which votes were afterwards quoted 
against him.^ 

Jackson was therefore fairly started as a candidate 
for the presidency. Among all the remarkable acci- 
dents which opened his way to the first jjosition in the 
country, it was not the least that he had William B. 
Lewis for a neighbor and friend. Lewis was the great 
father of the wire-pullers. He first practised in a mas- 
terly and scientific way the ai-t of starting movements, 
apparently spontaneous, at a distance, and in a quarter 
from which they win prestige or popularity, in order 
that these movements may })roduce, at the proper time 
and place, the effects intended by the true agent, who, 
in the mean time, prepares to be acted on by the move- 
ment in the direction in which, from the beginning, he 
desired to go. On this system political activity is ren- 
dered theatrical. The personal initiative is concealed. 
There is an adjustment of roles^ a 7nise en scene, and 
a constant consideration of effect Each person acts on 
khe other in prearranged wavs. Cues are given and 
1 38 Niles, 285. 



78 ANDREW JACKSON. 

taken, and the effect depends on the fidelity of eacK 
to his part. The perfection of the representation is 
reached when the audience or spectators are disre- 
garded until the finale, when the chief actor, having 
reached the denoument towards which he and his com- 
rades have so long been laboring, comes to the foot- 
lights and bows to the •"' mil of the people." Lewis 
showed great astuteness in his manoeuvres. There was 
notliino- vulgar about him. There was a certain breadth 
of generalship about his proceedings. He was very far- 
sighted and prudent. He had the great knowledge re- 
quired by the wire-puller, — knowledge of men. He 
knew the class amongst whom Jackson's popularity was 
strongest. He knew their notions, prejudices, tastes, 
and instincts. He knew what motives to appeal to. He 
wrote very well. When he wanted to go straight to a 
point he could do so. When he wanted to produce 
effects or suggest adroitly, without coming to the point, 
he coukl do that too. He also knew Jackson well. He 
no doubt sincerely loved and admired Jackson. He 
threw his whole soul into the undertaking to elect Jack- 
son, but he never showed any selfish or interested pur- 
poses in that connection. So long as Jackson was unin- 
formed or unprejudiced on any matter he was at the 
disposition of any one who had won his confidence, and 
who desired to influence him on that matter. He could 
then be led to accept any view of it which was put be- 
fore him in a way to strike his mind. Lewis knew how 
to put a thing before Jackson's mind. However, when 
Jackson had adopted any view or notion, his mind be- 
came set or biassed, and it was not easy, even for those 
who first influenced him, to deflect his mind from rigid- 
ity of inierence, or his conduct from direct deduction 



PROJECT TO NOMINATE JACKS 0^. 79 

He often outstripped the wishes and intentions of those 
who had moved him first. To contradict him, at that 
stage, would have been to break friendship. Lewis 
treated him with great tact and influenced him very 
often, but he did not control him or manage him. It 
would have been a good thing for the country if no 
worse man than Lewis had ever gained influence over 
Jackson. 

Parton obtained from Lewis a description of the first 
steps towards Jackson's nomination. Lewis tells how 
he used Jackson's letters to Monroe to win influential 
federalists to Jackson's sujDport. It was after Jack- 
son's return from Florida, in 1821, that the project was 
definitely decided upon. At first Jackson rejected, with 
some temper, the suggestion that he could or would run 
for President. He did not consider himself the right 
sort of man, and he felt old and ill. In the spring of 
1822 Lewis went to North Carolina, and worked ujd his 
connections there for Jackson. On the 20th of July, 
1822, the Tennessee Legislature made the formal nom- 
ination. During the next two years Jackson's sup- 
porters were gaining connections and undermining the 
caucus, for he was an independent candidate and a 
" disorganizer," because he was raised up outside of 
the machine, and without any consultation with the es- 
tablished party authorities. 

Certain features of Jackson's character have appeared 
already. We have seen some of his elements of strength 
and some of his faults. The nation wanted to reward 
him for military achievements and for a display of mil- 
tary virtues. They had discarded dukedoms, pensions, 
ribbons, and orders, and they had no sign of national 
gratitude to employ but election to civil office. So far 



60 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Jackson had not made public display of any qualities but 
those of a military man, and violence, indiscretion, obsti- 
nacy, and quarrelsomeness. In the campaign, those who 
opposed him called him a " murderer." The only in- 
cidents of his life which the biographer can note, aside 
from his military service,' are successive acts of impro- 
priety and bad judgment. Negatively, however, there 
was more to be said for Jackson. He was above every 
species of money vice ; he was chaste and domestic in 
his habits ; ^ he was temperate in every way ; he was 
not ambitious in the bad sense. 

There were already four other candidates in the field, 
who all belonged to the democratic-republican party. 
Niles sfives an instance in which seven democrats met 
at Philadelphia, who all were for Schulze, the democratic 
candidate for Governor. Each candidate for President 
had a supporter among them, and no candidate had 
over two.^ De Witt Clinton was not altogether out of 
consideration. A caucus of the South Carolina Legisla- 
ture nominated Lowndes.* 

John Quincy Adams stood first among the candi- 
dates by his public services and experience. He was 
fifty-seven years old. He went to Europe with liis 
father when he was eleven years old, and studied there 
for several years. He was, through his father, intimate 
from his earliest youth with public and diplomatic af- 
fairs. As far as education and early training could go, 
he had the best outfit for a statesman and diplomat. He 
enjoyed great respect. Those who thought that a man 
ought to advance to the presidency through lower grade? 
of public employment looked upon him as the most suit 

1 The ouly contrary suggestion known is in Binus, 245. 
a 24 Niles, 369. » 5 Adams, 468. 



JOHN QUINCY ADAMS. 81 

able candidate. He was not a man of genius, but one 
of wide interests, methodical habits, and indefatioable 
Industry. It is hard to see what he ever did, from his 
earliest youth, for amusement and entertainment. He 
would have been a better statesman if he had been more 
frivolous. He was unsocial • in his manners, had few 
friends, and repelled those who would have been his 
friends. So far as we can learn, he engaged in no in- 
trigues for the presidency. He certainly had the small- 
est and least zealous corps of workers. His weakness 
was that the great body of the voters did not have any 
feeling that a man with the qualifications which he pos- 
sessed was needed for the 23residential office. He had 
been a democrat since 1807, when he went over to the 
administration party because he believed that the New 
England federalists were plotting secession. His sound- 
ness in " democratic principles " was doubted. He 
was earnestly disliked by all the active politicians. In 
the campaign he was called a " tory." Adams was 
charged with offering, at Ghent, to yield to the English 
the right of navigating the Mississipi3i, if they would 
renew the rights to fish in Canadian waters ; that is, 
with offering to sacrifice a Western interest to serve an 
Eastern one. He published a small volume to expose 
the untruth of this charge and the character of the evi- 
dence by which it was supported.^ In his own opinion, 
this attack helped him.^ He was in favor of the tar- 
iff as it stood in 1824. He thought that it gave enough 
protection. He was also in favor of internal improve- 
ments, but thought they might be abused.^ He was ac- 

1 The Duplicate Letters, the Fisheries and the Mississippi. 
« 6 Adams, 263. 
» 6 Adams, 353, 451 



82 ANDREW JACKSOX. 

eused of undemocratic care for etiquette, and also ol 
slovenliness in dress. 

Calhoun enjoyed great popularity in New England, 
in New York city, and in Pennsylvania, as well as at 
home. He was forty-two years old, and was the " young 
men's candidate." He had actively favored the tariff of 
1816 and the bank, and also plans for internal improve- 
ments. In October, 1822, Adams wrote : " Calhoun 
has no petty scruples about constructive powers and 
state rights." ■* Calhoun and Adams had been strong 
friends, and there was some idea of putting Calhoun on 
the ticket with Adams until 1822, when some membei-s 
of Congress nominated Callioun for President.'^ Web- 
ster preferred Calhoun to all the other candidates.^ His 
brother wrote that Calhoun was the second choice of 
New Hampshire.* Calhoun took the War Department 
in 1817, when it was in great disorder. He had to bear 
a great deal of abuse before he got it in order, but later 
he was much praised for the system he had introduced.^ 
He and Crawford were especial rivals, because Crawford 
was the " reg-ular " Virginia and Southern candidate. 
In 1822 attempts were made to injure Calhoun by an 
Investigation of a contract for building the Rip Raps at 
Old Point Comfoii;. The contract was private, not com- 
petitive. He was exonerated by a committee of the 
House.® As we shall see, Calhoun withdrew his nam« 
before the election. 



1 6 Adams, 75. 25 Adams, 42. 

8 1 Curtis's Webster, 218, 236. 

* 1 Webster's Correspondence, 323. 

5 26 Niles, 50. Adams thought this praise undeserved. (7 Ad 
ims, 446.) 

• 22 Niles. 251. 



WILLIAM HARRIS CRAWFORD. S3 

Crawford was the regular candidate. He was fifty- 
kwo years old. In 1798 he had been an " Addresser," 
that is, an orthodox federalist.^ He had also been a 
supporter of the old bank, and had been the leader in 
the Senate for the renewal of its charter. He had also 
opposed the embargo.'^ He had been very eagerly work- 
ing for eight years to reach the presidency. In the 
campaign he was called an " intriguer." As Secretary 
of the Treasury during the crisis of 1819, he had a very 
difficult task to perform. He had undertaken even 
more than his duty required, for he had aimed to "do 
justice " between the banks, and to keep them from en- 
('roa(;hing upon each other. To this end he distributed 
his deposits, and in some cases favored certain banks. 
When the crash came his funds were locked up in some 
of these banks. He was then open to the charge, which 
Ninian Edwards made over the signature " A. B.," 
that he had used the treasury funds to win political 
capital, and had corruptly put the funds in unsound 
banks. Crawford was exonerated by a committee of the 
House, but he barely escaped ruin." He introduced the 
limited period of service, by the Act of May 15, 1820, 
into the Treasury Department. This act limits the pe- 
riod of office of all persons engaged in collecting the rev- 
enue to four years, at the expiration of which time they 
go out of office or come up for reappointment.* It is 
nne of the most important steps in the history of the 
abuse of the civil service. Crawford was believed by 
his colleagues to have sacrificed the administration to 
make capital for himself. Adams says that Crawford 

1 24 Niles, 132. - Cobb, 143." 

Folio State Papers ; 5 Finance, \ 
* 7 Adams, 424. 



84 ANDREW JACKSON: 

und Monroe quarrelled to the verge of violence during 
the last months of the administration.^ In order to win 
strength for Crawford, Van Buren was nominated for 
Vice-President by the Legislature of Georgia. This 
proposition was overwhelmed by ridicule.^ Crawford 
was physically disabled from September, 1823, to Sep- 
tember, 1824. He could not sign his name, and was 
apparently a wreck. He used a fac-simile stamp on 
public papers, or it was used by a member of his family 
under his direction. 

Clay had already assumed the championship of the 
protective system. He had been one of the strongest op- 
ponents of the re-charter of the first bank. He had also 
made " sympathy with nations struggling for liberty " 
one of his points, and had been zealous for the recog- 
nition of the South American republics. He was a 
great party leader. He had just the power to win men 
to him and to inspire personal loyalty which Adams 
had not. On the other hand he lacked industry. He 
was eloquent, but he never mastered any subject which 
required study. His strength lay in facility and practical 
tact. He was forty-seven years old. He was stigma- 
tized as a " gambler " by his ojjponents in the campaign. 
From 1820 to 1823 he was not m public life, but was 
retrieving his private fortunes. His enemies said that 
his affairs had been embarrassed by gambling. He was 
Speaker from 1815 to 1820, and again from 1823 to 
1825. He was one of the commissioners who made tlip 
treaty of Ghent. 

The Crawford men wanted a congressional caucus in 
1824, because they had control of the machine. Thr 
lupj)orters of the other candidates opposed any caiuus 
i 7 Adams, 81. 2 Cobb, 209. 



CAUCUS OF 1824. 85 

but secretly, because the caucus was now an established 
institution. The opponents of the caucus found a strong 
ally in Niles, who opened fire on the caucus in his 
" Register " without any reserve. His sincerity and 
singleness of purpose are beyond question. He did not 
use his paper to support any candidate. He was an old 
Jeffersonian republican of 1798, and he believed sin- 
cerely in all the "principles." He assailed the caucus, 
because in his view it usurped the right of the people to 
govern themselves. He denounced it steadily for more 
than a year, and he succeeded in casting odium upon it. 
The Legislatures of New York and Virginia passed reso- 
lutions in favor of a caucus, because these two States, 
while united, could control the presidency through the 
caucus. New York being rent by democratic faction 
fights, and Virginia being led by a close oligarchy. New 
York became an appendage to Virginia in their " co- 
alition. Tennessee, South Carolina, Alabama, and Ma- 
ryland adopted resolutions against the caucus. The 
Legislature of Pennsylvania declared against a " partial 
caucus." ^ As the time for the caucus approached, ne- 
gotiations for bargains between the candidates became 
active, but it would be tedious to gather the recorded 
reports and rumors of such transactions. 

The caucus met in the chamber of the House of Rep- 
resentatives February 14, 1824.^ Of 216 democrats in 
Congress, Q>Q> were present. Two, who were ill at home, 
sent proxies. If j^roxies were allowable, the members 
of Congress, when assembled in presidential caucus, 
must have been regarded as independent powers, pos- 
sessed of a prerogative, like peers or sovereigns. The 
*ote was : Crawford, 64 ; A Jams, 2 ; Jackson, 1 ; Macon, 
I 6 Aoams. 232. » 25 Nilea, 388. 



86 ANDREW JACKSON. 

1 : i. e., all but the Crawford men stayed away. Gal- 
latin was nominated for Vice-President by 57 votes. 
An address was published, defending the caucus, and 
arguing its indispensability to the party.^ Some ques- 
tion was raised about Gallatin's eligibility on account of 
his foreign birth, but he possessed the alternative quali- 
lication allowed by the Constitution. He had been a 
commissioner at Ghent and a friend of Crawford. His 
nomination did not strenofthen the ticket. There was 
still a great deal of rancor against him for forsaking the 
Treasury Department when the war broke out. He 
soon withdrew his name because the caucus was so un- 
popular. 

Martin Van Buren was chief engineer of this last con- 
gressional caucus. He was senator from New York. 
He and his friends, under the new Constitution of 1821, 
had established a very efficient party organization, which 
they had well in hand. They were known as the 
Regency, and they had renewed the alliance with Vir- 
ginia to control the machine and elect Crawford. A 
project which threatened to mar their scheme was the 
proposition, in 1823, to take the election of presidential 
electors from the Legislature of New York and give it 
to the people. The Regency-Tammany party opposed 
this, as it would render useless all their machinery 
The advocates of the change (being the opponents of 
Crawford, Tammany, and the Regency), formed the 
" people's party." Clinton was for Jackson, so he was 
allied with the people's party against Crawford. Al- 
though Clinton was the soul of the canal enterprise, he 
vas removed from his office of canal commissioner ta 
kry to break up this combination. It would never da 
1 25 NQes, 391. 



INTRIGUES IN NEW YORK. 87 

for the Regency to oppose directly and openly a propo* 
sition to give the election to the people. When the law 
was proposed, the Regency managed to twist it into such 
preposterous shape that a general ticket was to be voted 
for, and if there should not be a majority (which, with 
foiu' in the field, was a very probable result) the State 
would lose its vote. The bill passed the House, but was 
defeated in the Senate.^ The popular indignation was 
BO great that the next Legislature was carried by the 
people's party, and a joint ticket of electors was elected, 
on which were 25 Adams men, 7 Clay men, and 4 
Crawford men.^ Some of them must have changed 
their votes before the election. 

A federalist convention at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 
February 22, 1824, nominated Jackson.* At a primary 
meeting at Philadelphia, Dallas withdrew Calhoun's 
name from the first place and nominated him for the 
second. Calhoun was strong in Pennsylvania, but Jack 
son had superseded him. This move was a coalition of 
Jackson and Calhoun. The democratic convention at 
Harrisburg, Marck 4th, was stampeded for Jackson. 
Only one vote was given against him.^ Another demo- 
cratic convention, called " regular," was convened Au- 
gust 9th. It repudiated Jackson and adhered to Craw- 
ford.^ Jackson and his followers were denounced as 
" disorganizers." The Albany " Argus " said of Jackson, 
" It is idle in this State, however it may be in others, to 
strive even for a moderate support of Mr. Jackson. He 
is wholly out of the question as far as the votes of New 

1 2 Hammoud, 1?2. 

2 27 Niles, 186. Hammoad s statement is obscure. (See 9 
Hammond, 177.) ^ 1 Sargent, 41. 

♦ 26 Niles. 20. ^ I Sargent, 42. 



88 ANDREW JACKSON, 

York are in it. Independently of the disclosures of his 
political opinions, he could not be the republican candi- 
date. He is respected as a gallant soldier, but he stands, 
in the minds of the people of this State, at an immeasur- 
able distance from the executive chair." ^ After the 
" Argus " changed its mind about Jackson, any one who 
held the very judicious opinion embodied in this para- 
graph was regarded by it as a " federalist," wliich was 
as much as to say, an enemy of the American people. 
Niles says that John Randolph opposed Jackson in a 
public speech in 1822 because he was the candidate of 
the Bank of the United States, and his election would 
unite "the purse and the sword." ^ Jefferson said, "I 
feel very much alarmed at the prospect of seeing Gen- 
eral Jackson President. He is one of the most unfit 
men I know of for the place. He has had very little 
respect for laws or constitutions, and is, in fact, an able 
military chief. His passions are terrible. . . . He 
has been much tried since I knew him, but he is a dan- 
gerous man." ' On the contrary, Jackson's courtly 
bearing won for him all the ladies. Webster wrote, 
" General Jackson's manners are more presidential than 
those of any of the candidates. He is grave, mild, and 
reserved. My wife is for him decidedly." * Jackson's 
friends induced him to have a kind of reconciliation 
with Scott, Clay, and Benton. The last was a supportei 
of Clay, but when Clay was out of the contest he turned 
to Jackson.^ Adams says that Benton joined Jackson 
lifter Jackson's friends obtained for him the nominatior 

1 Quoted 49 Niles, 1 88. 2 22 NMes, 73. 

8 1 Webster's Correspondence, 371. 
* 1 Webster's Correspondence, 346. 
He went first to Crawford, then to Jackson. (Cobb, 215.^ 



VOTE OF 1824. 89 

AS minister to Mexico. When Adams came in he would 
not ratify the appointment.^ During the winter some 
Bort of a peace was made between Jackson and Craw- 
ford.2 

The result of the electoral vote was : Jackson, 99 ; 
Adams, 84 ; Crawford, 41 ; Clay, 37. For Vice-Presi- 
dent the vote was : Calhoun, 182 ; Sanford, 30 ; Macon, 
24 ; Jackson, 13 ; Van Buren, 9 ; Clay, 2 ; blank, 1. 
New York voted : Jackson, 1 ; Adams, 26 ; Crawford, 
5 ; Clay, 4. The electors were chosen by the Legislature 
in Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, South 
Carohna, and Vermont. In the other States the pojiular 
vote stood (in round numbers) : Jackson, 155,800 ; 
Adams, 105,300; Crawford, 44,200; Clay, 46,500. 
The second choice of Clay's States (Ohio, Kentucky, 
and Missouri) was Jackson. In Pennsylvania Jackson 
had 36,000 votes, and all the others together had less 
than 12,000. Only about one third of the vote of the 
State was polled, because it was known that Jackson 
would carry it overwhelmingly.^ 

The intriguing for the election now entered on a new 
stage. Clay was out of the contest in the House, but 
he had great influence there, and it has often been as- 
serted that the House would have elected him if his 
name had come before it as one of the three highest. 
He was courted by all parties. It would be tedious to 
collect the traces of various efforts to form combinations. 
The timth seems to be this : Washington was filled dur- 
ing the winter with persons, members of Congress and 
others, who were under great excitement about the 
election. All sorts of busybodiss were running about, 

» 6 Adams, 522. a 6 Adams, 478, 485. 

•27NUeB, ISC. 



90 ANDREW JACKSON. 

talking and planning, and proposing what seenied to 
each to be good. Persons who were in Washington, 
and were cognizant of some one line of intrigue, or 
of the activity of some one person, have left records of 
what they saw or heard, and have vehemently main- 
tained each that his evidence gives the only correct 
clew to the result. Every candidate's name is connected 
with some intrigue, or some proposition for a coalition. 
In no case is the proposition or intrigue brought home 
to the principal party as a conscious or responsible par- 
ticipator, and yet it appears that the negotiations were 
often of such a character that they could have been 
taken up and adopted if they had proved satisfactory. 

The election in the House took place February 9, 
1825. On the first ballot, Adams obtained the votes of 
thirteen States, Jackson of seven, and Crawford of four. 
For the first few days Jackson seemed to bear his defeat 
good-naturedly. He met Adams on the evening of the 
election at the President's reception, and bore himself 
much the better of the two.^ 

It was soon rumored that Clay was to be Secretary of 
State. After a few days Clay accepted that post. The 
cJiarge of a corrupt bargain between Clay and Adams 
was then started. It was an inference from Clay's ap- 
pointment, and nothing more. Any man can judge to- 
day as well as any one could in 1824 whether that fact 
leads straight and necessarily to that inference. Not a 
particle of other evidence ever was alleged. We hav^ 
n»ver had any definition of the proper limits of combi- 
nations, bargains, and pledges in politics, but an agree- 
ment to make Clay Secretary of State, if made, could 
not be called a com(/pt bargain. He was such a mau 

1 Cobb, 226. 



CHARGE OF CORRUPT BARGAIN, 91 

that he was a fit and proper person for the place. No 
one would deny that. Therefore no public interest 
would be sacrificed or abused by his appointment. A 
corrupt bargain must be one in which there is collusion 
for private gain at the expense of the public welfare. 
Bargains which avoid this definition must yet be toler- 
ated in all political systems, although they impair the 
purity of any system. 

The men around Jackson — Eaton, Lewis, Livingston, 
Lee, Swartwout — knew the value of the charge of 
corrupt bargain for electioneering purposes, and the 
political value of the appeal to Jackson's supporters 
on the ground that he had been cheated out of his 
election. Did not they first put the idea into Jackson's 
head that he had been cheated by a corrupt bargain ? 
Is not that the explanation of his change of tone from 
the lofty urbanity of the President's assembly to the 
rancorous animosity of a few days afterwards ? Such a 
conjecture fits all the circumstances and all the charac- 
ters. The men around Jackson might see the value of 
the charge, and use it, without ever ti'oubling themselves 
to define just how far they believed in it ; but Jackson 
would not do that. Such a suggestion would come to 
him like a revelation, and his mind would close on it 
with a solidity of conviction wliich nothing ever could 
shake. 

Benton always scouted the notion of the bargain.' 
He says that he knew before Adams did, that Clay in- 
tended to vote for Adams. Benton would not follow 
Clay. Clay's reason for voting for Adams was that 
Crawford was incapacitated by his broken health,^ and 

1 1 Benton, 48. 

* Crawford was taken to -he Capitol for a few hours, a day or 



92 ANDREW JACKSON. 

that a military hero was not a fit person to be President 
January 8th Clay wrote to F. P. Blair ^ that the friends 
of all the candidates were courting him, but that he 
should vote for Adams. January 24th Clay and the ma« 
jority of the Ohio and Kentucky delegations declared 
tliat they would vote for Adams. In a letter to F. 
Brooke, January 28, 1825, Clay stated that he would 
vote for Adams for the reasons given.^ The Clay men 
generally argTied that if Jackson was elected he would 
keep Adams in the State Department. It would then 
be difficult, in 1828, to elect Clay, another Western 
man ; but Adams would have more strength. If Adams 
should be elected in 1824, the election of Clay, as a 
Western man, in 1828, would be easier, especially if Ad- 
ams would give him the Secretaryship.^ On the 25th of 
January, the day after the Western delegations came out 
for Adams, an anonymous letter appeared in the " Co- 
lumbian Observer," of Philadelphia, predicting a bar- 
gain between Adams and Clay. Kremer, member of 
the House from Pennsylvania, avowed his responsibility 
for the letter, although it has generally been believed 
that he could not have written it. Clay demanded an 
investigation in the House, and a committee was raised, 
but Kremer declined to answer them. The letter was 
.inother case of the general device of laying down anch- 
ors for strains which would probably need to be ex- 
erted later. It would not do for Kremer to admit that 

two before the election, but he was apparently a wreck. (Cobb 
818.) 

1 Blair and Kendall, in 1824, were Clay men. They were botl 
ictive, in 1 825, in urging Clay men to vote for Adams. (40 Nile* 
73; Telegraph Extra, 300 ig.) 

« 27 Niles, 386. « Telegraph Extra, 381. 



ADAMS AND CLAY. 93 

the assertion in the letter was only a surmise of his. It 
eertainly was a clever trick. The charge would either 
prevent Clay from going into Adams's cabinet, lest he 
should give proofs of the truth of the imputation, or, if 
he did go into the cabinet, this letter would serve as a 
kind of evidence of a bargain. Immediately after the 
inauguration Kremer made this latter use of it in an 
address to his constituents.^ On the 20th of February 
Jackson wrote a letter to Lewis, in which he affirmed 
and condemned the bargain. Lewis published this letter 
in Tennessee. February 22d Jackson wrote a letter to 
Swartwout, in which he spoke very bitterly of Clay, and 
resented Clay's criticism of him as a " military chief- 
tain." He sneered at Clay as not a military chieftain. 
But he did not allege any bargain. Swartwout published 
this letter in New York.^ Both letters were plainly pre- 
pared by Jackson's followers for publication. Clay re- 
plied at the end of March in a long statement.^ 

Jackson remained in Washington until the middle of 
March. He was present at the inauguration, and pre- 
served all the forms in his public demeanor towards 
Adams.^ His rage was all directed against Clay. In 
the Senate there were fifteen votes against Clay's con- 
firmation, but no charges were made there.^ On his way 
home Jackson scattered the cliai>;e as he went. It is to 
his own lips that it is always traceable when it can be 
brought home to anybody. Up to this time it is ques- 
tionable whether Jackson was more annoyed or pleased 
%i being- run for President. Now that the element of 

1 28 Niles, 21. 2 08 Niles, 20. 

8 28 Niles, 71 * 28 Niles, 19. 

* Branch made some allusions and vague cc "nmet ts. (33 Milei 
SS.) 



94 ANDREW JACKSON. 

personal contest was imported into the enterprise hia 
whole being became absorbed in the determination to 
achieve a victory. There was now a foe to be crushed, 
a revenge to be obtained for an injury endured. He 
did not measure his words, and the charge gained ampli- 
tude and definiteness as he repeated it. In March, 1827, 
Carter Beverly, of North Carolina, wrote to a friend an 
account of a visit to Jackson, and a report of Jackson's 
circumstantial assertion, at his own table, that Clay's 
friends offered to support Jackson if Jackson would 
promise not to continue Adams as Secretary of State. 
Beverly's letter was published at Fayetteville, North 
Carolina.^ In June Jackson wrote to Beverly an explicit 
repetition over his own signature.^ The charge had now 
a name and a responsible person behind it, — Ja€kson 
himself. Clay at once called on him for his authorities 
and proofs. Jackson named Buchanan as his authority.* 
Buchanan had been one of the active ones ^ that win- 
ter, but he had blundered. He now made a statement 
whicli was not straightforward either way, but it did not 
support Jackson's statement. He distinctly said that he 
had never been commissioned by the Clay men for any- 
thing he said to Jackson about appointing Adams.^ 
Clay then called on Jackson to retract, since his only 
authority had failed. Jackson made no answer. He 
never forgave Buchanan. In 1842 Carter Beverly 
wrote to Clay that the charge had never been substan 
tiated, and that he regretted having helj)ed to sjDread it.* 
4.t Maysville, in 1843, Adams made a solemn denial ol 

1 32 Niles, 162. 2 32 Niles, 315. 

« S2 Niles, 415. 

* Markley's Letter, 33 Niles, 167. 

» 32 Niles, 416. • 61 Nilea, 40S. 



ADAMS AND CLAY. 96 

ike charge.^ May 3, 1844, Jackson reiterated the 
charge in a letter to the " Nashville Union." He said : 
" Of the charges brought against Mr. Adams and Mr. 
Clay at that time I formed my opinions, as the country 
at large did, from facts and circumstances which were 
indisputable and conclusive, and I may add that tliia 
opinion has undergone no change." ^ Of course this 
means that he inferred the charge from Clay's appoint- 
ment, never had any other ground for it, and therefore 
had as much ground in 1844 as in 1825. Clay never 
escaped the odium of this charge while he lived. At 
Lexington, Ky., in 1842, he said that he thought he 
would have been wiser if he had not taken office under 
Adams.^ 

On the publication of Adams's "Diary," probably all 
students of American political history turned to see 
what relations with Clay were noted in the winter of 
1824-25. Clay and Adams had never been intimate. 
Their tastes were by no means congenial. There was 
an " adjourned question of veracity " outstanding be- 
tween them, because Clay had given vague support to 
the charge against Adams about the fisheries and the 
Mississippi, and Adams had challenged him to produce 
the proof wliich would impeach Adams's own story of 
the negotiations at Ghent. Clay had never answered. 
December 17, 1824, Letcher, as one of Clay's nearest 
friends, called on Adams. " The drift of all Letcher's 
discourse was . . . that Clay would willingly support 
me, if he could thereby serve himself, and the substance 
i>f his 7neani7ig was tliat if Clay's friends could know 
that he would have a prominent siiare in the administra- 

1 11 Adams, 431. a f6 Nileg, 247. 

62 Niles, 29L 



96 ANDREW JACKSON. 

tion, that might induce them to vote for me, even in the 
face of instructions. But Letcher did not profess to 
have any authority from Clay for what he said, and he 
made no definite propositions." ^ January 1, 1825, Clay 
and Adams met by Letcher's intervention. Adams re- 
corded in 1828 ^ that Letcher told him, January 2, 1825, 
that Kentucky would vote for him. January 9th Clay 
told Adams that he should vote for him, and said that 
Crawford's friends and Adams's friends had approached 
him with personal considerations. January 21st Scott, 
of Missouri, who held the vote of that State, told Ad- 
ams that he wanted Clay to be in the administration. 
Adams replied that he could give no assurances, but 
that, in looking for a Western man, he could not over- 
look Clay. On the same day, in answer to fears that 
he would proscribe the federalists, he answered that he 
would try to break up the old parties. February 3d Web- 
ster called on Adams about the proscription of the feder- 
alists.^ Adams said that he could give no assurances 
about his cabinet, but would try to harmonize parties.* 

The Jackson men found another grievance in the elec- 
tion of Adams. They revived a doctrine which had 
been advocated in 1801, to the effect that the House of 
Representatives ought simply to carry out " the will of 
the people," as indicated by the plurality vote. Benton 
is the chief advocate of this doctrine.^ He faces all 

1 6 Adams, 447. 2 7 Adams, 462. 

» The federalists all hated Adams for "ratting." In 1828 
Timothy Pickering was a Jackson man ; not that he loved de- 
mocracy more, but that he hated Jackson less. (34 Niles, 246.) 

* 1 Curtis's Webster, 237. 

• 31 Niles, 98, gives a homely but very pungent criticism o 
penton's doctrine. It consists in showing what the " will of th* 
people " is, when the state divisions, Senate equality, and negr« 
representation are taken into acconnt. 



DEMOCRACY VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION. 97 

fche consequences of it without flinching. He saya 
plainly that there was a struggle " between the theory 
of the Constitution and the democratic principle." The 
Constitution gives to the House of Representatives the 
right and power to elect the President in a certain con- 
tingency. There is no provision at all in the Constitu- 
tion for the election of President by a great national 
democratic majority. The elected President is the per- 
son who gets a majority of the votes constitutionally 
described and cast, and the power and right of the House 
of Representatives in the contingency which the Consti- 
tution provides for is just as complete as that of the 
electoral college in all other cases. But the electoral 
college by no means necessarily produces the selection 
which accords with the majority of the popular vote. 
The issue raised by Benton and his friends was there- 
fore nothing less than constitutional government versus 
democracy. The Constitution does not put upon the 
House the function of raising a plurality vote to a ma- 
jority, for the obvious reason that it would be simpler 
to let a plurality elect. The Constitution provides only 
specified ways for ascertaining " the will of the people," 
and that will does not rule unless it is constitutionally 
expressed. That is why we are, fortunately, under a 
constitutional system, and not under an unlimited and 
ever-changing democracy. Benton and those who agreed 
with him were, as he avows, making an assault on the 
Constitution, when they put forward their doctrine of the 
function of the House. On that doctrine the Constitu- 
tion is every one's tool while it answers his purposes, and 
the sport of every faction which finds it an obstacle, if 
they can only manage to carry in election. Their might 
and their right become one and the same thing, — 



98 ANDREW JACKSON. 

guarantees of each other. Such a doctrine is one of the 
most pernicious political heresies. A constitution is tc 
a nation what self-control under established rules of con* 
duct is to a man. The only time when it is of value is 
just the time when the temptation to violate it is strong, 
and that is the time when it contravenes temporary and 
party interests. 

In its practical aspects, also, the election of 1824 
showed how pernicious and false Benton's doctrine is. 
" The will of the people," to which he referred as par- 
amount, was an inference only. The moment we de- 
part from constitutional methods of ascertaining the will 
of the people, we shall always be driven to inferences 
which will, in the last analysis, be found to rest upon 
nothing but party prejudices and party hopes. In the 
vote of 1824 the facts were as follows : Clay's states 
indicated, as their second choice, Jackson. Jackson's 
friends inferred that, if Clay had not been running, 
Jackson would have carried those States and would 
have been elected. Going farther, however, we find 
that in New Jersey and Maryland the Crawford men 
supported Jackson to weaken Adams. In North Car- 
olina Adams men supported Jackson to weaken Craw- 
ford. In Louisiana, Adams men and Jackson men 
combined to weaken Clay.^ Hence Jackson got the 
whole or a part of the vote of these four States by bar- 
gain and combination. How many more undercurrents 
of combination and secondary intention there may liavs 
been is left to conjecture. What then becomes of the 
notion of " the will of the people," as some pure and 
sacred emanation, only to be heard and obeyed ? Nc 
election produces any such pure and sacred product, hxk 
^ 1 Annual Register, 40. 



DEMOCRACY VERSUS THE CONSTITUTION. 99 

only a practical, most limited, imperfect, and approxi- 
mate expression of public opinion, by which we manage 
to carry on public affairs. The " demos krateo princi- 
ple," to use Benton's jargon, belongs in the same cate- 
gory with Louis Fourteenth's saying : JUetat c'est vioL 
One is as far removed from constitutional liberty as 
the other. 

Crawford went home to Georgia, disappointed, broken 
in health, his political career entirely ended. He re- 
covered his health to some extent. He became a cir- 
cuit judge, and gave to Calhoun, five years later, very 
positive evidence that he was still ahve. He died in 
1834. 



CHAPTER V. 

Adams's administration. 

The presidency underwent a great change at the elec* 
lion of 1824. The congressional caucus had, up to that 
time, i^roceeded on the theory that the President was to 
be a great national statesman who stood at the head 
of his party, or among the leaders of it. There were 
enthusiastic rejoicings that " King Caucus " was de- 
throned and dead. What killed the congressional cau- 
cus was the fact that, with four men running, the ad- 
herents of three of them were sure to combine against 
the caucus, on account of the advantage which it would 
give to the one who was expected to get its nomination. 
However, it was a great error to say that King Caucus 
was . dead. Looking back on it now, we see that the 
caucus had only burst the bonds of the chrysalis state 
and entered on a new stage of life and growth. 

Jackson was fully recognized as the coming man. 
There was no fighting against his popularity. The 
shrewdest politician was he who should seize upon that 
popularity as an available force, and prove capable of 
controlling it for his purposes. Van Buren proved him- 
Helf to be the man for this function. He usurped the 
position of Jackson leader in New York, which seemed by 
priority to belong to Clinton. He and the other Crawford 
leaders had had a hard task to run a man who seemed 
to be physically incapacitated for the duties of the presi 



THE OPPOSITION. 101 

iency, but when Crawford's health broke down it was 
too late for them to change the whole plan of their 
campaign. After the election they joined the Jackson 
party. The " era of good feeling " had brought into 
politics a large number of men,^ products of the con- 
tinually advancing political activity amongst the least 
ediicated classes, who were eager for notoriety and 
spoils, for genteel living without work, and for public 
position. These men were ready to be the janissaries 
of any party which would pay well. They all joined the 
opposition because they had nothing to expect from the 
administration. All the factions except the Adams fac- 
tion, that is to say, all the federalists, and all the non- 
Adams personal factions of the old republican party 
went into opposition. These elements were very inco- 
herent in their political creeds and their political codes, 
but they made common cause. ^ They organized at once 
an opposition of the most violent and factious kind. 
Long before any political questions arose, they devel- 
oped a determination to oppose to the last whatever 
the administration should favor. They fought for four 
years to make capital for the next election, as the chief 
business of Congress. John Randolph, who by long 
practice had become a vii'tuoso in abuse, exhausted his 
powers in long tirades of sarcasm and sensational denun- 
ciations, chiefly against Clay. The style of smartness 
which he was practising reached its climax when he 
called the administration an alliance of Blifil and Black 
George, the Puritan and the Black-leg. He and Clay 
fought a duel, on which occasion, however, Randolph 

1 3 Ann. Reg. 10. 

2 The new groupings caused ictense astonishment to simple- 
minded observers. (See 32 Niles, 339.) 



102 ANDREW JACKSON. 

fired in the air. After Jackson's election, Randolph 
was given the mission to Russia, and was guilty of a 
number of the abuses which he had scourged most freely. 
He had to endure hostile criticism, as a matter of course, 
and he learned the misery of a public man forced to 
make " explanations " under malignant charges. He 
proved to be as tliin-skinned as most men of his stamp 
are when their turn comes.^ 

Van Buren initiated the opposition into the methods 
and doctrines of New York politics. Ever since the 
republicans wrested the State from the federalists in 
1800, they had been working out the methods by which 
an oligarchy of a half dozen leaders could, under the 
forms of democratic-republican self-government, control 
the State. As soon as the federalists were defeated, the 
republicans broke up into factions. Each faction, when 
it gained power, proscribed the others. Until 1821 the 
patronage, wliich was the cohesive material by which 
party organization was cemented, was in the hands of a 
" council " at Albany. After 1821 the patronage, by 
way of reform, was converted into elective offices. It 
then became necessary to devise a new system adapted 
to this new arrangement, and all the arts by which the 
results of primaries, conventions, committees, and cau- 
cuses, while following all the forms of spontaneous ac- 
tion, can be made to conform to the programme of the 
oligarchy or the Boss, were speedily developed. If now 
the presidency was no longer to be the crown of public 
service, and the prize of a very limited number of states- 
men of national reputation, — if it was conceivable that 
an Indian fighter like Jackson could come within th« 
tange of choice, — then the presidency must be evei 
1 2 Garland's Randolph, 339. 



THE SPOILS SYSTEM. 103 

after the position reserved for popular heroes, or, in the 
ftbsence of such, for " available " men, as the figure- 
heads with and around whom a faction of party leaders 
could come to power. King Caucus was not dead, then. 
He had lost a town and gained an empire. It remained 
to develoj) and extend over the whole country an or- 
ganization of which the public service should constitute 
the network. There would be agents everywhere to re- 
ceive and execute orders, to keep watch, and to make 
reports. The central authority would dispose of the 
whole as a general disposes of his army. The general 
of the " outs " recruited his forces from those who hoped 
for places when the opposition should come in. As 
there were two or three " outs " who wanted each place 
held by those who were " in," recruits were not lacking. 
It was during Adams's administration that the opposition 
introduced on the federal arena the method of organiz- 
ing federal parties by the use of the spoils, which method 
had been previously jDerfected in the state politics of 
New York. 

The opposition invented and set in action two or three 
new institutions. They organized local Jackson com- 
mittees up and down the country, somewhat on the plan 
li the old revolutionary committees of corresjDondence 
and safety. It was the duty of these committees to 
carry on a propaganda for Jackson, to contradict and 
refute charges against him, to make known his services, 
to assail the administration,* and to communicate facts, 
arguments, reports, etc., to each other. Partisan news- 
paper writing was also employed to an unprecedented 
extent. The partisan editor, who uses his paper to 
felterate and inculcate statements of fact and doctrine 
designed to affect the mind of the voter, was not a new 



104 ANDREW JACKSON. 

figure in politics, but now there appeared all over the 
country small local newspapers, edited by men who asc 
sumed the attitude of party advocates, and pursued one 
side only of all public questions, disregarding truth, 
right, and justice, determined only to win. In 1826, at 
Calhoun's suggestion, an " organ " was started at Wash- 
ington, the " Telegraph," edited by Duff Green, of Mis- 
souri. The organ gave the key to all the local party 
newspapers. 

Adams showed, in his inaugural, some feeling of the 
unfortunate and unfair circumstances of his position. He 
said, " Less possessed of your confidence in advance 
than any of my predecessors, I am deeply conscious of 
the prospect that I shall stand more and oftener in need 
of your indulgence." In October the Legislature of 
Tennessee nominated Jackson for 1828, and he ap- 
peared before the Legislature to receive an address and 
to make a reply. He resigned the senatorship in a very 
careful and well-written letter,^ in which he urged (re- 
ferring, as everybody understood, to Clay's appointment) 
that an amendment to the Constitution should be adopted* 
forbidding the appointment to an office in the gift of the 
President of any member of Congress during, or for two 
years after, his term of office in Congress.^ In this let- 

1 29 Niles, 156. 

2 Robert G. Harper once testified in a court of law his personal 
belief, founded on general knowledge and inference, that Burr 
could have been elected in 1801 if he would have used "certain 
means," and his belief that Jefferson did use those means. (23 
Niles, 282.) He referred to the appointment by Jefferson to lu~ 
erative offices of Linn, of New Jersey, and Claiborne, of Ten 
nessee (each of whom controlled the vote of a State), and also 
of Livingston, who could have divided the vote of New York 
'86 Niles, 197.) According to a return made to a call by Co» 



METHODS OF THE OPPOSITION. 106 

ker he said that the senatorship had been given to him 
JO. 1823 without effort or solicitation ; also that he made 
it a rule neither to seek nor decline office. In his speech 
before the Legislature he spoke more freely of the cor- 
niption at Washing-ton, from wliich he sought to escape 
by resigning.^ He now had Livingston, Eaton, Lee, 
Van Buren, Benton, Swartwout, Duff Green, and Lewis 
managing his canvass, some of them at Washingion and 
some in Tennessee. They kept close watch over him, 
and maintained constant communication with each other. 
The first overt acts of tlie opposition were the objec- 
tion to Clay's confirmation and the rejection of the 
treaty with Colombia. Clay had been a champion of 
the South American republics, and everything in the 
way of intimacy with them was capital for him. These 
votes occurred in March, 1825. The " Annual Regis- 
ter," commenting, over a year later, on these votes, said : 
" The divisions which had been taken on the foregoing 
questions [those mentioned] left little doubt that the 
new administration was destined to meet with a sys- 
•tematic and organized opposition, and, previous to the 
next meeting of Congress, the ostensible grounds of op- 
position were set forth at public dinners and meetings, 
BO as to prepare the community foi a warm political 
contest until the next election." ^ The public was 
greatly astonished at the uproar among the politicians. 
The nation acquiesced in the result of the election as 
perfectly constitutional and regular, and it cost great ef- 

gress in 1826, the number of members of (/Ongress appointed to 
office by the PresidentvS down to that time was, by Washington, 
0, by Adams, 13 ; by Jefferson, 25; by Madison, 29; by Mon- 
'oe, 35 ; by J. Q. Adams, in his first year, 5. (36 Niles, 267.) 
' 1 Ann. Reg. 21. ^ i Ann. Heg. 38. 



106 ANDREW JACKSON. 

fort to stir up an artificial heat and indignation about it. 
The " bargain " formed the first stock or capital of the 
opposition. The claim that Jackson had been cheated 
out of his election was the second. Some attempt was 
made to get up a cry about " family influence," but thia 
did not take. The charge of bargain and fraud was so 
assiduously reiterated that, in 1827, there were six sena* 
tors and forty representatives who would not call on the 
President.^ It was during the session of 1825-26 that 
the discordant elements of the opposition coalesced into 
a party,^ the modern democratic party. Near the end 
of the session a prominent Virginia politician declared 
that the combinations for electing Jackson were already 
formed.* 

It was proposed to adopt a constitutional amendment 
taking away the contingent power of the House to elect 
a President, but no agreement could be reached. A 
committee on executive patronage was raised, in reality 
to provide electioneering material. This committee re- 
ported six bills, the most important of which provided 
that the President might not ajipoint to ofiice any person 
who had been a member of Congi'ess during his own 
term In the presidential office, and that the President, if 
he should remove any officer, should state his reasons 
to the Senate on the appointment of a successor. No 
action was taken. 

The topic, however, on which the opjiosltion most dis- 
tinctly showed their spirit was the Panama mission 
Benton misrepresents that affair more grossly than any 
other on which he touches. The fact is that the opposi 

1 7 Adams, 374. The federal members of Congress ironic 
•ot visit Madison in 1815. (1 Curtis's Webster, \Zb.) 
« 1 Ann. Reg. 22. » Ibid. 



THE PANAMA MISSION. 107 

don were forced by their political programme to oppose 
a measure which it was very awkward for them to op- 
pose, and they were compelled to ridicule and misrepre- 
sent the matter in order to cover their position. Sar- 
gent ^ tells a story of an opposition senator, who, when 
rallied on the defeat of the opposition in the vote on 
confirming the commissioners, replied, " Yes, they have 
beaten us by a few votes after a hard battle ; but if they 
had only taken the other side and refused the mission, 
we should have had them ! " 

When the Spaniards withdrew from South America, 
in 1824, the newly independent States of South America 
and Mexico drew together by natural instinct, and hav- 
ing borrowed their new political institutior.s from the 
United States, which institutions were for them exotic 
and ill-understood, they sought friendly intercourse with 
the Northern Union. There were then questions of in- 
ternational law pending, in which the new continent 
needed to make a stand against the old. The United 
States, on its part, wanted commercial intercourse with 
the states of Central and South America. It was pro- 
posed by the Central American states to hold a Con- 
gress for consultation. This scheme grew into one of a 
general American Congress, in which the United States 
was asked to join. Adams accepted the invitation and 
appointed two commissioners. The question on the con- 
firmation of these commissioners, and on appropriating 
money for their salaries, gave rise to wordy and violent 
debates in Congress, in which very extraordinary doc- 
trines were laid down aoout the power of the Executive 
m diplomatic affairs. It was declared that the mission 
meant a general policy of foreign interference and " en- 
* 1 Sargent, 117. 



108 ANDREW JACKSON. 

tangling alliances." The Monroe doctrine was vehfr 
mently denounced. The commissioners were finally con- 
firmed. One died on the way ; the other arrived too 
late for the meeting, which took place June 22, 1826. 
The CongTess adjourned to meet again, but, political 
troubles breaking out, nothing came of it. Benton says 
that the result proved the folly of the original plan. In 
order to judge of that, it is necessary to form some 
opinion as to what would have been the advantage polit- 
ically to the South American republics of a close and 
friendly relation with us, and what would have been the 
advantage commercially to us of a close and friendly 
relation with them. It is not at all improbable that a 
grand chance for good to all concerned was lost. As to 
" entangling alliances," the Congress was no doubt a 
grand chance for a " jingo " policy. Everything de- 
pended on the instructions with which the commis- 
sioners were sent. The opposition would not print the 
instructions, because they plainly refuted all the in- 
flated denunciations. It was not until 1829 that public 
opinion forced the printing of the instructions,^ but then 
the whole matter was dead. It has passed into history 
and popular tradition under a very false light. 

Adams had strong convictions about points of public 
policy. He held that it was the duty of the President 
to advise and recommend to Congress such measures as 
he thought desirable in the public interest, and then to 
leave to Congress the responsibility if nothing was done. 
He therefore set out in his messages series of acts and 
measures which he thought should be adopted. Ha 
thereby played directly into the hands of the opposition 
for they then had a comj)lete programme before them ol 
1 They are to be found 4 Ann. Beg. 29. 



ADAMS'S POLICY. 109 

«rhat they had to attack. Adams held the active theory 
oi statesmanship. He was not content to let the people 
ftlone. He thought that a statesman could foresee, plan, 
prepare, open the way, set in action, encourage, and 
otherwise care for the people. To him the doctrine of 
implied powers meant only that the Constitution had 
created a government complete and adequate for all the 
functions which devolved upon it in caring for all the 
interests which were confided to it. He regarded the 
new land as a joint possession of all the States, the sale 
of which would provide funds which ought to be used to 
build roads, bridges, and canals, and to carry out other 
works of internal improvement, which, as he thought, 
would open up the continent to civilization.^ He cared, 
more for internal improvements than for a protective 
tariff.^ He wanted a national university and a naval 
school. He favored expenditures on fortifications and a 
navy and an adequate army. He wanted the federal 
judiciary enlarged and a bankruptcy law passed. Some 
of the opposition found the party exigency severe which 
forced them to ojDpose all the points in this programme. 
In 1824 Crawford had been the only stickler for state 
rights and strict construction. Men of that stamp were 
now called " radicals." Calhoun and his friends had 
been on the other side. The old-fashioned pettifogging 
of the strict constructionists, and the cast-iron dogma- 
tism of the state-rights men, were developed in the heat 
of the factious opposition of 1825-29. All that, how- 
ever, was at that time considered extreme or " radical." 
Van Buren, on his reelection tG the Senate in 1827, 
wrote a letter in which he promised co recover for the 
States the " rights of which they had been deprived by 
1 9 Adams, 162. * 8 Adams, 444. 



110 ANDREW JACKSON. 

construction," and to save what rights remained.^ Ham 
mond expresses the quiet astonishment which this cre- 
ated in the minds of the people, even democrats like 
himself, who were not aware that the States had suf 
fered any wrong, especially at the hands of the exist- 
ing administration. The country was in profound peace 
and stupid prosperity, and the rancor of the politiciana 
seemed inexplicable. The public debt was being re- 
funded advantageously. Immigration was large and 
growing. The completion of tlie Erie Canal in 1825 
opened up the great lakes to navigation, and the adja- 
cent country to settlement. Public affairs were in fact 
dull. The following passage from the " Annual Reg- 
ister " shows the impression made by the agitation at 
Washington : ^ — 

" Nearly all the propositions which were called for by 
the popular voice were defeated, either from want of 
time for their consideration, or by an influence which 
seemed to exert itself for the sole purpose of rendering 
those who administered the government unpopular. The 
community was generally disajjpointed as to the results 
of the session. . . . Many of the members were new to 
political life. . . . Others were predetermined to oppo- 
sition, and from the first assembling of Congress devoted 
themselves to thwarting the measures which its [the ad- 
ministration's] friends urged upon the consideration of 
Congress. The Vice-President and his friends were most 
prominent in this class of politicians. . . . The manner, 
too, in which the opposition attacked the administration 
displayed an exasperated feeling, in which the commu 
nity did not sympathize, and a general suspicion wa> 
felt that its leaders were actuated by private griefs, anc' 
1 2 Hammond, 246. * 1 Ann. Beg. 149. 



ADAMS AND THE CIVIL SERVICE. Hi 

Jiat the public interests were neglected in their earnest 
Btruggle for power. The pride of the country, too, had 
received a deep wound in the prostration of the dignity 
of the Senate." 

Calhoun appointed committees hostile to the adminis- 
tration, which could not bring their own party to the 
support of their reports. Calhoun also ruled that it was 
not the duty of the Vice-President to preserve order 
save upon the initiative of some senator on the floor. 
Great disorder occurred, and John Randolph especially 
took advantage of this license. The Senate was led at 
the end of the session of 1825-26 to take from the 
Vice-President the duty of appointing the committees of 
the Senate. Letters which appeared in one of the Wash- 
ington newspapers, signed " Patrick Henry," criticising 
Calhoun's course, were ascribed to the President. An- 
swering letters, signed " Onslow," were ascribed to the 
Vice-President. ^ 

Adams took no steps to create an administration 
party. He offered the Treasury to Crawford, who re- 
fused it. He then gave it to Rush, who had voted 
against him. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy 
had likewise supported other candidates."'^ Adams re- 
fused to try to secure the election of Jeremiah Mason, 
an administration man, to the Senate.* He had de- 
clared, before the election, that he should reward no 
one, and proscribe no one. He adhered to this faith- 
fully. Clay urged him tc avoid pusillanimity on the 
one hand, and persecution on the otLer.^ The election 
being over, Clay said that no officer ought to be allowed 
"to hold a conduct in open and tontinual disparage- 

1 Harper's Calhoun, 3' * Perkius, 289. 

8 7 Adafc,8. 14. * 6 Adains. 546. 



112 ANDREW JACKSON. 

mont of the administration and its head." Adams re 
plied that, in the particular case under discussion (col- 
lector at New Orleans), there had been no overt act 
that four fifths of all the custom-house officers had been 
unfavorable to his (Adams's) election, and were now in 
his power ; that he had been urged to sweep them aU 
away ; that he could not do this as to one without open- 
ing the question as to all, and that he would enter on no 
such policy. In 1826 Clay urged Adams to remove 
the custom-house officers at Charleston and Philadelphia. 
Adams refused, although he thought that these officers 
were using the subordinate offices in their control against 
the administration.^ He appointed federalists when he 
thought that they were better qualified than other can- 
didates. This did not conciliate the federalists, and it 
aroused all *' the wormwood and the gall " of the old 
party hatred.^ In 1827 Clay and others urged him to 
confine appointments to friends. He refused to adopt 
that rule.^ He expressed the belief that the opposition 
were spending money to poison public opinion thi'ough 
the press, but he would not do anything for Binns, an 
administration editor."* In June, 1827, he refused to 
go to Philadelphia, to make a speech in German to the 
farmers at the opening of the canal, because he objected 
to this style of electioneering.^ In October, 1827, Clay 
made a warm protest against Adams's action in retain- 
ing INIcLean, the Postmaster-General. Clay alleged that 
McLean was using the post-office patronage actively 
against the administration. McLean hated Clay and 
loved Calhoun,^ but he claimed to be a loyal friend o' 

1 7 Adams, 163. '^ 7 Adams, 207. 

« 7 Adams, 257. * 7 Adams, 262. 

» 7 Adams, 297. ^ 7 Adams, 364. 



ADAMS ON ELECTIONEERING. 113 

the administration. Adams would not believe him a 
traitor.^ A campaign story was started that Adams'a 
accounts with the Treasury were not in order. Clay 
desired that Adams would correspond with an election 
committee in Kentucky, and refute the charge. Adams 
refused, because he disapproved of the Western style 
of electioneering and stump-speaking.^ Binns, an Irish 
refugee, editor of the " Democratic Press " of Phila- 
delphia, ought by all affinities to have been a supporter 
of Jackson, but he took the wrong turning after Craw- 
ford's disappearance, and became a sujiporter of Adams. 
He plaintively describes the results. He tried to talk 
to Adams about appointments. " I was promjitly told 
that Mr. President Adams did not intend to make any 
removals. I bowed respectfully, assuring the President 
that I had no doubt the consequence would be that he 
would himself be removed so soon as the term for which 
he had been elected had expired. This intimation gave 
the President no concern, and assuredly did in no wise 
affect his previous determination." ^ Binns, however, 
was wise in his generation. 

Adams's administration had a majority in the Senate 
until the 20th Congress met in 1827, when both Houses 
had opposition majorities. Adams says this was the 
first time in tlie history of the country that such had 
been the case.^ The session of 1827-28 was almost en- 
tirely occupied in manufacturing political capital. A 
committee on retrenchment and reform presented a 
majority and a minority report. The majority ex- 
pressed alarm at the increasing expenditures of the 
federal government and the extravagance of the ad 

^ 7 Adams, 343. 2 7 Adams, 347. 

» Binns, 250. * 7 Adama, 367, 

8 



114 ANDREW JACKSON. 

ministration. The minority said that no expenditures 
had been made which Congress had not ordered, and 
that the expenditures had not increased unduly, when 
the size and population of the countiy were considered. 
It was charged that large sums had been spent in dec- 
orating the President's house, esj^ecially the " East 
Room." Congress had appropriated $25,000 for the 
White House, of which $6,000 had been spent. The 
rest was returned to the Treasury. As soon as Jack- 
son was elected, the " Courier and Enquirer " said that 
the " East Koom " was very shabby, and would at once 
be made decent.^ There was no attempt to be fair or 
truthful in these charges. They were made solely 
with a view to effect. Clamor and reiteration availed 
to spread an opinion that the administration had been 
extravagant. 

The campaign was conducted, on both sides, on very 
ruthless methods. Niles said it was worse than the cam- 
paign of 1798.^ Campaign extras of the " Telegraph " 
were issued weekly, containing partisan material, ref- 
utations of charges against Jackson, and slanders on 
Adams and Clay. The Adams party also published a 
monthly of a similar character. The country was del- 
uged with pamphlets on both sides. These pamphlets 
were very poor stuff, and contain nothing important on 
any of the issues. They all appeal to low tastes and 
motives, prejudices and jealousies. Binns issued a 
number of hand-bills, each with a coffin at the head, 
known as " coffin hand-bills," setting forth Jackson's 
bloody and lawless deeds.^ One Jackson hand-bill ha^ 

1 Quoted 37 Niles, 229. 2 35 Niles, 33. 

8 Biuns says he issued these hand-bills and was mobbed in 1824 
It seems that his memory failed him. 



TONE OF THE CAMPAIGN. 115 

a broad-axe cut of John Quincy Adams driving off vn\h 
a liorsewliip a crippled old soldiei- who dared to speak 
to him, to ask an alms. In short, campaign literature 
took on a new and special development in this cam- 
paign, and one is driven to wonder whether the Ameri- 
can people of that day were such that all this drivel and 
vulgarity could affect their votes. It appears certain 
that they had not yet learned the art of reading news- 
papers, more especially campaign literature ; an art in 
which the average American citizen has since become a 
great adept. It requires a very active party interest 
now to break down the cynicism and skepticism with 
which everything in a partisan newspaper is read by an 
educated man of forty. 

Against Jackson was brought up his marriage, and 
all the facts of his career which could be made the sub- 
ject of unfavorable comment. Against Adams were 
brought charges that he gave to Webster and the fed- 
eralists, in 1824, a corrupt promise ; that he was a 
monarchist and aristocrat ; that he refused to pay a sub- 
scription to turnpike stock on a legal quibble ; that his 
wife was an Englishwoman ; that he wrote a scurrilous 
poem against Jefferson in 1802 ; that he surrendered a 
young American servant-woman to the Emperor of 
Russia ; that he was rich ; that he was in debt ; that he 
had long enjoyed public office ; that he had received 
immense amounts of public money, namely, the aggre- 
gate of all the salaries, outfits, and allowances he had 
ever received ; that his accounts with the Treasury were 
not in order ; that he liad charged for constructive 
journeys ; that he had put a billiard-table in the White 
House at the public expense ; ^ tha'. he patronized duel- 

1 Levi Woodbury was especially shocked aw this. (Plunjer's 
Pkimer, 513.) 



116 ANDREW JACKSON. 

lists (Clay) ; that he had had a quarrel with his father 
who had disinherited him ; that he had sent out men in 
the pay of the government to electioneer for him ; that 
he had corrupted the civil service ; that he had used 
the federal patronage to influence elections. The fed- 
eralists, in their turn, charged him with not having kept 
his promise to Webster. 

McLean's conduct towards the end of Adams's term 
caused more and more complaint. He had been a 
Methodist minister, and some administration men did 
not want liim dismissed lest the Methodists should be 
offended.^ Bache, the postmaster at Philadelphia, was 
a defaulter. McLean had known it for eighteen months. 
Finally he removed Bache, and af>pointed Thomas Sar- 
gent, who had been allied with Ingham, Dallas, and 
other Jackson men. Adams would not remove McLean.^ 

In October, just before the election, but too short a 
time before it to have any effect on it, Adams became 
involved in a controversy with William B. Giles about 
the circumstances and motives of his (Adams's) going 
over to the administration in 1807. On account of reve- 
lations which were made in this controversy, Adams was 
involved in another with the descendants of the old high 
federalists, who called him to account for allegations 
that the federalists of 1803-1809 were secessionists. 
The controversy developed all the acrimony of the old 
quarrel between the Adamses and the high federalists. 
John Qulncy Adams prepared a full statement of the 
facts on wliich he based his opinions and statements, but 
it was not published until 1877.^ 

I 7 Adams, 540. 2 g Adams, 8, 25, 51. 

* New England Federalism, by Henry Adams. See also Fl» 
Bier's Plainer, aud Lodge's Cabot 



THE VOTE IN 1828. 117 

In September, 1827, the Tammany General Commit- 
tee and the Albany " Argus " came out for Jackson,* aa 
it had been determined, in the progrannne, that they 
Bhould do. A law was passed for casting the vote of New 
York in 1828 by districts. The days of voting through- 
out the country ranged from October 31st to November 
19th.^ The votes were cast by the Legislature in Dela- 
ware and South Carolina ; by districts in Maine, New 
York, Maryland, Tennessee ; elsewhere, by general 
ticket. Jackson got 178 votes to 83 for Adams. Tlie 
popular vote was 648,273 for Jackson ; 508,064 for 
Adams. ^ Jackson got only one vote in New England, 
namely, in a district of Maine, where the vote was, Jack- 
son, 4,223 ; Adams, 4,028.^ New York gave Jackson 
20 ; Adams, 16. New Jersey and Delaware voted for 
Adams. Maryland gave him 6, and Jackson 5. Adams 
got not a single vote south of the Potomac or west of 
the Alleghanies. In Georgia no Adams ticket was 
nominated.^ Tennessee gave Jackson 44,293 votes, 
and Adams 2,240. Parton has a story of an attempt, 
in a Tennessee village, to tar and feather two men who 
dared to vote for Adams.* Pennsylvania gave Jackson 
101,652 votes ; Adams, 50,848. For Vice-President, 
Richard Rush got all the Adams votes ; Calhoun got all 
the Jackson votes except 7 of Georgia, which were given 
to William Smith, of South Carolina. 

General Jackson was therefore triumphantly elected 
President of the United States, in the name of reform, 

^ 2 Hammond, 258 ^ Telegraph Extra, 565. 

8 3 Ann. Reg. 31.. Th'j fig ires for the popular vote vary in 
lifferent authorities. 
4 35 Niles, 177. ^ See pa^^c 179. 

« 3 Parton, 151. 



118 ANDREW JACKSON. 

and as the standard-bearer of the people, rising in their 
might to overthrow an extravagant, corrupt, aristoci atic, 
federalist administration, which had encroached on the 
liberties of the people, and had aimed to corrupt elec- 
tions by an abuse of federal patronage. Many people 
believed this picture ox Adams's administration to be 
true. Andrew Jackson no doubt believed it. Many 
people believe it yet. Perhaps no administration, ex- 
cept that of the elder Adams, is under such odium. 
There is not, however, in our history any administration 
which, upon a severe and impartial scrutiny, appears 
more worthy of respectful and honorable memory.^ Its 
chief fault was that it was too good for the wicked world 
in which it found itself. In 1836 Adams said, in the 
House, that he had never removed one person from 
office for political causes, and that he thought that was 
one of the principal reasons why he was not reelected.^ 
The " Annual Register " ^ aptly quotes, in regard to 
Adams, a remark of Burke on Lord Chatham : " For a 
wise man he seemed to me, at that time, to be governed 
too much by general maxims. In consequence of having 
put so much the larger part of his opposers into power, 
his own principles could not have any effect or influence 
in the conduct of affairs. When he had executed his 
plan he had not an inch of ground to stand upon. When 
he had accomplished his scheme of administration he 
was no longer a minister." 

1 See ]Morse's Adairn, ^ 50 Niles, 194. 

* 3 Ann. Reg. 34. 



CHAPTER VI. 

THE *" RELIEF " SYSTEM OF KENTUCKY. 

Before entering upon the history of Jackson's ad- 
Dainistration it is necessary to notice a piece of local 
history, to which frequent subsequent reference must be 
made, on account of influences exerted on national poli- 
tics. A great abuse of paper money and banking took 
place in the Mississippi Valley between 1818 and 1828. 
It was an outcome of the application of political forces to 
the relations of debtor and creditor. It necessarily fol- 
lowed that political measures were brought into collision 
with constitutional provisions, and with judicial insti- 
tutions as the interpreters and administrators of the 
game, in such points as the public credit, the security 
j)f contracts, the sanctity of vested rights, the indej^en- 
dence of the judiciary, and its power to pass on the con- 
stitutionality of laws. Kentucky was the scene of the 
strongest and longest conflict between the constitutional 
guarantees of vested rights and the legislative measures 
for relieving persons from contract obligations, when the 
hopes under which those obligations were undertaken 
had been disappointed by actual experience. It was 
from Kentucky, also, that the influe.ices arose which were 
brought to bear on national politics. 

Some very early incidents in the history of Kentucky 
Bnow the spirit which was at work in the later troubles. 
An insurance company was chartered ic 1801, an ob- 



120 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Bcure clause in whose charter gave the power to iesuo 
currency. At that thne the Jeffersonian party was 
under its anti-bank impulse, and, that party then being 
in control, the power to issue currency would not have 
been given intentionally.^ In 1803, Judge Muter, of 
the Court of Aj)peals, " being very poor and rather super- 
annuated," was induced to resign by a pension of $300, 
guaranteed by the Legislature. The following year 
the pension was repealed, as being unconstitutional. In 
1809 the Bank of Kentucky was founded, with a capital 
of a million. The State owned part of the capital stock. 
In 1816 great popular hostility was manifested to the 
practice of quoting English decisions in the courts. 
This was one of Duane's '^ pet points of hostility to the 
judiciary. Of course it appealed to popular prejudice. 
All the English decisions breathed the spirit of perma- 
nent institutions and tradition? established to control 
moving interests and wishes. A law was passed in 
Kentucky forbidding the citation of any English cases 
since July 4, 1776. The negative was left out of this 
law. The cases were cited in the reports, but were not 
read in court. The law fell into disuse. 

During the period of inflation east of the AUeghanies 
(1812-18),* the States west of the AUeghanies had 
plenty of silver, and were free from financial disturbance. 
At the session of 1817-18, the Legislature of Kentucky 
plunged that State into the inflation system by charter- 
ing forty banks, which were to issue notes redeemable 
in Bank of Kentucky notes. The popular party was 
now under the dominion of a mania for banks, as th« 
'•latitutions for making the poor rich. Clamorous de 

1 Collins, 56. * Sec page 3(J9 

■ See page 229. 



BANK MANIA. 121 

mands were, at the same time, made for a share in the 
blessings which the Bank of the United States was to 
shower over the country, and two branches were es- 
tablished, one at Lexington and one at Louisville. 
Prices immediately began to rise, specie was exported, 
contracts were entered into, in the expectation of a con- 
stant advance of the " wave of prosperity." All has- 
tened to get into debt, because to do so was not only the 
way to get rich, but the only way to save one's self from 
ruin. In June, 1819, it is reported : " The whole State 
is in considerable commotion. The gross amount of 
debts due the banks is estimated at ten millions of 
dollars. . . . Several county meetings have been held. 
Their purpose is : (1) a suspension of specie payments ; 
(2) more paper money ; (3) an extra session of the 
Legislature to pass some laws on this emergency. What 
did we tell the people of Kentucky when they littered 
their banks ? " ^ 

In 1819 the banks of Tennessee and Kentucky and 
nearly all in Ohio suspended S23ecie payments. The}' 
generally ascribed their ruin to the Bank of the United 
States. They overissued their notes, which accumulated 
in the branch of the bank, that being the strongest 
holder. These notes were presented for redemption. 
The local banks construed that as " oppression," and 
eagerly warded off all responsibility from themselves by 
representing themselves as the victims of an alien mon- 
ster, wliich crushed them whi)^ they were trying to con- 
fer blessings on the people about them. The big bank 
was bad enough, but the plea of the local banks was in- 
geniously false. It availed, ho\^ever, to turn the po])u- 
lar indignation altogether against the Bank of tlie United 
States. 

' 16 Niles, 2ft. 



122 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Illinois chartered the Bank of Illinois, a private insti* 
tiition, in 1816 ; also the City and Bank of Cairo, tc 
build a city, and to issue notes as a means of getting 
other people's capital to do it with. In 1819 the State 
Bank of Illinois was founded,^ but its charter was soon 
repealed, because it was too preposterous to stand. An- 
other State Bank was founded in 1821, which was a 
great paper-money macliine, and produced ten years of 
confusion and loss.^ As early as 1816, Illinois had an 
endorsement and replevin law. 

July 26, 1820, the Bank of Tennessee was established, 
to last until 1843, with a branch at Knoxville. Its 
amount of issue was a million. Its notes were to be 
loaned on mortgage security under an ai:>portionment be- 
tween the counties, according to the taxable property 
in 1819.^ There was already a Bank of Tennessee, 
which would have nothing to do with the new " bank." 
The Legislature of Tennessee also passed a law that both 
real and personal property sold under execution should 
be redeemable within two years by paying the purchaser 
ten per cent advance. Jackson is mentioned as having 
been a prominent and energetic opponent of the relief 
system.* In June, 1821, the Court of Appeals of Ten- 
nessee pronounced the replevin law unconstitutional, and 
the relief system in that State came to an end.* 

Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri were, at the same period, 
more or less entangled in the same system. 

In 1817 the circulation of the Bank of Kentucky was 
$417,000. The forty banks and the two branches o} 
the national bank went into operation in that year 

1 16 Nilos, 208. 2 Edwards, 165, 174, 204. 

8 18 Niles, 452 ; Gouge, 39. * Ibid. 

• 21 Niles, 402. 



FORCED LIQUIDATION. 123 

riie Bank of Kentucky could not therefore sustain its 
former circulation. It imported $240,000 in silver, and 
reduced its circulation, November, 1818, to $195,000. 
Nevertheless, it fell neavily in debt during 1818 and 
1819 to the branches of the Bank of the United States.' 
In November, 1819, the latter bank ordered the debt to 
be collected. The Bank of Kentucky suspended and 
compromised. Its notes were at fifteen per cent dis- 
count. A great reduction of the paper was forced, be- 
cause the Bank of the United States came in to demand 
payment. Where any one strong creditor did that the 
credit system fell. May 4, 1820, the stockholders of 
the Bank of Kentucky voted to suspend specie payments. 
This suspension became permanent. Intense rage was 
excited against the Bank of the United States, but if the 
facts are as alleged the Bank of Kentucky must have 
been extending its loans, and if the Bank of the United 
States had not called for payment it would have been 
forced to stand back, and see the Bank of Kentucky use 
the capital of the Bank of the United States as a means 
of profit. Kentucky had laid a tax of $60,000 on each 
of the branches of the national bank, in January, 1819. 
At the same time the Supreme Court of the United 
States declared the bank constitutional.^ In December 
the Kentucky Court of ApjDcals unanimously sustained 
the state tax, on the ground that the bank was uncon- 
stitutional. Two judges thought they must yield to the 
.Supreme Court of the United States. The third. Rowan, 
thought they ought to stand out and force further trial 
in the interest of state rights.^ 

December 15, 18;f9, the Legislature of Kentucky 

Kendall's Autobiography, 203. 2 gee page 128. 

' Kendall's Autobiography, 20? 



124 ANDREW JACKSON. 

passed, over a veto, a law ^ to suspend for sixty day* 
Bales under executions, if the defendant gave bonds 
that the goods levied on should be forthcoming at the 
end of that time. The Bank of the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky was established November 29, 1820, as a 
further " relief " measure for the benefit of the debtors, 
victims of the forty banks of 1818. As a further meas- 
ure of relief a replevin law was passed, December 25, 
1820, according to which the debtor was to have two 
years in which to redeem, under an execution, unless 
the creditor should endorse on the note that he would 
take notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth, if the 
debtor could pay them. Another act was passed, De- 
cember 21, 1821, which forbade the sale of land on 
execution, unless it should bring three fourths of its 
value as appraised by a jury of neighbors. The Bank 
of the Commonwealth was authorized to issue notes for 
three millions of dollars. It had no stockholders. The 
president and directors were elected annually by the 
Legislature. Their salaries were paid by the State. 
They were incorporated. The notes were issued in 
loans on mortgage security, and were apjjortioned be- 
tween the counties in proportion to the taxable property 
in each in 1820. Loans were to be made, in 1820, only 
to those who needed them, " for the purpose of paying 
his, her, or their just debts," or to purchase the products 
of the country for exportation. The bank had twelve 
branches. Its funds were to be : all money thereafter 
paid in for land warrants, or land west of the Tennessee 
river ; the produce of the stock owned by the State in 
the Bank of Kentucky after that bank should be wound 
Bp ; the unexpended balances in the treasury at the en^ 
^ Kendall's Autobiography, 227. 



''JUD ge-breaking: 1 25 

of the year. The profits of the bank were to go to the 
State. Stripped of all pretence, therefore, the bank waa 
the state treasury, put into the hands of a commission 
elected by the Legislature, and incorporated. Its funds 
were the current receipts of the treasury from land, 
and its current balance, if it had one ; also the capital 
aheady invested in the old bank, whenever that should 
be released, which never was done. The notes of the 
bank were legal tender to and from the State. The 
Legislature appropriated $7,000 to buy books, paper, 
and plates for printing the notes. This is all the real 
capital the bank ever had. It was, therefore, just one 
of the grand swindling concerns common at that period, 
so many of which are described in the pages of Niles 
and Gouge.^ 

In 1822 Judge Clark, of the Circuit Court of Ken- 
tucky, declared the replevin law of that State unconsti- 
tutional.'^ He was cited before the House of Represen- 
tatives of the State, and an effort was made to have him 
removed by the Governor on the resolution of the Legis- 
lature. The vote was 59 to 35 ; not two thirds, as le- 
quired by the Constitution for this method of removal. 
In tJiis year the Legislature used its power in the election 
of directors of the old Bank of Kentucky to jnit in " re 
lief " men who would make that bank accept Common* 
wealth notes. The effect was that the stock of the old 
bank at once fell to fifty, an^ it suspended.^ In Oc- 
tober, 1822, a specie dollar was worth $2.05 in Com- 

1 See 8 Peters, 118; 11 Peters 257. 

2 23 Niles, Supp. 153; 'suppl-iien* ':o the 22d vol.). The 
fudge's decisiou, the legislative proceedings and the judge's de 
fence are there given. 

8 Collins, 89. 



126 ANDREW JACKSON. 

monwealth notes.^ A Kentucky correspondent wi'ites, 
February, 1823 : The Bank of the Commonwealth "' has 
nearly destroyed all commerce or trade, extinguished 
personal credit, and broken down confidence between 
man and man, as well as damped and depressed the 
industry of the State ; but the people are beginning to get 
tired of its blessings, and its paper-mill will soon cease 
working, leaving a debt, however, due to it from the 
poorest of the people to the amount of two and a half 
or three millions of dollars." ^ 

In 1823 the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth 
began to be withdrawn and burned. Governor Adair, in 
his message of that year, approved of the relief system, 
and denounced tlie courts for deciding the replevin laws 
unconstitutional. This proceeding of the courts seems 
to have been then regarded very generally by the people 
of Kentucky as a usurpation by the judges, and an as- 
sault on the liberties of the people. After Adair's term 
expired, he petitioned for redress, on account of the 
payment of his salary in depreciated paper. 

In 1823 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky declared 
the relief laws unconstitutional. The Legislature, in 
January, 1824, affirmed the constitutionality of said 
laws, and an issue was made up on the right and power 
of courts to annul, on the ground of unconstitutionality, 
laws passed by the representatives of the people. The 
relief system thus brought directly to the test the power 
of a system of constitutional guarantees, administered 
by an independent judiciary, to protect rights against an 
interested and corrupt majority of debtors, which was 

1 23 Niles, 96. 

* 23 Niles, 337. Kendall justly described the relief system ii 
1821. (Autobiography, 246.) 



OLD COURT AND NEW COURT. 127 

ttsing its power, under democratic-republican self-govern- 
ment, to rob the minority of creditors. The state elec- 
tion of 1824 was fought on the effort to elect a Legis- 
lature two thirds of wliich would memorialize the Gov- 
ernor for the removal of the judges who had decided the 
relief laAvs unconstitutional. A majority was obtained, 
but not two thirds. Another course was then taken. 
The legislative act by which the state judiciary was 
organized and the Court of Appeals created was re- 
pealed. Reference was made, in defence of this action, 
to the repeal of the federal judiciary act, at the begin- 
ning of Jefferson's administration.^ A new Court of Ap- 
peals was constituted by a new act. William T. Barry 
was appointed chief justice. The old court denied the 
constitutionality of the repeal and of the new court, an(/ 
continued its existence, so that there were two courts. 
In 1825 the parties in the State were " Old Court " and 
" New Court." ^ The new court party affirmed, some- 
times with vehemence, sometimes with solemnity, that 
liberty and republicanism were at stake, and that the 
contest was to see whether the judges should be above 
the law. The old court party won a majority in the 
lower House. The Senate, which held over, was still of 
the new court party. The House voted to abolish the 
new court, but the Senate did not agree. By this time 
the contest had developed a whole school of ambitious, 
rising politicians, who appealed with demagogical ad- 
dress to the passions and distress of the embarrassed 
debtors. In November, 1825, Niles quotes a Ken- 
tucky paper that more persons had left that State than 
aad come to it for many years. It is plain that two 
tlasses of persons were driven away by the relisf system : 
1 Collins, 90. 2 28 Niles, 277. 



l28 ANDREW JACKSON. 

(1) those who wanted, by steady industry and accumula- 
tion without borrowing, to acquire capital and to be se- 
cure in the possession of it ; and (2) those who could not, 
ander the prevailing depression, work off the mortgages 
which they had eagerly given to the Bank of the Com- 
monwealth for its notes, in the hope of thus escaping 
from old embarrassments. After five years their con- 
dition was hopeless, and if they had any energy they 
started westward to begin again. 

In the mean time there had been a number of decisions 
by the Supreme Court of the United States which irri- 
tated the people of Kentucky, and enhanced their alarm 
about the assaults of the judiciary on liberty. We have 
seen how the state banks used the Bank of the United 
States as a scapegoat for all their sins, and for all the 
bad legislation of the States. The next swing of the 
pendulum of popular feeling was over into hatred of the 
Bank of the United States. Several States, of which 
Kentucky was one, tried to tax the branches out of ex- 
istence. In McCuUoch vs. Maryland (1819),^ and in 
Osborn vs. Bank of the United States (1824),^ the Su- 
preme Court of the United States declared that the 
States could not tax the bank. In Sturges vs. Crownin- 
shield (1819),^ the same court set limits to the state in- 
solvent laws and thereby prevented the favor to debtors 
wnich the embarrassed States desired to provide. R. M. 
Jolmson, of Kentucky, proposed an amendment to the 
Constitution, January 14, 1822, giving appellate juris- 
diction to the Senate in any case to which a State was a 
party, arising under the laws, treaties, etc., of the United 
States.* In Bank of the United States vs. jJalstea(? 

1 4 Wheuton, 316. - 9 Wheaton, 739. 

* 4 Wheaton, 122. * 7 Benton's Abridgment, 145. 



ALLEGED FEDEPAL ENCROACHMENTS. 129 

(1825)/ the Supreme Court decided that it had juris- 
diction in suits to which the Bank of the United States 
was a party, and that a law which forbade sales of land 
under execution for less than tliree fourths of the ap- 
praised value did not apply to writs of execution issued 
b} federal courts. The question of the constitutionality 
of such a law was avoided. In Wayman vs. Southard 
(1825),^ the Supreme Court of the United States decided 
that the replevin and endorsement law of Kentucky did 
not apply to a writ of execution issued from a federal 
court. In the Bank of the United States vs. the Plant- 
ers' Bank of Georgia (1824),^ it decided that if a State 
became a party to a banking or commercial enterprise 
the State could be sued in the course of the business. 
This decision seemed to threaten the Bank of the Com 
mon wealth of Kentucky. In Green vs. Biddle (1823),* 
the Supreme Court of the United States decided that 
the laws of Kentucky of 1797 and 1812, which reduced 
the liability of the occupying claimant of land to the 
successful contestant, on account of rent and profits, as 
compared with the same liability under the law of Vir- 
ginia at the time of the separation, and which in a cor- 
responding manner increased the claims of the occupying 
claimant for improvements, were null and void, being in 
violation of the contract between Kentucky and Virginia 
at the time of separation.^ In Dartmouth College vs. 

1 10 Wheaton, 51. ^ \0 Wheaton, 1. 

8 9 Wheaton, 904. 8 Wheatou, 1. 

^ Kentucky sent to Congress, May 2>, 1824, a r'^moustrance 
Hgaiust this decision. Letcher, of Kentucky, introduced a reso- 
lution to amend the law, so that more than a majority of judges 
ghould be necessary U^ declare a state law void. (8 Benton'* 
ibridgment, 51.) 

9 



130 ANDREW JACKSON. 

WoodTPard (1819),^ the Supreme Court had decided 
that the charter of a private corporation was a contract 
which a state Legislature might not violate, and had thus 
put certain vested rights beyond legislative caprice.^ 

Other decisions had also been made, bearing on state 
rights and the powers of the federal judiciary in a more 
general way. In Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee (1816),* 
the constitutionality of the 25th section of the judi- 
ciary act (power of the Supreme Court to pass upon 
the constitutionality of state laws) was affirmed, and 
the authority of the court in a case under a federal 
treaty was maintained against the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia. In Gibbons vs. Ogden (1824),^ the court 
overruled the Supreme Court of New York, and declared 
an act of the Legislature giving exclusive privileges in 
the waters of New York unconstitutional and void. In 
Cohens vs. Virginia (1821),^ it was decided that, if a 
citizen of a State pleads against a statute of his own 
State an act of Congress as defence, the 25th section 
of the judiciary act gives the federal Supreme Court 
jurisdiction to test whether that defence be good. In 
the case of the "Marmion" (1823), the Attorney-Gen- 
eral of the United States (Wirt) had rendered an opin- 
ion » (1824) that a law of South Carolina (1822), 
according to which any free negro sailors who should 
eome into that State on board a ship should be impris- 
oned until the ship sailed again, was incompatible with 
the Constitution and with the international obligations 
of the United States. The District Court of the Uniteqf 
States had decided (1823) to the same effect.' 

1 4 "Wheaton, 518. '^ 1 Webster's Correspondence, 283. 

' 1 Wheaton, 304. * 9 Wheaton, 1. 65 Wheaton, 264, 
® 1 Opinions of the Attorneys-General, 659. 
' 25 Niles, 12. 



GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 131 

From our present stand-point of established doctrine 
on the points of constitutional law above enumerated, 
it is difficult to understand the shocks which many or 
all of these decisions gave to the Jeffersonian school of 
politicians. The assertion that the reserved rights of 
the States had been invaded ^ is to be referred to these 
judicial decisions, not to executive acts. The strict- 
eon struction, state-rights school felt every one of these 
decisions as a blow from an adversary against whom 
there was no striking back, and the fact undoubtedly is 
that the Supreme Court, under the lead of Marshall and 
Story, was consolidating the federal system, and secur- 
ing it against fanciful dogmas and exaggerated theories 
which would have made the federal government as 
ridiculous as the German Bund, Readers of to-day are 
surprised to find that a great many people were alarmed 
about their liberties under the mild and timid rule of 
Monroe.^ It was, however, by no means the scholastic 
hair-splitters and hobby-riders in constitutional law 
alone who were astonished and bewildered by the course 
of the decisions. It needs to be remembered that the 
system of the Constitution, even after the second war, 
was yet, to a great degree, unestablished and unformed. 
Actual experience of any legislative act or constitutional 
provision is needed to find out how it will work, and 
what interpretation its terms will take on from the 
growth of institutions and from their inter-action. It is 
impossible, upon reading a constitutional provision, to 
figure to one's self, save in the vaguest way, what will 
be the character and working, of the institution which it 

1 See page 109-10. 

2 See Garland's i?anc?oZpA, especially IL 211, on Gibbona r« 
dgden. 



132 ANDREW JACKSON. 

creates. It was one of the most fortunate circumstances 
in the history of the United States that the judicial in- 
terpretation and administration of the Constitution was, 
during its formative period, for a long time in the hands 
of men who shaped the Constitution in fidelity to its 
original meaning and spirit, to secure at once dignity 
and strength to the federal system, and constitutional 
liberty to the nation. It is fortunate that they were 
men of profound legal attainments and historic sense, 
and neither abstractionists of the French school, nor 
dialecticians under the state-rights and strict-construc- 
tion dogmas. The history of the country has proved 
the soundness and wisdom of the constitutional princi- 
ples they established, but while they were doing this 
they had to meet with a great deal of criticism and 
abuse. Kentucky had furnished a number of the cases, 
and at least two important interests of hers (relief sys- 
tem and contested land titles) had been decided ad- 
versely to the interests of the classes which had least 
education and property. 

The message of Governor Desha of Kentucky, No- 
vember 7, 1825,^ deserves attentive reading from any 
one who seeks to trace the movement of decisive forces 
in American political history. The Governor denounces 
all banks, and especially the Bank of the United States, 
because they are all hostile to the power and rights 
of the States. He says that the Bank of the United 
States has been taken under the protection of the federal 
Supreme Court, and that these two foreign powers, sa 
allied, have overthrown the sovereignty of Kentucky 
He complains of the State Court of Appeals, which ha(i 
leclared the law taxing the Bank of the United Statei 
1 29 Niles, 219. 



DESHA'S MESSAGE OF 18-25. 133 

So ba constitutional, for not maintaining its ground, but 
receding, and deferring to the contrary decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States. He congratulates 
the State, however, that the abolition of the old court 
has removed the compliant head from the state judiciary, 
and that the new court will maintain the sovereignty of 
the State against federal encroachments. He declares 
that the emigration from the State was due to the de- 
cision about the occupying claimant law. He denounces 
the federal courts for not recognizing the state relief laws 
in regard to writs issued by themselves, and he regards 
the State as robbed of self-government by this intrusion 
of foreign courts, which bring with them an independent 
code of procedure. He defends the relief system, and, 
altliough he does not distinctly say so, what he means is 
that the federal courts, by their intrusion, enable foreign 
creditors to escape the treatment which Kentucky cred- 
itors have to submit to under the laws of their country. 
This was the invasion of the " sovereignty " of Ken- 
tucky which was resented most. 

In the same message Desha suggested that the Legis- 
lature should abolish both the Courts of Appeals, and he 
promised that, if this should be done, and a new court 
should be established, he would select the judges for it 
equally from the two existing ones. In 1826 the state 
election was again a contest between old court and new 
court. The old court carried both Houses.^ The re- 
plevin laws were repealed. The acts of the new court 
were treated as null. The new court seized the records, 
and held them by military force. Civ'l war was avoided 
')nly by the moderation of the old court party. The 
Legislature repealed the law constituting the new court, 
1 Collins, 93 



134 ANDREW JACKSON. 

but the Governor vetoed the repeal.^ It was passed 
over his veto December 30, 1826. By resignations 
and new appointments among the judges, the court was 
reconstituted as a single anti-relief body in the years 
1828-9. 

In 1827 the currency of the States in the Mississippi 
Valley was fairly good. There remained only $800,000 
of Commonwealth paper out, and this was merchandise, 
not currency.^ The bank held notes of individuals to 
the amount of one and a half millions, and real estate 
worth $30,592. Hence there was due to it a balance 
from the public, after all its notes should be paid in, of 
$600,000. Its debtors had this to pay in specie or its 
equivalent, or else the bank would get their property. 
This sum, therefore, fairly represents the net final swin- 
dle which the relief system perpetrated on its dupes, to 
say nothing of its effects on creditors and on the general 
prosperity of the State. The bank never had over 
$7,000 capital even spent upon it. Its total issue of 
bits of paper was printed with the denomination dollars 
up to three millions. By this issue it had won $600,000 
worth of real property, or twenty per cent in five years. 
Who got this gain ? It seems that there must have been 
private and personal interests at stake to account for 
the luge which was excited by the decisions which 
touched this bank, and by the intensity of friendship 
.br it which was manifested by a leading political clique. 

In 1828 the parties were stiU relief and anti-relief . 
the former for Jackson, the latter for Adams. The 
ideas, however, had changed somewhat. A " relief ' 
man, in 1828, meant a state-rights man and strict con- 
Itructionist, who wanted to put bounds to the supposed 
1 31 Niles. 310. '^ 32 Niles, 37. 



OTHER DECISIONS. 135 

encroachments of the federal power, especially the 
judiciary, and indeed to the constitutional functions 
of the judiciary in general. Metcalf, the anti-relief 
candidate for Governor, in 1828, defeated Barry, the 
relief candidate, after a very hard fight,^ but the State 
gave 7,912 majority for Jackson. 

Two later decisions of the Supreme Court may here 
be mentioned, because they carried forward the same 
constitutional tendency which has been described. 
They were connected with the political movements 
which have been mentioned, and with those wliich came 
later. 

In the Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky vs. 
Wister et al. (1829),^ it was held that the bank must 
pay specie on demand in return for a deposit which had 
been made with it of its own notes, although these notes 
were, when deposited, worth only fifty cents on the 
dollar. It had been provided in the act establishing the 
bank that it should pay specie. The bank tried to plead 
the non-suability of a State, but it was held that, if the 
State was sole owner and issued as a sovereign, it would 
be non-suable. Then, however, the notes would be bills 
of credit. If the State issued as a banker, not a sover- 
eign, then it was suable under the decision in the case 
of the Planter's Bank of Georgia. In Craig vs. Mis- 
souri (1830),^ a law of Missouri (1821) establishing 
loan offices to loan state currency issues on mortgages 
was declared unconstitutional as to the notes issued, 
which were bills of credit. In tliis decision bills of 
credit were defined. 

1 Collins, 93. 2 2 leters, 318. 

« 4 Peters, 410. 



CHAPTER Vn. 

DTTERXAL HISTORY OF JACKSON'S FIRST ADMINTSTRA 

TION. 

Jackson came to power as the standard-bearer of a 
new upheaval of democracy, and under a profession of 
new and fuller realization of the Jeffersonian demo- 
cratic republican principles. The causes of the new 
strength of democracy were economic. It gained 
strength every year. Everything in the situation of the 
country favored it. The cotton culture advanced with 
great rapidity, and led to a raj)id settlement of the 
Southwestern States. The Ohio States filled up with a 
very strong population. Steamboats came into common 
use, and they had a value for this country, with its poor 
roads, but grand rivers, bays, sounds, and lakes, such as 
they had for no other country. Other forces have al- 
ready been mentioned. Railroads began to be built 
just after Jackson's election. The accumulation of 
capital in the country was not yet great. It was inade- 
quate for the chances which were offered by the opening 
up of the continent. Hence the industrial organization 
did not take the form of a wages organization. Indi? 
viduals, however, found the chances of very free and 
independent activity, which easily produced a simpU 
abundance. The conditions were such as to give to eaclr 
A sense of room and power. Individual energy and 
•nterprise were greatly favored. Of course, the effecl 



SOCIAL NOTIONS AND CHANGES. 137 

on the character of the people was certain. They be- 
came bold, independent, energetic, and enterprising 
They were versatile, and adapted themselves easily to 
eircmnstances. They were not disturbed in an emer- 
gency ; and they were shrewd in dealing with difficul- 
ties of every kind. The state constitutions became more 
and more purely democratic, under the influence of this 
character of the people. Social usages threw off all the 
forms which had been inherited from colonial days. 
The tone of mind was developed which now marks the 
true, unspoiled American, as disting-uished from all 
Europeans, although it has scarcely been noticed by the 
critics who have compared the two : namely, the tone of 
mind which has no understanding at all of the notion 
that A could demean himself by talking to B, or that B 
could be raised in his own estimation or that of other 
people by being spoken to by A, no matter who A and 
B might be. Ceremonies, titles, forms of courtesy and 
etiquette, were distasteful. Niles did not like it that 
members of Congress were called " honorable." ^ He 
criticised diplomatic usages. He devoted a paragraph 
to denunciation of a fashionable marriage in Boston, 
which took place in King's (!) Chapel, and at which the 
people cheered the groom. He objected to the term 
" cabinet," ^ and said, very truly, that there is no 
cabinet in our system. He was displeased by public 
honors to the President (Monroe). 

The people of the period found themselves happy and 
prosperous. Their lives were easy; free from gross 
cares, and free from great political anxieties. They 
tnew little and cared less about other countries. They 
were generally satisfied with some crude notions and 
1 37 Niles. 378. 2 40 Niles. 145. 



138 ANDREW JACKSON. 

easy prejudices about institutions and social states of 
which they really had no knowledge. Niles knew no 
more of the English Constitution and English politics 
than a Cherokee Indian knew of the politics of the 
United States. The American people did not think of 
their economic and social condition as peculiar or ex- 
ceptional. They supposed that any other nation could 
be just like the United States if it chose. They 
thought the political institutions, or, more strictly, the 
political " principles," of this country made all the 
difference. They gave their confidence to the great 
principles, accordingly, all the more because those prin- 
ciples flatter human nature. One can easily discern in 
Jackson's popularity an element of instinct and personal 
recognition by the mass of the people. They felt, " He 
is one of us." " He stands by us." " He is not proud, 
and does not care for style, but only for plenty of what 
is sound, strong, and good." " He thinks just as we do 
about this." The anecdotes about him which had the 
greatest currency were those which showed him tramp- 
ling on some conventionality of polite society, or shock- 
ing the tastes and prejudices of people from " abroad." 
In truth Jackson never did these things except for effect, 
or when carried away by his feelings. 

The Jackson party flocked to Washington to attend 
the inauguration. " They really seem," said Webster,^ 
" to think that the country has been rescued from some 
^reat danger." There was evidently a personal and 
elass feeling involved in their triumph. At the in- 
auguration ball a great crowd of people assembled who 
had not been accustomed to such festivities. Jacksor 

1 1 Curtis's Webster, 340. On the crowd, see Webster's Cor 
respondence, 470, 473. 



JACKSON'S INAUGURATION. \69 

refused to call on Adams, partly because, as he suld, 
Adams got his office by a bargain, and partly because he 
thought that Adams could have stopped the campaign 
references to Mrs. Jackson. That lady had died in the 
previous December, and Jackson was in a very tender 
frame of mind in regard to her memory.^ Adams was 
hurt at the slight put upon him, and thought that he had 
deserved other treatment from Jaekson.'-^ In March, 
1832, R. M. Johnson came to Adams to try to bring 
about a reconciliation with Jackson. Nothing came of 
it.« 

The inaugural address contained nothing of any im- 
portance. There was a disposition to give Jackson a 
fair chance. Every one was tired of party strife,^ and 
there was no disposition in any quarter to make factious 
oj)position. The opposition had taken the name of 
national republicans. They never acknowledged any 
succession to the federalists. They claimed to belong 
to the true republican party, but to hold national theo- 
ries instead of state-rights theories. The Jackson party 
was heterogeneous. In opposition it had been held to- 
gether by the hope of success, but it had not been 
welded together into any true party. No one yet 
knew what Jackson thought about any political question. 
It had been an unfortunate necessity to send him to the 
Senate in 1823. He had made a record on tariff and 
internal improvements. His Coleman letter, it is true, 
left him safely vague on tariff, but he could only lose, 
he could not possibly gain, by making a record on any- 

1 The New York American foUowed her even beyond the 
grave with a scurrilous epitaph. 

2 8 Adams, 128. ' « 8 Aiams, 484. 
* 5 Ann. Reg. 1 . 



140 ANDREW JACKSON. 

thing. His advantage over the " statesmen " was that 
every one of them was on record a dozen times on every 
public question. 

Calhoun had been reelected Vice-President. He now 
understood that Jackson would take only one term, and 
that he (Calhoun) would have all Jackson's support in 
1832. Van Buren, however, who had come into 
Jackson's political family at a late date, had views and 
ambitions which crossed this programme of Calhoun. 
These two men came into collision in the formation of 
the cabinet. Jackson introduced two innovations. He 
put the Secretaries back more nearly into the place in 
which they belong by the original theory of the law. 
He made them executive clerks or staff officers. The 
fashion has grown up of calling the Secretaries the 
President's " constitutional advisers." It is plain that 
they are not anything of the kind. He is not bound to 
consult them, and, if he does, it does not detract from 
his responsibility. Jackson, by the necessity of his 
character and preparation, and by the nature of the 
position to which he had been elected, must lean on 
somebody. He had a number of intimate friends 
and companions on whom he relied. "Biey did not 
hold important public positions. They came to be called 
the " Kitchen Cabinet." The men were William B. 
Lewis, Amos Kendall, Duff Green, and Isaac Hill. 
If the Secretaries had been the " constitutional advisers " 
of the President, their first right and duty would have 
been to break off the intimacy with these irresponsible 
peisons, and to prevent their influence. Jackson's 
Becond iimovation was that he did not hold cabinet 
councils. Hence his administration lacked unity and 
discipline. It did not have the strength of hearty anc 



JACKSON'S CABINET. 141 

jonscious cooperation. Each Secretary went his way, 
and gossip and newsmongering had a special field of 
activity open to them. The cabinet was not a strong 
one. Van Buren was Secretary of State. S. D. Ing- 
ham was Secretary of the Treasury. He had been an 
active Pennsylvania politician, and a member of the 
House for the last seven years. John H. Eaton, of 
Kentucky, was Secretary of War. He had married, for 
his first wife, one of Mrs. Jackson's nieces, and had been 
an intimate friend of Jackson. He was brother-in-law 
of Lewis. He finished, in 1817, a life of Jackson, which 
had been begun by Major John Reid. He had been in 
the Senate since 1818. John Branch, of North Caro- 
lina, was Secretary of the Navy. He had been in the 
Senate since 1823.^ John M. Berrien, of Georgia, was 
Attorney-General. He had been in the Senate since 
1824. William T. Barry, of Kentucky, was Postmaster- 
General, with a seat in the cabinet, a privilege to which 
that officer had not previously been admitted. McLean 
passed into high favor with the new administration, and 
was asked to keep the postmaster-generalship with its 
new rank. When the general proscription began he 
would not a(miit it as to his department. He was trans- 
ferred to the bench of the Supreme Court.'^ Ingham, 
Branch, and Berrien were understood to be the Calhoun 
paen in the cabinet. 

The men who controlled the administration were the 
membei^ of the kitchen cabinet. Lewis does not ap- 
pear to have had any personal ambition. He wanted 
to return to Tennessee, but Jackson remonstrated that 
Lewis must not abandon him 'n the posit; m to which he 

1 See pa2:e 93, and note 5 

2 8 Adams, 112. 



142 ANDREW JACKSON. 

had been elevated.^ Lewis was made Second Auditoi 
of the Treasury. He only asked for an office with 
little work to be done.^ His character and antecedents 
have already been noticed.^ Ainos Kendall was born in 
Massacnusetts in 1789. He was a graduate of Dart- 
mouth College. In 1814 he went to Washington. In 
1815 he was a tutor in Henry Clay's family. He 
edited a newspaper, the " Frankfort Argus," and prac- 
tised law, and was postmaster at Georgetown, Kentucky. 
He became a leading "relief" man, director in the 
Bank of the Commonwealth, and as such an enemy of 
the Bank of the United States. Many of Clay's old 
supporters, who became relief men, were carried over to 
Jackson between 1824 and 1828. Kendall was one of 
these. He had expected an office from Clay, and was 
offered one, but it did not satisfy him. He had an 
acrimonious correspondence with Clay in 1828.^ He 
was in debt. Clay was one of his creditors. His war 
with Clay won him Jackson's favor. Kendall was an 
enigmatical combination of good and bad, great and 
small traits. His ability to handle important state ques- 
tions and his skill as a politician are both beyond ques- 
tion. He prostituted his talents to partHan purposes, 
and was responsible for the bad measures adopted by 
Jackson as much as any other one man. In his private 
character he showed admirable traits of family devotion 
and generosity. As a public man he belonged to the 
worst school of American politicians. He brought the 
vote of Kentucky to Washington, and was appointed 
Fourth Auditor of the Treasury. As time went on he 
proved more and more the master spirit of the adminis 

1 3 Farton, 180. ^ Kendall's Antobiogm/thj/, sm. 

• Telegraph Extra, 305. 



THE KITCHEN CABINET. 143 

tration. Harriet Martineau wrote of him, in 1836, as 
follows : " I was fortunate enough once to catch a 
glimpse of the invisible Amos Kendall, one of the most 
remarkable men in America. He is supposed to be the 
moving spring of the whole administration, the thinker, 
planner, and doer ; but it is all in the dark. Documents 
are issued of an excellence which prevents their being 
attributed to persons who take the responsibility of 
them ; a correspondence is kept up all over the country 
for which no one seems to be answerable ; work is done, 
of goblin extent and with goblin speed, which makes 
men look about them with a superstitious wonder ; and 
the invisible Amos Kendall has the credit of it all. 
. . . He is undoubtedly a great genius. He unites 
with liis ' great talent for silence ' a splendid audac- 
ity." ^ She goes on to say that he rarely appeared in 
jublic, and seemed to keep up the mystery. She at- 
jributes some of Xewis's work to Kendall, but the pas- 
sage is a very fair representation of the opinions of 
Washington society about Kendall. He had very great 
executive and literary ability. Duff Green was a light- 
ing partisan editor. He had the virtue of his trade. 
He was loyal to the standard to which he had once 
sworn. He was a Calhoun man, and he continued to be 
a retainer of the most unflinching loyalty. For the 
first years of Jackson's administration. Green, as editor 
of the " organ," stood on guard all the time to advance 
the cause of the administration. Isaac Hill was born in 
Massachusetts in 1788. His education was picked up 
•n a printing-office. In 1810 he bought and began to 
edit the " Patriot," published at Concord, New Hamp 

1 1 Martiueau's Western Travel, 155. Cf. also 1 Society in 
America, 45. 



144 AN DEE W JACKSON. 

shire. He edited his paper with skill and ability, prop 
agating " true republicanism " in i^artlhus injidellum 
for the people about him were almost all federalists. 
He gained adherents. His jjaper became influential, 
and he built up a democratic par^y in New Hampshire.^ 
He had long favored strict party proscription. In 1818 
he remonstrated with Governor Plumer for appointing 
a federalist sheriff.^ He had the rancorous malignity 
of those men who have been in a contest with persons 
who have treated them from above downwards. He 
was not able to carry New Hampshire for Jackson in 
1828, but the vote was 24,000 for Adams to 20,600 for 
Jackson. Hill was immediately taken into the inner- 
most circle at Washington. The election of Jackson 
meant that an uneducated Indian fighter had been 
charged with the power of the presidency, and that 
these four men wielded it through and for him. Van 
Buren followed, in order to win the* aid of Jackson 
for the succession. He did not put forth any guiding 
force. Eaton had some share in the kitchen cabinet. 
No other member of the cabinet had any influence. 
Barry, another relief man, but personally quite insignifi- 
cant, was at the disposal of the kitchen cabinet. Henry 
Lee had made himself " impossible " by an infamous 
domestic crime. He was offended at the poor share in 

1 He had kept a boarding-house, at which members of the 
Legislature, etc., boarded. In 1823 he is referred to as a power. 
(I Webster's Corres])ondence, 324.) During the New Hampshire 
"flection of 1830, forged documeuts were sent on from Washin^- 
',on to prove Upham, the auti-Jacksou candidate for Governor 
guilty of smuooliuo; under the embargo. (39 Niles, 156.) Mason 
charged Hill with having sent the papers. ' . Webster's Corr& 
$pondenct, 495.) 

* Plumer *8 Plumer, 471. 



THE VICTORS AND THE SPOILS. 145 

the spoils offered to him, and withdrew, relieving the 
administration of a load. Edward Livingston was in 
the Senate, but no direct influence by him on the ad- 
ministration, during the first two years, is discernible. 
The same may be said of Benton. 

Some vague expressions in the inaugural about " re- 
form " and the civil service frightened the office-holders, 
who had akeady been alarmed by rumors of coming 
proscription. There was an army of office-seekers and 
editors in Washington, who had a very clear and posi- 
tive theory that the victory which they had won, under 
Jackson's name, meant the acquisition and distribution 
amongfst them of all the honors and emoluments of the 
federal government. They descended on the federal 
administration as if upon a conquered domain. The 
office-holders of that day had generally staked their ex- 
istence on the mode of getting a living which the civil 
service offered. It did not pay well, but it was supposed 
to be easy, tranquil, and secure. All these persons who 
were over forty years of age saw ruin staring them in 
the face. It was too late for them to change their 
habits or acquire new trades.-^ All the stories by eye- 
witnesses testify to the distress and terror of the " ins," 
and the rapacity of the " outs," at that time. It is cer- 
tain that the public service lost greatly by the changes. 
Sometimes they were made on account of trivial dis- 
respect to Jackson.^ It is not clear who was the author 
or instigator of the policy. Lewis is said to have op- 

1 Washington removed nine personS; one a defaulter ; Adams, 
ten, one a defaulter ; Jefferson, thirty-nine ; Madison, five, three 
defaulters; Monroe, nine; Adams, two, both for cause. (5 Ann 
Beg. 19.) 

'2 I Curtis's Webster, 348. 
10 



146 ANDREW JACKSON. 

posed it. Kendall does not appear to have started with 
the intention of proscription. March 24, 1829, ha 
wrote to the editor of the Baltimore " Patriot " ^ : " The 
interests of the country demand that the [Fourth Audit- 
or's] office shall be filled with men of business, and not 
with babbling politicians. Partisan feelings shall not 
enter here, if I can keep them out. To others belongs the 
whole business of electioneering." Probably Jackson 
believed that the departments were full of corrupt per- 
sons, and that Adams and Clay had demoralized the 
whole civil service, so that a complete change was 
necessary. It would be quite in character for Jackson 
to take all the campaign declamation literally. One 
man, Tobias Watkins, Fourth Auditor, was found short 
in his accounts.^ This seemed to offer proof of all that 
had been affirmed. The proscription was really en- 
forced by the logic of the methods and teachings of the 
party while in opposition. The leaders had been taken 
literally by the party behind them, and by the workers, 
writers, and speakers who had enlisted under them. If 
they had failed to reward their adherents by the spoils, 
or if they had avowed the hollowness and artificiaHty of 
their charges against the last administration, they would 

1 49 Niles, 43. Cf. Kendall's Autobiography, 292. 

2 Adams calls this " the bitterest drop in the cup of my afflic- 
tions" (8 Adams, 144) ; and again he says, " The wrong done to 
me and my administration by the misconduct of Watkins de- 
serves, a severer animadversion from me than from Jackson." 

S Adams, 290.) He there depicts Jackson's rancor agains* 
Watkins. Niles describes the virulent political animus of the 
prosecution. (36 Niles, 421.) After Watkins's term of imprison- 
ment was over, he was detained on account of an unpaid fine 
By Jackson's personal order a label, " Criminal's Apartment, 
was put over the door of the room in which he was kept. 



ORIGIN OF THE SPOILS SYSTEM. 147 

have thrown their party into confusion, and would have 
destroyed their power. It has been shown above how 
the spoils system had been developed, since the begin- 
ning of the century, in Pennsylvania and New York.^ 
It is a crude and incorrect notion that Andrew Jackson 
corrupted the civil service. His administration is only 
the date at which a corrupt use of the spoils of the pub- 
lic service as a cement for party organization under 
democratic-rejjublican self-government, having been per- 
fected iilto a highly finished system in New York and 
Pennsylvania, was first employed on the federal arena. 
The student who seeks to penetrate the causes of the 
corruption of the civil service must go back to study the 
play of human nature under the political dogmas and 
institutions of the States named. He cannot rest satis- 
fied with the exi)lanation that " Andrew Jackson did it." 
Thirty-eight of Adams's nominations had been post- 
poned by the Senate, so as to give that patronage to 
Jackson. Between March 4, 1829, and March 22, 1830, 
491 postmasters and 239 other officers were removed, 
and as the new appointees changed all their clerks, dep- 
uties, etc., it was estimated that 2,000 changes in the 
civil service took place."^ Jackson, as we have seen, had 
made a strong point against the appointment of mem- 
bers of Congress to offices in the gift of the President. 
In one year he appointed more members of Congress to 
office than any one of his predecessors in his whole 
term.® The Senate, although democratic, refused to 
confirm many of the nominations made. Henry Lee, 
appointed consul tc Algiers, and James B. Gardner; 

1 Page 102. 

2 Holmes's speech in the Senate, April 28, *830 
• 5 Ann. Reg. 20. 



148 ANDREW JACKSON. 

register of the land office, were unanimously rejected. 
Others were rejected by large votes.^ Isaac Hill was 
one of these. Webster said that, but for the fear of 
Jackson's popularity out-of-doors, the Senate would 
have rejected half liis appointments.^ The Senate ob- 
jected to the obvious distribution of rewards among the 
partisan editors who had run country newspapers in 
Jackson's influence.* Eaton had visited Binns, and had 
made to him a distinctly corrupt proposition to reward 
him with public printing,* if he would turn to Jackson. 
The rejection of the editors was construed by the Jaclc- 
son men as a proscription of " printers " by the " aristo- 
cratic " Senate.® Kendall was confirmed by the casting 
vote of Calhoun, for fear that he would, if not confirmed, 
set up a newspaper in competition with Green's " Tele- 
graph " for the position of administration organ.* On 
subsequent votes some of the appointments were con- 
firmed, for it was found that Jackson was thrown into a 
great rage against the Senate which dared reject his 
apiDointments. He was delighted when Hill, in 1831, 
was elected by the Legislature of New Hampshire a 
member of the Senate which had refused to confirm 
him as Second Comptroller of the Treasury. Jackson 
threw all the administration influence in favor of Hill's 
election. Here we have an illustration of a method 
of his of which we shall have many illustrations here- 
after. When he was crossed by any one in a course in 
which he was engaged, he drew back to gather force 
with which to carry his point in some mode so much 
more distasteful to his opponents than his first enterprise 

1 5 Ann. Reg. 21. 2 j Webster's Correspondence, 501. 

8 1 Webster's Correspondence, 488. * Binns, 253. 

* Kendall's Autobiography , 370. 

* Kendall's Autobiography, 371. 



THE EATON AFFAIR. 149 

that it would be a kind of punisliment to them and a re- 
dress to him. 

Van Buren and Calhoun at once besfan to strupfo-le 
for the control of the patronage which was made dis- 
posable by the system of proscription. Their contest 
for the succession rent the administration. 

It was a very noteworthy fact that this administra- 
tion, which represented a certain contempt for social 
forms and etiquette, should immediately go to pieces on 
a question of that kind. So true is it that etiquette is 
never burdensome until we try to dispense with it. 

In January, 1829, John H. Eaton married Mrs. Tim- 
berlake, widow of a purser in the navy, who had, a 
short time before, committed suicide, while on service 
in the Mediterranean, because he could not conquer 
habits of excessive drinking. Mrs. Timberlake was the 
daughter of a Washington tavern keeper. As Peggy 
O'Neil she had been well known about Washingfton. 
Eaton had paid her such attention, before her husband's 
death, as to provoke gossip. He consulted Jackson be- 
fore the marriage. Jackson, having in mind the case of 
his own wife, was chivalrously ready to take sides with 
any woman whose reputation was assailed. He made 
no objection to the marriage. When it occurred, several 
persons remonstrated with Jackson about it, on the 
ground that Eaton was to be in the cabinet, and that it 
would hurt the administration. Jackson replied with 
• ifoirit to the effect that Mrs. Eaton was not to be in the 
cabinet. If he had kept that attitude towards the matter 
there might have been no trouble. By Eaton's appoint- 
ment his wife was introduced to the lust circle in Wash- 
ington. The wives of the other Secretaries and the wife 
'>f the Vice-President did not recognize her. She tried 



150 ANDREW JACKSON. 

to force her way, and General Jackson tried to lielj) her 
He made a political question of it. R. M. Johnson was 
the agent for conferring with the Secretaries to prevail 
on them to persuade their wives to recognize Mrs. Eaton. 
The gentlemen were approached individually. Each said 
that he left such matters to liis wife, and could not un- 
dertake to overrule her judgTuent. This answer had no 
effect on Jackson. Mrs. Donelson, wife of Jackson's 
nephew and private secretary, and presiding lady at the 
White House, was as recalcitrant as any one. She was 
banished to Tennessee for some months. Mrs. Huyghens, 
wife of the Dutch minister, refused to sit by Mrs. Eaton 
at a public ball. Jackson threatened to send her hus- 
band home. September 10, 1829, he held a meeting of 
his cabinet, before which Ely and Campbell, two clergy- 
men who were held by Jackson partly responsible for the 
stories about Mrs. Eaton, were called to appear. Jack- 
son interrogated them, argued with them, and strove 
to refute their statements, as a means of convincing the 
members of the cabinet that there was no ground for 
the 2)osition their wives had taken. Of course this fool- 
ish and unbecoming proceeding had no result. 

Van Bur en, being a widower, was in a certain posi- 
tion of advantage, which he used by showing Mrs. Eaton 
public and private courtesies. In this way he won Jack- 
son's heart, for as the matter went on Jackson became 
more and more engaged in it. On the other hand, 
Calhoun suffered in Jackson's good graces by the fault 
of Mrs. Calhoun, who had been conspicuous for dis- 
approval of Mrs. Eaton. Jackson had been growing 
cold towards Calhoun for some time. He doubted if 
Ualhoun was thoroughly loyal to him in 1825 ^ or in 

1 Wise (p. 82) says that Jackson was very angry with CaihouB 
*fter the election in 1825. 



JACKSON'S RELATIONS WITH CALHOUN. 15i 

1828. He thought that Calhoun, in 1825, would have 
made other arrangements than those with Jackson, if 
any more convenient ones had been offered him. Cal- 
houn did, in fact, declare, in 1825, that he was quite 
neutral as between Adams and Jackson. He did not 
interfere at all with the election.-^ The Eaton affair 
was either a pretext or a cause of widening the breach 
between them. The factions opposed to Calhoun tried 
to increase the bad feeling. Jackson was led to believe, 
and he often affirmed, that the attack on Mrs. Eaton 
was a plot to drive Eaton out of the cabinet. When 
forced to justify his own interference, he put it on this 
ground. He said that Clay was at the bottom of the 
attack on Mrs. Eaton. All this trouble in the cabinet 
remained for the time unknown to the public. 

Lewis's statement, given by Parton,^ covers the his- 
tory of all Jackson's relations Avith Calhoun. Lewis had 
an inkling, in 1819, that Calhoun had not, as Jackson 
supposed, been Jackson's friend in Monroe's cabinet, in 
the Seminole war affair. Lewis wrote to the " Aurora," 
suggesting that opinion, but Jackson wrote to him from 
Washington to dismiss any suspicion as to Calhoun's un- 
friendliness in that matter. It seems to be necessary to 
read between the lines of Lewis's statement, on pages 
315-30. Did he not always retain his suspicion of Cal- 
houn ? Was he not on the watch for any evidence to 
confirm it ? He speaks as if he had rested content with 
Jackson's assurance, and Lad been corrected later by ae- 
eident or entirely on the initiative of otners. He does 
not mention the first attempt made by the old Crawford 
men to get over into the Jackson camp. It was not a» 
lasy march, for in 1824 the Crawford men, as the " reg 

1 Cobb, 219. - 3 Parton,3iO. 



152 ANDREW JACKSON. 

nlars," hated intensely the Jackson men, as upstarts 
and disorgaiiizers. Crawford had carried into his re- 
tirement a venomous and rancorous spirit, the chief ob- 
ject of which was Calhoun. He could join any one to 
hurt Calhoun. In 1828 there was a project to run 
Crawford for Vice-President with Adams. ^ Adams re- 
fused.^ Crawford also, in 1828, by private letters to the 
Georgia electors, tried to persuade them not to vote for 
Calhoun.^ In the same year he made friends with Clay, 
writing to him that the charge of bargain was absurd. 
In April, 1827, Van Buren and Cambreleng visited Craw- 
ford, and first established ties between him and Jackson. 
The first effect was a letter from Crawford to Balch, a 
neighbor of Jackson, December 14, 1827, stating that 
Calhoun and his friends bandied about the ej)ithet " mili- 
tary chieftain ; " also that Calhoun favored Adams until 
Clay came out for Adams ; ^ and adding that it would do 
Jackson a service to obtain assurances for Crawford that 
Jackson's advancement would not benefit Calhoun.^ This 
letter was meant to separate Jackson and Calhoun, and 
it may have had a general effect. Specific consequences 
cannot be traced to it. 

According to Lewis's story, James A. Hamilton, on a 
Jackson electioneering tour, went to see Crawford, in 
January, 1828, in order to reconcile him with Jackson. 
Lewis instructed Hamilton what to say to Crawford on 
Jackson's part. Hamilton did not see Crawford. He 
left the business in the hands of Forsyth. Forsyth sooc 
wrote to Hamilton that Crawford affirmed that Jackson'a 

1 33 Niles, 315. 27 Adams, 390. 3 Cobb, 240. 

^ Cf. Lewis, in 3 Parton, 315, on the allusion to Banquo's ghosi 
c Webster's reply to Hayne. 
' 40 Niles, 12. 



CRAWFORD'S REVELATION. 15g 

enmity against him was groundless, since it was not he, 
but Calhoun, in Monroe's cabinet, who had tried to bave 
Jackson censured for his proceedings in Florida in 1818. 
In April or May Lewis was in New York. Hamilton 
showed him Forsyth's letter. For the time, Lewis kept 
this information quite to himself. He was too clever to 
spoil the force of it by using it too soon, and he well un- 
derstood how, in the changes and chances of poHtics, a 
conjuncture might arise in which such a fact would gain 
tenfold force. 

In April, 1828, Henry Lee tried to draw Calhoun into 
a correspondence about the construction of the orders to 
Jackson in 1818. Calhoun offered to give Jackson any 
statements or explanations, but declined to correspond 
with any one else.^ 

In November, 1829, at the height of the Peggy 
O'Neil affair, Jackson gave a dinner to Monroe. At 
this dinner Ringold affirmed that Monroe alone stood 
by Jackson in 1818. If Ringold did not have his cue, 
he was by chance contributing astonishingly to Lewis's 
plans. After dinner Lewis and Eaton kept up a con- 
versation, within ear-shot of Jackson, about what Ringold 
had said. Of course Jackson's attention was soon ar- 
rested, and he began to ask questions. Lewis then told 
him that he had seen, eighteen months before, the above- 
mentioned letter of Forsyth to Hamilton. Jackson 
dispatched Lewis to New York the next morning to get 
that letter. In all this story, it is plain how adroitly 
these men managed the General, and how skilful they 
ivere in producing " accidents." It is evident that they 
did not think it was time yet to bring about the explo- 
iion. Lewis came back from New York without Foi> 
1 40 Nileg, 14. 



154 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Byth's letter, and said that it was thought best to get a 
letter directly from Crawford, containing an explicit 
statement. In this position the matter rested all winter. 
It is perfectly clear that the Jackson managers lost faith 
in Calhoun's loyalty to Jackson and the Jackson party, 
and that they were hostile to him in 1827—28, but could 
not yet afford to break with him. Jackson clung to his 
friendships and alliances with a certain tenacity. As 
Calhoun was drawn more and more into nuUification, 
the Jackson clique took a positive attitude in opposition 
to it. 

In the autumn of 1829 the clique around Jackson had 
decided that he must run again, if he should live, in 
1832, in order to consolidate the party, which no one 
else could lead to victory at that time, and that Van 
Buren must succeed him in 1836.-^ Lewis was already 
committed to Van Buren, and Parton brings us some 
more of Lewis's invaluable testimony as to this arrange- 
ment.^ Here, for once, a wire-puller put on paper a 
clear description of his proceedings in a typical case. 
There was fear in the Jackson camp, in 1829, on ac- 
count of Jackson's very bad health, that he might not 
live through his term. Lewis says that he and Jackson 
were both anxious that Van Buren should succeed Jack- 
son, and they believed that, if Jackson should die, a po- 
litical testament left by him would have great influence. 
Accordingly, Jackson wrote a letter to his old friend, 
Judge Overton, of Tennessee, dated December 31, 1829, 
praising Van Buren, and expressing grave doubts about 
Calhoun. A copy was duly kept, for Judge Overton 

1 Parfcon says that Benton was booked for the period 1844-52 
(3 Parton, 297.) 

2 3 Parton, 293, 297. 



PLOTS FOR 1832. 155 

was not informed of the contingent use for which the 
letter was intended, and no risk was taken as to his 
care in preserving the letter. This provision having 
been made for the case that Jackson should die, the 
next thing was to provide for his reelection, in case he 
should live. 

December 19, 1829, the " Courier and Enquirer " 
came out in favor of Van Buren for the succession, if 
Jackson should not stand for reelection. The " Tele- 
graph " was annoyed at this, called it " premature," and 
likely to produce division.^ These two papers, repre- 
senting the Van Buren and Calhoun factions in the ad- 
ministration party, were engaged, during the winter, in 
acrimonious strife.^ Niles no doubt expressed the senti- 
ment of sensible j)eople when he said, April, 1830, that 
he did not see the necessity of action on the subject at 
that time. His statement, however, only showed how 
little he understood the processes by which the people 
manifest their power of self-government. 

March 11, 1830, Lewis wrote to Colonel Stanbaugh, of 
Pennsylvania, suggesting that the Pennsylvania Legis- 
lature should address to Jackson an appeal to stand for 
reelection. To the end that they might send just the 
proper appeal, Lewis inclosed it to them, already pre- 
pared for their signatures. Lewis wrote to Stanbaugh 
that he did not think it would be wise for Jackson's 
friends in Washington to [be known to] lead in the 
movement for his reelection, and Pennsylvania, the 
stronghold of his popularity, seemed to be the most ad- 
vantageous place from which the movement might [ap- 
pear to] start. The addj'ess came back duly signed 
with sixty-eight names. It vas published in the " Penn- 
1 37 Niles, 300. 2 33 Niles, 169. 



1.56 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Bylvanla Reporter," and copied all over the country as a 
spontaneous and irrepressible call of the people to the 
^* old hero " not to desert his country. The enterprise 
did not run off quite so smoothly as Lewis's narrative 
would imply. There was strong opposition by the Cal- 
houn faction to Jackson's renomination, and a distinct 
renomination could not be carried.^ In April a caucus 
of the New York Legislature declared that it responded 
" to the sentiment of the Legislature of Pennsylvania." 
This caucus was prompted from Washington, and man- 
aged by the editor of the " Courier." "^ As soon as the 
example was set, other Legislatures followed it. In 
January, 1831, the " Globe " said that General Jackson 
might be regarded as before the country for reelection.^ 
April 13, 1830 (Jefferson's birthday), while still the 
letter from Crawford was not received, but while Jack- 
son's mind was full of suspicion against Calhoun, a 
banquet was prepared at Washington, which was in- 
tended to be a nullification demonstration.^ Jackson 
gave as a toast, " Our federal Union : It must be pre- 
served." This was a bomb-shell to the nullifiers, and 
a declaration of war against Calhoun, who at the same 
banquet offered a toast and made a speech, the point of 
wliich was that Hberty was worth more than union. 
How much the personal element of growing suspicion 
and ill-will towards Calhoun had to do with the attitude 
which Jackson took up towards nullification is a matter 
of conjecture and inference. His opinions, however, 
deduced from hatred of the Hartford convention, had 
always been strongly favorable to the Union, and the 
rnen in the kitchen cabinet, except Green, were strong 

38 Niles, 170. 2 md, 

« 39 Niles, 385. * 1 Benton, 148 



THE JEFFERSON'S BIRTHDAY BANQUET. 157 

Unionists, although Jackson and they all were likewise 
strong state-rights men. Ten years earlier KtLdaD 
had maintained the major premiss of nullification with 
great zeal.^ 

At the same banquet Isaac Hill offered the following 
toast and " sentiment : ' -* " Democracy : ' Wherefore do 
I take my flesh in my teeth, and put my life in mine 
hand ? Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him.' " 
The quotation is from Job xiii. 14, and " he " is usually 
interpreted as referring to God. This " sentiment " 
therefore exalts democracy higher than any other known 
expression, but it is best worth remembering as an il- 
lustration of the slave-like spirit which is bred by ad- 
herence to absolutist doctrines, whether the absolute 
sovereign be an autocrat or a popular majority. All 
together, the Jefferson's birthday banquet was a mem- 
orable occasion. 

A letter from Crawford's own hand, disclosing the 
attitude of Callioun in Monroe's cabinet towards Jack- 
son and his proceedings in Florida in 1818, was at last 
received about May 1, 1830. In this letter the John 
Rhea letter from Jackson to Monroe first comes into 
history, and is the pivot on which the whole Seminole 
war question, in its revived form, is made to turn. 
Crawford said that that letter was produced in the cab- 
inet, and that it brought him over to Jackson's side, 
but that Calhoun persisted in hostility. Monroe and 
every member of his cabinet, when appealed to, denied 
ihat the Rhea letter was produced, or brought into con- 
Bideration in 1818 at all. Jackson immediately. May 
t3th, inclosed a copy of Crawford's letter to Calhoun, 
and demanded an explanation of Calhoun's apparent 
1 Aufoh'tofjraphy, 222. ^ 38 Niles, 153. 



158 ANDREW JACKSON. 

perfidy, as he construed it. Jackson's main point in this 
letter, wliich was evidently " copied " for him, is that 
Calhoun well knew, by virtue of his position in the cab* 
inet, and as he had shown by his orders,^ that Jackson, 
in all that he did, had the approval and connivance of 
the administration. This brought out all the tangled 
misunderstandings about Jackson's letter to Monroe and 
John Rhea's supposed reply. Calhoun at once recog- 
nized his position. He could not understand the allu- 
sions to previous uiiderstandings which had never existed, 
but it was plain that Crawford had opened an irreparable 
breach between Calhoun and Jackson, and that all the 
hopes Calhoun had built upon his alliance with Jackson 
were in ruins. He also saw that the whole movement 
was a Van Buren victory over him. He replied on 
May 20th, complaining and explaining. He really had 
no charge to repel. He had done nothing wrong, and 
was guiltless of any injustice or perfidy towards JacJt- 
Bon. The whole matter was a cabinet secret. Crawford 
had violated confidence in making known the nature of 
the preliminary discussions which preceded the adoption, 
by Monroe's cabinet, of a definite policy as to Jackson's 
proceedings. Calhoun was not to blame for any of the 
misunderstandings about the previous authorization 
which Jackson thought he had received. It seems that 
Calhoun might have set forth this position with dignity. 
He did not do so. Jackson replied to him. May 30th, in 
a very haughty tone, declaring a complete breach be- 
tween them on the ground of Calhoun's duplicity. This 
letter was plainly prepared by the persons who were 
working on Jackson's strong personal feeling about his 
Florida campaign to bring him to a breach 'with Cal 
1 See ])a<;e 56. 



THE ''GLOBE'' FOUNDED. 159 

houn, and to throw him into a close alliance with Van 
Buren. The plan was a complete success. Lewis says 
that Jackson sent Calhoun's letter of May 20th to Van 
Buren, that he might read it and give advice about it, 
but that Van Buren would not read it because he did 
not want to be involved in the affair at all. Lewis 
further says that Van Buren had nothing to do with 
getting up the quarrel. We may well believe all this. 
Lewis was not such a bungling workman in a job of that 
kind as to commit his principal to any inconvenient 
knowledge or compromising activity. 

The quarrel with Calhoun brought on a quarrel with 
Duff Green and the " Telegraph." Amos Kendall sent for 
Francis P. Blair, an old Kentucky friend and co-worker of 
his, and his successor as editor of the " Frankfort Argus." 
Blair was then thirty-nine years old. He was another 
old Clay man, converted by Kentucky relief politics into 
a Jackson man. He was a fanatical opponent of the 
Bank of the United States, and strongly opposed to 
nullification. Parton says he was forty thousand dollars 
in debt. He had been president of the Bank of the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky, and was indebted to the 
Bank of the United States.^ Blair started the " Globe," 
and took Green's place in the kitchen cabinet, which 
now contained a very large element of Kentucky relief 
politics. Blair was the prince of partisan editors, a 
man made to run an organ. For he was not a mere 
mouth-piece. He was independent and able to go alone, 
but had infinite tact, discretion, and shrewdness, so that 
he was an easy man to work with. The organ, therefore, 
worked perfectly. Every expression in it came directly 
Li'om the White House. If Blair spoke without consult- 
1 Keudairs Autobiogrupky, 372. 



160 ANDREW JACKSON. 

in^^ Jackson, the harmony and sympathy of their ideas 
was such that Jackson's mind was correctly interpreted. 
If Jackson wanted anything said, Blair was in such 
accord that it cost him nothing in the way of conces- 
sion to say it. He and Kendall went with Jackson 
when no one else did, and they were the leading spirits 
in the government of the country until 1840. The first 
number of the " Globe " was issued December 7, 1830. 
Since Blair had no capital, the paper was at first semi- 
weekly, but Lewis and Kendall brought their connections 
to bear on the office-holders to make them transfer their 
subscriptions from the " Telegraph " to the " Globe." * 
Parton says that Jackson compelled the departments to 
give Blair their printing. 

The quarrel between the President and the Vice-Pres- 
ident did not become known until the end of the year. 
Adams first refers to it in his diary under date of De- 
cember 22, 1830. Niles mentions it as a rumor January 
29, 1831. In February, 1831, Calhoun published a large 
pamphlet about the whole matter.""^ The next thing for 
his enemies'to do was to get his three friends, Ingham 
Branch, and Berrien, out of the cabinet. To this end 
those who were in the secret resigned, as a means of 
breaking up the cabinet and forcing a reconstruction. 
Barry was asked to remain in his office. Eaton re- 
signed first, April 7, 1831. Van Buren resigned April 
11, 1831, in a letter which was so oracular that no one 
could understand it.* The main ideas in his letter of 
resignation and in Jackson's reply were, (1) that Jack 
son did not intend to have any one in his cabinet who 
w'^as a candidate for the succession. This indicated Van 
Buren as such a candidate. (2) That the cabinet wai 
1 40 Niles, 318. 2 40 Niles, 11. « 40 NUea, 145. 






DISRUPTION OF THE CABINET, 161 

originally a " unit," and that Jackson wanted to keep his 
cabinet a unit. This hint had no effect on the other 
Secretaries. They wanted to be dismissed, and a sepa- 
rate quarrel was necessary in the case of each. It was 
in this connection that the Peggy O'Neil affair ^ and all 
the old misunderstanding about the Seminole war came 
to a public discussion. Van Buren was appointed min- 
ister to England, and he went out. At the next session 
of Congress a gi*eat political conflict arose over his con- 
firmation. When McLane was sent out to England, in 
1829, he had instructions from Van Buren to reopen the 
negotiations about the West India trade,^ and, as a basis 
for so doing, to point out to the English government that 
the party wliich had brought that question into the posi- 
tion in which it then stood had been condemned by the 
people at the election. This introduced the internal 
party contests of the country into diplomacy, and instead 
of representing this nation to foreign nations as a unit, 
having, for all its international relations, a continuous and 
consistent life, it invited foreigners to note party changes 
here, as if they had to negotiate at one time wixh. one 
American nation, and at another time with another. The 
fact that Van Buren had given these instructions was 
alleged as a reason for not confirming his apj)ointment, 
but the debate took a wide range. His confirmation 
was defeated by the casting vote of Calhoun. This 
check to Jackson's plans gave jus<- the requisite spiu' of 
personal pique to his desire to make Van Buren Presi- 
dent, and he pursued that purpose from tliis time on 
mth all his powers. It was in the debate on Van 

^ Webster knew of that atTiiir und its pol^'^'cal bearings in Jan 
aary, 1830. (1 Correspondence, A^S.] 
^ See below, pajje 169. 
11 



162 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Buren's confirmation that William L. Marcy cynicallj 
avowed the doctrine : " To the victors belong the spoils." 

Eaton was in a state of ungovernable rage at the dis« 
cussion of his wife's reputation by the newspapers from 
one end of the country to the other. He challenged 
Camj^bell, one of the clergymen mentioned above as 
prominent in connection with the scandal. June 18, 
1831, he challenged Ingham, Secretary of the Treasury. 
Ingham declined to fight. A few days later Ingham 
complained to Jackson that he had been waylaid and 
hindered in his duties by Eaton, Lewis, Randolph, and 
others. They denied that they had molested him, or 
had intended to do so.^ Jackson's plan had been that 
Hugh L. White, senator from Tennessee, should resign, 
and that Eaton should take his place. White was to be 
Secretary of War.^ White, however, who perhaps was 
piqued that he was not made Secretary of War in 1829, 
declined to fulfil his share of this programme. He became 
alienated from Jackson. Eaton was made Governor of 
Florida. From 1836 fo 1840 he was minister to Spain. 
Parton says he quarrelled with Jackson, and was a whig 
in 1840.3 He died in 1856. Mrs. Eaton died about 
1878. 

The new cabinet was: Edward Livingston, of Loui- 
siana, Secretary of State ; Louis McLane, of Delaware, 
Secretary of the Treasury ; Lewis Cass, of Michigan, 
Secretary of War ; Levi AVoodbury, of New Hampshire 
(who had given up to Hill his place in the Senate;^ 
Secretary of the Navy ; Roger B. Taney, of Maryland, 
Attorney-General. Adams mentions a story that the 
War Department was ofliered to William Draytorv 

1 40 Niles, 302. 2 Hunt's Livingston^ 358. 

2 3 Parton, 368, 639. See, also, page 273. 



r 



THE NEW CABINET. 163 

leader of the Union party of South Carolina.* This 
cabinet was a " unit," and a unit for Jackson and the 
successor on whom he had determined. 

We have now brought the intimate and personal his- 
tory of Jackson's first administration down to the time 
when the campaign for his reelection opened. We have 
seen how Jackson construed the presidential office in ita 
immediate bearings, and how he addressed himself to its 
immediate and personal duties. 

^ 9 Adams, 182. 



CHAPTER Vm. 

PUBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSOn's FIRST ADMENISTRA 

TION. 1. 

It is proposed in this and the three following chapters 
to take up, in categorical order, the great questions of 
public policy with which Jackson had to deal, to show 
how each question stood when he was elected President, 
and to show what was done about it, more especially 
how he acted upon it, during his first administration 
down to December, 1831, when the campaign of 1832 
opened. 

The first two points to be noticed are questions of 
foreign relations. 

I. The trade between the United States and the 
British West Indies had been a source of irritation and 
dissatisfaction ever since the United States had been in- 
dependent. Great Britain declined, in 1815, to include 
the West Indies in the commercial treaty then nego- 
tiated. In the negotiations of 1818, Rush and Gallatin 
offered complete reciprocity as to ships and goods, but 
England would not give up her colonial system.^ The 
act of Congress of April 15, 1818, was intended to coun- 
tervail the English navigation system. It introduced a 
policy of retaliation in which, at that time, much faith 
was placed.'^ This act provided that no British ships 
should come here from any port to which an America! 
1 1 Bush, 417. .2 See page 197. 



WEST INDIA TRADE. 166 

(ihip might not go, and that an English ship, clearing 
here, should give bonds not to land her cargo where an 
American ship might not go. This law hurt the islands. 
England then made Halifax and St. John's free ports 
for goods in transit to the West Indies. This arrange- 
ment drew American products to the ports mentioned, 
from which they were taken to the West Indies in Brit- 
ish ships. Negotiations, which were attempted, came to 
nothing, because the English insisted on laying differen- 
tial duties to favor their northern colonies. By the act 
of May 15, 1820, the United States forbade all trade 
with the British West Indies in British vessels, and all 
imjjortation of British West India goods save in direct 
trade from the place of production. This closed the 
ti'ade with the British colonies and forced concessions 
from England, which greatly strengthened faith in the 
" countervailing " policy. By an act of Parliament of 
June 24, 1822, the British West Indies were opened to 
foreign vessels, at specified ports, for specified goods, 
subject to the colonial duties and to a ten per cent dif- 
ferential duty to favor the products of British North 
America.^ The voyage of an English ship then was to 
the United States, thence to Halifax, thence to the West 
Indies, thence to England. Monroe's proclamation of 
August 24, 1822, responded to the act of Parliament by 
opening the ports of the United States to British ships 
bearing West India goods, under a differential tonnage 
duty of SI. 00 per ton, and a differential impost of ten 
per cent. Neither an American nor a British vessel 
could then bring- West India ooods from a northern 
British colony, nor products of a northern colony from 
Uie West Indies.- By the act of March 1, 1823, the 
1 23 Niles, 28. 2 Treasurr Circular, 2-^ Niles, 86 



166 ANDREW JACKSON. 

United States confined the trade in English bottoms to 
the direct trade, and the differential tonnage duty was 
put at ninety-six cents. The demand of the United 
States then was, to be put on the same footing in the 
British West Indies as the British North American col- 
onies. If this claim had been made on a general free- 
trade theory, it would have been wise and laudable, but 
in advance of the age. Under the idea of trade which 
then prevailed, it was thought to be an unbecoming de- 
mand. The King of England, by an order in council, 
July, 1823, laid a retaliatory differential tonnage duty of 
4s. ^d per ton on American ships in the West Indies. 
Thus the statesmen of the two countries were trying to 
see what mischievous devices they could invent to crip- 
ple trade, and to treat a ship coming from such a port, 
or with such goods, as if it were a pirate or pest-laden. 
The English restrictions were aimed at the Americans, 
but it was very plain to the West Indians that it was 
they, and not the Americans, who bore the weight of all 
the taxes and restrictions by which the shipping of 
Great Britain was protected and the northern colonies 
were favored. The American ships fell back into the 
old-fashioned illicit trade, and did more and more of the 
business, in spite of all the regulations. The geography 
of the islands offered the greatest facilities for such 
vrade. The islanders connived at it. Why should 
planters in Jamaica pay ten per t^ent extra duty, at 
the bidding of statesmen in England, in order to buy 
inferior flour of farmers in New Brunswick ? No men 
of the Anglo-Saxon race have been found who would 
thus sacrifice their interests, if they saw the fact, and if 
they could in any way help themselves. Adams tells a 
story wliich he got from Foot, of Connecticut, who hao 



RELAXATION OF THE NAVIGATION SYSTEM. 167 

aimself been engaged in the West India trade. He took 
;,o the West Indies candles, which were subject to heavy 
duty. The insj)ector said they were not candles, but 
herrings, and passed them.^ 

The whole English navigation system was decrepit. 
As trade expanded, the old policy became impossible. 
By the act of Parliament of July 5, 1825, England 
divided the powers which had colonies from those which 
had none. To the former she offered complete recip- 
rocity, metropolis against metropolis, colonies against 
colonies. To the latter she offered the same rights in 
her colonies which they gave to England and her posses- 
sions. Her emjDire as a whole was put in reciprocity 
with any other empire as a whole, but parts of her em- 
pire were to favor each other. The ^proposition thus 
made to all the world was to stand open for a year, and 
was to go into operation in favor of any who, within 
that time, should give notice of their acceptance of it. 
On account of politics in Congress in 1825-26, no action 
was taken by the United States. The protectionists here 
ridiculed the pretended slackening of the navigation 
system, and they made light of all Huskisson's reforms 
which were carried out in the same connection, and from 
vrhich, in fact, modern free trade dates. They thought 
they saw interested and sinister reasons for the reforms. 
Interested reasons there certainly were, and no others. 
There never are, and never ought to be, any others, for 
this kind of legislation. The navigation system was so 
cumbersome and burdensome that it could not be sus- 
tained. The act of 1825 was pitiful enough in com- 
parison with sound doctrin'^, but it was a first breach in 
*n old system, which was founded ix ?\vong prejudice* 
ind sustained by powerful interests. 
1 7 Adams, 429. 



IG8 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Jul}^ 27, 1826, an order in council was issued, closing 
the ports of the English colonies in America, except 
Canada and Nova Scotia, to American ships after 
December 1, 1826. England now interdicted the trade 
which the United States had interdicted in 1820. Galla- 
tin had just arrived in England to try to renew negotia- 
tions. Canning refused to negotiate, saying that Eng- 
land meant to regulate her commercial relations by the 
act of Parliament, not by negotiations. England did 
not complain, he said, that the United States had not 
cared to take what others thought worth having. Eng- 
land held that colonial trade was a boon, to be paid for, 
if granted at all. The United States held that trade is 
its own reward, and is mutually advantageous.^ The 
latter ought to have put itself plainly and consistently 
on that doctrine in all its bearings. American protec- 
tionism even, at that time, was by no means a barbarian 
prejudice against trade, or a sacrifice of national intei*- 
ests to private cliques, in the measure of their impu- 
dence and rapacity. The United States wanted com- 
plete reciprocity as to ships and the carrying trade, and 
its doctrine was that each nation should arrange its fiscal 
system to suit itself ; but it tried to countervail, by taxes 
on imports, the taxes laid by foreign nations on Ameri- 
can exports of grain, etc.^ Part of the English regula- 
tions belonged to the domestic fiscal system of Great 
Britain, but others were part of the navigation system. 
Hence the conflict arose. 

1 Correspotnlence, 31 Niles, 269. 

2 See below, pa<ie 195. Niles, who was a fanatical protection 
Ist, said, " To all the powers that wish *free trade,' we say, Lei 
Cree trade be ; to all that will restrict us, we say Let restnctioi 
W," (31 Niles, 240 : December, 1826.) 



MO LANE'S MISSION. 109 

The matter had now (1827) been brought into a 
diplomatic dead-lock, where the next move must be for 
one party or the other to recede from its position. Can- 
ning's sarcasm was not a little to blame for tliis state of 
things. The opposition in the United States made 
capital out of the entanglement. In the mean time the 
illicit trade went merrily on, and the smuggler rectified, 
in his way, the folly of statesmen. Thus the matter 
stood when Jackson was elected. 

One of his first acts was to send McLane to England 
to reopen negotiations. This he was to do by pointing 
to the result of the election as a rebuke to the former 
administration, which had brought about the dead-lock.^ 
Pending the negotiations an act of Congress was passed. 
May 29, 1830, authorizing the President to declare the 
acts of 1818, 1820, and 1823 repealed, whenever Amer- 
ican ships should be allowed in the West Indies on the 
same terms as British ships from the United States, and 
when they should be allowed to carry goods from the 
colonies to any non-British ports to which British ships 
might go. This act was sent to England. Lord Aber- 
deen said that it was all that England had ever de- 
manded.'^ The colonial duties were raised, a differen- 
tial duty in favor of the North American colonies was 
laid, and the trade was opened. The President issued 
his proclamation 0(;tober 5, 1830. The administration 
coasted of this diplomatic achievement. The truth was 
that the United States set out to force England to let 
American goods come into the West Indies on the same 
footing as British North American goods. England was 
foerced by the acts of 1818 ani 1820. Canning said, 
11 1826, that England had yielded to coercion, but that 
1 Cf. page 161. 2 39 Niles, 390 fg. 



170 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Bhe escaped from it as soon as she could. She opened 
lier trade to all the world as an escape. The counter- 
vailing system of the United States, then, no longer exer- 
cised any coercion, and the United States, to get the 
trade reopened, abandoned the demands with which it 
liad started on the experiment of countervailing. This 
last step was what the Jackson administration had ac- 
complished. Niles and the other protectionists scoffed 
at the new arrangement. They said that the illicit 
trade was better than the new arrangement.^ A proof 
that this was true is found in the fact that the illicit 
trade went on. The laws forced products of the United 
States to reach the islands through Canada and Nova 
Scotia, and this offered just so much premium to illicit 
trade. 

II. The claims of the U7iited States for spoliations 
against France and against all those states of Europe 
which had been drawn by Napoleon into his Continental 
system, had been a subject of fruitless negotiation ever 
since 1815.^ Jackson took up these claims with new 
energy and spirit. He sent W. C. Rives to France in 
1829, umler instructions which covered the whole his- 
tory of the claims, to try to get a settlement. In his 
message of 1829, while these negotiations were pending, 
Jackson referred to the claims as likely to " furnish a 
subject of unpleasant discussion and possible collision." 
This reference was not of a kind to help the negotia- 
utions. In 1830 a revolution put Louis Philippe on the 
tlu'one under a Constitution. New hopes of a settlement 

1 39 Niles, 298 ; 42 Niles, 148. 

2 Succinct statements of the orioiu and history of these clairai 
'ti the report of a minority of the committee of the House, 41 
Nik«. 6, and the article 47 Niles, 455. 



TREATY OF PARIS. 171 

Df the claims were raised by this turn in affairs. A 
treaty was finally signed at Paris, July 4, 1831, by 
which France agreed to pay twenty-five million francs, 
and the United States agreed to pay one and a half 
million francs, in final settlement of all outstanding 
claims of citizens of one country against the government 
of the other country. The treaty was ratified February 
2, 1832. The first instalment became due February 
2, 1833. Claims against the other States of the old 
Continental league were likewise liquidated, and pay- 
ment was secured during Jackson's administration. The 
administration derived great credit from these settle- 
ments. There was a great deal more in the matter than 
the money. European nations, which had similar claims 
against France, had secured payment soon after the 
peace, but the claims of the United States had been 
neglected. Payment now meant a concession of con- 
sideration and respect to the United States, and the 
people felt that Jackson had won this for the nation. 

We have now to notice seven leading questions in the 
internal policy of the nation up to and during Jackson's 
first term of ofiice : — 

I. The federal judiciary had never yet been organ- 
ized in such a manner as to discharge its functions satis- 
factorily. The federal judiciary act, which was passed 
at the close of Adams's administration, was hastily re- 
pealed, as a political measure, immediately after Jeffer- 
son's accession. The repeal was an error, for the fed- 
eral judiciary continued weak and inadequate for lack of 
just what that act had pro^^ided. After the decisions 
on great constitutional points which were rendered be- 
tween 1819 and 1S25, a party grew up which was ready 
to make any attempt to reorganize the federal judiciary 



172 ANDREW JACKSON-. 

an occasion for an attack, both on the federal authority 
and on the judicial institution. The strongest disposi- 
tion so to act was evinced by the Kentuckians.^ 

In the session of 1825-26, when a bill for some new 
circuits of the Supreme Court was pending, Rowan, of 
Kentucky,^ moved an amendment that seven judges out 
of ten (the number which the bill proposed) must con- 
cur in order to declare any state law unconstitutional. 
The whole bill was lost in a disagreement of the two 
Houses. 

In the session of 1827-28 a bill was introduced to 
regulate the procedure of the federal courts in the new 
States which had been admitted since the laws of Sep- 
tember 29, 1789, and May 8, 1792, which regulated the 
procedure of the federal courts, were passed. To this 
bill Rowan proposed an amendment which would take 
away from the federal courts the power to modify or 
change any of the rules of procedure, or any of the 
forms of writs of execution, which were to be those of 
the State in which the court was sitting.^ If tliis amend- 
ment had been passed, the federal courts would not 
have been allowed to change rules and forms, but the 
state Legislatures would have had power to do so, and 
the federal judiciary would have been handed over to 
state control. This amendment was adopted by the 
Senate. Webster, who had been away, returned to find 
that the whole federal judicial system had been thrown 
nto confusion * by this hasty proposition, which had 
Seen made only with reference to some of the whims of 
Kentucky relief politics. He exposed the effects of the 
bill. It was recommitted and recast, establishing fof 

1 See chapter VI. 2 cf, page 123. 

• Cf. page 129. * 7 Adams, 465. 



JEALOUSY OF TEE FEDERAL JUDICIARY. 178 

the new States the procedure then existing, with power 
in the courts to modify under the supervision of the 
Supreme Court, and in this shape it was passed. 

In 1830 an attempt was made to repeal the twenty- 
fifth section of the judiciary act, by which the Supreme 
Court is empowered to pass upon the constitutionahty 
of state laws. The bill was lost in the House by the 
vote of 137 to 51, but the minority consisted of some of 
the leading administration men. In 1831 the House 
refused, 115 to 61, to consider a resolution instructinsr 
the judiciary committee to report a bill setting terms of 
years for federal judges.^ In 1830 Berrien gave an 
opinion on the South Carolina Police Act,^ in which he 
overturned Wirt's opinion. He held that that act was 
valid because it was an act of internal police. In this 
opinion he laid down the doctrine of the extreme South- 
ern state-rights men about the limits of federal power. 
He held that the federal authorities ought not, in exer- 
cising their j^owers, to make laws or treaties to come 
into collision with anything which the States nad done 
under their reserved powers, unless it was necessary to 
do so. The admission of black men into the State 
was only convenient, not necessary ; hence collision on 
that point would be improper.' 

The Jackson party and the Executive Department 
were on terms of jealousy and distrust with the judiciary 
for several years. Another expression of these feelings 
was the Impeachment of Judge Peck, of Missouri. The 
democrats were especially jealous of the prerogative 
powers of the courts, among the rest of the power to im- 
prison for contempt. Peck wrote out and published in 

1 39 Niles, 405. 2 gge page 130. 

* 2 Opinions of the Attorneys-GeneraJ, 433. 



174 ANDREW JACKSON. 

a newspaper, in 1826, a decision which he had rendered, 
Lawless, counsel for the defeated party, published a re^ 
view of the opinion. Peck imprisoned him for twenty- 
four hours, and suspended him from practice in the 
court for eighteen months, for contempt. Lawless ])eti- 
tioned the federal House of Representatives during three 
sessions for redress, in vain. In 1829 the democratic 
House impeached Peck. Buchanan was the leader.* 
The impeachment was in the current of popular feeling, 
and there was capital to be made out of it. January 
31, 1831, the vote was, 21 to convict, 22 to acquit. 
Adams says that Jackson favored acquittal lest Buch- 
anan should gain by a conviction, just as Jefferson, in 
Chase's case, favored acquittal lest John Randolph 
should gain power by a conviction.^ By an act of 
March 2, 1831, the power of the courts to punish at 
discretion for contempt was limited to cases of misbe- 
havior in court, or so near to the court as to obstruct 
the administration of justice. 

II. The Indians of the Gulf States had been in col- 
lision with the Whites ever since the Revolution, when 
the Cherokees and Creeks were allied with England. 
The government of the United States restrained the 
Indians from intercourse with foreign nations, and made 
them wards of the nation, but it made treaties with 
them as independent tribes, not to say nations. The 
history is a monotonous repetition of the same series of 
facis. The Indians occupied as much territory per man 
for their hunting-grounds as would have supported a 
dozen white families. The Whites gained economic ad 

"^ Charjres and specifications, 38 Niles, 245. Cf., also, 2 Ke» 

Dedy's Wirt, 308. 
• 8 Adam8. 306. 



TREATIES BETWEEN GEORGIA AND INDIANS. 175 

vantages by spreading themselves thinly over a great 
area. Treaties were made by which the Indians ceded 
land, and a boundary was drawn. The Whites spread 
over the ten-itory and up to the boundary. The twO' 
races then began to commit outrages on each othe;:. 
The Whites made no account of white outrages and 
great account of red outrages. They set out to chastisv» 
the Indians. They forced a new treaty, with a new 
land cession, established a new boundary, and began the 
same process over again. 

In November, 1785, Georgia made a treaty with the 
Creeks at Galphinton, by which they ceded land. The 
Continental Congress was not a party to this treaty, but 
it made one with the Cherokees in December of the same 
year,^ at Hopewell. In 1786 Georgia made another 
treaty with the Creeks at Shoulder Bone Creek. In 
1789 the new federal government sent an agent to in- 
vestigate the treaties made by Georgia. He apjjroved of 
them, but he failed in his effort to make another on be- 
half of the federal government, because McGillivray, 
the half-breed chief of the Creeks, opposed any further 
treaties.^ In 1790 McGillivray and several other chiefs 
were persuaded to go to New York. There they made a 
treaty. Washington's administration was in the attitude 
of protecting the Indians against the Georgians. The 
latter were much displeased by the treaty of New York, 
because it gave up to the Indians lands which had been 
extorted from them at Galphinton. McGillivray died 
in 1793, and Georgia, in the same year, made war on 
the Creeks. Washington wrote to express strong dis- 
approval of this offensive movement on the part of 

1 2 Stevens, 4-0 fg. 

2 See 2 Pickett, 30 fg for the story of McGillivray. 



176 ANDREW JACKSON, 

Georgia.^ In 1796 the United States made a treaty at 
Holston with the Cherokees, by which the latter were 
to be subject to the United States only, and to treat with 
the United States only. In the same year the federal 
Indian Intercourse Act forbade any one to go into the 
Indian territories under penalty of fine or imprisonment. 
In 1798 the Cherokees made a further cession at Tel- 
lico, in a treaty with the United States, by which their 
remaining lands were secured to them, and they were 
to have their own laws, to which any white person re- 
siding amongst them was to be subject.^ There was an 
old treaty of 1777 between Georgia and the Cherokees, 
which the former always made the basis of its claims.' 
New lands, which were obtained by cession, were, ac- 
cording to the practice of Georgia, distributed by lottery 
amongst the citizens of the State. Hence the eagerness 
for land cessions of the people of that State, and the con- 
stantly renewed collisions with the Indians and with the 
federal government. In 1802 the United States agreed 
to extinguish the Indian title to lands within the pre- 
scribed boundaries of Georgia, "whenever it could be 
peaceably done on reasonable terms," and Georgia ceded 
to the United States the present States of Alabama and 
Mississippi, with the privilege of settling with the Yar 
zoo land-scrij) holders, to do which ultimately cost four 
million dollars. 

Georgia continually pressed the federal government 
to bi«y off the Indian title to lands in that State, and it 
was d*>ne from time to time for certain portions. The 
treaty of 1802 was supposed to cover Georgia's claims 
for the expenses of the Indian wars of 1793-94, but 

1 2 Steveus, 454 ; 2 Pickett, 144. 

8 5 Ann. Beg. 45. 3 2 Kennedy's Wirt, 278. 



TREATY OF INDIAN SPRING. 177 

those claims were ui'ged until 1827, when Congress voted 
$129,375 to discharge them. At the urgent solicitation 
of Georgia, Monroe appointed two commissioners to 
ti-eat with the Creeks, of whose lands nine and a half 
million acres were still under the Indian title. The 
lower Creeks were then on the land west of the Flint 
River, and north of 31° 30', and the upper Creeks were 
ahuost entirely in Alabama, between the Coosa river and 
the Georgia boundary, and north of an east and west line 
thi'ough the Hickory Ground (Wetumpka). These boun- 
daries were set by Jackson's treaty with the Creeks of 
1814, and he guaranteed to them the lands which were 
then left to them.^ The Cherokees were in the north- 
western corner of Georgia, the northeastern corner of 
Alabama, and the southeastern corner of Tennessee, be- 
tween the Chattahoochee, the Etowah, and the Hiwasee 
rivers. The Creeks voted to put to death any one who 
should vote to sell any more land, and refused to treat 
with Monroe's commissioners. After the council broke 
uj), a few chiefs, headed by Mcintosh, made the treaty 
of Indian Spring, February 12, 1825, ceding aU their 
lands in Georgia and Alabama for $400,000. The Sen- 
ate confirmed this treaty, March 3, 1825. April 30th 
the Creeks set McLtitosh's house on fire, and shot him as 
he came out. Governor Troup of Georgia claimed the 
lands for Georgia at once, and began to survey them. 
He also set up a lottery to dispose of them. President 
Adams appointed an agent to investigate the negotia- 
tion of the treaty. The agent reported that forty-nine 
fiftieths of the Creeks repudiated the treaty as a fraud 
on them. The President ordered General Gaines to 
prevent any trespass on the lands of the Indians, and 

1 Folio State Papers, 1 Ind^^xn Affairs, 827. 
12 



178 ANDREW JACKSON. 

pointed out to Governor Troup the objections to his 
proceedings. Troup Mustered, and asked if the Presi- 
dent would hold himself responsible to the State of 
Georgia. The Georgia Legislature did not sustain the 
Governor. The treaty of Indian Spring Avas annulled, 
and a new one was made in January, 1826, by which a 
part of the lands in Georgia were ceded. This treaty 
v/as not confirmed, and another, ceding alP the lands 
in Georgia, was finally made, as Benton says, by appeal- 
ing to the cuj^idity of the chiefs. The Mcintosh party 
got an indemnity, and a large sum was given to the 
cliiefs. Land was to be provided west of the Mississippi 
for all who would go there. This treaty did not satisfy 
the Georgians. Nevertheless, inasmuch as by the last 
treaty all the lands in Georgia were ceded, and by the 
second treaty only part of those lands were ceded, the 
Georgians claimed a substantial victory,^ although not 
all the lands in Georgia and Alabama were ceded, as by 
the treaty of Indian Spring. The Cherokees still re- 
mained undisturbed. In .lanuary, 1828, the Georgia 
Legislature passed a set of resolutions, the truculency of 
which is unparalleled, demanding that the United States 
should extinguish the title of the Cherokees.^ 

The Cherokees were the most civilised of the Gulf In- 
dians, and perhaps they had reached a higher pitch of 
civilization than any other Indians have ever yet readied.^ 
They had horses and cattle, goats, sheep, and swihe. They 
raised maize, cotton, tobacco, wheat, oats, and potatoes, 
and traded with their products to New Orleans. They 
had gardens, and apj^le and peach orchards. They haa 
built roads, and they kept inns for travellers. Thej 

1 1 Benton, 59. 2 Hodgson, 141. 

* 3 Ann Reg., Local History, 143. * 3 Ann. Reg. 77. 



CIVILIZATION OF THE INDIANS. 179 

manufactured cotton and wool. Probably all this was 
very poor in its way. Their numbers were increasing. 
In 1825 there were 13,563, besides 220 resident whites 
and 1,277 slaves, in the Cherokee country. One of their 
number had invented an alphabet for their language. 
They had a civil government, imitated from that of the 
United States. The Chickasaws had ten mills and 
fifty workshops. They lived in the northeast corner 
of Mississippi. They numbered 4,000, and were in- 
creasing. The Choctaws, in Central Mississippi, num- 
bered 21,000, and ranked next to the Cherokees in civil- 
ization. The Creeks numbered 40,000, and were the 
lowest in civilization. The money paid them tor their 
lands had debauched them. It was the facts that the 
Indians had reached a certain grade of civilization, that 
they were increasing in numbers, and that they were 
forming civilized civil and Christian bodies, which made 
all the trouble, for these facts all led to the probability 
that the Indians would remain a permanent part of the 
society, and would occupy definite areas of land in the 
midst of the States. It certainly was a home question, 
when, in 1829, Jackson asked whether Maine or New 
York would tolerate an Indian state within her own 
civil limits. Peter B. Porter, Secretary of War under 
Adams, prepared a plan for an Indian territory west of 
the Mississippi, and for colonizing the Gulf Indians in 
it. The plan was referred to the next administration. 
Adams made himself very unpopular in the Southwest 
by his action to protect the Indians. He did not get a 
vote in Georgia in 1828. Jackson had abundantly 
ihown^ that he held the Southwestern white man's 
*iews of Indians and Indian rights. 
1 See page 23. 



180 ANDREW JACKSON. 

As soon as Jackson was elected, December 20, 1828, 
Georgia passed a law extending her jurisdiction over the 
Cherokee lands and dividing them into counties, and 
enacted that no Indian should testify against a white 
man. In 1829 she modified this so that an Indian 
might testify against a White who lived in the Indian 
territory. In 1829 Alabama, and in 1830 Mississippi, 
passed similar laws, but somewhat milder. The new 
administration admitted the soundness of the theory of 
these laws, which were plainly in contravention of the 
treaties made with the Indians by the federal govern- 
ment. In liis message of 1829 Jackson said that he had 
told th o Indians that their pretensions would not be sup- 
ported. In the spring of 1830 Congress passed an act 
for encouraging and facilitating the removal of the Gulf 
Indians to a territory set apart for them west of the 
Mississippi. 

The quarrel between Georgia and the Indians had 
now narrowed down to a struggle with the Cherokees, 
who were the most civilized, and who had the strongest 
treaty guarantees from the federal authority for their 
territory and their self-government. It was proposed to 
test the proceedings of Georgia before the Supreme 
Court of the United States. In the summer of 1830, 
Judge Clayton, a Georgia state judge, charged the grand 
jury that he intended to allow no case to be withdrawn 
from his jurisdiction by any foreign authority, but that 
he should enforce the state laws about the Indians, and 
he wanted to know whether he was to be supported by 
the people.-^ The first test arose on a murder case 
against George Tassel, a Cherokee, for killing anothei 
Cherokee. The Superior Coia't of Hall County tried 

1 39 Niltis, 99. 



GEORGIA AND THE FEDERAL AUTHORITY. 181 

convicted, and sentenced him. The Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States issued a citation to 
the State of Georgia, December 12, 1830, to appear and 
show cause, in answer to a writ of error, why the sentence 
against Tassel should not be corrected.^ Governor Gil- 
mer laid this document before the Legislature, which 
ordered him to disregard it, and to resist by force any 
attemjjt to interfere with the criminal law of the State. 
On the 28th of December Tassel was hung;. 

The Governor of Georgia called on the President 
to withdraw the federal troops, and leave Georgia to 
deal with the Indians and gold-diggers. The President 
complied. The Georgia militia marched in, and com- 
plaints from the Indians at once began to be heard. The 
President refused to enforce the treaty rights of the In- 
dians. The Cherokees applied to the Supreme Court 
for an injunction to prevent Georgia from interfering 
with their treaty rights. In January, 1831, the court, 
while in effect sustaining the claims and rights of the 
Cherokees, declared that the remedy prayed for could 
not be employed. What was needed was not a judicial 
but a political remedy.^ The jDolitical remedy belonged 
to the Executive and the President had refused to use it. 

Georo-ia ordered all white residents of the Cherokee 
country to obtain state licenses, and to take an oath of 
allegiance to the State. Two missionaries, sent out by 
a Boston society, Worcester and Butler, amongst others, 
did not comply with this law. They were arrested, but 
were at first released, under the belief that they were 
disbursing agents of the federal government. The au- 
thorities at Washing-ton denied that they were such. 
Thereupon they were rearrested, tried, convicted, and 
1 39 Niles. 338. ^ 5 Peters, 1. 



182 ANDREW JACKSON. 

condemned to four year's hard labor in the penitentiary. 
In sentencing them Judge Clayton made another stump 
Bjjeech.^ On a writ of error in 1832, the Supreme Court 
held that the law under which these men were convicted 
was unconstitutional, that the laws of Georgia about the 
Cherokees contravened federal treaties and were void, 
and the men were ordered to be released.^ Georgia re- 
fused to obey. The Georgia doctrine seemed to be that 
all three Departments of the federal government must 
concur in holding a state law to be unconstitutional in 
oi'der to set it aside.^ Jackson refused to take any exec- 
utive action to give force to the decision of the court. 
The presidential election was at hand, and he said that 
he would submit his conduct to the people, who could at 
the election show whether they approved or disapproved 
of his refusal to sustain the decision.* No case could 
more distinctly show the vice of the political philoso})hy 
which Jackson professed. Twelve persons in all were 
convicted, in Georgia, of illegal residence in the Indian 
country. All were pardoned.^ The missionaries refused 
at first to accept a pardon. In January, 1833, they with- 
drew their suit in the Supreme Court> and were re- 
leased.^ 

In 1833 Alabama came into collision with the federal 
government on account of Indians. Federal troops were 
employed to expel intruders from the Indian territory. 

1 41 Niles, 174. 2 g Peters, 515, 

8 9 Adams, 548. 

* Greeley has a story that Jackson said, " John Marshall has 
made his decision. Now let him enforce it." (1 Greeley, 106.) 
Jackson disliked Marshall, although he had no active enmitj 
dgainst him. Scarcely two men could he found less likely to ap 
Dreciate each other personally or politically. 

« 7 Ann. P>eg. 265. « 43 Niles, 419. 



REMO^^AL OF THE GULF INDIANS. 183 

In executing this duty they killed one Owens. The sta,te 
authorities attempted to try for murder the soldiers 
through whose action the man met his death. The mili- 
tary authorities would not consent. The federal govern 
ment, taught by nullification, took a firmer position than 
in the case of Georgia. By a compromise, the reserva- 
tion was made smaller, and the white intruders were al- 
lowed to buy titles from the Indians.^ 

In September, 1830, a treaty was negotiated at Danc- 
ing Rabbit Creek with the Choctaws, over whom Missis- 
sippi had extended her laws, by which they ceded their 
lands and went west of the Mississippi. They were to 
be provided with land, transportation, houses, tools, a 
year's subsistence, $50,000 for schools, $20,000 a year 
for twenty years, $250 each, for twenty years, for four 
chiefs, and $500 far another, as president of the nation, 
should such an officer be chosen. When this treaty 
was before the Senate for ratification the preamble was 
stricken out, because it recited that " the President of 
the United States has said that he cannot protect the 
Choctaw people from the operation of these laws " of 
Mississippi.^ During the next eight years the tribes were 
all half persuaded, half forced, to go. The Indian Terri- 
tory was roughly defined by an act of June 30, 1834. 
Part of the Cherokees had gone in 1818, because they 
wanted to follow their old mode of life. In 1836 all 
the rights of the Cherokees east of the Mississippi were 
bouglit for five million dollars and the expenses of re- 
moval.^ In the same year the Creeks broke into hostili- 
ties, and were forced to migrate. In 1838 the civilized 
Cherokees migrated, except a few, who disajjpeared as 
Indians have disappeared everywhere else. 

1 45 Niles, 155 ; Hodgson, 179. 

'' 40 Niles. 106. '50 Niles. 265. 



CHAPTER IX. 

PtTBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSON's FIRST .iJDMINISTEA 

TION. II. 

III. The land system of the United States had been 
adojDted in 1800, when the i3rice was fixed at $2.00 per 
acre, and long credit was given, or at <;he rate of $1.64 
per acre, cash.^ In 1820 the price was reduced to $1.25 
per acre, cash, as a minimum j^rice. There were heavy 
arrears due for lands sold on credit. The policy to be 
pursued with the lands came to be a great political ques- 
tion. The popular notion was that the lands, while 
wild and in the hands of the government, were a great 
property. The earth's surface is an abode for man, and 
a source from which he can get a supply of the things 
to satisfy his needs, if he will work hard enough for 
them. In its natural state the land is only an open 
chance, worth a great deal to a man who has no other 
chance, but not attractive to a man who has any com- 
mand of the resources of life which may be emjjloyed 
in civilized communities. The earth's surface is not a 
boon or gift of nature to man, and cannot be a thing of 
value while wild. To subdue the land to the use of man 
costs hardship, labor, and self-denial. Often it costs dis- 
ease, and the premature death of generations. What 
then, can any one afford to give for wild land ? He car 
wily afford to give a remuneration for the survey whici 
1 Seybert, 354. 



POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAND. 185 

Becures him a definite description and identification of 
the land which he has appropriated, and for the author- 
ity of a civil government which protects his title. If, 
then, the purchaser does not occupy and till, he looks to 
the demand for land, which will advance as the country 
fills up with population, to give him a profit on his out- 
lay. He has appropriated part of a natural monopoly, 
and advancing demand will give liim profit. In the 
mean time interest and taxes are running against him. 
Hence it has happened again and again that land spec- 
ulators have been ruined in financial revulsions. If the 
purchaser occupies and tills the land, he is putting cap- 
ital into it all the time, and he and his neighbors, as 
they build up a commonwealth, gain incidentally by the 
monopoly principle, and by cooperation. Any holder 
who seeks only the monopoly profit on raw land is work- 
ing against himself, unless he can divide his possessions, 
and sell part and withhold part in a judicious adjust- 
ment. Then, however, a great capital and a long time 
are necessary. The federal government was in this last 
position. Its lands, therefore, were not a source of in- 
come or a valuable possession to it. Down to Septem- 
ber 30, 1832, the lands had cost $49.7 million, and the 
total revenue received from them had amounted to 
$38.3 million. 

Various plans for dealing with the lands had been 
})roposed previous to Jackson's accession. One was that 
the States should seize the lands by virtue of their " sov- 
ereignty." This short and easy method recommended 
itself to the politicians of the emphatic and metaphy- 
sical school. It meant simply that the first settlers should 
buy some land, organize a State, and get " sovereignty," 
%nd then take possession of the rest of the land within 



186 ANDREW JACKSON. 

the civil jurisdiction. Another plan was to sell to the 
States at a nominal price. Another : to sell all the land 
at graduated prices, for what it would bring. Another : 
to give the land to actual settlers (since realized in the 
homestead law). Another: to use the lands as a fund 
for internal improvements and education (since realized 
in the railroad subsidies and agricultural college land 
grants). It is plain that if the federal government buys 
territory by treaties like those of Louisiana and Florida, 
and surveys the lands, and maintains civil institutions 
over all the territory, and then gives the lands away, 
what it gives is the outlay necessary to bring the land to 
the point where a civilized man can begin to use it. Of 
course the new States wanted population, and were 
eager that the federal government should encourage im- 
migration by making this outlay and giving away the 
product of it. 

The old States, especially the tariff States, then saw 
distinctly the relation of the lands to the tariff. Every- 
thing which enhanced the attractiveness of the land and 
made it easier to get at it was just so much force draw- 
ing the man who had no land and no capital away from 
the old States and out of the wages class. Every im- 
provement in transportation ; every abolition of taxes 
and restrictions like the corn laws, which kept American 
agricultural products out of England ; every reduction 
in the price of land, increased the chances of the man 
who had nothing to become by industiy and economy 
an independent land-owner. The capitalist employer 
in the old States was forced to offset this attractiveness 
of the land by raising wages. This of course is the rea- 
son why wages in the United States are high, and why 
no wages class has ever yet been distinctly differentiated 



TARIFF AND LAND. 187 

here. It might justly be argued that it was improper 
for the federal government to raise funds by taxation on 
the old States, and expend them in buying, surveying, 
and policing wild land, and then to give the land away 
to either " the poor " or the rich ; but the protectionists 
distinctly faced the issue which was raised for their jDet 
dogma, and demanded that the lands should not be sur- 
veyed and sold abundantly and cheaply, but should be 
kept out of the market. The effect of this would be 
to prevent the population from spreading thinly over 
the whole continent, to make it dense in the old States, 
to raise the value and rent of land there, to produce a 
class de^^endent on wages, i. e., a supply of labor, and 
to keep wages down. At the same time all the taxes 
on clothing, furniture, and tools would reduce the net 
return of the agriculturist and lower the attractiveness 
of the land. Lower wages would then suffice to hold 
the laborer in the East. These two lines of legislation 
would therefore be consistent and support each other ; 
but they were sorely unjust to the man who had noth- 
ing save his stout hands with which to fight the battle 
of life and his good-will to work. 

The free-trade States of the South and the free-land 
States of the West, therefore, fell most naturally into 
the " coalition " which the tariff men and national re- 
publicans denounced. The latter said that the Southern- 
ers had agreed to surrender the lands to the West as a 
price for the assistance of the West against the Eastern 
States and the tariff.^ The sudden and unaccountable 
poi)ularity of Jackson in rural Pennsylvania threw that 
State, in spite of the tariff interests of her cai)italists, into 
the combination to which JacKSon belonged sectionally, 
^ 9 Adams, 235. 



188 ANDREW JACKSON. 

and the ambitious politicians of New York, seeing the 
need of joining Jackson, brought as much as they could 
of that State to his suj)port. These combinations con- 
stituted the Jackson party, in regard to the incoherency 
of Tvhose elements something has been said and more 
will appear. Clay was operating his political career 
through tariff and internal improvements, with the lands 
as a fund for colonization, canals, roads, and education. 
This gave liim no strength in the West, and he could 
not break Jackson's phalanx in Pennsylvania, where his 
own policy should have made him strong. Hence he 
never could consolidate a party. Benton antagonized 
Clay in the West by taking up the policy of free lands. 
In 1827 Rush, Secretary of the Treasury, included in 
his annual report a long dissertation on lands, tariff, 
and internal improvements. He sees and states dis- 
tinctly and correctly the relation between free land and 
free trade, restricted land sales and protection.^ He 
makes an argument out of it for protection and for not 
selling the lands cheaply, although he does not venture 
positively to urge the latter. He lays down the dogma 
that " the creation of capital is retarded by the diffusion 
of a thin population over a great surface of soil," — a 
dogma which is the very opposite of the truth. He also 
declares that the price at which the lands were being 
sold was an encouragement by legislation to agriculture, 
which is not true, and would not be true unless the 
lands were sold for less than the cost of buying, survey- 
big, and policing. The figures above given show that 
the lands had been sold as nearly as possible at cost 
price. Leaving out these errors, his recognition of the 
economic relations and their effects is correct ; y«t they 
1 33 Niles, 250. 



FOOTS RESOLUTIONS. 189 

^eem to him to sustain an argument for restriction on 
trade and restriction on the sales of land, and he dis- 
tinctly favors the plan of making it hard for the non- 
capitalist to get upon the land, in order that the non- 
capitalist may be kept in the old States, and may be 
more willing to work tliere for wages. One thing, at 
least, must be admitted to the credit of the statesmen of 
that day who believed in the restrictive system. They 
did not give away the lands by a homestead law, and 
distribute them to railroads which were to render the 
new land easily accessible, while they laid restrictions on 
imports to encourage manufacturing, and they did not 
propose to pay subsidies to ships for bringing goods in, 
while they were laying duties to keep goods out. Their 
system was vicious, but the abuse was perpetrated only 
once ; it was not multiplied into itself three or four 
times. It was based on an error, but the error was at 
least logical and consistent with itself. 

In January and February, 1829, Illinois and Indiana 
adopted resolutions questioning the right of the federal 
government to the lands in those States. They did not 
adopt the Georgia tone, but they seemed disposed to 
adopt the Georgia policy in case of a disagreement with 
the federal government. 

Jackson had no settled policy in regard to land. In 
his first message he favored distribution of the surplus 
revenue among the States, so soon as the debt should 
be paid. 

December 29, 1829, Foot, of Connecticut, offered in 
ihe Senate a resolution that the Committee on Public 
Lands should inquire into th^ expediency of restricting 
sales of land to xnds not yet sold at the minimum price, 
L «., within the areas which up to that time had been 



190 ANDREW JACKSON. 

put upon the market. It was in the debate on this 
resolution that Webster and Hayne became involved in 
their famous argument on the theory of the confedera- 
tion. Benton introduced a bill for selling the lands 
at graduated prices, so that those remaining unsold at 
$1.25 should not be reserved, but sold at lower prices, 
after they had been three years on the market. The 
Senate passed this bill May 7, 1830. It was not acted 
on in the House. 

In January, 1831, the subject came up again in the 
House, on an appropriation for surveys,^ and produced 
a long debate, in which all the views of the question were 
represented. In his annual report for 1831, McLane, 
Secretary of the Treasury, proposed that the lands 
should be sold to the States in which they lay at a fair 
price, and that the sum thus obtained should be divided 
amongst the States. March 22, 1832, Bibb moved,"^ in 
the Senate, that the Committee on Manufactures should 
report, as a preliminary to the consideration of the tariff, 
on the expediency of reducing the price of the lands, 
and also on the expediency of surrendering the lands to 
the States. Clay reported from that committee against 
both propositions, and in favor of giving ten per cent of 
the proceeds of the lands to the new States, in addition 
to whf>t they were already entitled to, and dividing the 
residue among all the States. Clay's report was re 
?erred to *he Committee on Public Lands, which re- 
ported, May 18th, adversely to his propositions, an^l 
recommended a minimum price of $1.00 ; lands remain- 
ing unsold at that price for five years to be tlien sold 
for fifty cents ; fifteen per cent of the proceeds to be 
divided amongst the new States. No action was takea 
1 6 Ann. Reg. 81. » 7 Ann. Reg. 57. 



EARLY POLICY ABOUT IMPROVEMENTS. 191 

on account of the disagreement of the two Houses, but 
the administration, by its attitude on the land question, 
gained strength in the Western States for the presiden- 
tial election of 1832. 

IV. Internal improvements. In 1802 appropria- 
tions were made for a road to the northwestern terri- 
tory. In 1807 Gallatin made an elaborate report on 
public works, laying down doctrines which no one would 
dispute about the advantage of public highways and 
means of transportation. The Jeffersonians were timid 
on the point of constitutionality, but they did not raise 
the question of expediency, and there was no party 
question about internal improvements. By the act of 
May 11, 1812, provision was made for the survey of a 
road from Robinstown, Maine, to St. Mary's, Georgia. 
This was a north and south road, proposed, in the inter- 
est of justice, to offset the Cumberland road from east 
to west. The vice of the policy, therefore, presented 
itself at once. It was impossible to select only the 
enterprises which were of a national character, and 
were really demanded by public necessity and con- 
venience. Local jealousy and self-interest demanded 
" equal " favor, and the enterjirises were either all im- 
possible, or could be carried out only by log-rolling to 
include them all. 

February 16, 1816, Calhoun moved for a committee 
to inquire into the expediency of setting apart tlie bonus 
and profits from the Bank of the United States as a 
fund for internal improvements. At the next session 
a bill to that effect was f)assea. Madison vetoed it, 
because the federal government had not the power tc 
engage in such enterprises. Monroe declared, in his 
first message, that he held the same views as Mad 



192 ANDREW JACKSON. 

ison on this subject.^ In 1817 the subject of internal 
improvements was much agitated, but without action, 
on account of Monroe's well-known views on the sul> 
ject. PojDular opinions were strong to the effect that 
all government expenditures were a boon or favor which 
the government ought to distribute equally, and it was 
very common to hear a congressman complain that the 
federal government derived more revenue from his dis- 
trict than the sums expended there. Congressmen were 
also beginning to find out how the public expenditures 
could be used to make capital for themselves. May 4, 
1822, Monroe vetoed a bill for collecting tolls on the 
Cumberland road, and keeping it in repair. In this veto 
message he discussed the whole subject of internal im- 
provements. He admitted that expenditures for that 
purpose were advantageous and proper, if the enter- 
prises were national in character ; but he objected to 
them strenuously when they were local and special, and 
he thought that Congress had no constitutional power 
to carry them out in either case. 

By the act of April 30, 1824, $30,000 were appropri- 
ated as an annual appropriation for surveys, to be made 
by the board of engineers, of such roads, canals, and 
river improvements as the President might designate. 
The theory of this act was that the engineers might be 
advantageously employed, in time of peace, in finding 
out what works were practicable and likely' to be worth 
executing. In the session of 1827-28 the whole subject 
rame up again on a question of passing the annual ap 
propriation of $30,000. The question of internal im 
provements then first took on a party character, and 
party exigency forced not a few men on either side U 
1 6 Ann. Reg. 68. 



VETO OF THE MAYSVILLE ROAD. 193 

change their opinions. Crawford alone of the candi- 
dates in 1824 had been understood to be a strict con- 
structionist. Calhoun had favored improvements. Clay 
was not, at this time, earnestly in favor of them.^ The 
opposition assailed the policy as unconstitutional, and 
some of the finest pettifogging of the political scholastics 
and casuists was done on tliis question. Little was said 
about the expediency of the policy Oakley, of New 
Yorli, in the House, March 1, 1828, declared that 
under the act of 1824 the President had been exposed 
to a constant assault from Governors, members of Con- 
gress, Legislatures, mayors, and corporations, to cause 
the surveys for local and private enterprises to be made 
at the expense of the United States. The opposition 
did not dare to oppose directly all projects under the 
vicious system. Their proposition was to distribute 
funds for internal improvements to the States. The 
appropriation, in 1828, was finally carried, with a pro- 
viso that the surveys were to be made only for works of 
a national character. 

Jackson, in his first message, indicated hostility to 
the general policy of internal improvements, and favored 
distribution.^ May 27, 1830, he vetoed a bill for sub- 
Bcription, by the United States, to the stock of the 
Maysville and Lexington road.^ In his veto message he 
placed himself on the constitutional doctrine of Madison 
and Monroe. The local and political interests which 
had become involved in the system at this time were 
very numerous and very strong. The evil of special 

1 7 Adams, 191. 2 gee page 189. 

8 This road was to run through the strongest JacKson district 
ia Kentucky. (Clay to Webster. I "Webster's Correspondence, 
^01.) 

13 



194 ANDREW JACKSON. 

legislation was growing. Politicians and interested 
speculators combined to further each other's interests at 
the public expense. Jackson affronted the whole inter- 
est ; one would say that he affronted it boldly, if it were 
not that he acted with such spontaneous will and dis- 
I'egard of consequences that there was no conscious 
exercise of courage. He was not able to put an end to 
the abuse, but he curtailed it. He used the exceptional 
Btrength of his political position to do wliat no one else 
would have dared to do in meeting a strong and grow- 
ing cause of corruj^tion. He held a bill for the Louis- 
ville canal, and another for light-houses, over the ses- 
sion, and then returned them unsigned. At the session 
of 1830-31 a bill for improvements was passed by such 
majorities that a veto was useless. In 1831—32 Jackson 
signed one such bill and " pocketed " another. In the 
session of 1832-33 an internal improvement bill was 
defeated by parliamentary tactics. In the message of 
1832 Jackson recommended the sale of all the stocks 
held by the United States in canals, turnpikes, etc. He 
educated his party, for that generation at least, up to a 
position of party hostility to special legislation of every 
kind. 

V. Tariff. The " American system " is an elastic 
designation, which can be applied to win a presumption 
in favor of whatever one desires to recommend. In our 
history it has changed its meaning in every generation 
^s above stated,^ the United States, between the second 
war and 1830, did not favor treaties of commerce. The 
policy of treaties of commerce was European. Its 
theory was that, all nations having restrictions on trade 
and regarding them as wise, one nation should breair 

1 See page 168. 



''RECIPROCITY:' 195 

down its restrictions to a specified degree and for a 
specified counter-relaxation, in favor of another nation 
with which it might make a commercial treaty. The 
favors and relaxations granted were therefore sj^ecial 
and individual, and the relations of trade between na- 
tions were the result of all the special and peculiar 
relaxations which had been made, starting from a the- 
ory of isolation and prohibition. The United States, 
from the first independent acts performed by it as a 
nation with any other nation, the commercial treaty 
and treaty of alliance with France in 1778, adopted a 
different policy. It started not from an hypothetical 
situation of prohibition and isolation, but from an hy- 
pothesis of perfect freedom. It tried to get into the 
commercial relations of Europe, but it would not grant 
any special privileges. Its doctrine was that each na- 
tion, while rendering trade as free as possible, should 
be governed in its fiscal arrangements by its own needs, 
circumstances, and good judgment, but that, once having 
adopted its system, it should present a uniform front 
to foreign nations. This was the "American system" 
in the first generation. In the second generation the 
difficulty of combining an independent fiscal system 
with commercial treaties led to a prejudice against the 
latter, and they were sought almost exclusively for the 
sake of receiving reciprocity as to ships and the carry- 
ing trade. Then the " American system " underwent 
a change. " Recij^rocity " did not mean mutual relaxa« 
tion and concession, but retaliation. The United States 
departed from the un'fcmity and independence of its 
fiscal system to countervail and resent what it considered 
discrimination against itself. There was no case in which 
%ny nation placed on products of the United States a 



196 ANDREW JACKSON. 

heavier tax than was laid on the same products fron. 
ftny other country, save in the case of colonies ; but the 
discrimination complained of lay in the selection for 
taxation of those commodities which the United States 
produced, as a means of protecting the same commod' 
ities when produced in the taxing countries. It was 
urged that the American system required that the United 
States should protect the production at home of products 
similar to those which were produced by the country 
which taxed the products of the United States. Hence 
the American system then meant retaliation to force a 
foreign nation to break down its protective system, — 
just the policy advocated by the newest school of " re- 
ciprocitarians " and " fair traders " in England. Re- 
taliation always amounts to just this : Inasmuch as the 
other party has cut himself off, by his protective taxes, 
from the share which he might have had, through trade, 
in our natural advantages, incidentally narrowing the 
market for our products, and so injuring us, therefore let 
us now, in addition, cut ourselves off, by protective taxes, 
from the share which we might obtain, through trade, in 
his natural advantages, for the sake of incidentally nar- 
rowing the market for his products, and so injuring 
him. When the scale of operations is small enough for 
the effects to be perceived, retaliation will generally ac- 
complish its object ; for it is no satisfaction to us, in the 
long run, when we are suff'ering from harm done us by 
eomebody, to know that he is hurting himself more ; but 
when the scale of operations is large, retaliation is 
powerless, because the effects of it then pass under that 
great class of things, — the despair of the reformers ana 
social pliilosophers, — the things which people do not 
kee. 



''COUNTERVAILING^ 197 

In 1817 an act was passed to retaliate for certain re- 
strictions laid by Nova Scotia and New Brunswick on 
New England ships engaged in the plaster trade. Here 
the scale of operations was small and the effects were 
immediate and evident. The provinces repealed their 
restrictions. This instance greatly stimulated faith in 
the policy of " countervailing." It was referred to as a 
demonstration of the power of that policy.^ The ap- 
plication of it to the West India trade has been noticed. 

We have already briefly described the tariff of 1824.^ 
In anticipation of the passage of that act large quantities 
of woollen goods were imported. In that and the pre- 
ceding year manufacturing in England had been very 
active, under a pressure of flush times, and in the ex- 
pectation of a good market in the South American states, 
which had just won their independence. The expecta- 
tions were disappointed. On the mania followed the 
crisis and panic in 1825. Then large stocks w^ere thrown 
on this market and sacrificed for a quick return. In 
1825 Huskisson brought forward the first reforms in 
the system of taxation. His propositions, viewed from 
to-day's stand-point, seem beggarly enough, but at that 
time they seemed revolutionary. He reduced taxes on 
raw materials, chemicals, dye-stuffs, and materials of 
industry. Raw wool was reduced from sixjjence to a 
Denny and a half penny per pound, according to quality. 
Vfter the tariff of 1824 was passed by Congress, the 
English woollen producers imported some of their cloths 
into this country in an unfinished state, in order to get 
them in below the minimum (33^ cents j, and then had 
them finished here. They also sent agents to this coun- 
iry, to whom they invoiced their cloths below the open 
Uia 'iet price. 

*^ 5 Adams, 41. * See page 76. 



198 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Every one of the above statements, as will be seea 
introduces a fact which affected the relations of the 
American woollen industry In its competition with the 
English woollen industry in a way to counteract any pro- 
tection by the tariff. A number of persons had begun 
the manufacture of woollens because the federal legisla- 
tion encouraged them so to do, not because they under- 
stood that business, or had examined the industrial con- 
ditions of success in it. They were pleased to consider 
Huskisson's legislation as hostile to the United States, 
and they called for measures to countervail it. They 
also construed as fraud the importation of unfinished 
cloths and the practice of invoicing to agents at manu- 
facturer's cost. The " American system " therefore un- 
derwent another transformation. It now meant to coun- 
tervail and offset any foreign legislation, even in the 
direction of freedom and reform or advance in civiliza- 
tion, if that legislation favored the American consumer. 

The first complaint came from the old free-trade sec- 
tion. After 1824 the New England States, which up to 
that time had been commercial States, turned to manu- 
factures. They had resisted all the earlier tariffs. They 
would have been obliged to begin manufacturing, tariff 
or no tariff, on account of the growing density of the 
population ; but there was force in Webster's assertion, 
in reply to Hayne, that New England, after protesting 
against the tariff as long as she could, had conformed to 
a policy forced upon the country by others, and had 
embarked her capital in manufacturing.^ October 23, 
1826, the Boston woollen manufacturers petitioned Con 
gress for more protection.^ They said that they hixi 
been led, by the profits of the English woollen industry io 
1 3 Webster's Works, 305. « 31 Niles. 145. 



TARIFF ON COTTONS AND WOOLLENS. 199 

1824 and the tariff of 1824, to begin manufacturing 
tvoollens, confident that they should not yield to fair com- 
petition, and that such competition would be secured to 
them by law. They went on to say that the English 
woollen manufacturers had glutted the market in Eng- 
land, and produced distress there, which had reacted on 
this country. They said that they could not be relieved 
"without the aid of their national government." 

This appeal of the w^oollen manufacturers brought out 
new demands from other quarters. Especially the wool- 
growers came forward. They had not gained anything 
by the tariff. A few shrewd men, who took to breeding 
sheep and who sold out their flocks to the farmers (who 
were eager buyers, because they were sure, since they 
had a protective tax in their favor, that they were to 
make fortunes out of wool), won by the tariff. No one 
else did. It is stated that the woollen manufacturers did 
not dare to ask for higher duties in 1824, because they 
feared that the wool-growers would only demand so 
much more.^ They thought that their want of success 
was due to want of experience and skill, and they looked 
to make improvements. In fact, the tax on wool was 
raised, in 1824, more than that on woollens. 

By the tariff of 1816 the tax on cottons was fixed for 
three years at?"25 per cent ; after that at 20 per cent. 
This was a direct application of the theory that a protect- 
ive tax is good to set up an industry, and that it may 
then be lowered or removed. The device of the mini- 
mum was introduced, however, and all cottons, except 
nankeens, which cost less than 25 cents per square yard, 
were to be held to have cost 25 cents. By this device 
lie tax on the lowest grades was made greatly highei* 
I 2 Ann. Reg. 102- 



200 ANDREW JACKSON. 

than it seemed to be. For the same three years wool 
lens were to be taxed 25 per cent ; after that, 20 pel 
cent. In 1824 the tax on cottons was put back to 25 
per cent, and woollens were raised to 25 per cent if 
worth not above 33^ cents per square yard, and 30 per 
cent or 33^ per cent if of greater value. Wool, which 
was free in 1816, was graded at 15 per cent, 20 per 
cent, and 30 per cent, in 1824. 

January 10, 1827, Mallary, of Vermont, introduced the 
" woollens bill," for " adjusting " the tariff on wool and 
woollens.^ Niles had taken up the high tariff doctrine 
ten years before, and had preached it in liis " Register " 
assiduously. His economic notions were meagre and 
erroneous throughout, and he had absolutely no training. 
He had no doubt, however, that he was inculcating the 
rules of prosperity and wise govermnent. He unques- 
tionably exerted a great influence ; for he never tired 
of his labored prescriptions for " giving a circulation to 
money," and " encouraging industry." He took up the 
cause of the woollen men with his whole heart. Of his 
sincerity and disinterestedness there can be no question. 
To him and the economists and statesmen of his school 
the minimum seemed to be a marvellous invention. Mal- 
lary proposed to use it to the utmost. He proposed to 
leave the rates of tax unchanged, but to apply them on 
and between minima of 40 cents, $2.50, and $4.00. 
Cloth, therefore, which cost 41 cents was to be held to 
have cost $2.50, and the tax on it was to be 62^ cents. 
Wool which cost over 10 cents was to be held to have 
cost 40 cents. The duty on it was to be 35 per cent for 
B/ year ; then 40 per cent. The principle now proposed 
vas, therefore, that the duties should advance with tima 
1 31 Nileg, 319. 



TEE ''WOOLLENS BILL."' 201 

The woollens bill passed the House, 106 to 95. It was 
tabled in the Senate by the casting vote of Calhoun. 
Calhoun was forced into tliis vote by a manoeuvre of 
Van Buren, who " dodged." Calhoun suffered, in conse- 
quence, in Pennsylvania and New York. Politics ran 
very high on this bill. In fact, they quite superseded 
all the economic interests.^ The opposition were afraid 
of offending either the Pennsylvania supporters of Jack- 
son, or the Southern supporters of Jackson. Passion 
began now to enter into tariff discussion, not only on 
the part of the Southerners, but also between the wool 
men and the woollen men, each of whom thought the 
other grasping, and that each was to be defeated in his 
purpose by the other. Niles said that it was more a 
wool bill than a woollens bill, and the wooUen men were 
much dissatisfied with it. 

May 14, 1827, the Pennsylvania Society for the Pro- 
motion of Manufactures and the Mechanic Arts called a 
convention of wool groAvers and manufacturers. The 
convention met at Ilarrisburg, July 30, 1827. It was 
found necessary to enlarge the scope of the convention 
in order to make allies of interests wliich would other- 
wise become hostile. The convention went on the plan 
of favoring protection on everything which asked for it. 
The result was that iron, steel, glass, wool, woollens, 
hemp, and flax were recommended for protection. 
Louisiana was not represented, and so sugar was left 
out. It was voted to discourage the importation of for- 
eign spirits and the distillation of spirits from foreign 
products, by way of protection to Western whiskey. The 
convention proposed, as its idea of a reasonable and 
proper tax on wool and woollens, the following : *'' On 

I 31 Niles, 321 ; 33 Niles, 385. 2 32 Niles, 888 



202 ANDREW JACKSON. 

wool which cost 8 cents or less per pound, 20 cents pel 
pound and an advance of 2^ cents per pound per an- 
num until it should be 50 cents ; on woollens, four 
minima were proposed, 50 cents, $2.50, $4.00, and 
$6.00, on which the tax was to be 40 per cent for a 
year, 45 per cent the next year, and 50 per cent there- 
after. The minimum on cottons was to be raised to 40 
cents. 

When the 20th Congress met, the tariff was the ab- 
sorbing question. Popular interest had become engaged 
in it and parties were to form on it, but it perplexed 
the politicians greatly. It was to this Congress at its 
opening that Rush sent the report described above.-^ 
Stevenson, of Virginia, an anti-tariff man, was chosen 
Speaker. Adams says that Stevenson won votes by 
promising to make a committee favorable to the tariff.^ 
Stevenson put Mallary at the head of the committee,' 
but he put an anti-tariff majority behind him. The 
" Annual Register " ^ stated the foreign trade of the 
country then as follows : Twenty-four million dollars' 
worth of cotton, rice, and tobacco were exported to 
England annually. Four million dollars' worth moro 
were exported to other countries. The imports from 
Enoland were seven or eight millions' worth of wool- 
lens, about the same value of cottons, three or four mil- 
lions' worth of iron, steel, and hardware, and miscella- 
aeous articles, bringing the total up to twenty-eight 
millions. From this it was plain that the producers of 
bread-stuffs in the United States, who were kept out of 
England by the corn laws, were forced to take their 
products to the West Indies and South America, and 

1 See page 188. 3 7 Adams, 369. 

« 3 Am. Reg. 37. 



FOREIGN TRADE BALANCE, 1828. 203 

exchange them there for four millions' worth of colo- 
nial produce, which England would receive, in order to 
balance the account. The editor of the " Annual Reg- 
ister " built upon this fact his argument for protection 
as a retaliation to break down the English corn laws. 
He saw that the Southern staple products must be the 
fulcrum for the lever by which the English restrictions 
were to be broken. He offered the Southerners a cer- 
tain consolation in the hope that there would be a larger 
consumption of their staples at home, but really con- 
cluded that, as between interests, the grain interest of 
the North and West was worth more than the interests 
of the South. It is not strange if this mode of reason- 
ing was not relished in the South.^ 

Mallary stated in debate that the consumption of 
woollens in the United States was then seventy-two mill- 
ion dollars per annum, of which ten millions' worth were 
imported, twenty-two millions' worth were manufactured 
in the United States, and forty millions' worth were pro- 
duced by household spinning and weaving (" domestic 
industry," as the term was then used). If these statistics 
are worth anything, the twelve millions of population 
consumed, on an average, six dollars' worth of woollens 
per head per annum. What Mallary proposed to do 
was to prevent the ten millions' worth from being im- 
ported. To do this he would increase the cost of the 
part imported and the part manufactured at home, the 
result of which would be that still a larger part of the 
population would have to be clothed in homespun. 
Thus his project might easily defeat itself, so far as it 
aimed to benefit the American manufacturer, pnd it 
«rould deprive the American people of the rest, leisure. 
1 h>3e page 209. 



204 ANDREW JACRdON. 

and greater satisfaction, as well as abundance, which 
new machinery and the factory system were winning 
out of the textile industries, as compared with the old 
household spinning and weaving. 

The Committee on Manufactures of the House had 
been taking testimony on the tariff during the recess. 
The Southern free-traders had brought this about against 
the opposition of the Northern protectionists. There 
were only twenty-eight witnesses examined, of whom 
nine were voluntary and seven were members of Con- 
gress. The evidence amounted to nothing but com- 
plaints of hard times and losses.^ The deduction that 
these facts were due to a lack of sufficient tariff was 
taken for granted.^ 

Silas Wright and other anti-tariff men on the Com- 
mittee on Manufactures would not let Mallary report 
the propositions of the Harrisburg convention on wool 
and woollens.^ Mallary tried to introduce those propo- 
sitions as amendments on the floor of the House. All 
the interests, industrial and political, pounced upon the 
bill to try to amend it to their notions. New England 
and the Adams men wanted high duties on woollens and 
cottons, and low duties on wool, iron, hemp, salt, and 
molasses (the raw material of rum). Pennsylvania, 
Ohio, and Kentucky wanted high taxes on iron, wool, 
hemp, molasses (protection to whiskey), and low taxes 

1 34 Niles, 1 . 

2 As- a specimen of the value of such complaints : In April; 
1828, Nilcs said that there was dullness in trade aud great distress 
lit Baltimore. (34 Niles, 139.) In Octoher he said that he had 
Dot heen througli parts of the city for a long time, and that on « 
recent walk he had heen astonished at the signs of prosperity 

35 Nile.5, 81.) 
• Hammond's Wright^ 104. 



TARIFF OF 1828. 205 

on woollens and cottons. The Southerners wanted low 
taxes on everything, but especially on finished goods, 
and if there were to be heavy taxes on these latter they 
did not care how heavy the taxes on the raw materials 
were made. This last point and the unswerving loyalty 
of rural Pennsylvania to Jackson enabled the Jackson 
party to hold together its discordant elements. The 
political and economic alliances of the South were plainly 
inconsistent.^ 

The act which resulted from the scramble of selfish 
special interests was an economic monstrosity. The 
industrial interests of twelve millions of people had been 
thrown into an arena where there was little knowledge 
of economic principles, and no information about the in- 
dustrial state of the country, or about the special indus- 
tries. It being assumed that the Legislature could, 
would, and was about to, confer favors and advantages, 
there was a scramble to see who should get the most. 
At the same time jDarty ambitions and strifes seized 
upon the industrial interests as capital for President- 
making. May 19, 1828, the bill became a law. The 
duty on wool costing less than 10 cents ])qv pound was 
15 per cent, on other wool 20 per cent and 30 j)er cent. 
That on woollens was 40 per cent for a year, then 45 
per cent, there being four minima, 50 cents, $1.00, 
$2.50, $4.00. All which cost over $4.00 were to be 
taxed 45 per cent for a year, then 50 per cent. Niles 
and all the woollen men were enraged at this arrange- 
ment. No South Carolinian was more discontented 
than they. The " dollar minimum " was the especial 
eause of their rage. Cloth which cost 51 cents they 
wanted to regard as costing $2.50, and to tax it 40 per 
1 See page 211. 



206 ANDREW JACKSON. 

cent on that, i. «., $1.00. The dollar minimum let in a 
large class of cloths which cost from $1.00 to $1.25, 
and which could be run down to cost from 90 to 99 
cents. 

The process of rolling iron had not yet been intro- 
duced into this country. It was argued that rolled iron 
was not as good as forged, and this was made the 
ground for raising the tax on rolled iron from $30.00 to 
$37.00 per ton, while the tax on forged iron was raised 
from $18.00 to $22.40. Rolled iron was cheaper, and 
was available for a great number of uses. The tax, in 
this case, " countervailed " an improvement in the arts, 
and robbed the American people of their share in the 
advantao:e of a new industrial achievement. The tax on 
steel was raised from $20.00 to $30.00 per ton ; that on 
hemp from $35.00 to $45.00 per ton ; that on molasses 
from 5 cents to 1 cents per gallon ; that on flax from 
nothing to $35.00 per ton. The tax on sugar, salt, and 
glass remained unchanged, and that on tea also, save by 
a differential tonnage duty. Coffee was classified and 
the tax reduced. The tax on wine, by a separate act, 
was reduced one half or more.^ 

This was the " tariff of abominations," so called on 
account of the number of especially monstrous provi 
Bions which it contained. In the course of the debate 
on it the dogma was freely used that protective taxes 
lower prices, and the exclusion of American grain by 
the English corn laws was a constantly effective argu- 
ment. Credit varying from nine to eighteen montlii 
was allowed under this as under the previous tariffs. 
1 See page 343. 



CHAPTER X. 

PUBLIC QUESTIONS OF JACKSCN's FIRST ADMINISTRA- 
TION. — ni. 

VI. Nullification, The Southerners bitterly de- 
nounced the tariff of 1828. They had already begun 
to complain of the operation of the system four or five 
years before. To understand their complaint, it is 
enough to notice with what reckless extravagance the 
tariff theory, even if its truth were admitted, was being 
handled in 1828. Of course the jjublic argument in 
favor of the tariff necessarily took the form of asser- 
tions that, by some occult process or other, the taxation 
proposed would be beneficent to all, and that the pro- 
tective theory was a theory of national wealth. The 
Southerners were sure that they paid the expenses of 
the experiment, and they ventured the inference that 
those who were so eager for the tariff saw their profit 
ia it ; but when the attempt was made to find any com- 
pensation to the nation or to the South, no such thing 
could be found. Up to that point there was the plain 
fact of capital expended and capital gained ; at that 
point all turned into dogma and declamation. 

March 12, 1828, McDuffie, of South Carolina, pre- 
sented a report from the Committee on Ways and 
Means ^ against the tariff. He enumerated the varieties 
if woollens used by the people, and showed the operation 
1 34 Nile*. 81. 



208 ANDREW JACKSON. 

of the minima upon each. He then went on to discuss 
the economic doctrines and the theory of protection as a 
mode of increasing the wealth of the country, and more 
especially the effect of the proposed taxes on the agri- 
cultural and exporting sections. The facts and doctrines 
stated by him were unanswerable, but they did not 
touch either the political motives or the interested pe* 
cuniary motives which were really pushing the tariff. 
He had all the right and all the reason, but not the 
power. The agricultural States were forced, under the 
tariff, either to export their products, exchange them 
for foreign products, and pay taxes on these latter to 
the federal treasury before they could bring them home, 
or else to exchange their products with the Northern 
manufacturers for manufactured products, and to pay 
taxes to the latter in the price of the goods. All the 
mysteries of exchange, banking, and brokerage might 
obscure, they never could alter, these actual economic 
relations of fact. When the Southerners were put off 
with the glib commonplace reply to their remonstrance 
that they would sell more cotton to the North, they 
were doubly exasperated. If the South, under free 
trade, produced 100 bales of cotton, of which it exported 
75 bales for $3,750 and sold 25 bales to the North for 
$1,250, it got $5,000 for 100 bales. If a ten per cent 
tax was laid on manufactures, and if that tax availed, 
as argued, to cause only 60 bales to be exported and 40 
to be sold at the North, then the 60 exported, at the 
^ame price as before, would bring $3,000 worth of man- 
ufactured goods, on which ten per cent must be paid to 
get them home ; net $2,700. The 40 bales sold at the 
North would bring $2,000, at the same price as before 
but goods bought with this $2,000 would be enhance^. 



THE SOUTHERN GRIEVANCE. 209 

bi price ten per cent by the protectior, and, as comparet, 
with former returns, the goods now obtained woula oe 
worth $1,800. The South would therefore have ob 
tained for 100 bales $4,500 worth of products at the 
old free-trade prices. Therefore the difference in the 
distribution of the product could make no difference at 
all in the facts of profit and the incidence of the tax, 
and at the end of the calculation the intricate device 
came to nothing but an imposition of ten per cent tax 
on the agricultural products of the country. 

The protectionists always affected to deride the South- 
ern declaration that the tax fell on the South. The pop- 
ular notion was that the tariff tax bore on the foreigner 
in some way or other, and helped the domestic producer 
to a victory over the foreigner. Since the object of the 
tariff was to prevent importations of foreign goods, it 
would, if it succeeded, make the foreigner stay at home, 
and keep his goods there. This of course deprived him 
of a certain demand for his goods, and prevented him 
from reaching a gain which, under other conditions, he 
might have won, but it could not possibly render him or 
his capital in any way available for " encouraging Amer- 
ican manufactures." The American consumer of Amer- 
ican products is the only person whom American laws 
could reach in order to make him contribute capital to 
build up American industry. So far, then, as the Amer- 
ican protected industries were concerned, they preyed 
upon each other with such results of net gain and loss 
as chance and stupidity might bring about. So far as 
American non-protected industries were concerned, they, 
being the naturally strong and independent industries of 
the country, sustained the whole body of protected in- 
dustries, which were simply parasites apon them. Tha 
U 



210 ANDREW JACKSON. 

protective theory, as a theory of wealth, therefore pro' 
posed to organize national industry as an independent 
body with a parasite upon it, wliile the free-trade theory 
proposed to let industry organize itself as so many in- 
dependent and vigorous bodies as the labor, capital, and 
land of the country could support. 

The grievance of the South in 1828 is undeniable. 
So long as the exports of the country were almost ex- 
clusively Southern products — cotton and tobacco — and 
so long as the federal revenue was almost entirely d&^ 
rived from duties on imports, it is certain that the 
Southern industries either supported the federal govern- 
ment or paid tribute to the Northern manufacturers. 
The Southerners could not even get a hearing or patient 
and proper study of the economic questions at issue. 
Their interests were being sacrificed to pretended national 
interests, just as, under the embargo, the interests of New 
England were sacrificed to national interests. In each 
case the Jjarty which considered its interests sacrificed 
came to regard the Union only as a cage, in which all 
were held in order that the stronger combination might 
plunder the weaker. No amount of precept or emphasis 
can make the Union, which is the paramount civil inter- 
est of the American people, strong and permanent, if 
any section or party in it has reason to believe that its 
interests are sacrificed in the Union ; and the Union 
neve, can be secure unless there is a disposition in the 
predominant majority at any time to listen with patience 
to any remonstrance, and to exercise power with moder- 
ation and justice. 

The more thoroughly the economist and politica' 
philosopher recognizes the grievance of the Southerner? 
\n 1828, the more he must regret the unwisdom of tht 



VOTES ON THE TARIFF OF 1828. 211 

Southern proceedings. The opponents of the tariff of 
1828 adopted the policy of voting in favor of all the 
" abominations " on points of detail, in the hope that 
they could so weight down the bill that it would at last 
fail as a whole. ^ Hence those Southerners who sup- 
ported Jackson voted with the Pennsylvania and New 
York high-tariff men for all the worst features of the 
bill, while New England and the Adams men, who 
started as high-tariff men, voted on tlie other side. 
The Southern Jackson men wanted to give way suffi- 
ciently on the tariff to secure one or two doubtful States. 
For instance, they were willing to protect whiskey and 
hemp to win Kentucky from Clay to Jackson. They 
were, in fact, playing a game which was far too delicate, 
between their economic interests and their political 
party affiliations. They were caught at last. In the 
vote on the previous question in the House, the yeas 
were 110, of whom 11 were Adams men and 99 Jackson 
men ; the nays were 91, of whom 80 were Adams men 
and 11 Jackson men. The nays were those who wanted 
a tariff, but who wanted to amend the bill before them 
a great deal more before they passed it ; that is, they 
wanted to take out the abominations which the anti- 
tariff men had voted into it. On the final passage of 
the bill, the yeas were 105, of whom 61 were Adams 
men and 44 Jackson men ; the nays were 94, of whom 
35 were Adams men and 59 were .Tackson men. Of 
the yeas only 3 were from south of tJie Potomac. The 
policy oi the Southei'n free-traders, like most attempts 
at legislative finesse, proved an entire failure. The 
high-tariff men, although every man had intense objec- 
tion to sometliino; in the bill voted for it rather tlian 
1 35 Niles ^2. 



212 ANDREW JACKSON. 

defeat the bill entirely. The New England men did 
not know how to vote. In the end 23 of them voted 
against the bill and 16 for it.^ The bill passed the 
Senate, 26 to 21. Webster did not know on May 7th 
how he should vote.^ He voted for it, and then went 
home and defended the vote on the ground that he had 
to take the good and evil of the measure together.* 
After all, the tariff made no capital for anybody. The 
protectionists by threatening both parties forced both to 
concede the tariff, after which the protectionists voted 
with either party, according to their preferences, just as 
they would have done if both had resisted instead of 
both yielding. 

Van Buren obtained " instructions " from Albany to 
vote for the tariff, in order to be able to do so without 
offending the Southerners.* Calhoun declared, in a 
speech in the Senate, February 23, 1837, that Van 
Buren was to blame for the tariff of 1828.^ 

The South had already begun to discuss remedies be- 
fore the tariff of 1828 was passed. Colonel Hamilton, 
of South Carolina, at a public dinner in the autumn of 
1827, proposed " nullification " as a remedy, the term 
being borrowed from the Virginia and Kentucky reso- 
lutions of 1798. Those resolutions now came to have 
for a certain party in the South the character and 
ftuthority of an addendum to the Constitution. They 

1 35 Niles, 52. 2 7 Adams, 534. 

8 1 Webster's Works, 165. 

* Mackeiuzie, 103 ; Hammond's Wright, 105. 

^ Green's Telegraph Extra, 271, says Adams wanted to veta 
the tariff of 1828, and throw himself on the South, uniting with 
Calhoun, but tliat Clay would not let him do so, because thai 
ivould ruin him and the American system. This is a very doubt 
{qI ?'C7y. 



THE RESOLUTIONS OF 1798, 213 

were, in truth, only the manifesto of a rancorous oppo- 
lition, and they belong, in the history of the country, m 
the same box of curious products of political passion 
with the resolutions of the Hartford convention. Yet, 
ftt that time, to call a man a "federalist" would have 
been a graver insult throughout the South than it would 
be now, in the North, to call a man a secessionist. 

An examination of the resolutions of 1798, as they 
were adopted, will fail to find nullification in them. 
The resolutions, with a number of other most interesting 
documents connected therewith, are given by Niles in 
a supplement to his 43d volume. By examination of 
these it appears that Jefferson's original draft of the 
Kentucky resolutions contained, in the eighth resolution, 
these words : " Where powers are assumed which have 
not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the right 
remedy." The Legislature of Kentucky cut out this 
and nearly all the rest of the eiglith resolution. The 
executory resolution, as drawn by Jefferson, ended thus : 
' The co-States [he means those States which adopt these 
resolutions] . . . will concur in declaring these acts 
[the alien and sedition laws] void and of no force, and 
will each take measures of its own for providing that 
neither of these acts . . . shall be exercised within their 
respective territories." The Legislature struck this out, 
and adopted, as the executory resolution : " The co- 
States . . . will concur in declaring these [acts] void 
and of no force, and will each unite with this common- 
wealth in requesting their repeal at the next session of 
Congress." Some of the other States responded to these 
resolutions, and in 1799 Kentucky passed a resolution 
hi which occurs this statement •' A nullification by those 
lovereignties of all unauthorized acts done under colof 



214 ANDREW JACKSON. 

of that instrument [the Constitution] is the rightful 
remedy." Madison's Virginia resolutions do not con- 
tain nullification either in form or substance, least of 
all as a practical remedy. They declare the alien and 
sedition acts unconstitutional, and that " the necessary 
and proper measures will be taken by each [of the con- 
curring States] for cooperating with this State " to pre- 
serve the reserved rights of the States and people. In 
1799 Madison made a long report to the Virginia House 
of Delegates, in which he analyzed and defended the 
resolutions of 1798, and especially defended the rem- 
edy proposed, namely, a solemn resolution and protest, 
communicated to the other States. He construed this 
remedy strictly. In May, 1830, Madison wrote to Liv- 
ingston, approving of an anti-nullification speech made 
by him on March 15th of that year. He thus states 
the error of the nullifiers : " The error in the late com- 
ments on the Virginia proceedings has^ arisen from a 
failure to distinguish between what is declaratory of 
opinion and what is ipso facto executory ; between the 
rights of the parties and of a single party ; and between 
resorts within the purview of the Constitution ard the 
ultima ratio which apj)eals from a Constitution can- 
celled by its abuses to original rights, paramount to all 
Constitutions." In 1830 Madison also wrote two long 
letters, one to Edward Everett, the other to Andrew 
Stevenson, in which he interprets the Virginia resolu- 
tions. He certainly softens them down somewhat, 
which is a proof that party heat influenced liim when he 
wrote them. He lays especial stress on the limited and 
harmless nature of the proposed action of Virginia 
His two letters are the best statement of " Madisoniai 
Eoderali&m." 



JEFFERSON AND NULLIFICATION. 215 

It is certain that the nullification of a federal law in a 
State, by a state authority, as a practical and available 
remedy against an offensive measure, found no sanction 
in 1798-99, except in the supplementary resolution of 
Kentucky, when the heat of the controversy favored an 
extreme position. It was a notion of Jefferson, in 
which Madison did not join, and which neither Legis- 
lature adojited, except as stated. Never until 1827 was 
any body of men found to take up the notion, and try 
to handle it as reasonable and j^ractical. Nullification 
is jacobinism. It is revolution made a constant political 
means, and brought into the every-day business of civil 
life. Nothing is more astonishing in American political 
history than the immunity enjoyed by some men, and 
the unfair responsibility enforced against others. Every 
Bchool-boy is taught to execrate the alien and sedition 
laws, and John Adams bears the odium of them, but no 
responsibility worth speaking of for nullification attaches 
to Jefferson. He was the father of it and the sponsor 
of it, and the authority of his name was v/hat recom- 
mended it in 1827. 

In December, 1827, the South Carolina Legislature 
raised a committee on the powers of the federal govern- 
ment in regard to tariff. In the winter of 1827-28 the 
Legislatures of several Southern States passed resolutions 
about protective tariff legislation. South Carolina had 
been a federal State in the previous generation. She 
had not been opposed to the federal government save 
m the matter of her " police bill." Geor^-ia had been 
the turbulent State, — the one which had had the most 
frequent collisions with the federal government, and had 
behaved on those occasions witn violence and folly. 
South Carolina in Monroe's time was latitudinarian and 



216 ANDREW JACKSON, 

Bnti-raclical, and as such was opposed to Georgia.' 
South Carolina now declared the tariff, internal im- 
provements, and appropriations for the colonization so- 
ciety unconstitutional. Georgia declared the tariff and 
internal improvements unconstitutional ; declared that 
Georgia would not submit to the action of Congress, 
and affirmed the right of secession.^ The old Crawford 
party, however, took sides against nullification, and pre- 
vented Georgia from ranging herself with South Caro- 
lina. At a meeting at Athens, August 6, 1828, pre- 
sided over by Crawford, a committee, consisting of 
Wayne, Berrien, Cobb, Gilmer, Clayton, Troup, and 
others, reported an address and resolutions denouncing 
the tariff, but disclaiming all disunion sentiments or 
purposes, and favoring ^ constitutional remedies. In 
1832 Crawford advocated a theory that secession was 
wrong until after a convention to amend the Constitu- 
tion had been tried and j)roved a failure."* North Caro- 
lina protested, in 1828, against the new tariff, declaring 
that it violated the spirit of the Constitution and ojiposed 
the interests of that State. Alabama denied the con- 
stitutionality of the tariff, and denounced it as pillage of 
that State. 

The proceedings of South Carolina did not remedy 
fche matter at all. They altered the issue very much to 
the satisfaction of the protectionists. The Union and 
the supremacy of the law were something on which a 
much better fight could be made than on the tariff, and 
the protectionists, having secured the law, wanted noth« 
ing better than to draw away attention from the criti- 
cism of it by making the fight on nullification. Cai 

1 38 Niles, 154. 23 Ann. Reg. 64. 

« 35 Niles, 14. « 42 Niles, 389. 



REASONS FOR EXASPERATION. 217 

ftoun and the South Carolinians had changed the fighting 
from free trade to nullification, and on that they stood 
ftlone. They threw away a splendid chance to secure 
a sound policy on one of the first economic interests 
of the country. In the debate between Webster and 
Hayne the latter won a complete victory on tariff and 
land. Webster made the fighting on the constitutional 
question, and turned away from the other questions al- 
most entirely. He had no standing ground on tariff 
and land. He was on record in his earliest speeches as 
an intelligent free-trader, and his biographer ^ has in- 
finite and fruitless trouble to try to explain away the 
fact. When Hayne opened the constitutional question 
he gave Webster every chance of victory. 

The action of Congress in passing the tariff of 1828, 
in spite of the attitude of the South, seemed to the 
Southerners to indicate an insolent disregard of their 
exj)ostulations. Of course it was not a question to be 
settled by a majority. A remonstrance against injustice 
and wrong cannot be put down by any majority. There 
may be many answers to the remonstrance, or it may 
not be practicable to yield to it, but to disregard it and 
answer it by a heavier and more reckless imposition of 
the same kind is not good government, whether it be a 
democratic majority which levies a tariff, or a despot 
who levies a forced loan. The supporters of the tariff 
were forced to argue that it was a wise public and na- 
tional policy, just as it might be argued that a state 
church or a state theatre is a beneficial public institution, 
vhich it is expetlient to support by taxation ; but the 
remonstrance of one man, paying only one dollar tax, 
irLo should say that he did not believe in these institw 
i I Curtis's Webster, 207 fg. 



218 ANDREW JACKSON. 

tions, and did not want to contribute to their support, 
would at least be entitled to resj)ectful consideration in 
any Legislature, and it would suffice to condemn, in 
the forum of political philosophy, the policy of support- 
ing such institutions by taxation. In the winter of 
1828-29 the South Carolina Legislature sent to the Sen- 
ate an "Exposition and Protest" against the new law. 
Georgia wanted to nullify both Indian legislation and 
tariff. Virginia adopted the principle of nullification. 
North Carolina denounced the tariff, but nullification 
also. Alabama denounced the tariff, but recognized the 
right of Congress to levy revenue duties, with incidental 
protective effect. In 1829 Alabama went nearer to nul- 
lification. This was the high water mark of nullifica- 
tion outside of South Carolina. All these States were 
taunted, in answer to their remonstrances, with the votes 
ctf the Southern members on thQ details of the tariff of 
abominations. 

Neither party could let the tariff rest. A high tariff 
IS in a state of unstable equilibrium. If legislators could 
ever gain full and accurate knowledge of all the circum- 
stances and relations of trade in their own country, and 
in all countries with which it trades ; if they had suffi- 
cient wit to establish an artificial tax system which 
should just fit the complicated facts, and produce the re- 
sults they want without doing any harm to anybody's 
interests ; and if, furthermore, the circumstances and re- 
lations of trade would remain unchanged, it would be 
possible to make a permanent and stable tariff. Each 
of tliese conditions is as monstrously impossible as any- 
thing in economics can be. Hence constant new efforts 
are necessary, as well to suit those to whom the tariff 
ioee not yet bring what they expected from it as tc 



EFFECT OF JACKSON'S TOAST. 219 

Bilence those who are oppressed by it. The persons 
whose interests were violated by the tariff of 1828 tried 
every means in their power to evade it. January 27, 
1830, Mallary brought in a bill to render the custom 
house appraisal more stringent and effective. McDuffie 
responded with a proposition to reduce all taxes on 
woollens, cottons, iron, hemp, flax, molasses, and indigo 
to what they were before the tariff of 1824 was passed. 
The whole subject was reopened. McDuffie's bill was 
defeated, and Mallary 's was passed. By separate bills 
the taxes on salt, molasses, coffee, cocoa, and tea were 
reduced. 

In April, 1830, came Jackson's Union toast.^ It was 
a great disappointment to the mass of the Southerners, 
who had been his ardent supporters, and who had hoped, 
from his action in regard to Georgia and the Indians, 
that he would let the powers of the federal government 
go by default in the case of the tariff also.^ The per- 
sonal element, which always had such strong influence 
with Jackson, had become more or less involved in the 
nullification struggle with which Calhoun was identified. 
The Georgia case involved only indirectly the authority 
and prestige of the federal government. The immediate 
parties in interest were the Indians. Nullification in- 
volved directly the power and prestige of the federal 
^overmnent, and he would certainly be a most excep- 
tional person who, being President of the United States, 
would allow the government of which he was the head 
to be defied and insulted. 

On the 22d of November, 1 S30, a bill for a state con- 
vention failed to get a two thirds vote in the South 
Carolina Legislature. An attempt was then made to 

^ See page 156. ^ Hodgson, 166-7. 



220 ANDREW JACKSON. 

test the constitutionality of the tariff in the courts by 
refusing to pay duty bonds, and pleading " no consider- 
ation " for the taxes levied ; but the United States Dis- 
trict Court, in 1831, refused to hear evidence of " no 
consideration " drawn from the character of the tariff of 
1828.1 

June 14, 1831, Jackson wrote a letter to a committee 
of citizens of Charleston, in answer to an invitation to 
attend the celebration of the Fourth of July at that 
city, in which he indicated that a policy of force would 
be necessary and proper against nullification. The 
Governor of the State brought this letter to the notice 
of the Legislature, which adopted resolutions denounc- 
ing the act of the President in writing such a letter, 
and denying the lawfulness of the steps which he de- 
scribed. North Carolina noyv denounced nullification, 
but the other States as yet held back. 

On the 5th of October, 1831, a free-trade convention 
met at Philadelphia. On the 26th of October a protec- 
tionist convention met at New York. Gallatin wrote the 
address published by the former. Of course it was all 
free trade, — no nullification. A. H. Everett wrote the 
address issued by the New York convention. The jmblic 
debt was being paid off with great rapidity, and the 
leed for revenue was all the time declining. The 
free-traders said : In that case, let us abolish the taxes, 
and not raise a revenue which we do not need. It will 
be an additional advantage that we can do away, with- 
out any complicated devices, with all the protective 
taxes which one citizen pays to another, and which take 
Bhelter under the revenue taxes. Let the people keep 
ind use their own earnings. The protectionists wante<r 
I 7 Ann. Reg. 260. 



CLATS PROGRAMME, 221 

to remove the taxes from all commodities the like of 
which were not produced here. They argued that, if 
the country was out of debt, it could afford to enter on 
great schemes of national development by government 
expenditure. They therefore proposed to keep up the 
taxes for protective purposes, and to spend the revenue 
(in which they regarded the revenue from land as a thing 
by itself) on internal improvements, pensions, French 
spoliation claims, etc. These were not yet strictly 
party positions, but in general the former was the ad- 
ministration policy and the latter the opposition policy. 

The session of 1831-32 was full of tariff. A presi- 
dential election was again at hand. J. Q. Adams was 
put at the head of the Committee on Manufactures with 
an anti-tariff majority. McDuffie was chairman of the 
Committee on Ways and Means. January 19, 1832, the 
House instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to col- 
lect information about manufactures. A rej)ort was 
rendered in two large volumes in 1833, after the whole 
subject had been disposed of. Clay was nominated for 
President in December, 1831, and was preparing his 
policy and programme. A conference was held at 
Washington by his supporters, at which he presented 
his views, as it appears, in a somewhat dictatorial man- 
ner.^ He wanted all the revenue taxes (on tea, coffee, 
wine, etc.) abolished. The protective taxes he wanted 
to make prohibitory, so as to stop revenue. He said that 
the duties on heni]) were useless, as our dew-rotted hemp 
never could compete with the water-rotted hemp which 
was imported. He was willing to allow a drawback on 
all rigging exported. Dearborn said that the tax on 
hemp had closed every rope-walk in Boston. This was 
1 8 Adams, 445. 



222 - ANDREW JACKSON. 

rather hard, considering that the tax on hemp had been 
laid for the sake of Kentucky, and now the member 
from Kentucky and father of the " American system " 
said that protection to hemp was useless. Adams said 
that the House Committee on Manufactures would re- 
duce the duties prospectively ; that is, to take effect 
when the debt should be paid. Clay wanted to stop 
paying the debt in order to take away the administra- 
tion " cry." Adams took sides with Jackson on the 
point of paying the debt. He thought public opinion 
favored that policy. He also thought Clay's programme 
would appear like defying the South. Clay said that 
he did not care whom he defied. "To preserve, main- 
tain, and strengthen the American system he would defy 
the South, the President, and the Devil." We may say 
what we like of the nullifiers, but, so far as they met 
with and knew of this disposition on the part of Clay 
and his supporters, they would not have been free men 
if they had not resisted it ; for it must not be forgotten 
that the real question at issue was whether their prop- 
erty should be taken away from them or not. 

In the annual message for 1831 Jackson recom- 
mended that the tariff be amended so as to reduce 
revenue. Febiuary 8, 1832, McDuffie reported a bil^ 
making the taxes on iron, steel, sugar, salt, hemp, flour, 
woollens, cottons, and manufactures of iron twenty-five 
per cent for a year after June 30, 1832, then eighteen 
and three fourths per cent for a year, and then twelve 
and one half per cent for an indefinite period. All other 
goods wliich were taxed over twelve and one half per 
cent at the time of passing the bill were to be taxed 
twelve and one half per cent after June 30, 1832 
\pril 27, 1832, the Secretary of the Treasury (Mo 



TARIFF OF 1832. 223 

Lane) presented a tariff bill in answer to a call by the 
House. It was planned to raise twelve millions of 
revenue. It was proposed to collect fifteen per cent on 
imports in general, with especial and higher rates on 
the great protected commodities. This was the adminis- 
tration plan. The House Committee on Manufactures 
reported a bill May 23d, which was taken uj) instead of 
the others. The battle reopened, and ranged over the 
whole field of politics and political economy. The act, 
as finally passed (July 14 1832), reduced or abolished 
many of the revenue taxes. It did not materially alter 
the protective taxes. The tax on iron was reduced, 
that on cottons was unchanged, that on woollens was 
raised to fifty per cent ; wool costing less than eight 
cents per pound was made free, other wool was taxed as 
before. Woollen yarn was now first taxed. This was 
the position of tariff and nullification when the preai- 
dential election was held. 



CHAPTER XI. 

rUBLlfJ QUESTIONS OF JACKSON's FIRST ADMINI8TBA 

TiON. — rv. 

VIL National hank. Democracy ^ affirms that men 
are, may be, ought to be, were born, or were created, 
equal, and it determines that in politics they shall be 
treated as if they were so, facts to the contrary notwith- 
standing. The inequality of men in their industry, econ- 
nomy, prudence, self-control, etc., etc., produces the most 
marked results in the different amounts of capital which 
they accumulate. For caf>ital is the sujDport and fortifi- 
cation of human existence, and a man of virtuous habits 
and right life secures his existence against destructive 
forces by accumulating capital. His caj^ital is at once 
the reward of right living and the means of better liv- 
ing. At the same time it is a proof of inequality and 
the cause of inequality. The existence of capital is 
therefore a refutation of all dogmas of equality. If 
there were no caj)ital, men would sink to the level of the 
other animals, and become ajjproximately equal to each 
other when they were all equal to brutes. The advocates 

1 Democracy is a theory about sovereignty, or who ought to 
rule. Its first dogma is that all men are equal. Its second do^ma 
is that power and rule belong: of right to a mnjority of the equal 
and undifferentiated units. It therefore affirms that the demos 
ought to rule, in contradiction to autocracy, theocracy, aristocracy, 
and other theories of who ought to rule. The first principhi oi 
^vil liberty is that there is no cue who, of right, ought to rule. 



DEMOCRACY AND PLUTOCRACY. 225 

of equality consequently rage against capital which con- 
tradicts their theories. The inequality in the distribu- 
tion of capital, which is at once the proof and the reward 
of unequal effort and virtue, is a still more favorite ob- 
ject of attack, but so long as men strive upwards and 
away from their original brutishness, the inequalities in 
their being and doing will inevitably produce inequali- 
ties in their having and enjoying. Of all the supersti- 
tions which have ever been entertained by men, the 
most astonishing is the one which has been accepted 
during the last century : That the mass of men are by 
nature wise and good — although universal experience 
proves that men become wise and good only by severe 
and prolonged effort. And yet, the fate of modern de- 
mocracy is to fall into subjection to plutocracy. In its 
struggles against what is called ""the money power," 
democracy strives against its fate, yet hastens it on. 
Democracy strives to banish the power of capital from 
open and admitted influence in political affairs. One of 
two results follows : (1) When the capital is combined 
with virtue and high principle, it really is banished from 
all share in politics. The consequence is that the com- 
munity loses the incalculable advantage which it might 
gain from the experience and good-will of men who 
have accumulated capital by integrity, or have managed 
inherited capital with honor and success, and whose 
assistance in resisting corrupt schemes, or in reforming 
laws which give chances to corrupt and crafty men to 
accumulate capital without industry or integrity, would 
be invaluable. (2) When capital is in the hands of cor- 
rupt and crafty men, it is driven to secret modes of in- 
fluence, which undermine and destroy institutions, and 
legislation is moulded to suit the ideas and modes ol 
15 



226 ANDREW JACKSON. 

operation of the crafty and lazy, instead of those of the 
honest and industrious. We might as well expect to 
free ourselves from the pressure of the atmosphere as 
to abolish " the money power." The effect would be as 
mischievous in one case as in the other. What is true 
is that selfishness and cupidity constantly strive to make 
use of laws and civil institutions to divert one man's 
earnings to another man's use. This occurs whenever 
laws change at all that distribution of products which 
would be brought about by the free operation of eco- 
nomic forces. The modern industrial organization, in- 
cluding banks, corporations, joint-stock companies, 
financial devices, national debts, paper currency, na- 
tional systems of taxation, is largely the creation of 
legislation (not in its liistorical origin, but in the mode 
of its existence and in its authority), and is largely regu- 
lated by legislation. Capital is the breath of life to this 
organization, and every day, as the organization becomes 
more complex and delicate, the folly of assailing capital 
or credit becomes greater. At the same time it is evi- 
dent that the task of the legislator to embrace in his view 
the whole system, to adjust his rules so that the play of 
the civil institutions shall not alter the natural play of 
the economic forces, requires more training and more 
acumen. Furthermore, the greater the complication 
and delicacy of the industrial system, the greater the 
chances for cupidity when backed by craft, and the task 
of the legislator to meet and defeat the attempts of 
this cupidity is one of constantly increasing difiiculty 
Finally, the methods and machinery of democratic re» 
publican self-government, — caucuses, primaries, com- 
mittees, and conventions, — lend themselves perhaps 
more easily than any other political methods and ma 



BANK OF NORTH AMERICA. 227 

ehinery to the uses of selfish cliques which seek polit« 
ical influence for interested purposes. 

In the United States the democratic element in public 
opinion has always been jealous of and hostile to the 
money power. The hostility has broken out at different 
times in different ways, as an assault on banks, corpora- 
tions, vested rights, and public credit. Sometimes it 
seems as if the " money power " were regarded super- 
stitiously, as if it were a superhuman entity, with will 
and power. The assaults on it are mingled with dread, 
as of an enemy with whom one is not yet ready to cope, 
but whose power is increasing rapidly, so that the chance 
of ultimate victory over him is small. We are now to 
study one of the gTeatest struggles between democracy 
and the money power. 

The Bank of North America was forced, in 1784-85, 
to weather a storm of popular opposition and prejudice 
in Pennsylvania. All the elements of the opposition, 
which has been above described, were well represented 
there. There was jealousy of capital, fear of the in- 
fluence of a corporation of capitalists in politics, super- 
stition about banking, denunciation of a monopoly, and 
incoherent denunciations of the bank for the most con- 
tradictory misdeeds.^ When Hamilton founded the 
first Bank of the United States ^ there arose the same 
doubts and complaints, and the same opposition; and 
the dissatisfaction, although it was silenced for a time, 
lasted as long as that bank lasted, and came out again 
when the question of rechartering it was brought up. 
Each party regarded the bank as an available power in 
politics, and each tried to get control of it. The one 

1 3 Sparks's Morris, 44C ; Jouaideratious oi. tlic IBank of North 
A.merica; 3 Wilson's Works. • ^ See page 12 



228 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Hrhicli failed (the republicans) then denounced the bank 
as dangerous to the state. Niles affirmed a great many 
times that, in 1798, no man who was not a " black 
cockade federalist " could get accommodation at the 
bank. The bank authorities always denied this, and 
it is very doubtful indeed if it was true. Niles is far 
better authority for what the republicans believed at 
that heated period than he is for the facts as to the 
management of the bank. State banks at that time 
were distinctly regarded as j)olitical engines. Each 
bank had a well-defined party character, and " accom- 
modated " only men of its own party. It seems that 
people then would have been as much astonished if a 
group of federalists asked for a bank charter from a 
republican Legislature as we would be now if a rej^ub- 
lican should ask a democratic House to elect him clerk. 
Jefferson, when President, wrote to Gallatin, Secretary 
of the Treasury: "I am decidedly in favor of making 
all the banks republican by sharing dejjosits amongst 
them in proportion to the disposition they show." ^ Pit- 
kin, who was a federalist, found it quite natural that a 
republican Congress should not be willing to recharter 
the Bank of the United States, since it was federalist.* 
Very little is known of the banking merits or demerits 
of the bank. It was favored by the susjjension of specie 
payments by the Bank of England. It published no 
reports of its condition until January, 1811.* Pitkin 
gives a generalized statement, in round numbers,^ of the 
operations of the bank. It paid, on an average, eight 
ftnd thirteen thirty-fourths per cent dividend per annum.' 
In 1810, when the question of renewing the charter 

1 1 Gallaiiu's Writings, 129. 2 pitkin, 421. 

« Seybert, 523. * Pitkin, 418. ^ Seybert, 521. 



FIRST BANK OF THE UNITED STATES. 229 

eame up, a great jDolitical and economic controversy 
arose. It was generally expected that a commercial 
crisis would occur if the bank was forced to wind up. 
The business men and men of capital generally wanted 
the charter renewed. Matthew Carey's letters to Adam 
Seybert undoubtedly expressed the opinion of that class. 
The republicans opposed the bank as aristocratic, fed- 
eralist, a dangerous political engine, and because its 
stock was partly held by foreign noblemen. Clay was 
one of the leaders of the opposition to the bank. The 
recharter was reported to the Senate by William H. 
Crawford, who ardently favored it. It was defeated 
by the casting vote of the Vice-President, George Clin- 
ton, of New York. The bank paid back its capital in 
dividends from time to time down to 1834 ; in all 109^ 
for 100 paid in. 

The old bank went out of existence without any con- 
vulsion in business. Its place was taken by local banks. 
During the second war these banks suspended, except 
in New England, and then went on to issue notes in the 
most extravagant manner, until the currency of the 
country was dejireciated at least twenty-five per cent, 
and was furthermore unequally dei)reciated, so that it 
was necessary to have a list of all the banks, and a 
quotation of them, in order to calculate the value of any 
number of notes. The notes were loaned to the Treas- 
ury, which did its business with the rags which the 
banks manufactured and loaned to it for its six per cent 
bonds. There was then no outcry against the money 
power. The mania was to make more banks, and the 
state Legislatures were besieged by applicants for bank 
sharters ; that is, by corporations wnich desired the priv* 
vlege of issuing paper to be used as currency by the gov* 



230 ANDREW JACKSON. 

eminent and the public, who should pay them interest 
for it, while it cost them nothing but the paper and 
printing. The mischievous notion has always been held 
in tliis country that a bank is an institution whose prime 
function is to issue circulating notes. To read the 
doctrines and plans of 1814-16 one would think the 
people here thought that a bank manufactured capital 
out of nothing, and could give it away. Its main duty 
was to dole it out fairly, and if the existing banks did 
not do tliis some more ought to be made. They talked 
about a man's " right " to accommodation, as if a bank 
resembled a town pump, at which every one might draw. 
At this juncture there would have been some sense in 
assailing the " money power," for ninety-nine in one 
hundred of these banks were pure swindles. They had 
no capital, by issuing notes they borrowed instead of 
lending, and they paid no interest. 

The administration was republican, but its financial 
distress was so great that it was obliged to put away 
its constitutional scruples and its party tradition, and 
to propose a national bank. Many forms of this were 
suggested, for it was very hard for the old republicans to 
be oblioed to reinstate Hamilton's bank. The Senate 
wanted to make a bank to suit the administration ; that 
iit, one which should lend to the Treasury. No bank 
could do this in the measure desired and maintain spe- 
cie payments. The House would not consent to a big 
paper-money machine, not paying si3ecie, but providing 
notes for the government. In January, 1815, after a 
long struggle, a bank charter was passed to suit the 
House. Madison vetoed it, because the bank would not 
heljj the Treasury at aU if it could make no loans. The 
House was more anxious that it should restore the cur 



CHARTER OF THE SECOND BANK. 231 

rency, believing that, if tliat could be done, prices of 
supplies would fall, loans could be placed in a sound 
currency, and real relief would follow. There was 
especial reason for this view, because the money market 
of the country was then at Boston, where the currency 
was not depreciated. It was said that the New Eng- 
landers would not sustain the public credit, because they 
would not subscribe to stocks in their currency at the 
same rates at which the people of Philadelphia and 
Baltimore subscribed to stocks in their currency.^ The 
New Englanders were also denounced for drawing specie 
from the Middle States and exporting it,^ because the 
specie of course left the States where the paper issues 
were excessive, and went to the States where the paper 
issues were small. When it accumulated in excess of 
the requirement in the latter States, it was exported, 
which was another ground of denunciation.^ 

Another bill was introduced at once, which provided 
for a bank to conform to the wishes of the administra- 
tion. This bill was before the House on the day on 
which news of the treaty of Ghent was received at 
Washington (February 13th). Pitkin says the news 
was received at the moment of voting.* The bill was 
laid aside and was never revived. 

At the next session (1815-16) the proposition came 
up for a national bank, not as a financial resource for 
the Treasury, but to check the local banks and force a 
return to specie payments. The charter became a law 
A^pril 10, 1816. It was a perfect imitation of Hamil- 

1 See the Report of the Secretarv of t:je Treasury, 1815. See 
also 3 Webster's Works, 35, his speech on the proposed bank. 

2 IngersoH, 250. 

« Carey's Olive Bran^k, 294, 298. * Pitkin. 427 



f 




232 ANDREW JACKSON. 

ton's bank. In this bank also the government had a 
big stock note for seven millions of dollars of stock, 
which it had subscribed for as a resource to pay its 
debts, not as investment for free capital. The bank was 
chartered for twenty years. Its capital was thirty-five 
millions, seven subscribed by the United States in a five 
per cent stock note, seven by the public in specie, and 
twenty-one by the public in United States stocks. It 
was to pay a bonus of one and one half millions in two, 
three, and four years. It was not to issue notes under 
$5.00, and not to suspend specie payments under a pen- 
alty of twelve per cent on all notes not redeemed on pres- 
entation. Twenty directors were to be elected annually 
by the stockholders, and five, being stockholders, were 
to be appointed by the President of the United States 
and confirmed by the Senate. The federal government 
was to charter no other bank during the period of the 
charter of this. The Secretary of the Treasury might 
at any time redeem the stocks in the capital of the bank, 
including the five per cent subscription stock. He 
might remove the public deposits if he should see fit, but 
must state his reasons for so doing to Congress at its next 
meeting. The bank engaged to transfer public funds 
without charge. At first it undertook to equalize the 
currency by receiving any notes of any branch at any 
branch, but it was soon forced to abandon the attempt. 
The old bank had never done tliis.^ Two things were 
mixed up in this attempt : (1) The equalization of the 
different degrees of depreciation existing in the bank- 
notes of different districts. This the bank could not 
have corrected save by relentlessly presenting all locaj 
Qotes for redemption, until they were made equal \4 
^ Carey's Letters, 55. 



r 



FAULTS OF THE CHARTER. 233 

specie or were withdrawn. So far as the bank did this 
it won the reputation of a " mo aster " which was crush- 
ing out the local banks.^ (2) The equalization of the 
domestic exchanges. This was impossible and undesir- 
able, since capital never could be distributed in exact 
proportion to local needs for it. The failure of the bank 
to " equalize the exchanges," and its refusal to take any 
notes at any branch, earned it more popular condemna- 
tion than anything else. 

The bank charter contained a great many faults. To 
mention only those which affected its career : The capi- 
tal was too large. There was no reason for lending its 
capital to the government, i. e., putting it into public 
stocks, or making it a syndicate of bond-holders. There 
was every reason why the United States should not hold 
stock in it, especially when it could not pay for the 
same. The dividends of the bank from 1816 to 1831, 
when the government paid its stock note, averaged five 
per cent per annum, paid semi-annually. The United 
States paid five per cent on its stock note quarterly. 
This gave room for another complaint by the enemies of 
the bank. 

The bank was established at Philadelphia. It began 
with nineteen branches, and grew to twenty-five. Specie 
payments were resumed nominally February 20, 1817, 
after which date, according to a joint resolution of Con 
gress of April 16, 1816, the Treasury ought to receive 
.^nly specie, or notes of the Bank of the United States, 
or^f specie-paying banks, or Treasury notes. In the 
first two years of its existence the great bank was 
carried to the verge of bankruptcy by as bad banking as 
^ver was heard of. Instead of checking the othei 
^ See page 121. 



234 ANDREW JACKSON. 

banks in their improper proceedings, it led and suiv 
passed them all. A clique inside the bank was jobbing 
in its shares, and robbing it to provide the margins. 
Instead of rectifying the currency, it made the currency 
worse. Instead of helping the country out of the dis- 
tress produced by the war, it plunged the country into 
the commercial crisis of 1819, which caused a general 
liquidation, lasting four or five years. All the old- 
school republicans denounced themselves for having 
abandoned their principles. All the ill-doing of the 
bank they regarded as essential elements in the charac- 
ter of any national bank. Niles denounced the whole 
system of banking, and all the banks. He had good 
reason. It is almost incredible that the legislation of 
any civilized country could have opened the chance for 
such abuses of credit, banking, and currency as then 
existed. The franchise of issuing paper notes to be used 
by the people as currency, that is to say, the license to 
appropriate a certain amount of the specie circulation of 
the country, and to put one's promissory notes in the 
place of it, was given away, not only without any 
equivalent, but without any guarantee at all. When 
Niles and Gouge denounced banking and banks, it was 
because they had in mind these swindling institutions. 
The great bank justly suffered with the rest, because it 
had made itself in many respects like them. The popu- 
lar anti-bank party, opposed to the money power, was 
very strong during the period of liquidation. 

Langdon Cheves, of South Carolina, was elected pres- 
ident of the bank March 6, 1819. He set about re- 
storing it. In three years he had succeeded, although 
the losses were over three millions. Nicholas Biddle 
iras elected president of the bank in January, 1823 



BRANCH DRAFTS INVENTED. 235 

He was only thirty-seven years old, and had been more 
a literary man than anything else. He was appointed 
government director in 1819. His election in Cheves'a 
place was the result of the conflict between a young and 
progressive policy, which he represented, and an old 
and conservative policy. At the nearest date to Janu- 
ary 1, 1823, the bank had $4.6 million notes out ; $4.4 
million specie ; $2.7 million public deposits ; $1.5 mill- 
ion deposits by pubHc officers ; $3.3 million deposits by 
individuals ; $28.7 million biUs discounted. Congress 
refused to allow the officers of the branches to sign 
notes issued by the branches. It is not clear why this 
petition was refused, except that Congress was in no 
mood to grant any request of the bank. The labor, for 
the president and cashier of the parent bank, of signing 
all the notes of the bank and branches was very great. 
Accordingly, in 1827, branch drafts were devised to 
avoid this inconvenience. They were the counterpart 
of bank-notes. They were drawn for even suras, by the 
cashier of any branch, on the parent bank, to the order 
of some officer of the branch, and endorsed by the latter 
to bearer. They then circulated like bank-notes. They 
were at first (1827) made in denominations of $5.00 and 
$10.00. In 1831 the denomination $20.00 was added. 
Binney, Wirt, and Webster gave an ojiinion that these 
drafts were legal. Rush, Secretary of the Treasury, 
ajjproved of them, and allowed public dues to be paid in 
them.^ These branch drafts were a mjst unlucky in- 
vention, and to them is to be traced most of the subse- 
nuent real trouble of the bank Tlie branches, espe- 
cially the distant ones, when they issued these drafts, did 
^ot lend their own capii^al, but that jf the bank at 
^ Document B 



236 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Philadelphia. At the same time, therefore, they fell in 
debt to the parent bank. This stimulated their issues. 
The borrowers used these drafts to sustain what were 
called " race-horse bills." These were drafts drawn 
between the different places where there were branches, 
so that a bill falling due at one place was met by the 
discount of a bill drawn on another place. This system 
was equivalent to unlimited renewals. It kept up a 
constant inflation of credit. Up to the time of Jackson's 
accession these drafts had not yet done much harm, and 
had attracted no adverse criticism. 

At the session of 1827-28, P. P. Barbour brought 
forward a proposition to sell the stock owned by the 
United States in the bank. A debate arose concerning 
the bank, and it seems that there was a desire on the 
part of a portion of the opposition to put opposition to 
the bank into their platform.^ The project failed. Bar- 
bour's resolution was tabled, 174 to 9. 

The facts which are now to be narrated were not 
known to the public until 1832. They are told here 
as they occurred in the order of time. 

June 27, 1829, Levi Woodbury, senator from New 
Hampshire, wrote to Samuel Ingham, Secretary of the 
Treasury, making confidential complaints of Jeremiah 
Mason, the new president of the Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, branch of the Bank of the United States, 
because (1) of the general brusqueness of his manner ; 
(2) of his severity and partiality in the matter of loans 
and collections. He added that Mason was a friend of 
Webster. " His political character is doubtless known 
to you." He also said that the complaints were general 
ftnd from all political parties. Ingham enclosed thf 
1 33 Niles, 275. 



CORRESPONDENCE OF INGHAM AND DIDDLE. 237 

..etter to Biddle, pointing out that the letter seemed to 
have been called out by the political effects of the action 
of the branch. He said that the administration wanted 
no favors from the bank. Biddle replied that he would 
Investigate. 

One great trouble with Biddle, which appeared at 
once in this correspondence, was that he wrote too 
easily. When he got a pen in his hand, it ran away 
with him. In this first reply, he went on to write a long 
letter, by which he drew out all the venomous rancor of 
Levi Woodbury and Isaac Hill against the old federal- 
ists and Jeremiah Mason and the bank, all which lurked 
in Ingham's letter, but came out only in the form of 
innuendo and suggestion. The innuendoes stung Biddle, 
and he challenged the suggestions instead of ignoring 
them. Thus he gave them a chance to come forth with- 
out sneaking. He was jauntily innocent and unconscious 
of what spirit he was dealing with and what impended 
over him. He stated (1) that Mason had been appointed 
to a vacancy caused by the resignation, not by the re- 
moval, of his predecessor ; (2) that the salary of the 
position had not been increased for Mason ; (3) that, 
lifter Mason's appointment, Webster was asked to per- 
suade him to accept. He quoted a letter from Wood- 
bury to himself, in July, in which Woodbury said that 
Mason was as unpopular with one party as the other 
Biddle inferred, no doubt correctly, that Mason, as 
banker, had done his duty b} the bank, without re- 
gard to politics. He explained that the branch had 
previously not been well n^anaged, and that Mason was 
put in as a competen': banker ara lawyer to put it right 
llgain. It is easy to see that Mason, in order to put the 
bank right, had to act seveiely, and that he especially 



238 ANDREW JACKSON. 

disappointed those who, on account of political sjrm* 
pathy, expected favors, but did not get them. Politics 
had run high in New Hampshire for ten or twelve 
years. Mason and Webster on one side, and Hill, 
Woodbury, and Plumer on the other, had been in 
Btronsr antasronism. The relations had been amicable 
between some of them, but Hill and Mason were two 
men who could not meet without striking fire. Hill was 
now president of a small bank at Concord, and business 
jealousy was added to political animosity. Woodbury 
had been elected to the Senate as an Adams man, and 
the personal and political feelings were only more in- 
tense, because Adams was called a republican. The 
federalists were first invited to support him, then they 
were ignored,^ and Woodbury and Hill were working 
for Jackson. 

Biddle, as if dissatisfied with whatever prudence he 
had shown in his first letter, wrote another, in which he 
declared that the bank had nothing to do with politics ; 
that people were all the time trying to draw it into 
politics, but that it always resisted. 

July 23d Ingham wrote again to Biddle, insisting that 
there must be grounds of complaint, and that exemption 
from party preference was impossible. He added that 
he represented the views of the administration. 

In August the Secretary of War ordered the pension 
agency transferred from the Portsmouth branch to the 
bank at Concord, of which Isaac Hill had been presi- 
dent. The parent bank forbade the branch to comply 
with this order, on the ground that it was illegal. The 
l>rder was revoked. 

September 15th Biddle wrote again to Ingham. H^ 
1 1 Webster's Correspondence^ Alb, \\9, 



BIDDLE TO INGHAM— 1829 239 

had nsited Buffalo and Portsmouth during the *ammer. 
His letter is sharp and independent in tone. He says 
that two memorials have been sent to him by Isaac Hill, 
Second Contraller of the Treasury, one from the busi- 
ness men of Portsmouth, and the other from sixty mem- 
bers of the Legislature of New Hampshire, requesting 
Mason's removal, and nominating a new board of di- 
rectors, "friends of General Jackson in New Hamp- 
shire." Those proceedings were evidently planned by 
the anti-bank clique at Washington to provoke Biddle. 
He hastened to crown that purpose with complete suc- 
cess. He says that public opinion in the community 
around a bank is no test of bank management, and that 
the reported opinion at Portsmouth, upon examination, 
" degenerated into the personal hostility of a very 
limited, and for the most part very prejudiced, circle." 
He then takes up three points which he finds in Ing- 
ham's letters, suggested or assumed, but not formulated. 
These are : (1) That the Secretary has some super- 
vision over the choice of officers of the bank, which 
comes to him from the relations of the government to 
the bank. (2) That there is some action of the govern- 
ment on the bank, which is not precisely defined, but of 
which the Secretary is the proper agent. (3) That it is 
the right and duty of the Secretary to make known to 
the president of the bank the views of the administra- 
tion on the political opinions of the officers of the bank. 
He tlien says that the board acknowledge no responsi- 
bility whatever to the Secretary in regard to the polit- 
ical opinions of the officers of the bank ; that the bank 
IS responsible to Congress only, and is carefully shielded 
by its charter from executive control. He indignantly 
denies that freedom from political bias is imnossible 



240 ANDREW JACKSON 

shows tlie folly of the notion of political " checks and 
counter-balances " between the officers of the bank, and 
declares that the bank ought to disregard all parties. 
He won a complete victory on the argument of his 
points, but delivered himself, on the main issue, without 
reserve into the hands of his enemies. 

Ingham's letter of October 5th is a masterly specimen 
of cool and insidious malice. In form it is smooth, 
courteous, and plausible, but it is full of menace and 
deep hostility. He discusses the points implied by him, 
but, in form, raised by Biddle. He says that if the 
bank should abuse its powers the Secretary is authorized 
to remove the deposits. Hence the three points which 
Biddle found in his former letter are good. It does not 
af)pear that Biddle ever thought of this power as within 
the range of the discussion, or of the exercise of it as 
amongst the possibilities. Ingham says there are two 
theories of the bank: (1) That it is exclusively for 
national purposes and for the common benefit of all, and 
that the " employment of private interests is only an 
incident, — perhaps an evil, — founded in mere con- 
venience for care and management." (2) That it is 
intended "to strengthen the arm of wealth, and coun- 
terpoise the influence of extended suffrage in the dispo- 
tition of public affairs," and that the public deposits are 
one of its means for performing this function. He says 
that there are two means of resisting the latter theory : 
the power to remove the deposits, and the power to ap- 
point five of the directors. He adds that, if the bank 
should exercise political influence, that would afford him 
the strongest motive for removing the deposits. Bid 
die's reply of October 9th shows that he recognizes a 
^ast wliat temper he has to deal with. He is still gaj 



THE BANK CORRESPONDENCE. 241 

Hiid good-natured, and he recedes gracefully, only maio 
tainmg that it is the policy of the bank to keep out of 
poHtics. 

In Ingham's letters of July 23d and October 5th is to 
be found the key to the " bank war." Ingham argues 
that the bank cannot keep out of politics, that its offi- 
cers ought to be taken from both parties, and that, if 
it meddles with politics, he will remove the deposits. 
The only road left by Which to escape from the situation 
he creates is to go into politics on his side. No evidence 
is known to exist that the bank had interfered in poli- 
tics. The administration men are distinctly seen in this 
correspondence, trying to drive it to use political in- 
fluence on their side, and the bank resists, not on behalf 
of the other party, but on behalf of its independence. 
It is the second of the alleged theories in the letter of 
October 5th, however, which demands j)articular atten- 
tion. The Jackson administration always pretended 
that the managers of the bank construed the character 
and function of the bank according to that theory. It 
is the Kentucky relief notion of the bank in its extreme 
and most malignant form. The statement is, on its 
face, invidious and malicious. It is not, even in form, 
a formula of functions attributed to the bank. It is a 
construction of the political philosophy of a national 
bank. It is not parallel with the first statement. It 
was ridiculous to allege that the stockholders of the 
bank had subscribed twenty-eight million dollars, not 
even for party purj^oses, but to go crusading against 
democracy and universal suffrage However, the justice 
or injustice of the allegations m thest letters, wliich 
could be submitted to no tribunal, and which touched 
ttiotives, not acts, was immaterial. The administration 
16 



242 ANDREW JACKSON. 

had determined to make war on the bank. The ultimate 
agents were Amos Kendall, who brought the Kentucky 
relief element, and Isaac Hill, who brought the element 
of local bank jealousy and party rancor. Ingham pub- 
lished, in 1832,^ after the above correspondence had 
been published, an " Address " in his own defence. Ho 
says that he found, to his surprise, soon after he entered 
Jackson's cabinet, that the President and those nearest 
in his confidence felt animosity against the bank. He 
Baw that the persons who had the most feeling influ- 
enced the President's mind the most. Allegations of 
fact were reported in regard to political interference 
by the bank. Ingham says that when he was urged to 
action about the bank he tried to trace down these 
stories to sometliing tangible. He quotes the only state- 
ment he ever got. It is a letter by Amos Kendall, 
giving second or third hand reports of the use of money 
by officers of the bank in the Kentucky election of 1825, 
when the court question was at issue.^ The man whom 
Kendall gave as his authority failed, when called upon, 
to substantiate the assertion. In Kendall's Autobiog- 
raphy there is a gap from 1823 to 1829, and the origin 
of his eager hostility to the bank is not known. Jackson 
is not known to have had any opinion about the bank 
when he came to Washington. He is not known to 
htive had any collision with the bank, except that, when 
'he was on his way to Florida, as Governor, the branch 
It New Orleans refused his request that it would ad- 
vance money to him on his draft on the Secretary oi 
State.^ Hill and Kendall, either by telling Jackson 
that the bank had worked against him in the election. 
or by other means, infused into his mind the hostility tj 
* 42 Niles, 315. 2 gee page 127. » 2 Parton, .596. 



HINTS OF THE COMING BANK WAR. 243 

it which had long rankled in theirs. They were soon 
reenforced by Blair, who was stronger than either, and 
more zealously hostile to the bank than either. 

In November, 1829, about a week before Congress 
met, Amos Kendall sent privately ^ a letter to the 
" Courier and Enquirer," Jackson organ at New York, 
in wliich he insinuated that Jackson would come out 
against the bank in the annual message. A head and 
tail piece were put to this letter, and it was put in as 
an editorial. It attracted some attention, but, its origin 
being of course unknown, it was received with a great 
deal of skepticism. In its form it consisted of a series 
of queries,^ of which the following may be quoted as the 
most significant, and as best illustrating the methods of 
procedure introduced in Jackson's administration. We 
must remember that these queries were drawn up by a 
man in the closest intimacy with the President, who 
helped to make the message what it was, and we must 
further remember what we have already learned of 
William B. Lewis's methods. " Will sundry banks 
throughout the Union take measures to satisfy the 
general government of their safety in receiving deposits 
of the revenue, and transacting the banking concerns of 
the United States ? Will the Legislatures of the several 
States adopt resolutions on the subject, and instruct their 
senators how to vote ? Will a proposition be made to 
authorize the government to issue exchequer bills, to the 
amount of the annual revenue, redeemable at pleasure, 
••o constitute a circulating medium equivalent to the 
Xiotes issued by the United States Bank ? " So far as 
appears, no one saw in these queries *^he oracle which 

1 Memoirs of Bennett, HI. 

« It is quoted 37 Niles, 3*8. (January 30, 1830.) 



244 ANDREW JACKSON. 

foretold the history of the United States for the next 
ken or fifteen years. 

Jackson's first annual message contained a paragraph 
on the bank which struck the whole country with as- 
tonishment. " We had seen," says Niles, " one or two 
dark paragraphs in certain of the newspapers, which 
led to a belief that the administration was not friendly 
to this great moneyed institution, but few had any sus- 
picion that it would form one of the topics of the first 
message." ^ After mentioning the fact that the charter 
would expire in 1836, and that a recharter would be 
asked for, the message said that such an important 
question could not too soon be brought before Congress. 
" Both the constitutionality and the expediency of the 
law creating this bank are well questioned by a large 
portion of our fellow citizens, and it must be admitted 
by all that it has failed in the great end of establishing 
a uniform and sound currency." The question is then 
raised whether a bank could not be devised, " founded 
on the credit of the government and its revenues," 
which should answer all the useful purposes of the Bank 
of the United States. 

No period in the history of the United States could 
be mentioned when the country was in a state of more 
profound tranquillity, both in its domestic and foreign 
relations, and in a condition of more humdrum prosper- 
it}"^ in its industry, than 1829. The currency never had 
been as good as it was then, for the troubles of the 
early '20's, both in the East and in the West, had been 
uo a great extent overcome.^ The currency has nevei 

1 37 Niles, 257. 

* See the tables in 2 Macgregor, 1140; also Gallatin on th 
CWr«nci/ and Banking System of the Unued States. 



CRITICISM OF THE MESSAGE. 246 

been better and more uniform, if we take the whole 
country over, since 1829 than it was then. The pro- 
eeedings, of which the paragraph in the message of 1829 
was the first warning, threw the currency and banking 
of the country into confusion and uncertainty, one thing 
following upon another, and they have never yet re- 
covered the character of established order and routine 
operation which they had then. The bank charter was 
not to expire until March 3, 1836 ; that is, three years 
beyond the time when Jackson's term would expire. 
He seems to apologize for haste in bringing up the ques- 
tion of its renewal. It certainly was a premature step, 
and can only be explained by the degree of feeling 
which the active agents had mingled with their opinions 
about the bank. It was, moreover, a new mode of state- 
ment for the President to address Congress, not on his 
own motion, and to set forth his own opinions and rec- 
ommendations, but as the mouth-piece of '* a large por- 
tion of our fellow citizens." Who were they ? How 
many were they ? How had they made their opinions 
known to the President? Why did they not use the 
press or the Legislature, as usual, for making known 
their opinions ? Who must be dealt with in discussing 
the opinions, the President or the " large portion," etc. ? 
What becomes of the constitutional responsibility of the 
President, if he does not speak for himself, but gets his 
notions before Congress as a quotation from somebody 
else, and that somebody " a large portion of our fellow 
citizens " ? Then again the question must arise : Does 
\lie President correctly quote anybody ? No proofs can 
be found that any hundred persons in the United States 
tiad active doubts of the constitutionality and expediency 
%f the bank, or were looking forwai'd to its recharter aa 



246 ANDREW JACKSON. 

a political crisis to be prepared for. If the theoretical 
question had been raised, a great many people would 
have said that they thought a national bank unconstitu* 
tional. They would have said, as any one must say 
now, that there was no power given in the Constitution 
to buy territory, but they did not propose to give up 
Louisiana and Florida. Just so in regard to a national 
bank. The Supreme Court had decided in McCulloch 
vs. Maryland that the bank charter was constitutional, 
and that was the end of controversy. The question of 
the constitutionality of the bank had no life, and oc- 
cupied no place in public opinion, so far as one can 
learn from newspapers, books, speeches, diaries, corre- 
spondence, or other evidence we have of what occupied 
the minds of the people. Jackson's statement was only 
a figure of speech. The observation which is most im 
portant for a fair judgment of his policy of active hos- 
tility to the bank is, that any great financial institution 
or system which is in operation, and is performing its 
functions endurably, has a great presumption in its 
favor. The only reasonable question for statesman or 
financier is that of slow and careful correction and im- 
provement. The man who sets out to overturn and 
destroy, in obedience to " a princij^le," especially if he 
^hows that he does not know the possible scope of his 
own action, or what he intends to construct afterwards, 
assumes a responsibility which no public man has any 
right to take. 

The vague and confused proposition of the President 
for some new kind of bank added alarm to astonish- 
ment. AVhat did he mean by his bank on the credit 
and revenues of the government ? It sounded like a 
sig paper-money machine. If there was any intelligibU 



ACTION OF CONGRESS ON THE BANK. 247 

idea in it, it referred to something like the Bank of the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky on a still larger scale 
The stock of the bank declined from 125 to 116 on 
Recount of the message.^ It was supposed that the 
President must have knowledge of some facts about the 
bank. 

The part of the message about the bank was referred 
in both Houses. April 13, 1830,^ McDuffie made a 
long report from the Committee on Ways and Means. 
He argued that the constitutionality of the bank was 
settled by the decision of the Supreme Court and by 
prescription. He defended the history and expediency 
of the bank, and ended by declaring the bank proposed 
by the President to be very dangerous and inexpedient, 
both financially and politically, — the latter because it 
would increase the power of the Executive. ' In the 
Senate, Smith, of Maryland, reported from the Com- 
mittee on Finance in favor of the bank.^ The House, 
May 10, 1830, tabled, by 89 to 66, resolutions that the 
House would not consent to renew the charter of the 
bank, and on May 29th it tabled, 95 to 67, a series of 
resolutions calling for a comprehensive report of the 
proceedings of the bank. As yet there were no allega- 
tions against the management of the bank. The stock 
rose to 130 on the reports of the committees of Con- 
gress. 

A great many politicians had to " turn a sharp cor- 
ner," as Niles expressed it, when Jackson came out 
Igainst the bank. His supporters in Pennsylvania 
cities were nearly all bank m }n. Van Buren, Marcy, 
Ind Butler had signed a petition, in 1826, for a branch 

i 38 Niles, 177. 2 33 Xiles, 183. 

' 38 Niles, 126. 



248 ANDREW JACKSON. 

of the bank at Albany.^ The petition was refused. In 
January, 1829, Van Buren, as Governor of New York, 
referred to banks under federal control as objectionable. 
The administration party was not yet consolidated. It 
was still only that group of factions which had united in 
opposition to Adams. The bank question was one of 
the great questions through which Jackson's popularity 
and his will hammered them into a solid party phalanx. 
All had to conform to the lines which he drew for the 
party, under the influence of Kendall, Lewis, and Hill. 
If they did not do so, they met with speedy discipline. 

In his message for 1830, Jackson again inserted a 
paragraph about the bank, and proposed a bank as a 
" branch of the Treasury Department." The outline is 
very vague, but it approaches the sub-treasury idea. 
No notice was taken of this part of the message in the 
session of 1830-31. On a test question, whether to 
refer the part of the message relating to the bank to 
the Committee on Ways and Means or to a select com- 
mittee, the bank triumphed, 108 to 67. Benton offered 
a joint resolution, in the Senate, February 2, 1831, 
"That the charter of the Bank of the United States 
ought not to be renewed." The Senate refused leave, 
23 to 20, to introduce it. In July, 1831, the Secretary 
of War ordered the pension funds for the State of New 
York to be removed from the New York branch. Bid- 
die remonstrated, because there was no authority of law 
for the order, and the Auditor had refused to accept 
such an order as a voucher in a previous case. Secre- 
tary Cass revoked the order, March 1, 1832. In the 
message of 1831 Jackson referred to the bank questior 
ft8 one on which he had discharged his duty and free4 
1 Mackeinzie, 98 



MCLANE IN FAVOR OF THE BANK. 249 

his responsibility. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mc- 
Lane, in his annual report, December, 1831, made a 
long and strong argument in favor of the bank. If we 
may judge from the tone of the message of 1831, Jack- 
son was willing to allow the bank question to drop, at 
least until the presidential election should be over. 
There is even room for a suspicion that McLane's argu- 
ment in favor of the bank was a sort of " hedging ; " for 
although the Secretary's report was not necessarily sub- 
mitted to the President,^ Jackson was hardly the man to 
allow a report to be sent in of which he disapproved. 

We have now concluded our review of the public 
questions which occupied attention during Jackson's 
first administration, and have brought the history of 
those questions, and of his proceedings in regard to 
them, down to the time when the presidential campaign 
of 1832 opened, — December, 1831. 
1 See page 302. 



CHAPTER XII. 

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1832. 

Clay was the leading man in the opposition, but the 
opposition was by no means united. A new factor had 
been gaining importance in politics for the last few 
years. The politicians had ignored it and sneered at 
it, but it had continued to grow, and was now strong 
enough to mar, if it could not make, a national election. 

In 1826 a bricklayer, named William Morgan, who 
lived at Batavia, N. Y., and was very poor, thought that 
he could earn something by writing an exposure of the 
Becrets of free-masonry,^ he being a mason. The 
masons learned that he had written such a book. They 
caused his arrest and imprisonment over Sunday on a 
frivolous civil complaint, and searched his house for the 
manuscrijDt during his absence. A month later he was 
arrested again for a debt of $2.10, and imprisoned 
under an execution for $2.69, debt and costs. The 
next day the creditor declared the debt satisfied. Mor- 
gan was released, passed at the prison door into the 
hands of masked men, was placed in a carriage, taken 
to Fort Niagara, and detained there. A few days later 
a body was found floating in the river, which was iden- 
tified as Morgan's body. The masons always denied 
that this identification was correct. Morgan has never 

1 Report of the Special Agent of the State of New York. S 
Ann. Reg. 537. 



OUTRAGE ON MORGAN. 251 

been seen or heard of since. In January, 1827, certain 
persons were tried for conspiracy and abduction. They 
pleaded guilty, and so jDrevented a disclosure of details.* 
The masons confessed and admitted abduction, but de- 
clared that Morgan was not dead. The opinion that 
Morgan had been murdered, and that the body found 
was his, took possessions of the minds of those people of 
Western New York who were not masons. Popular 
legend and political passion have become so interwoven 
with the original mystery that the truth cannot now be 
known. 

The outrage on Morgan aroused great indignation in 
Western New York, then still a simple frontier country. 
Public opinion acted on all subjects. A committee ap- 
pointed at a mass-meeting undertook an extra-legal 
investigation, and soon brought the matter into such 
shape that no legal tribunal ever after had much chance 
of unravelling it. After the fashion of the time, and of 
the place also, a political color was immediately given to 
the affair. As Spencer, the special agent appointed by 
the State to investigate the matter, declared in his re- 
port, the fact of this political coloring was disastrous to 
the cause of justice. The politicians tried to jDut down 
the whole excitement, because it traversed their plans 
and combinations. They asked, with astonishment 
and with justice, what the affair had to do with jjolitics. 
The popular feeling, however, was very strong, and it 
was fed by public meetings, committee reports, etc. 
The monstrous outrage deserved that a strong public 
opinion should sustain the institutions of justice in 
finding out and pum'shing the p'^rpetrators. Some of 
ihe officers were too lax and indifferent in the dischai'ge 
1 2 Hammond, 376. 



k_/ 



252 ANDREW JACKSON. 

of their duties to suit the public tempei*. They were 
masons. Hen,;e the inference that a man who was a 
mason was not fit or competent to be entrusted with 
public duties. The political connection was thus ren- 
dered logical and at least plausible. Many persons re- 
solved not to vote for anyone who was a mason for 
any public office. Moreover, the excitement offered an 
unexampled opportunity to the ambitious young orators 
and politicians of the day. It was a case where pure 
Leat and emphasis were the only requirements of the 
orator. He need not learn anything, or have any ideas. 
A number of men rose to prominence on the movement 
who had no claims whatever to public influence. They 
of course stimulated as much as they could the popular 
ex;citement against masonry, which furnished them their 
opportunity and their capital. Many masons withdrew 
from the order. Others foolislily made light of the 
outrage itself. For the most part, however, the masons 
argued that masonry was no more responsible, as an in- 
stitution, for the outrage on Morgan than the Christian 
church is responsible for the wrongs done in its name by 
particular persons and groups. These discussions only 
sharpened the issue, and masons and anti-masons came 
to be a division which cut across all the old party lines 
in the State of New York. In 1828 the anti-masons 
were the old Clintonians,^ the rump of the federalists, 
and many buck-tails, with whom horror at the Morgan 
outrage was a controlling motive. Jackson, Clinton, 
and Van Buren were then allied. Jackson and Clinton 
were masons. The Clintonians who would not follow 
Clinton to the support of Jackson, either because they 
disliked the man or because he was a mason, and thi 
1 Clinton died February 11, 1828. 



POLITICAL EFFECTS OF ANTI-MASONRY, 253 

buck-tails who would not vote for a mason, were Adams 
men. The great body of the buck-tails (amongst whom 
party discii)line was stronger than in any other faction), 
the Clintonians who followed Clinton into the Jackson 
camp, and the masons who let defence of the order con- 
trol their politics, were Jackson men. Hence the New 
York vote (which was taken by districts in 1828) was 
divided. 

The regency buck-tail democrats, being in control 
of the state government, tried to put down the excite- 
ment by indirect means, because of its disorganizing 
effects. This made them appear to suppress inquiry, and 
to be indifferent to the outrage. It only fanned the 
dame of popular indignation, and strengthened anti- 
masonry. The anti-masons came out as an anti-ad- 
ministration party in 1830. They held a convention at 
Utica in August, and framed a platform of national 
principles. This is the first " platform," as distinguished 
from the old-fashioned address. The anti-masons had 
come together under no other bond than opposition to 
masonry. If they were to be a permanent party, and a 
national party, they needed to find or make some polit- 
ical principles. Tliis was their great political weakness 
and the sure cause of their decay. Their party had no 
root in political convictions. It had its root elsewhere, 
and in very thin soil too, for a great political organiza- 
tion. Since the masons were not constantly and by the 
^fe principle of their order perpetrators of outrages and 
murders, they could not furnish regular fuel to keep up 
the indignation of the anti-masons. The anti-masons, 
then, put on their principles as an after-thought. For 
this reason, however, they needed an explicit statement 
of them, if possible, in a categorical form, i. e., a plat 



254 ANDREW JACKSON. 

form, far more than a party which had an historical 
origin, and traditions derived from old political contro- 
versies. Anti-masonry spread rapidly through New 
York and large parts of Pennsylvania and Massachu- 
setts. Vermont became a stronghold of it. It is by no 
means extinct there now. It had considerable strength 
in Connecticut and Ohio. It widened into hostility to 
all secret societies and extra-judicial oaths. Perhaps it 
reached its acme when it could lead men like J. Q. 
Adams and Joseph Story to spend days in discussing 
plans for abolishing the secrecy of the Plii Beta Kappa 
society of Harvard CoUege.^ It only showed to what 
extent every man is carried away by the currents of 
thought and interest which prevail for the time being in 
the community. 

The anti-masons next invented the national political 
convention.^ They held one at Philadelphia, September 
11, 1830,* which called another, to meet September 
26, 1831, at Baltimore, to nominate candidates for 
President and Vice-President. At the latter date 112 
delegates met.^ William Wirt, of Maryland, was nomi- 
nated for President, and Amos Ellmaker, of Pennsyl 
vania, for Vice-President, almost unanimously. Wirt 
had been a mason, and had neglected, not abandoned, the 

1 8 Adams, 383. 

2 A convention of delegates from eleven States nominated De 
Witt Clinton, in 1812. Binns (page 244) claims to have invented 
the national convention, but his was a project for introducing into 
the congressional caucus of the republican party special dele- 
gates from the non-republican States, so as to make that bodj» 
represent the whole party. 

3 39 Niles, .58. 

4 41 Niles, 83, 107. Twelve States were represented. W. Q 
Bewaid and Thaddeus Stevens were in the convention. 



ANTI-MASONIC NOMINATIONS. 256 

order. In his letter of acceptance ^ he said that he had 
often spoken of " masonry and anti-masonry as a fitter 
subject for farce than tragedy." He circumscribed and 
tamed down the whole anti-masonic movement, and put 
himself on no platform save hostility to oaths which 
might interfere with a man's civic duties. He put the 
whole Morgan case aside, except so far as, on the trial, 
it appeared that masonry hindered justice. The anti- 
masons were, in fact, aiming at poHtical power. They 
had before them the names of McLean, Callioun, and 
J. Q. Adams.^ New York wanted McLean. He de- 
clined.* The anti-masonic convention published a long 
address, setting forth the history and principles of the 
party.* There was a hope, in which Wirt seems to 
have shared, that when the anti-masons presented a 
separate nomination Clay would withdraw, and the 
national republicans would take up Wirt.® When this 
hope had passed ^.way, Wirt wanted to withdraw, but 
could not do so.® He had from the first desired Clay's 
election, and had agreed to stand only when assured 
that Clay could not unite the anti-Jackson men. Clay 
refused to answer the interrogatories of the anti-masons. 
He said, " I do not know a solitary provision in the 
Constitution of the United States which conveys the 
slightest authority to the general government to inter- 
fere, one way or the other, with either masonry or 
anti-masonry." He said that if the President should 

1 2 Kennedy's Wirt, 350. 2 g Adams, 412, 416. 

8 41 Niles, 259. * 41 Niles, 166. 

6 Judge Spencer thought that Wirt could unite the opposition. 
d Clay would stand hack, and that Wirt could be elected ovei 

Jackson. (I Curtis's \V<h$ifr, 40-J.) 
e -2 Kennedy's Wirl, .S56, 362. 366. 



256 ANDREW JACKSON. 

meddle with that matter he would be a usurper and a 
tyrant.^ 

The opposition therefore went into the contest divided 
and discordant. The anti-masons were strong enough 
to produce that state of things, and of course their con- 
duct showed that the opposition was not united on any 
political policy whatever. Jackson, on the contrary, 
had been consolidating a party, which had a strong con- 
sciousness of its power and its purpose and a vigorous 
party will. Jackson had the credit of recovering the 
West India trade, settling the spoliation claims, and 
placing all foreign relations on a good footing. He 
also claimed that he had carried the administration of 
the government back to the Jeffersonian ideas. In 
general this meant that he held to the non-interference 
theory of government, and to the policy of leaving 
people to be happy in their own way. He had not yet 
been forced to commit himself on land and tariff, al- 
though he had favored a Hberal policy about land ; but 
on internal improvements he had spoken clearly, and 
inferences were freely drawn as to what he would do on 
land and tariff. He had favored state rights and strict 
construction in all the cases which had arisen. He had 
discountenanced all heavy expenditures on so-called na- 
tional objects, and had prosecuted as rapidly as possible 
the payment of the debt. Here was a strong record 
and a consistent one on a number of great points of 
policy, and that, of course, is what is needed to form a 
party. The record also furnished two or three good 
party " cries." The general non-interference policy 
Btrengthens any government which recurs to it. AX 
governments in time depart from it, because they al 
I 41 Niles. 260 ; 8 Adams, 430. 



JACKSON'S PARTY. 257 

Rrays credit themselves with power to do better for the 
people than the people can do for themselves. In 
1831-32 Jackson had not yet reached this stage in his 
career. The delicate points in his record were tariff 
and bank. If he assailed the tariff, would he not lose 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Kentucky ? If he favored it, 
would he not lose the South ? This was the old division 
in the body of his supporters, and it seemed that he 
might now be ruined if that cleft were opened. Also, il 
he went on with the " bank war," would he not lose 
Pennsylvania ? His mild message on the bank in 1831 
Beemed to indicate fear. 

Clay declared unhesitatingly that the campaign re- 
quired that the opposition should force the fighting on 
tariff and bank, especially on the latter. We have seen * 
what his demeanor and demands were in the conference 
at Washington. For the fight out-of-doors he thought 
that the recharter of the bank was the strongest issue he 
could make. Of course Benton's assertion '^ that the 
bank attacked Jackson is a ridiculous misrepresentation. 
Clay did, hovrever, seize upon the question which Jack- 
son had raised about the bank, and he risked that im- 
portant financial institution on the fortunes of a political 
campaign. The bank was very unwilling to be so used. 
Its disinterested friends in both parties strongly dis- 
suaded Biddle from allowing the question of recharter 
to be brought into the campaign.* Clay's advisers tried 
to dissuade him. The bank, however, could not oppose 
the public man on whom it depended most and the 
party leaders deferred at last to their chief. Jackson 
nev*^r was more dictatorial and obstinate than Clay was 
Ht this juncture. Clay was the champion of the system 

* Page 22? ^ j Benton, 227. ^ lugersoll, 268. 

17 



258 ANDREW JACKSON. 

of state-craft which makes j^ubllc men undertake a tute- 
lage of the nation, and teaches them not to be content to 
let the nation grow by its own forces, and according to 
the shaping of the forces and the conditions. His sys- 
tem of statesmanship is one which always offers slieiter 
to numbers of interested schemes and corrupt enter- 
prises. The public regarded the bank, under his polit- 
ical advocacy, as a part of that system of state-craft. 

The national republican convention met at Baltimore, 
December 12, 1831.^ It consisted of 155 delegates from 
seventeen States. Abner Lacock, of Pennsylvania, who 
as senator had made a very strong report against Jack- 
son on the Seminole war, was president of the conven- 
tion. John Sergeant, of Pennsylvania, was nominated 
for Vice-President. The convention issued an address, 
in which the bank question was put forward. It was 
declared that the President " is fully and three times 
over pledged to the people to negative any bill that may 
be passed for rechartering the bank, and there is little 
doubt that the additional influence which he would ac- 
quire by a reelection would be employed to carry 
through Congress the extraordinary substitute which he 
has repeatedly proposed." The appeal, therefore, was 
to defeat Jackson in order to save the bank and prevent 
the device proposed by Jackson from being tried. 

Such a challenge as that could have but one effect on 
Jackson. It called every faculty he possessed into 
activity to compass the destruction of the bank. Instead 
of retiring from the position he had taken, the moment 
there was a fight to be fought, he did what he did at 
New Orleans. He moved liis lines up to the last point 
he could command on the side towards the enemy Th* 
1 41 Niles. 301. 



PETITION FOR RECHARTER. 259 

anti-bank men, Kendall, Blair, and Hill, must have been 
delighted to see the adversary put spurs into Jackson's 
animosity. The proceedings seemed to prove just what 
the anti-bank men had asserted : that the bank was a 
great monster, which aimed to control elections, and to 
set up and put down Presidents. The campaign of 
1832 was a struggle between the popularity of the bank 
and the popularity of Jackson. His poi)ularity in rural 
Pennsylvania had never had any rational basis, and 
hence could not be overthrown by rational deductions. 
His spirit and boldness in meeting the issue offered by 
Clay won him support. His party was not broken ; it 
was consolidated. 

On the 9th of January, 1832, in prosecution of the 
programme, the memorial of the bank for a renewal of 
its charter was presented in the Senate by Dallas, and 
in the House by McDuffie. These men were both 
" bank democrats." Sargent ^ says Biddle told him 
that the bank wanted Webster, or some such unequivocal 
friend of the bank, to present the memorial, but that 
Dallas claimed the duty as belonging to him. There was 
great and just dissatisfaction with Dallas for the way in 
which he managed the business. He intimated a doubt 
whether the application was not premature, and a doubt 
about the policy of the memorial, lest "it might be 
drawn into a real or imaginary conflict with some higher, 
some more favorite, some more immediate wish or pur- 
pose of the American people." In the Senate the peti- 
tion was referred to a select conmiittee, and in the 
House to the Committee on Ways and Means. The Sen- 
nate committee reported favorably March 13th and rec- 
ommended oidy a few changes in the old charter. Th«y 
1 1 Sargent, 215. 



260 ANDREW JACKSON. 

proposed to demand a bonus of one and a half millions 
in three annual instalments. In the House, McDuffie 
reported February 9th.^ He said that the proposition to 
recharter had called out a number of wild jjropositions. 
The old bank was too large, but one was proposed with 
a capital of fifty millions. He criticised the notion that 
all citizens should have an equal right to subscribe to 
the stock of the bank. If A has $100 on balance and 
B owes $100 on balance, their " equal right " to sub- 
scribe to bank stock is a strange thing to discuss. 

Benton ^ says that the opponents of the bank in Con- 
gress agreed upon a policy. They determined to fight 
the charter at every point, and to bring the bank into 
odium as much as possible. He says that he organized 
a movement to this effect in the House, incited Clayton, 
of Georgia, to demand an investigation of the bank, and 
furnished him with the charges and specifications on 
which to base that demand. Clayton moved for an 
investigation, February 23d. He presented Benton's 
charges, seven important and fifteen minor ones. Mc- 
Duffie answered the charges at once, but the investiga- 
tion was ordered to be made by a special committee. 
They reported, April 30th. The majority reported that 
the bank ought not to be rechartered until the debt was 
all paid and the revenue readjusted. R. M. Jolinson 
signed this report, so as to make a majority, out of good- 
nature. He rose in his place in Congress and said that 
he had not looked at a document at Philadelphia. The 
minority reported that the bank ought to be rechartered ; 
that it was sound and useful. Jolin Quincy Adams 
made a third repoi't. in which he brouglit his chai'acter 
istic industry to bear on the question, and discussed al 
1 Document C. * 1 Benton, 236. 



CHARGES AGAINST THE BANK. 261 

flie points raised in the attack on the bank. It is to 
his report that we are indebted for a knowledge of the 
p,orrespondenee of 1829 between Biddle and Ingham^ 
and the controversy over the Portsmouth branch, which 
was the first skirmish in the " bank war." * 

The charges against the bank, and the truth about 
them, so far as we can discover it, were as follows : — 

(1.) Usury. The bank sold Bank of Kentu<3ky notes 
to certain persons on long credit. When these persons 
afterwards claimed an allowance for depreciation, it was 
granted. A case which came to trial went off on tech- 
nicalities, which were claimed to amount to a confession 
by the bank of a corrupt bargain.^ The bank had also 
charged discount and exchange for domestic bills, when 
these two together amounted to more than six per cent, 
the rate to which it was restrained by its charter. This 
charge was no doubt true. The device was used by all 
banks to evade the usury law. 

(2.) Branch drafts issued as currency. The amount 
of these outstanding was $7.4 millions. The majority 
of the committee doubted the lawfulness of the branch 
drafts, but said nothing about the danger from them 
as instruments of credit. Adams said they were useful, 
but likely to do mischief. These drafts were in form 
redeemable where issued, but in intention and practice 
they were redeemed hundreds of miles away, and they 
had no true convertibility. There was no check what- 
ever on the inflation of the currency by them so long as 
credit was active. Cambreleiig very pointedly asked 
Biddle how the brand: draft arrangement differed fi'om 

* Document B. 

« Cf. Bauk of the United States* ••«. William Owens et al. 9 
»>etett\, 527. 



£62 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Kn. obligation of a Philadelphia bank to redeem all the 
notes of all the banks in Pennsylvania. Biddle replied 
that the Bank of the United States controlled all the 
branches which issued branch drafts on it. That was, 
to be sure, the assumption, but he had had hard ex- 
perience all winter that it was not true in fact.^ 

(3.) Sales of coin, especially American coin. The 
bank had bought and sold foreign coin by weight. The 
majority held that such corns were not bullion, because 
Congress had fixed their value by law. Adams easily 
showed the fallacy of this. All gold coins, then, Ameri- 
can included, were a commodity, not money.^ The 
bank had sold S84,734.44 of American gold coin. 

(4.) Sales of public stocks. The bank was forbidden 
by the charter to sell public stocks, the object being to 
prevent it from manijDulating the price of the same. In 
1824, in aid of a refunding scheme, the bank took 
some public stocks from the government, and had spe- 
cial permission by act of Congress to sell them. The 
majority disapproved of the sale. 

(5.) Gifts to roads, canals, etc. The bank had made 
two subscriptions of $1,500 each to the stock of turn- 
pike companies. The other cases were all petty gifts 
to fire companies, etc. The majority argued that, since 
\he administration had pronounced against internal im- 
\»rovements, the bank ought not to have assisted any such 
works. Adams said that the administration had opposed 
internal improvements, on the ground that they were 
unconstitutional when undertaken by the federal govern- 
-saent ; but he asked what argument that furnished 
against such works when undertaken by anybody else. 

(6.) Building houses to rent or sell. The bank ha<J 
* See below, page 270-1. 2 gee page 333. 



CHARGES AGAINST THE BANK. 263 

been obliged, in some cases, to take real estate for debts. 
When it could not sell, it had, in a few cases, improved. 

These points were the alleged violations of the charter. 
Biddle denied the seventh charge, of non-user, in failing 
to issue notes in the South and West for seven years. 
Adams pointed out that these charges would only afford 
ground for a scb'e facias to go before a jury on the 
facts. The charges of mismanagement, and the truth 
about them, so far as we can ascertain, were as follows : 

(1.) Subsidizing the press. Webb and Noah, of the 
" Courier and Enquirer " (administration organ until 
April, 1831 ; then in favor of the bank), Gales and 
Seaton, of the " National Intelligencer " (independent 
opposition), Duff Green, of the "Telegraph" (adminis- 
tration organ until the spring of 1831), and Thomas 
Ritchie of the Richmond " Enquirer " (administration) 
were on the books of the bank as borrowers. The 
change of front by the "Courier and Enquirer" was re- 
garded as very significant. Adams said that there was 
no law against subsidizing the press, and that the phrase 
meant nothing. He protested against the examination 
of the editors. The case stood so that, if the bank dis- 
counted a note for an administration editor, it was said 
to bribe him ; if for an opposition editor, it was said to 
subsidize him. 

(2.) Favoritism to Thomas Biddle, second cousin of 
the president of the bank. Reuben M. Whitney was 
the witness on this charge. T. Biddle was the brokei 
•>f the bank. N. Biddle admitted that the bank had 
K>llowed a usage, adopted by other banks, of allowing 
.asli in the drawer to be loaned out to particular persons, 
vnd replaced by securities, which were passed as cash, 
for a few days. He said the practice had been discon 



264 ANDREW JACKSON. 

tinued. Whitney made a very circumstantial charge 
that T. Biddle had been allowed to do this, and that he 
had paid no interest for the funds of the bank of which 
he thus got the use. N. Biddle proved that he was in 
Washington when Whitney's statement implied his 
presence in Philadelphia. Adams said Whitney lied. 
It was. certainly true, and was admitted, that T. Biddle 
had had enormous confidential transactions with the 
bank, but Whitney was placed, in respect to all the im- 
portant part of his evidence, in the position of a con- 
victed calumniator. He went to Washington, where he 
was taken into the kitchen cabinet and made special 
agent of the deposit banks. In 1837 he published an 
" Address to the American People," in which he reit- 
erated the charges against Biddle.^ 

(3.) Exporting specie, and drawing specie from the 
South and West. The minority state that the usual 
current was, that silver was imported from Mexico to 
New Orleans, and passed up the Mississippi and Ohio, 
and was exported to China from the East. From 
1820 to 1832, $22.5 million were drawn from the South 
arid West to New York. The bank was charged with 
draining the West of specie. So far as the current of 
silver was normal, the bank had nothing to do with 
it. If there had been no banks of issue, the West would 
have kept enough specie for its use, and the current 
would have flowed through and past, leaving always 
enough. The paper issues in the valley drove out the 
specie, and little stayed. The branch drafts after 1827 
helped to ])roduce this result, and the charge was, in 
go far, just.^ The bank was also charged with export 

1 52 Niles, 1 OG. 

* Gouge says that, in 1828, there was no local bar.k in opera 



f 



CHARGES AGAINST THE BANK. 265 

Sng specie as a result of its exchange operations. It 
8old drafts on London for use in China, payable six 
months after sight. They were sold for the note of the 
buyer at one year. The goods could be imported and 
sold to meet the draft. This produced an inflation of 
credit, since one who had no cajDital, if he could get the 
bank accommodation, could extend credit indefinitely. 
The majority made a point on this, but they added the 
following contribution to financial science : " The legiti- 
mate object of banks the committee believe to be grant- 
ing facilities, not loaning capital." On that theory there 
would have been no fault to be found with the China 
drafts, which must have been a great " facility " to those 
who could get them, and who had no other capital. 

(4.) The improper increase of branches. It was 
true that there were too many. Cheves, in his time, 
thought some of them disadvantageous to the bank, but 
it had been importuned to establish them, and there was 
complaint if a branch was lacking where the government 
or influential individuals wanted one. 

(5.) Expansion of the circulation by $1.3 million be- 
tween September 1, 1831, and April 1, 1832, although 
the discounts had been reduced during the winter. The 
bank was struggling already with the branch drafts, and 
the facts alleged were produced by its efforts to cope 
with the effects of the drafts. 

(6.) Failure of the bank to serve the nation. The 
majority made another extiaordinary blunder here. 
They said tliat the duties were paid at New York and 
Philadelphia, and that drafts on these cities were al- 
ways at a premium. Hence they argued that the bank 

lion in Kentucky, Indiana, Illinois, or Miti=ouri, and only one 
»ach in Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama (Gouge, 39.) 



266 ANDREW JACKSON. 

gained more the further it transferred funds for the 
government. The minority ridiculed this as an anni- 
hilation of space, a means of making a thing worth more 
the further it was from where it was wanted. 

(7.) Mismanagement of the public deposits. The 
majority state what they think the bank ought to do. 
It ought to use its capital as a permanent fund, and loan 
the public deposits on time, so as to be payable near the 
time when they would be required by the government 
for the debt payments. If the bank had done this it 
would have carried to a maximum the disturbances in 
the money market which were actually produced by the 
semi-annual payments on the debt. It would have in- 
flated and contracted its discounts by an enormous sum 
every six months. 

(8.) Postjionement of the payment of the three per 
cents. These stocks were issued in 1792 for the accrued 
interest on the Revolutionary debt. They were to be 
paid at 100. The Secretary informed the bank, March 
24th, just before the bank committee was raised, that 
he should pay half the three per cents ($6 million) in 
July. Biddle hastened to Washington to secure a post- 
ponement ; not, as he affirmed, for the sake of the bank, 
but for two other reasons : (1) that $9 million duty 
bonds would be jDayable July 1st, and the merchants 
would be put to inconvenience if the debt payment fell 
at that time ; (2) a visitation of cholera was to be 
feared, which would derange industry ; and the payment 
of the debt, with the recall of so much capital loaned 
to merchants, would add to the distress. The friends of 
the bank said that these reasons were good and suffi 
eient. Its enemies said that they Avere specious, but wer« 
»nly pretexts. The Secretary agreed to defer the pay 



CHARGES AGAINST THE BANK. 267 

ment of $5 million of the three per cents until October 
1st, the bank agreeing to pay the interest for three 
months.^ This matter will be discussed below. 

(9.) Incomplete number of directors. Biddle wa8 
both government director and elected director, so that 
there were only twenty-four in all. 

(10.) Large expenditures for printing : $6,700 in 
1830 : $9,100 in 1831. From 1829, the date of Jack- 
son's first attack, the bank spent money on pamphlets 
and newspapers to influence public opinion in its favor. 

(11.) Large contingent expenditures. There was a 
contingent fund account, the footings of which, in 1832, 
were $6 million, to sink the losses of the first few years, 
the bonus, premiums on public stocks bought, banking 
house, etc., etc. 

(12.) Loans to members of Congress in advance of 
appropriations. Adams objected to this as an evil prac- 
tice. He said afterwards that the investigation into 
this point was dropped, because it was found that a 
large number of congressmen of both parties had had 
loans. 

(13.) Refusal to give a list of stockholders resident 
in Connecticut, so that that State might collect taxes 
from them on their stock. 

(14.) Usurpation of the control of the bank by the 
exchange committee of the board of directors, to the 
oxclusion of the other directors. This charge was de- 
nied. 

In all this tedious catalogue of charges we can find 

nothing but frivolous complaints and ignorant criticism 

successfully refuted, except when we touch the branch 

drafts. The majority of the jommittee, if all their 

1 Document D. 



268 ANDREW JACKSON. 

points are taken together, thought that the bank ought 
to lend the public deposits liberally, and draw them in 
promptly when wanted to pay the debt, yet refuse no 
accommodation (especially to any one who was em- 
barrassed), not sell its public stocks, not increase its 
circulation, not draw in its loans, not part with its 
specie, not draw on the debtor branches in the West, 
not press the debtor state banks, and not contract any 
temporary loans. The student of the evidence and re- 
ports of 1832, if he believes the hank's statements in the 
evidence, will say that the bank was triumphantly vin- 
dicated. Two facts, however, are very striking : (1) 
The most important of the charges against which the 
bank successfully defended itself in 1832 were the very 
acts of which it was guilty in 1837-38, and they were 
what ruined it ; these were the second charge, which 
involved Whitney's veracity, and the fourteenth charge, 
which the bank denied. (2) Whether the bank was 
thoroughly sincere and above-board in these matters is 
a question on which an unpleasant doubt is thrown. by 
the certainty that it was not thorouglily honest in some 
other matters. In regard to the three per cents, it is 
certain that BIddle wanted to defer the payment for the 
sake of the bank. He was embarrassed already by the 
debt of the Western branches, which had been produced 
by the operation of the branch drafts. Their effect was 
just beginning to tell seriously. There was a great 
movement of free capital in the form of specie to this 
country in 1830, on account of revolutions in Europe. 
Tn 1830 and 1831 the United States paid its stock note 
in the capital of the bank. Capital was easy to borrow. 
In October, 1831, a certain stringency set in. The 
branch drafts were transferring the capital of the *>anlr 



BI DOLE'S PLAUSIBILITY. 269 

lo the Western branches, and locking it up there in 
accommodation paper, indefinitely extended by drawing 
and redrawing. Biddle could not make the Western 
branches pay. He was forced to curtail the Eastern 
branches. At such a juncture it was impossible for him 
to see with equanimity a debt which bore only three 
per cent interest paid off at one hundred, when the 
market rate was seven or eight per cent. He wanted 
to get possession of that capital. Even before he re- 
ceived notice that the three per cents were to be paid, 
he tried to negotiate with Ludlow, the representative 
of a large number of holders of the three per cents, 
for the purchase of the same. Ludlow had not power to 
sell.^ Great consequences hung on the strait into which 
the branch drafts had pushed the bank, and this meas- 
ure of relief to which Biddle had recourse. Biddle was 
too plausible. In any emergency he was ready to write 
a letter or report, to smooth things over, and present a 
good face in sj)ite of facts. Any one who has carefully 
studied the history of the bank, and Biddle's " state- 
ments," will come to every statement of his with a dis- 
agreeable sense of suspicion. It is by no means certain, 
whatever the true explanation of the contradiction may 
be, that Whitney told a lie in the matter in which his 
word and Biddle's were opposed. 

Biddle's theory of bank-note issues was vicious and 
false. He thouoht that the business of a bank was to 
furnish a paper medium for trade and commerce. He 
thought that this medium served as a token and record 
of transactions, the exchange turning upon itself, as it 
were, so that the transactions to be accomplished called 
•ut the paper, and when accomplished brought the papei 
1 Polk's Minority Report, 1833, Document E. 



270 ANDREW JACKSON. 

oack. There could then be no inflation of the paper, ii 
it was only put out as demanded for real transactions. 
Therefore he never distinguished between biUs of ex- 
change and money, or the true jjaper surrogate for 
money, which is constantly and directly interchangeable 
with money, so that it cannot degenerate into a negoti- 
able instrument like notes and bills. His management 
of the bank was a test of his theory on a grand scale. 
The branch drafts were a special test of it. It was 
proven that they had none of the character of convertible 
bank-notes or money, but were instruments of credit, 
and, like all instruments of credit which have cut loose 
from actual redemption in capital, there was no more 
limit to their possible inflation than to the infinity of 
human hopes and human desires. Only a few months 
after this investigation, November, 1832, the president 
of the Nashville branch wi'ote to Biddle, " Be assured, 
sir, that we are as well convinced as you are that too 
many bills are offered and purchased, — amounting to 
more than the present crop of cotton and tobacco will 
pay ; I mean, before all these papers are taken up." It 
does not appear that, in the spring of 1832, Biddle yet 
perceived the operation of the branch drafts, and it 
2ould not be said that sincerity required that he should 
avow a mistake to a hostile committee ; but his letter to 
Clayton, appended to the rejjort of 1832, is meretricious 
and dazzling, calculated to repel investigation and cover 
up weakness by a sensational assertion. " The whole 
policy of the bank for the last six months has been ex- 
clusively protective and conservative, calculated to miti- 
gate suffering and yet avert danger." He sketches out 
in broad and bold outlines the national and interna 
tional relations of American industry and commerce 



BI DOLE'S INSINCERITY. 271 

ftnd the financial relations of the Treasury, with the bank 
enthroned over all as the financial providence of the 
country. This kind of writing had a great effect on the 
uninitiated. Who could dispute with a man who thus 
handled all the public and private finance of the whole 
country as a school-master would tell boys how to do a 
Bum in long division ? However, it was all humbug, and 
especially that part which represented the bank as 
watching over, and caring for the pubHc. As Gouge 
most justly remarked, after quoting some of Biddle's 
rhetoric : " The true basis of the interior trade of the 
United States is the fertility of the soil and the industry 
of the people. The sun would shine, the streams would 
flow, and the earth would yield her increase, if the Bank 
of the United States was not in existence." ^ If the 
bank had been strong, Biddle's explanations would all 
have been meretricious ; as it was, the bank had been 
quite fully occupied in 1831-32 in taking care of itself, 
mitigating its own sufferings and averting its own dan- 
gers. 

No doubt the bank was the chief sufferer from the 
shocks inflicted on the money market by the sudden and 
heavy payments on the public debt. Long credits were 
given for duties. When paid they passed into the bank 
as public deposits. They were loaned again to mer- 
chants to pay new duties, so that one credit was piled 
upon another already in this part of the arrangement. 
Then the deposits were called in to meet drafts of the 
Treasury to pay the debt, and so passed to the former 
Eund-holders. These latter next entered the money 
market as investors, and the capital passed into new em- 
ployments. Therefore Benton's argument, which all tb« 
^ Gouge, 56. 



272 ANDREW JACKSON. 

anti-bank men caught up, that the financial heats and 
chills of this period were certainly clue to the malice of 
the bank, is of no force at all. The disturbances were 
such, they necessarily lasted so long, and they finally 
settled down to such uncalculable final effects that aU 
Buch deductions as Benton made were unwarranted. A 
public debt is not a blessing, but it is not as great a 
curse as a public surplus, and it is very possible to pay 
off a debt too rapidly. We shall, on two or thi-ee fur- 
ther occasions in this history, find the " public deposits " 
banging about the money market like a cannon ball 
loose in the hold of a ship in a high wind. 

While the committee was investigating the bank the 
political strife was growing more intense, and every 
chance of dealing dispassionately with the question of 
recharter had passed away. In January, Van Buren's 
nomination as minister to England was rejected by the 
Senate.^ The Legislature of New York had passed 
resolutions asfainst the recharter of the bank.^ This 
hurt Van Buren in Pennsylvania. Such was the strange 
combination of feelings and convictions at this time that 
Jackson could demolish the bank without shaking his 
hold on Pennsylvania, but Van Buren was never for- 
given for the action of his State against the bank. It 
illustrated again the observation made above, that the 
popular idol enjoys an unreasonable immunity, while 
others may be held to an unreasonable responsibility. 
A-11 Jackson's intensest personal feelings, as well as the 
2hoice of the kitchen cabinet, now converged on Van 
Buren's nomination. The Seminole war grudge, hatred 
af Calhoun, the Eaton scandal, and animosity to th« 
Senate contributed towards this end. 

1 See page 161. ^2 Hammoud, 351. 



DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION— 1832. 273 

Parton gives us one of Lewis's letters, which shows 
the wire-pulling which preceded the fii-st democratic 
convention. Kendall was in New Hampshire in the 
spring of 1831. Lewis wrote to him to propose that a 
convention should be held in May, 1832, to nominate 
Van Buren for Vice-President. He suggested that the 
New Hampshire Legislature should be prompted to 
propose it. Kendall arranged this and wrote a letter, 
giving an account of the meeting, resolutions, etc., 
which was published anonymously in the " Globe," July 
6, 1831. The " Globe " took up the proposition and 
approved of it. The convention met at J^altimore, May 
21, 1832. John H. Eaton was a delegate to the con- 
vention. He intended to vote against Van Buren, for, 
although Van Buren had taken Mrs. Eaton's part, he 
had not won Eaton's affection. Lewis wrote to Eaton 
that he must not vote against Van Buren " unless 
he was prepared to quarrel with the general." Van 
Buren was nominated by 260 votes out of 326. The 
*' spontaneous unanimity " of this convention was pro- 
duced by the will of Andrew Jackson and the energetic 
discipline of the kitchen cabinet. It may well be 
doubted whether, without Jackson's support. Van Buren 
could have got 260 votes for President or Vice-Presi- 
dent in the whole United States, in 1832. The " Globe " 
dragooned the whole Jackson party into the support of 
Van Buren, not without considerable trouble. The con- 
vention adopted an address prepared by Kendall, con- 
taining a review of Jackson's first administration.* 

May 7, 1832, a national republican convention of 

young men met in Washington. ^William Cost Johnson 

ras president. The convention ratified the nomination 

1 Kendall's Autobiography, 296. 
18 



274 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Df Clay and Sergeant, and passed a series of resolutions 
in favor of tariff and internal improvements, and ap- 
proving the rejection of Van Buren's nomination.^ 

During the spring and summer Biddle took quarters 
in Washington, from which he directed the congressional 
campaign on behalf of the recharter. He was then at 
the zenith of his power and fame, and enjoyed real re- 
nown in Europe and America. He and Jackson were 
pitted against each other personally. Biddle, however, 
put a letter in Livingston's ^ hands, stating that he would 
accept any charter to which Jackson would consent.® 
Jackson never fought for compromises, and nothing was 
heard of this letter. Jackson drew up a queer plan of 
a "bank," which he thought constitutional and suitable, 
but it remained in his drawer.* The anti-bank men 
affirmed that Biddle was corrupting Congress. 

The charter passed the Senate June 11th, 28 to 20, 
and the House, July 3d, 107 to 85. It was sent to the 
President July 4th. The Senate voted to adjourn July 
16th. It was a clever device of theirs to force Jackson to 
sign or veto by giving him more than ten days. They 
wanted to force him to a direct issue. It is not prob- 
able that there was room for his will to be any further 
stimulated by this kind of manoeuvring, but he never 
flinched from a direct issue, and the only effect was 
to put him where he would have risked his reelection 
and everything else on a defiant reply to the challenge 

1 42 Niles, 206, 236. 

2 Livingston was on the side of the bank. (Hunt's Livingstonf 
153.) 

* Ingersoll, 268. On the same page it is said that Biddle wa| 
Hdked of for President of the United States. 

* Ingersoll, 283. 



VETO OF THE BANK. 275 

•ffered. Niles says ^ that, a week before the bill passed, 
the best informed were " as six to half a dozen," whether 
the bill, if passed, would be vetoed, but that, for the 
two or three days before the bill was sent up, a veto 
was confidently expected. The veto was sent in, July 
10th. ^ The reasons given for it were : (1) The bank 
would have a monopoly for which the bonus was no 
e(piivalent. (2) One fifth of the stockholders were 
foreigners. (3) Banks were to be allowed to pay the 
Bank of the United States in branch drafts, which in- 
dividuals could not do. (4) The States were allowed 
to tax the stock of the bank owned by their citizens, 
which would cause the stock to go out of the country. 

(5) The few stockholders here would then control it. 

(6) The charter was unconstitutional. (7) The business 
of the bank would be exempt from taxation. (8) There 
were strong suspicions of mismanagement in the bank. 

(9) The President could have given a better plan. 

(10) The bank would increase the distinction between 
rich and poor. 

The bill was put to vote in the Senate July 13th, but 
failed of two tliirds (22 to 19). If the bank was to 
continue to exist it was now necessary to defeat Jackson. 
The state bank interest, however, had now been aroused 
to the great gain it would make if the Bank of the 
United States should be overthrown. The Jackson party 
thereby won the adhesion of an important faction. The 
Baf ety-fund banks of New York were bound into a solid 
phalanx by their system, and they constituted a great po- 

1 42 Niles, 337. 

2 Congress has chartered national banks as follows: 1791, 
815 (vetoed), 1816, 1832 (vetoed 1841, two bills, both vetoed, 

1863. 



276 ANDREW JACKSON. 

litical power. The chief crime alleged against the Bank 
of the United States was meddling with politics. The 
safety-fund banks of New York were an active political 
power under Van Buren's control, and they went into 
this election animated by the hope of a share in the de- 
posits. The great bank also distributed pamphlets and 
subsidized newspapers, fighting for its existence. The 
Jackson men always denounced this action of the Bank 
of the United States as corrupt, and as proof of the 
truth of Jackson's charges. 

Jackson got 219 electoral votes ; Clay, 49 ; Floyd, 11 
(of South Carolina, the nullification ticket) ; Wirt, 7 
(of Vermont). There were two vacancies (in Mary- 
land). Clay carried Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Con- 
necticut, Delaware, and Kentucky, and five votes in 
^Maryland. For Vice-President Van Buren got 189. 
Pennsylvania would not vote for him. She gave her 30 
votes to William Wilkins. Sergeant got 49 votes ; 
Henry Lee, of Massachusetts, 11 (of South Carolina) ; 
EUmaker, 7. At this election South Carolina alone 
Jirew her vote by her Legislature. The popular vote 
was 707,217 for Jackson; 328,561 for Clay; 254,720 
for Wirt. Jackson's majority, in a total vote (excluding 
South Carolina) of 1,290,498, was 123,936. In Alar 
bama there was no anti-Jackson ticket 



CHAPTER XIII. 

TARIFF, NULLIFICATION, AND BANK DURING JAOKSOX's 
SECOND ADMINISTRATION. 

General Jackson now advanced to another develop- 
ment of his political philosophy and his political art. 
No government which has felt itself strong has ever had 
the self-control to practice faithfully the non-interference 
theory. A popular idol at the head of a democratic 
republic is one of the last political organs to do so. 
The belief in himself is of course for him a natural 
product of the situation, and he is quite ready to be- 
lieve, as he is constantly told, that he can make the 
people happy, and can " save the country " from evil 
and designing persons, namely, those who do not join 
the chorus of adulation. A President of the United 
States, under existing social and economic circum- 
stances, has no chance whatever to play the role of Csb- 
sar or Napoleon, but he may practise the methods of 
personal government within the limits )f the situation. 
Jackson held that his reelection was a triumphant vindi- 
cation of him in all the points in wliich he had been 
engaged in controversy with anybody, and a kind of 
charter to him, as representative, or rather tribune, of 
the people, to go on and govern on his own judgment 
over and against everybody, includixig Congress. His 
action about the Cherokee Indians, his attitude to the 
Supreme Court, his construction of his duties under the 



278 ANDREW JACKSON. * 

Constitution, his vetoes of internal improvements and 
the bank, his defence of Mrs. Eaton, his attitude toward 
Calhoun and Clay, his discontent with the Senate, all 
things, great and small, in which he had been active and 
interested, were held to be covered and passed upon by 
the voice of the people in his reelection.^ Adulation and 
success had already done much to make Jackson a dan- 
gerous man. After his reelection, his self-confidence 
and self-will became tenfold greater.^ Moreover, his in- 
intimates and confidential advisers, Kendall, Lewis, 
Blair, and Hill, won more confidence in themselves, and 
handled their power with greater freedom and certainty. 
It has already been shown in this history that they were 
perfect masters of the art of party organization, and 
they had a strong hatred of the bank ; but they had no 
statesman-like ideas in finance or public policy, and they 
governed by playing on the prejudices and vanity of 
Jackson. 

1 We may test this theory in regard to one point, the bank. 
The Legislature of Pennsylvania, on the 2d of February, 1832^ 
within eight months of the election at which Jackson got three 
fifths of the vote of Pennsylvania, instructed the senators and 
representatives in Congress from that State, by a unanimouo 
vote in the Senate, and by 77 to 7 in the House, to secure the re- 
charter of the bank. 

2 " The truth is, I consider the President intoxicated with 
power and flattery." " All the circumstances around him [when 
he came to office] were calculated to make him entertain an ex- 
alted opinion of himself, and a contemittuous one of others. His 
own natural passions contributed to this result." (Duane, 133, 
ander date October, 1833.) "There is a tone of insolence and 
insult in his intercourse with both Houses of Congress, especially 
«»ince his reelection, which never was witnessed between the Ex 
•cutive and the Legislature before." (9 Adams, 51 : Decembei 

2, 1833.) 



PERSONAL GOVERNMENT. 279 

Jackson's modes of action in his second term were 
those of personal government. He proceeded avow- 
edly, on his own initiative and responsibility, to experi- 
ment, as Napoleon did, with great public institutions 
and interests. It came in his way to do some good, 
to check some bad tendencies and to strengthen some 
good ones ; but the moment the historian tries to ana- 
lyze these acts, and to bring them for purposes of 
generalization into relations with the stand-point or 
doctrine by which Jackson acted, that moment he per- 
ceives that Jackson acted from spite, pique, instinct, 
prejudice, or emotion, and the influence he exerted sinks 
to the nature of an incident or an accident. Then, al- 
though we believe in personal liberty with responsibility, 
and in free institutions ; although we believe that no 
modern free state can exist without wide popular rights ; 
although we believe in the non-interference theory, and 
oppose the extension of state action to internal improve- 
ments and tariffs ; although we recognize the dreadful 
evils of bad banking and fluctuating currency ; and 
although we believe that the Union is absolutely the 
first political interest of the American people, yet, i'f we 
think that intelligent deliberation and disciplined reason 
ought to control the civil affairs of a civilized state, we 
must say of Jackson that he stumbled along through 
a magnificent career, now and then taking up a chance 
without really appreciating it ; leaving behind him dis- 
torted and discordant elements of good and ill, just fit 
to produce turmoil and disaster in the future. We 
have already seen, in some cases, what was the tyranny 
of his popularity. It crushed out reason and common 
sense. To the gravest arguments and remonstrances, 
Jie answer was, literally, " Hurrah for Jackson I " Is, 



280 ANDREW JACKSON. 

then; that a sound state of things for any civilized state ? 
Is that the sense of democracy? Is a democratic re- 
public working fairly and truly by its theory in such a 
case ? Representative institutions are degraded on the 
Jacksonian theory, just as they are on the divine-right 
theory, or on the theory of the democratic empire. 
There is not a worse perversion of the American system 
of government conceivable than to regard the President 
as the tribune of the people, endowed by his election 
with prerogative to check, warn, correct, guide, and 
watch the representatives of the nation in Congress as- 
sembled. 

One of the most remarkable modes of personal rule 
employed by Jackson was the perfection and refinement 
given to the " organ " as an institution of democratic 
government. In the hands of Blair the " Globe " came 
to be a terrible power. Every oifice-holder signed his 
allegiance by taking the " Globe." In it both friend 
and foe found daily utterances from the White House 
a propos of every topic of political interest. The sug- 
gestions, innuendoes, queries, quips, and sarcasms of the 
*' Globe " were scanned by the men who desired to 
recommend themselves by the zeal which anticipatas, 
and the subserviency which can even dispense with, a 
command. The editorials scarcely veiled their inspira- 
tion and authorization. The President issued a message 
to his party every day. He told the political news con- 
fidentially, and in advance of the mere newspapersj 
while deriding and denouncing his enemies, praising the 
adherents who pleased him, and checking, warning, o? 
Btimulating all as he thought best to promote discipline 
and efficiency. When we say " he " did it, we speak, of 
course, figuratively. If it was Blair's voice, JacksoB 



NULLIFICATION CONVENTION. 281 

ratified it K it was Jackson's will, Blair promulgated 
it. 

The South Carolinians thought that the limit of 
proper delay and constitutional agitation had been 
peached when the tariff of July, 1832, was passed. In 
the year 1832 the nullifiers, for the first time, got con- 
trol of South Carolina. The Legislature was convened, 
by special proclamation for the 22d of October 1832, — 
a month earlier than usual. An act was passed, October 
25th, ordering a convention to be held on the 19th of 
November. The Legislature then adjourned until its 
regular day of meeting, the fourth Monday in Novem- 
ber. The convention met as ordered ; Governor Hamil- 
ton was president of it. It adopted an ordinance that the 
acts of Congress of May 19, 1828, and July 14, 1832, 
were null and void in South Carolina. These proceed- 
ings conformed to a theory of the practice of nullification 
which the South Carolina doctrinaires had wrought out : 
namely, that the Legislature could Mot nullify, but that 
a convention, being the State in some more original 
capacity, and embodying the " sovereignty " in a purer 
emanation, could do so. The theory and practice of 
nullification was a triumph of metaphysical politics. 
The South Carolinians went through the evolutions, by 
which, as they had persuaded themselves, nulhfication 
could be made a constitutional remedy, with a solem- 
nity which was either edifying or ridiculous, according 
as one forgot or remembered that the adverse party 
attached no significance to the evolutions. 

The ordinance provided that no appeal from a South 
Carolina court to a federal court should bo allowed 
in any case arising under any of the laws passed in 
ipiirsuance of the ordinance ; such an appeal to be a 



282 ANDREW JACKSON. 

contempt of court. All officers and jurors were to take 
an oath to the ordinance. South Carolma would secede 
if the United States should attempt to enforce anything 
contrary to the ordinance. Novemher 27th the Legis- 
lature met again, and passed the laws requisite to put the 
ordinance in operation. Goods seized by the custom- 
liouse officers might be replevied. Militia and volun- 
teers might be called out. A thousand stand of arms 
were to be purchased. 

A Union convention met at Columbia early in Decem- 
ber. It declared itself ready to support the federal 
government. It appeared, therefore, that there would 
be civil war in South Carolina. The Union men were 
strong in Charleston and in the Western counties. 

Jackson immediately took up the defiance which 
South Carolina had offered to the federal government. 
He ordered General Scott to Charleston, and caused 
troops to collect within convenient distance, although 
not so as to provoke a collision. He ordered two war 
vessels to Charleston. He issued, December 10th, a 
proclamation to the people of South Carolina. It was 
written by Livingston, who, as we have seen,^ had taken 
up a position against nullification more than two years 
before. He represented the only tariff State in the 
South, — Louisiana. It has been asserted that Jackson 
did not like the constitutional doctrines of the procla- 
mation, which are Madisonian federalist, and not such as 
he had held, but that he let the paper pass on account 
of the lack of time to modify it.* There is nothing o£ 

1 See page 214. 

2 Lewis in 3 Parton, 466; Tyler's Taney, 188. Taney re- 
corded, in 1861, that he should have objected to some of the doo 
trines of th» proclamation, if he had been in Washington at the 
time. {Ihih.j 



ANTI-NULLIFICATION PROCLAMATION. 283 

the Jacksonian temper in the document. It is strong, 
moderate, eloquent, and, at last, even pathetic.^ It ia 
very long : The following passage is perhaps the most 
important in it : "I consider the power to annul a law 
of the United States, assumed by one State, incompatible 
with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly 
by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its 
spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was 
founded, and destructive of the great object for which 
it was formed." This proclamation voiced the opinion 
and feeling of the whole country, except the nuUifiers in 
South Carolina and a few of their comrades in other 
Southern States. The dignified tone of the paper was 
especially satisfactory. It was the right tone to take to 
men who had allowed their passionate temper to commit 
them to unworthy and boyish proceedings, and who had 
sought a remedy for civil grievances in acts which made 
liberty and security impossible. Jackson found him- 
self a national civil hero for once, and he enjoyed 
the plaudits of people who had detested him the most 
earnestly. He lives in popular memory and tradition 
chiefly as the man who put down this treason, but the 
historian must remember that, if Jackson had done hia 
duty in regard to Georgia and the Indians, nullification 
would never have attained any strength. The Southern- 
ers were astonished at the proclamation. It seemed to 
them inconsistent, even treacherous.^ The constitutional 
theories were not at all such as Jackson had been under- 
stood to hold. They ascribed Jackson's attitude on this 

1 Jackson contributed a suggestion of the pathos. (Hunt'i 
Livingston, 373.) 

^ Hodgson, 173. Cf. Resolufcion of the South Carolina l^pB 
^tnre, 43 Niles, 300. 



284 ANDREW JACKSON. 

qnestion to hatred of Calhoun. Old John Randolph, 
who was in a dying condition, roused himself as the 
champion of state rights, although he had been a strong 
adherent of Jackson, and went through the counties of 
Virginia, in which he had once been a power, in his 
carriage, to try to arouse the people to resist the danger- 
ous doctrines of the proclamation,^ and yet to uphold 
the Union. 

December 20th, Governor Hayne of South Carolina 
issued a proclamation in answer to Jackson's. Calhoun 
resigned the vice-presidency, December 28th. He was 
elected senator in Hayne's place. He had been Vice- 
President for eight years. He now returned to the 
floor and to active work. He never afterwards took 
position in any party. He was an isolated man, who 
formed alliances to further his ends. South Carolina 
also remained an isolated State until 1840, when she 
voted for Van Buren and came back into the ranks. 
Calhoun seemed to have lost the talent for practical 
statesmanship which he had shown in his earlier years. 
He involved himself tighter and tighter in spinnings of 
political mysticism and fantastic speculation. Harriet 
Martineau calls him a cast-iron man, and describes his 
eager, absorbed, over-speculative type of conversation 
dnd bearing, even in society.^ " I know of no man who 
lives in such utter intellectual solitude. He meets men 
and harangues them by the fireside as in the Senate. 
He is wrought like a piece of machinery, set going 
vehemently by a weight, and stops while you answer 
He either passes by what you say, or twists it into suit> 
ability with what is in his head, and begins to lecturt 

1 2 Garland's Randolph, 360. 

* 1 Martineau, Western Travel, 149. 



JACKSON ASKS FOR INCREASED POWERS. 285 

again." He " is as full as ever of his nullification doc- 
trines [1836], i,nd those who krow the force that is in 
him, and his utter incapacity of modification by other 
minds, ... will no more expect repose and self-reten- 
tion from him than from a volcano in full force. Re- 
laxation is no longer in the power of his wilL I never 
saw any one who so completely gave me the idea of 
possession." 

In his message of 1832, Jackson said that the pro- 
tective system must ultimately be limited to the commod- 
ities needed in war. Beyond this limit that system had 
already produced discontent. He suggested that the 
subject should be reviewed in a disposition to dispose of 
it justly. December 13th the Senate called on the 
Secretary of the Treasury to propose a tariff bill. De- 
cember 27th, in the House, the Committee on Ways and 
Means reported a bill based on the Secretary's views. 
It proposed an immediate and sweeping reduction, 
with a further reduction, after 1834, to a " horizontal " 
rate of fifteen per cent or twenty per cent. January 16, 
1833, Jackson sent in a message, in which he informed 
Congress of the proceedings of South Carolina, and 
asked for power to remove the custom house and to 
hold goods for customs by military force ; also for pro- 
visions that federal courts should have exclusive juris- 
diction of revenue cases, and that the Circuit Court of 
the United States might remove revenue cases from state 
courts. Calhoun, in reply to this message, de-clared that 
Soiith Carolina was nov hostile to the Union, and he 
«ade one unanswerable point against Jackson's position. 
Jackson had referred to the Supreme Court as the 
proper authority to decide the constitutionality of the 
toriff. The nullifiers had always wished to get the 



286 ANDREW JACKSON. 

tariff before tlie Supreme Court, but there was no way 
to do so. The first tariff of 1789 was preceded by a 
preamble, in which the protection of domestic manufact- 
ures was specified as one of the purposes of the act, 
but this form had not been continued. The anti-tariff 
men tried to have such a preamble prefixed to the tariff 
act of 1828, but the tariff majority voted it down. 
Congress had unquestioned power to lay taxes. How 
could it be ascertained what the purpose of the majority 
in Congress was, when they voted for a certain tax law ? 
How could the constitutionality of a law be tried, when 
it turned on the question of this purpose, which, in the 
nature of the case, was mixed and unavowed ? ^ It 
was not, therefore, fair to represent the nullifiers as 
neglecting an obvious and adequate legal remedy. A 
grand debate on constitutional theories arose out of Cal- 
houn's criticism of Jackson's message and proclamation. 
Calhoun, Grundy, and Clayton each offered a set of 
resolutions,^ and a flood of metaphysical dogmatizing 
about constitutional law was let loose. As it began no- 
where, it ended nowhere. In these disputes, the dis- 
putants always carefully lay down, in their resolutions 
about " the great underlying principles of the Constitu- 
tion," those premises, which will sustain the deductions 
which the disputant in question wants to arrive at for 
the support of his interests. In the mean time the 
merits of the particular question are untouched. To 
inform one's self on the merits of the question would 
require patient labor. To dogmatize on '* great prin- 

1 The principle is covered fully by the decision in Loan Asso 
ciation vs. Topeka (20 Wallace, 655), but the practical difficult* 
probably remains. 

* 43 Niles, Snpp. 222. The debate is there i^irea 



ENFORCEMENT ACT. 287 

eiples" and settle the question by an inference ia 
easy. Consequently, the latter method will not soon b« 
abandoned. 

On the 21st of January, 1833, a bill for enforcing the 
collection of the revenue was reported to the Senate. It 
gave the powers and made the provisions which Jackson 
had asJied for. On the next day Calhoun introduced 
his resolutions : that the States are united " as parties to 
a constitutional compact; " that the acts of the general 
government, outside of the defined powers given to it, 
are void ; that each State may judge when the compact 
is broken ; that the theory that the people of the United 
States " are now or ever have been united on the prin- 
ciple of the social compact, and as such are now formed 
into one nation or people," is erroneous, false in history 
and reason. It would only be tedious to cite the other 
resolutions offered. Webster was good enough lawyer 
to get tired of the metaphysics very soon. Hodgson 
says that he withdrew, defeated by Calhoun.^ The 
appearance of the " social compact " as an understood 
and accepted element of political philosophy is worth 
noting. 

The state Legislatures also passed resolutions. Mas- 
sachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, New York, Missouri, 
Tennessee, and Indiana pronounced against nullification ; 
North Carolina and Alabama against nullification and 
lariff ; Georgia against the tariff, also thit nullification 
is unconstitutional, and that a convention of the Gulf 
States should be held ; New Hampshire, that the tariff 
should be reduced ; Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Ver- 
mont, New Jersey, and Pecnsylvania, that the tarirf 
1 Hodgson 174, 



288 ANDREW JACKSON. 

ought not to be reduced. Virginia offered to mediate 
between the United States and South Carolina.^ 

The House was at work on the tariff during January- 
February 12th, Clay introduced the compromise tariff in 
the Senate, to supersede all other propositions and be a 
final solution of all pending troubles. Of all the duties 
which were over twenty per cent by the act of July 14, 
1832, one tenth of the excess over twenty per cent was 
to be struck off after September 30, 1835, and one tenth 
each alternate year thereafter until 1841. Then one 
half the remaining excess was to be taken off, and in 
1842 the tax would be reduced to twenty per cent as a 
horizontal rate, with a large free list, home valuation, and 
no credit. Credit for duties worked very mischievously. 
An importer sold liis goods before he paid his duties. 
The price he obtained contained the duties which he had 
not yet paid. Hence he was able to get capital from 
the j3ublic with which to carry on his business. In the 
end perhaps he became bankrupt, and did not pay the 
duties at all. In 1831 a report from the Treasury 
6tated the duty bonds in suit at %Q>.S million, of which 
only $1 million was estimated to be collectible. Clay's 
compromise, as first drawn, had a preamble, in which it 
was stated that, after March 3, 1840, all duties should 
oe equal, " and solely for the purpose and with the in- 
lent of providing such revenue as may be necessary to 
an economical expenditure by the government, without 
regard to the protection or encouragement of any branch 
of domestic industry whatever." ^ 

Webster objected to the horizontal rate, and to ai; 
fcttempt to pledge future Congresses. He was now re> 
duced, after having previously made some of the moi^ 

* % Ann. Reg. 48. ^ I Curtis's Webster, 434, 455. 



ENFORCEMENT AND COMPROMISE. 289 

masterly arguments ever made for free trade, to defend 
protection by such devices as he could. Now he de- 
rided Adam Smith and the other economists.^ He fu'st 
paltered with liis convictions on the tariff, and broke his 
moral stamina by so doing. Many of the people who 
have been so much astonished at his " sudden " apostasy 
on slavery would understand it more easily if their own 
judgment was more open to appreciate his earlier 
apostasy on free trade. February 13th, he introduced 
resolutions against the compromise.^ 

The enforcing act passed the Senate, February 20, 
1833, by 32 to 8. On the 21st the compromise tariff 
was taken up in the Senate. On the 25th the House 
recommitted the tariff bill which was there pending, 
with instructions to the committee to report the com- 
promise bill. On the 26th the latter was passed, 119 to 
^o. On the same day the Senate laid Clay's bill on the 
table, took up the same bill in the copy sent up from 
the House, and passed it, 29 to 16. On the 27th the 
House passed the enforcing bill, 111 to 40. Thus the 
olive branch and the rod were bound up together. 

There was one moment in January when ex-Governor 
Hamilton seemed ready to precipitate a conflict, and 
when Governor Hayne seemed ready to support him ; ' 
but the leading nullifiers determined to wait until Con- 
gress adjourned. February 1st was the day appointed 
tor nullification to go into effect, but all action was post- 
poned. The Legislature replied to Jackson's procla- 
mation by a series of resolutions which charged him 
with usurpation and tyranny.* Jackson was annoyed 

1 1 Webster's Correspondence, 501, 

* 43 NQes, 406. » 8 Ann. Reg. 290 

* 43 Niles, 300. 

19 



290 ANDREW JACKSON. 

by tliese resolutions, and made threats against the lead 
ing iiullifiers in January. The Governor had summoned 
the convention to meet again on March 11th. The com- 
promise tariff was regarded as a substantial victory. It 
became a law on March 3d, the day on which the tariff 
of July 14, 1832, went into effect. The convention 
repealed the ordinance of nullification, passed another 
ordinance nullifying the enforcement act, and adjourned. 
It is not quite clear whether the last act was a bit of 
fireworks to fete the conclusion of the trouble, or was 
seriously meant. If it was serious, it strongly illus- 
trated the defective sense of humor which characterized 
all the proceedings of the nullifiers. The gentlemen 
who had nullified a tax, and then nullified a contingent 
declaration of war, would probably, in the next stage, 
have tried, by ordinance, to nullify a battle and a de- 
feat. 

The compromise tariff settled nothing. The fact was 
that Clay had been driven, by the rapacity of the pro- 
tected interests, to a point from which he could neither 
advance nor recede, and Calhoun had been driven by 
the nullification enterprise into a similar untenable 
position. Benton says that Calhoun was afraid of Jack- 
son, who had threatened to hang the nullifiers. Curtis, 
on the authority of Crittenden, says that Calhoun, in 
alarm, sought an interview with Clay, and that Clay in- 
tervened.^ They met and patched up the compromise, 
by which they opened an escape for each other. For 
ten years afterwards they wrangled, in the Senate, over 
the question who was in the worse predicament and whe 
won most in 1833. Clay claimed that he rescued pro 
taction from the slaughter which awaited it in Ve» 
^ 1 Curtis 's Webster, 444. 



THE BANK AND THE THREE PER Cl'.NTS. 291 

planck's bill. Calhoun claimed that the compromise 
tariff was a free-trade victory, won by nullification. 
Clay said that he made the comjjromise out of pity for 
Calhoun and South Carolina, who were in peril. Cal- 
houn said that nullification killed the tariff, and that 
Clay was flat on his back until Calhoun helped him to 
rise and escape by the compromise. The protected in- 
terests were as angry with Clay as if he had never 
served them. They accused him of treachery. He 
never gained anything by his devotion to protection. 
He was right at least in saying that protection would 
have been overthrown in 1833 if it had not been for 
the compromise tariff.^ 

Jackson's animosity towards the bank, in the autumn 
of 1832, had gathered the intensity and bull-dog ferocity 
which he always felt for an enemy engaged in active 
resistance. In the matter of the three per cents, the 
bank gave him a chance of attack. In July General 
Cadwallader was sent to Europe to try to negotiate with 
the holders of the three per cents for an extension of 
the loan for a year beyond October, the bank becoming 
the debtor, and paying, if necessary, four per cent on 
the extension. The bank, then, instead of paying the 
iebt for the government, desired to intrude itself into 
\he position of the Treasury, and extend a loan which 
the Treasury wanted to pay. Its object of course was 
to get a loan at three or four per cent. This proceed- 
ing was obviously open to grave censure. The obliga- 
tion of the Treasury would not cease, although the bank 
would have taken the public money appropriated to the 

1 See a speech by Clayton on Hugh L. White's actiou, Oc- 
tober 5, 1842. (63 Niles,' 106.) Tarton (III. 478) has the sam* 
■toTy. 



292 ANDREW JACKSON. 

payment of the debt. Five million dollars were in fact 
transferred, in October, to the Redemption of the Public 
Debt Account. It seems to be indisputable that the 
bank, in this matter, abused its relation to the Treasury 
as depository of the public funds. August 22d General 
Cadwallader made an arrangement with the Barings, 
by which they were to pay off all the holders of the 
stocks who were not willing to extend them and take 
the bank as debtor. The Barings bought $1,798,597, 
and extended $2,376,481. The arrangement with the 
Barings was to be secret, but it was published in a New 
York paper, October 11th. October 15th, Biddle re- 
pudiated the contract, because, under it, the bank would 
become a purchaser of public stocks, contrary to the 
charter. Would he have repudiated the contract if it 
had not been published ? 

The message of 1832 was temperate in tone, but very 
severe against the bank. The President interpreted 
the eagerness of the bank to get possession of the three 
per cents as a sign of weakness, and he urged Congress 
to make a " serious investigation " to see whether the 
public deposits were safe. An agent, Henry Toland, 
was appointed to investigate on behalf of the Treasury. 
He reported favorably to the bank. The Committee on 
Ways and Means also investigated the bank. The 
President's message created considerable alarm for a 
time, and, at some places, there were signs of a run on 
the branches.^ February 13, 1833, Polk reported a bUl 
to sell the stock owned by the nation in the bank. It 
was rejected, 102 to 91. The majority o^ the Committee 
m Ways and Means reported (Verplanck's report) thai 
the bank was sound and that the deposits were safe 
1 43 NUes, 315. 



REFORTS OF 1833 ON THE BANK. 298 

On January 1, 1833, the assets were $80.8 million, 
the liabilities $37.8 million ; leaving $43 million to pay 
$35 million of capital. The circulation was $17.5 
million ; specie $9 million. The state banks were esti- 
mated to have $68 million circulation and $10 million 
or $11 million specie. The minority report (Polk's) 
doubted if the assets were all good, and hence doubted 
the solvency of the bank. It referred to the Western 
debts, and the minority gave, in a supplemental report, 
evidence of the character of these debts. The com- 
mittee investigated the proceedings of the bank in re- 
lation to the three per cents. The minority reported 
that they could not find out clearly what was the final 
arrangement made by the bank, but it appeared that 
the certificates had been surreaidered, and that the bank 
had, by and through the former transaction, obtained a 
loan in Europe. The majority said that the bank had 
receded from the project, and that there was notliing 
more to say about it.^ 

October 4, 1832, Biddle informed the directors that 
the bank was strong enough to relax the orders given to 
the Western branches, in the previous winter, to con- 
tract their loans and remit eastward. He then supj30sed 
that the arrangement with the Barings about the three 
per cents had been concluded. The Western affairs, 
however, were at this time approaching a crisis. The 
supplementary report (Polk's) by the minority of the 
Committee on Ways and Means, March 2, 1833,^ cou- 
sins conclusive evidence that the Western branches 
were in a very critical condition ; that there had been 
di'awing and redrawing between the branches, and that 
Biddle knew it. The directors nad testified to the 
» Document E * Ibid. 



204 ANDREW JACKSON. 

committee that they knew nothing of any such pioceed 
mgs. Some of the most important points in evidence 
are as follows. September 11, 1832, the cashier of tha 
branch at Lexington, Kentucky, wrote that he was en- 
during a run. Two hundred and seventy-five thousand 
dollars were sent to him from Philadelphia, Louisville, 
St. Louis, New Orleans, and Natchez. A letter from 
Biddle to the president of the Nashville branch, dated 
November 20, 1832, shows plainly that he knew that 
redrawing was going on. In a letter from the president 
of the Nashville branch, November 22d, the following 
passage occurs : " We will not be able to get the debts 
due this office paid ; indeed, if any, it will be a small 
part ; the means are not in the country." The same 
branch officer, in a letter of November 24th, plainly 
states that he had been forced to collect drafts drawn 
on him by the parent bank, and the New York, Balti- 
more, Washington, Richmond, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, 
Louisville, and Lexington branches, and that he could 
not prevent a protest save by redrawing on New Or- 
leans. Again, November 26th, he states that he had, 
within a year, collected drafts for a million dollars for 
the bank and branches, " which, with small exceptions, 
have been paid through our bill operations." The 
majority of the committee of 1832-33 had interpreted 
: :e iiuctnations in the amount of bills at Nashville as 
proof that, when the crops came in, the debts were can- 
celled. The minority show that these fluctuations were 
due to the presence of the " racers " at one or the other 
end of tlie course. It is quite beyond question that a 
riass of accommodation bills were chasing each othei 
from branch to branch in the years 1832-33, and tha 
Ihey lormed a mass of debt, which the bank could not 
'or the time, control. 



THE DRAFT ON FRANCE. 296 

March 2, 1833, the House adopted, 109 to 46, a 
resolution that the deposits might safely be continued in 
the bank. The reports of the committee had not been 
carefully considered by anybody. The bank question 
was now a party question, and men voted on it accord- 
ing to party, not according to evidence. Whatever 
force ndght be attributed to any of the facts brought out 
by Polk in the minority report, it does not appear that 
anybody in Congress really thought that the bank was 
insolvent and the dejDosits in danger. His supplemental 
report bears date March 2d. Polk did not propose to 
withdraw the deposits. He wanted to avoid any posi- 
tive action. McDuffie objected to this policy that, if 
Congress took no action, Jackson would remove the 
deposits on the principle that silence gives consent.^ 

The first instalment of the payment by France was 
due February 2, 1833. The Secretary of the Treasury 
did not draw until February 7th. Then he drew a sight 
draft, which he sold to the bank for $961,240.30. Con- 
gress, March 2d, passed an act ordering the Secretary 
to loan this sum at interest. The treaty of July 4, 1831, 
was unpopular in France, and the French Chambers had 
not passed any appropriation to meet the payments pro- 
vided for in it. The draft was therefore protested, 
and was taken up by Hottinger for the bank, because it 
bore the indorsement of the bank. The bank had put 
the money to the credit of the Treasury, and it claimed 
to prove, by quoting the account, that the funds had 
been drawn. Hence it declared that it was out of funds 
for twice the amount oi the bill. It demanded fifteen 
per cent damages under an old law of Maryland, which 
<ras the law of the District of Columbia. The Trea» 
1 44 Niles, 108. 



296 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Dry paid the amount of the bill, and offered to pay the 
actual loss incurred. July 8, 1834, Biddle informed 
the Secretary of the Treasury that the sum of $170,041 
would be retained out of a three and a half per cent 
dividend payable July 17th, on the stock owned by the 
United States. March 2, 1838, the United States 
brought suit against the bank, in the federal Circuit 
Court of Pennsylvania, for the sum so withheld. It got 
judgment for $251,243.54. The bank appealed to the 
Supreme Court, which, in 1844, reversed the judgment, 
finding that the bank was the true holder of the bill and 
entitled to damages.^ On a new trial the Circuit Court 
gave judgment for the bank. The United States then 
appealed on the ground that a bill drawn by a govern- 
ment on a government was not subject to the law mer- 
chant. The Supreme Court sustained this view, in 1847, 
and again reversed the decision of the Circuit Court.* 
No further action was taken. 

In the spring of 1833, McLane was transferred from 
the Treasury to the State Department. He was opposed 
to the removal of the deposits by executive act, which 
was now beginning to be urged in the inmost adminis- 
tration circles. William J. Duane, of Pennsylvania, was 
appointed Secretary of the Treasury. This appointment 
was Jackson's own personal act. He had admired 
Duane's father, the editor of the " Aurora," and he de- 
clared that the son was a chip of the old block. In this 
he was mistaken. Duane was a very different man 
from his father.* He was a lawyer of very good stand- 

i 2 Howard, 711. 25 Howard, 382. 

^ Partou obtained from William B. Lewis an inside account oi 
lh«! removal of the deposits. Dnane wrote a full account of it 
and there is another account in Kendall's Antobioqraphy , but it 
** by the editor, and only at second hand from Kendall. 



PROJECT OF REMOVING THE DEPOSITS. 297 

Eng. He had never been a politician or office-holder, 
but had shunned that career. Lewis says that he doea 
not know who first proposed the removal of the deposits, 
but that it began to be talked of in the inner adminis- 
tration circles soon after Jackson's second election. In 
the cabinet McLane and Cass were so earnestly opposed 
to the project that it was feared they would resign. 
McLane sent for Kendall to know why it was desired 
to execute such a project. This was before McLane 
left the Treasury. Kendall endeavored to persuade him. 
Cass finally said that he did not understand the ques- 
tion. Woodbury was neutral. Barry assented to the 
act, but brought no force to support it. Taney strongly 
supported the project. He was an old federalist, who 
had come into Jackson's party in 1824, on account of 
Jackson's letters to Monroe about non-partisan appoint- 
ments.-^ He was Jackson's most trusted adviser in 1833 : 
so his biographer says, and it seems to be true. Van 
Buren warmly opposed the removal at first. Kendall 
persuaded him. He seems to have faltered afterwards, 
but Kendall held him up to the point.^ Benton warmly 
approved of the removal, but was not active in bringing 
it about. Lewis opposed it. 

The proceeding is traced, by all the evidence, to Ken- 
dall and Blair as the moving spirits,* with Reuben M. 
Whitney as a coadjutor. These men had no public 
official responsibility. They certainly were not recog- 
nized by the nation as the men who ought to have a 
controlling influence on public affairs. They were ani- 
mated by prejudice and rancor sixteen years old. An- 
irew Jackson's power and popularity, moving now 

1 Tyler's Taney, 158. ^ Kendall's Autobiography, 383. 

* Kendall's Autobiography, 375. 



208 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Under the impulse of the passions which animate ai 
Indian on the war-path, were the engine with which 
these men battered down a great financial institution. 
The bank had been guilty of great financial errors, but 
they were not by any means beyond remedy. The 
Bank of England, at the same period, was guilty of 
great financial errors. Blair and Kendall were not 
working for sound finance. Blair's doctrine was that 
the bank would use the public deposits as a means of 
corrupting the political institutions of the country. If 
that were true, it proved the error of having a great 
surplus of public money in the Treasury, i. e., in the 
bank. He said that the bank would corrupt Congress.^ 
In August Duane wrote, "It is true that there is an 
irresponsible cabal that has more power than the people 
are aware of." " What I object to is that there is an 
under-current, a sly, whispering, slandering system pur- 
sued." ^ In his history of the matter, written five years 
later, he says : " I had heard rumors of the existence 
of an influence at Washington, unknown to the Consti- 
tution and to the country ; and the conviction that they 
were well founded now became irresistible. I knew 
that four of the six members of the last cabinet and 
hat four of the six members of the present cabinet op- 
posed a removal of the deposits, and yet their exertions 
were nullified by individuals, whose intercourse with 
the President was clandestine. During his absence [in 
New England] several of those individuals called on 
me, and made many of the identical observations, in the 
identical language used by himself. They represented 
Congress as corruptible, and the new members as is 
need of special guidance. ... In short, I felt satisfied 
^ Lewis in 3 Parton, 503. 2 Duane, 130. 



REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITS. 29S 

from all that I saw and heard, that factious and selfish 
views alone guided those who had influence with the 
Executive, and that the true welfare and honor of the 
country constituted no part of their objects." ^ Lewis 
gives a report of a conversation with Jackson, in which 
he (Lewis) tried to persuade Jackson to desist from 
the project. Jackson's points were, " I have no con 
fidence in Congress." " If the bank is permitted to 
have the public money, there is no power that can 
prevent it from obtaining a charter ; it will have it if 
it has to buy up all Congress, and the public funds 
would enable it to do so ! " "If we leave the means of 
corruption in its hands, the presidential veto will avail 
nothinor." ^ Xhe statements in Kendall's " Autobiosfra- 
phy " are in perfect accord with these. It is perfectly 
plain who was at the bottom of this project, what their 
motives were, how they set to work, how they gave a 
bias to Jackson's mind, and furnished him with argu- 
ments and phrases. It is also worthy of the most care- 
ful attention that they and Jackson were now busy 
" saving the country," holding in check the constitu- 
tional organs of the country, above all Congress ; and 
that they were proceeding upon assumptions about the 
motives and purposes of the bank which were not true, 
and had not even been tested, and upon assumptions in 
regard to the character of Congress which were insult- 
ing to the nation. The Jeffersonian non-interference 
theories were now all left far behind. Jacksonian democ- 
racy was approaching already the Napoleonic type of 
the democratic empire, in which " the elect of the 
nation " is charged to protect the state against every- 
body, chiefly, however, against any constitutional organs. 
1 Duaue, 9. 2 Levis in 3 Parton, 505 fg. 



300 ANDREW JACKSON. 

On the first day of Duane's official life, June 1, 1833^ 
Whitney called on him, obviously in a certain ambaa 
sadorial capacity, and made known to him the project 
to remove the deposits from the bank, and to use state 
banks as depositories and fiscal agents. A few days 
later Jackson started on a progress through New Eng- 
land. The recent overthrow of nullification had ren- 
dered him very popular. No one knew of any new 
trouble brewing, and there was a general outburst of en- 
thusiasm and satisfaction that a great cause of political 
discord had been removed, and that peace and quiet 
might be enjoyed. Jackson was feted enthusiastically 
and generally. Harvard College made him a Doctor of 
Laws. Adams said that it was " a sycophantic compli- 
ment." Jackson was very iU at this time. Adams wrote 
a spiteful page in the " Diary," alleging that " four fifths 
of his sickness is trickery, and the other fifth mere fa- 
tigue." " He is so ravenous of notoriety that he craves 
the sympathy for sickness as a portion of his glory." ^ 
The low personal injustice which is born of party hatred 
is here strikingly illustrated. 

Duane did not accept the role for which he had been 
selected. He objected to the removal of the deposits. 
Jackson sent to him from Boston a long argument, 
written by Kendall, to try to persuade him. Jackson re- 
turned early in July. The question of the removal was 
then debated between him and Duane very seriously, 
Duane standing his ground. It is evident that Taney was 
then asked to take the Treasury in case Duane should 
continue recalcitrant. Jackson left Washington on an 
excursion to the Rip Raps without having come to as 
trrangement with Duane. ^ 

1 4 Adams, 5. 

* In May, 1833, Jackson laid the corner-stone of a monamem 



KENDALL'S NEGOTIATIONS. 301 

In July rumors became current that the Presiden 
btended to remove the deposits.^ August 5, 1833, 
while Jackson was absent, Taney wrote to him, encourao-- 
ing him to prosecute the project of removal, and thor- 
oughly approving of it. It is a sycophantic letter.^ In 
August Kendall went on a tour through the Middle 
and Eastern States to negotiate with the state banks so 
as to find out whether they would undertake the fiscal 
duties. His first project seems to have been based on 
the New York Safety Fund system. He got no en- 
couragement for this.* To more general inquiries as to 
a willingness to enter into some arrangement he got a 
number of favorable replies.^ Commenting on these 
replies, Duane says, " It was into this chaos that I was 
asked to plunge the fiscal concerns of the country at a 
moment when they were conducted by the legitimate 
agent with the utmost simplicity, safety, and despatch." * 

On Jackson's return he took up the business at once. 
Of course Kendall's negotiations could not be kept se- 
cret. " Niles's Register " for September 7, 1833, con- 
tains a long list of extracts from different newspapers 
presenting different speculations as to the probability of 
••lie removal of the deposits. The money market was, 
of course, immediately affected. The bank had ordered 

to Washington's mother. On his way to the site of the monu- 
ment, while the steamboat was at Alexandria, Lieutenant Ran- 
dolph, who had been dismissed from the navy because he could 
Dot make his accounts good, committed an assault on the Pres 
ident, and attempted to pull his nose. Considerable politica. 
heat was excited by the extra 'egal measures taken to punish 
Randolph for his outrage. (44 Niles, 170.) 
i 44 Niles, 353. 2 Tyler's Taney, 195, 

• Document F. page 10. * Document F. 

* Duane, 96. 



302 ANDREW JACKSON. 

its branches to buy no drafts having over ninety days 
to run. This was too short a time for " racers," consid- 
ering the difficulty of communication. The Western 
debts had now been considerably curtailed by the stren- 
uous efforts which had been made during the year. In 
the cabinet, Duane was still resisting. The sixteenth 
section of the bank charter gave to the Secretary of the 
Treasury, by specific designation, the power to remove 
the deposits. 

By the acts of July 2, 1789, and May 10, 1800, the 
Secretary of the Treasury reports to the House of Rep 
resentatives. John Adams objected to the position thus 
created for the Secretary of the Treasury.^ At other 
times also it has caused complaint.^ His position cer- 
tainly was anomalous. His powers and resj)onsibilities 
were in no consistent relation to each other. He was 
independent of the President in his functions, yet might 
be removed by him. He reported to Congress what he 
had done, yet could not be removed by Congress except 
by impeachment. Jackson now advanced another step 
in his imperial theory. He said to Duane : I take tho 
responsibility ; and he extended liis responsibility over 
Duane on the theory that the Secretary was a sub- 
ordinate, bound only to obey orders. What then was 
the sense of providing in the charter that the Secretary 
might use a certain discretion, and that he should state 
to Congress his reasons for any use he made of it ? 
Jackson's responsibility was only a figure of speech ; he 
was elected for a set term, and could uot and would not 

1 1 Gibbs, 569. 

2 4 Adams, 501. See a history of the Treasury Department is 
% report of the Committee on Ways and Means, March 4, 1 834 
|4€ Niles, 39.) 



PAPER READ IN THE CABINET. 303 

Stand again. As Congress stood there was no danger of 
bnpeachment. His position, therefore, was simply that 
he was determined to do what he thought best to do, 
because there was no power at hand to stop him. 

On the 18th of September the President read, in the 
meeting of his cabinet, a paper prepared by Taney ,^ in 
which he argued that the deposits ought to be removed. 
The grounds were, the three per cents, the French bill, 
the political activity of the bank, and its unconstitu* 
tionality. He said that he would not dictate to the 
Secretary, but he took all the responsibility of deciding 
that, after October 1st, no more public money should be 
deposited in the bank, and that the current drafts should 
withdraw all money then in it. Duane refused to give 
the order and refused to resign. He was dismissed, 
September 23d. Taney was transferred to the Treas- 
ury. He gave the order. Taney told Kendall that he 
was not a politician, and that, in taking a political office, 
he sacrificed his ambition, which was to be a judge of 
the Supreme Court.^ Duane at once published the final 
correspondence between the President and himself, in 
which he gave fifteen reasons why the deposits ought 
not to be removed.^ One of them was, " I believe that 
the efforts made in various quarters to hasten the re- 
moval of the deposits did not originate with patriots or 
statesmen, but in schemes to promote factious and self- 
ish purposes." The administration press immediately 
turned upon Duane with fierce abuse. 

The removal of the deposits was a violent and unnec- 
essary step, even from Jackson's stand-point, as Lewis 
tried to persuade him.** The bank had no chance of a 

1 Tyler's Taney, 204. ^ Kendaii's A'xtobijyraphy,3S6. 

« 45 Niles, 336. * Lewis in 3 Farton. 506. 



BO 4 ANDREW JACKSON. 

recharter, unless one is prepared to believe that it could 
and would buy enough congressmen to get a two-thirda 
majority. If it had been willing to do that, it had 
enough money of its own for the purpose, even after the 
deposits were withdrawn. The removal caused a great 
commotion, — even a panic.^ Bank stock fell one and 
one half per cent at New York. But it recovered when 
the paper read in the cabinet was received, because the 
grounds were only the old charges. The public con- 
fidence in the bank had not been shaken by the charges, 
investigations, and reports. The bank replied to the 
President's paper by a long manifesto, in which it pur- 
sued him point by point.' No doubt Biddle wrote this 
paper. In order to defend the bank in the matter of the 
three per cents, he resorted to the tactics noticed before. 
He said that there was heavy indebtedness to Europe 
in 1832, on account of the importations of 1831. He 
wanted to prevent an exportation of specie and give the 
country leisure to pay that debt. He says that the 
bank was at ease, and would have kept quiet if it had 
considered only its own interests. Nothing less than the 
movements which involve continents and cover years 
will do for him to explain his policy. No motive less 
than universal benevolence will suffice to account for the 
action of the bank. These pretences were, as similar 
ones almost always are, not true. 

The average monthly balance in the bank, to the 
credit of the Treasury, from 1818 to 1833, was $6,7 
million. In 1832 it was $11.3 million. In 1833 it 
was $8.5 million. In September, 1833, it was $9.1 
million.^ KendaU reported to a cabinet meeting the 
results of his negotiations with the banks. One bani 

- 45 Niles. 65. « 45 Niles. 248. » Document H. 



DISORDER IN THE FISCAL SYSTEM. 305 

«ras objected to "on political grounds." ^ Twenty-three 
were selected before the end of the year. The chanc% 
for favoritism was speedily perceived. The first in- 
tention was to use the Bank of the Metropolis, Washing- 
ton, as the head of the system of deposit banks, although 
no system was devised. In fact, the administration had 
taken the work of destruction in hand with great vigor, 
but it never planned a system to take the place of the 
old one. The Bank of the United States had, of course, 
been compelled to devise its own measures for carrying 
on the business of the Treasury, so far as it was charged 
with that business. The Treasury was now forced to 
oversee, if it did not originate, the system of relations 
between the deposit banks. January 30, 1834, Silas 
Wright made a statement which was understood to be 
authoritative. He said that the Executive had entered 
again upon the control of the public money which be- 
longed to him before the national bank was chartered ; 
that the administration would bring forward no law to 
regulate the deposits, but that the Executive would pro- 
ceed with the experiment of using state banks. Webster 
expressed strong disappointment and disapproval, claim- 
ing that there should be a law.^ March 18, 1834, Web- 
ster proposed a bill to extend the charter of the Bank of 
the United States for six years, without monopoly, the 
public money to be deposited in it, it to pay to the 
Treasury $200,000 annually on March 4th, none of •its 
notes to be for less than $20.00. The bank men would 
not agreo to support it. It was tabled and never called 
ap.^ April 15, 1834, sis. moi?^.hs after the deposits were 

^ Keudall's Autobiography, 387. ^ 45 Niles, 400. 

8 46 Niles, 52 ; 1 Curtis's Webster, 485 ; 4 Webster's Worka, 
IS. 

90 



306 ANDREW JACKSON. 

removed, Taney sent to the Committee on Ways and 
Means a plan for the organization of the deposit hank 
System, but it was a mere vague outline.^ December 
15, 1834, Woodbury sent in a long essay on currency 
and banking, but no positive scheme or arrangement. 
It was not until June, 1836, that the system was regu- 
lated by measures aiming at efficiency and responsibility. 
Taney desired that Kendall should be president of 
the Bank of the Metropolis and organize the system, 
but Kendall's readiness, which had not before failed, 
had now reached its limit. The Bank of the Metropolis 
was then asked to admit Whitney as agent and corre- 
spondent of the deposit banks. The bank refused to do 
this, and the plan of making that bank the head was 
given up.^ The banks were recommended to employ 
Whitney as agent and correspondent at Washington for 
their dealings with the Treasury. He was thus placed 
in a position of great power and influence. He did not 
escape the charge of having abused it, and an investiga- 
tion, in 1837, produced evidence very adverse to his 
good character. Part of the correspondence between 
him and the banks was then published. From that cor- 
respondence it is plain that the chief argument brought 
to support an application for a share of the deposits, or 
other favor, was devotion to Jackson and hatred of the 
Bank of the United States.^ It is not proven that the 
deposits were ever used by the Bank of the United 
States for any political purpose whatever. It is con- 
clusively proven that the deposits were used by Jack- 
son's administration, through Whitney's agency, to re- 
irard adherents and to win supporters. The first banki 

» 46 Niles, 1 57. « Kendall's Autobiography, 388. 

» 52 Niles, 91 



THE TRANSFER DRAFTS. 307 

which took up the system also, in some cases, used the 
deposits which were given to them to put themselves in 
the position which they were required, by the theory of 
the deposit system, to occupy. Taney assumed that 
the Bank of the United States would make a spiteful 
attempt to injure the deposit banks by calling on them 
to pay balances. It was then considered wrong and 
cruel for one bank to call on another to pay balances 
promptly. Taney, therefore, placed some large drafts 
on the Bank of the United States in the hands of 
officers of the deposit banks at New York, Philadelphia, 
and Baltimore, so that they might offset any such ma- 
licious demand. Otherwise, the drafts were not to be 
used. The bank took no steps which afforded even a 
pretext for using these drafts, but the president of the 
Union Bank of Maryland cashed one of them for 
$100,000 a few days after he got it, and used the money 
in stock speculations.^ For fear of scandal this act was 
passed over by the Executive, but it led to an investiga- 
tion by Congress. Taney was a stockholder in the 
Union Bank.^ The Manhattan Company used one of 
these drafts for $500,000.^ Taney claimed the power 
to make these transfers. He referred it back to a pre- 
cedent set by Crawford,^ who, in his turn, when he had 
been called to account for it, had referred it back to 
Gallatin. The source of the stream, however, was not 

1 Kendall's Autobiography, 389. Cf. Document H. page 339 
It is well worth while to read these two passages together in 
order to see how much deceit there was iu tae proceedings about 
ihe removal of the deposits. 

2 Quincy's Adams, 227. lie sold his stock Feoruary 18, 18.34 
Document M.) 

^ Document H. 
Document F. 



308 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Gallatin, but William Jones, Acting Secretary.* The 
baneful efEects of the large surplus of public money are 
plain enough. 

At the session of 1833-34 the message alleged, as the 
occasion of removing the deposits, the report of the 
government directors of the bank, which showed, as 
Jackson said, that the bank had been turned into an 
electioneering engine. It was never alleged that the 
bank had spent money otherwise than in distributing 
Gallatin's pamplilet on currency, McDuffie's report of 
1830, and similar documents. Some might think that 
it was not wise and right for the bank so to defend it- 
self, since politics were involved ; but its judge was now 
the most interested party in the contest, the one to whom 
that offence would seem most heinous, and he insisted 
on imposing a penalty at liis own discretion, on an ex 
parte statement of his own appointees, and a penalty 
which could not be considered appropriate or duly 
measured to the offence. He also charged the bank 
with manufacturing a panic. Taney reported "his" 
reasons for the removal. He argued that the Secretary 
must discharge his duties under the supervision of the 
President ; that the Secretary alone had power to re- 
move the deposits ; that Congress could not order it to 
be done ; that the Secretary could do it, if he thought 
best, for any reason, not necessarily only when the bank 
had misconducted itself. He put the removal which had 
been executed on the ground of public interest. The 
people had shown, in the election, that tliey did not 
w^ant the bank rechartered. It was not best to remove 

1 American State Papers, 4 Finance, 266, 279. Cf 1 Gal 
latin's Writings, 80. It has been asserted that Hamilton useu 
che eauie power. (Ingersoll 279. Cf. 6 Hamilton's Works, 175.' 



WAR WITH THE SENATE. 309 

Ihe deposits suddenly when the charter should expire. 
He blamed the bank for increasing its loans from De- 
cember 1, 1832, to August 2, 1833, from $61.5 million 
to $64.1 million, and then reducing them, from that date 
until October 2, 1833, to $60 million. He said that 
the bank had forfeited public confidence, had excluded 
the government directors from knowledge to which they 
were entitled, had shown selfishness in the affair of the 
French bill, had done wrongly about the three per cents, 
had granted favors to editors, and had distributed docu- 
ments to control elections. He favored the use of the 
state banks as fiscal agents of the government. 

December 9th the bank memorialized Congress against 
the removal of the deposits as a breach of contract. A 
great struggle over the bank question occupied the whole 
session. The Senate refused, 25 to 20, to confirm the 
reappointment of the government directors, who were 
said to have acted as the President's spies. Jackson 
sent the names in again with a long message,^ and they 
were rejected, 30 to 11. Taney's appointment as Secre- 
tary of the Treasury was rejected, to Jackson's great 
indignation. Taney was then nominated for judge of 
the Supreme Court, and again rejected. Marshall died 
in July, 1835. Taney was appointed Chief Justice, De- 
cember 28, 1835, and confirmed, March 15, 1836. 

December 11th Clay moved a call for a copy of the 
paper read in the cabinet. Jackson refused it on the 
ground that Congress had no business with it. The 
document, in fact, had no standing in our system of 
government. It was another extension of personal 
goverimient, by the adopti')n of a Nti))oleonic procedure. 
I'he Emperor made known his ^-ill by a letter of in- 
1 46 Nilcs, 180. 



310 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Btructions to his minister, and this, when published 
informed the public. Jackson used his " paper read in 
the cabinet " in just that way. By publishing it he 
violated the secrecy and privilege of the cabinet, and 
made it a public document, but when it was called for 
he fell back on cabinet privilege.^ If Jackson's doctrine 
was sound, there would be modes of governing this 
country without any responsibility to Congress, and the 
" cabinet," as such, would come to have recognized 
functions as a body for registering and publisliing the 
rescripts of the President. It was a thoroughly con- 
sistent extension of the same doctrine that Jackson, in 
his reply, in which he refused to comply with the call 
of the Senate, professed his responsibility to the Amer- 
ican people, and his willingness to explain to them the 
grounds of liis conduct. Such a profession was an insult 
to the constitutional organ of the mind and will of the 
American people worthy of a military autocrat, and al- 
though it might have a jingle which would tickle the 
ears of men miseducated by the catch-words of democ- 
racy, a people which would accept it as a proper and 
lawful expression from their executive chief would not 
yet have learned the alphabet of constitutional govern- 
ment. 

In January, 1834, Jackson seixt in a message com- 
plaining that the bank still kept the books, papers, and 
funds belonging to the pension agency with which it had 
Hitherto been charged. The Senate voted, May- 26th, 
26 to 17, that the Secretary of War bad no authority to 
remove the pension funds from the bank. 

Clay introduced resolutions which finally took this 
ihape : " Resolved, (1) That the President, in the lat« 
1 45 Niles, 247. 



CENSURE OF JACKSON. 311 

•xecutive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, 
has assumed upon himself authority and power not com- 
ferred by the Constitution and the laws, but in deroga 
tion of both. (2) That the reasons assigned by the 
Secretaiy for the removal are unsatisfactory and insuf- 
ficient." Benton offered a resolution that Biddle should 
be called to the bar of the Senate to give the reasons for 
the recent curtailments of the bank, and to answer for the 
use of its funds for electioneering.^ January 5, 1834, 
Webster reported from the Committee on Finance in 
regard to the removal of the deposits. Clay's second 
resolution was at once adopted, 28 to 18. March 28th 
the first resolution was adopted, 26 to 20. April 15th, 
Jackson sent in a protest against the latter resolution. 
The Senate refused to receive it, 27 to 16, declaring it 
a breach of privilege. The main points in the protest 
were that the President meant to maintain intact the 
rights of the Executive, and that the Senate would be 
the judges in case of impeachment, but for that reason 
ought not to express an opinion until the House saw fit 
to impeach. The bank charter provided that the Secre- 
tary should report his reasons to Congress. On the 
doctrine of the protest, however, one House of Congress 
could adopt no expression of opinion on the report sub- 
mitted, because it must wait for the other. The ad- 
ministration press kept up truculent denunciations of 
the Senate all winter. The " Pennsylvanian " said : " The 
democrats never heartily sanctioned it, and now, having 
the power, should amend or get rid of it once and for- 
jver." 2 The New York " Sta.idard " called the sena- 
lors " usurpers." ^ 

1 45 Niles, 332. 2 45 Niles, 131. 

« Ibid. 147. 



812 ANDREW JACKSON. 

The debates of the winter were acrimonious in the 
extreme. Probably no session of Congress before 
1860-61 was marked by such fierce contention in Con- 
gress and such excitement out-of-doors. Chevalier, 
who was an acute and unprejudiced observer, said that 
the speeches of the administration men resembled the 
French republican tirades of 1791-92. They had the 
same distinguishing trait, — emphasis. " Most generally 
the pictures presented in these declamations are fantas- 
tical delineations of the moneyed aristocracy overrun- 
ning the country, with seduction, corruption, and slavery 
in its train, or of Mr. Biddle aiming at the crown." * 
The chief weapon of debate was emphasis instead of 
fact and reason. With an " old hero " to support and the 
" money power " to assail, the politicians and orators of 
the emphatic school had a grand opportunity. There 
is also an unformulated dogma, which seems to command 
a. great deal of faith, to this efEect, that, if a man is only 
sufficiently ignorant, his whims and notions constitute 
" plain common sense." There are no questions on 
which this dogma acts more perniciously than on ques- 
tions of banking and currency. Wild and whimsical 
notions about these topics, propounded with vehemence 
and obstinacy in Congress, helped to increase the alarm 
out-of-doors. 

Senators Bibb, of Kentucky, and White, of Tennes- 
see, went into opposition. Calhoun, also, for the time, 
allied himself heartily with the opposition. 

The Virginia Legislature passed resolutions condemn- 
ing the dismissal of Duane and the removal of the de 
posits. In pursuance of the dogmas of Virginia demoo 
•uey, Rives, senator from that State and supporter of th« 
1 Chevalier, 61. 



EXPUNGING AND INSTRUCTIONS. 813 

administration measures, resigned. B. W. Leigh was 
elected in his place. 

As soon as the resolution of censure was passed, Ben- 
ton gave notice of a motion to exjjunge the same from 
the records. He introduced such a resolution at the next 
session, and the Jackson party was more hrndy consoli- 
dated than ever before in the determinatioi to carry 
it. The personal element was present in that enterprise, 
with the desire for revenge, and the wish to demonstrate 
loyalty. March 3, 1835, the words " ordered to be ex- 
punged " were stricken from Benton's resolution, 39 to 
7, and the resolution was tabled, 27 to 20. The agita- 
tion was then carried back into the state elections, and 
" expunging " came to be a test of party fealty. Ben- 
ton renewed the motion December 26, 1836. The Leg- 
islature of Virginia adopted instructions in favor of it. 
John Tyler would not vote for it, and resigned. Leigh 
would not do so, and would not resign. He never re- 
covered party standing.^ Rives was sent back in Tyler's 
place. This martyrdom and Tyler's report on the bank, 
mentioned below, made Tyler Vice-President.^ The vice 
of the doctrine of instructions was well illustrated in 
these proceedings. If the Virginia doctrine were ad- 
mitted, senators would be elected, not for six years, but 
until the politics of the State represented might change. 
The senator would not be a true representative, under 
the theory of representative institutions, but a delegate, 
or ambassador. It would be another victory of pure 
democracy over constitutional institutions. 

The administration had a majority in the Senate in 
1836, but Benton says that a caucus was held on expung- 

1 See his letter of reply ; 1.0 Niles, 28. 

2 Wise, 158. 



314 ANDREW JACKSON. 

big. The resolution was passed, 24 to 19, that blacli 
ines should be drawn around the record on the journal 
of the Senate, and that the words " expunged, by order 
of the Senate, this 16th day of January, 1837," should 
be written across it. It was a great personal victory for 
Jackson. The Senate had risen up to condemn him for 
something which he had seen fit to do, and he had suc- 
cessfully resented and silenced its reproof. It gratified 
him more than any other incident of the latter part of 
his life. It was still another step forward in the de- 
velopment of his political methods, according to which 
his personality came more and more into play as a 
political force, and the constitutional institutions of the 
country were set aside. The day after the resolution 
was expunged, leave was refused, in the House, to bring 
in a resolution that it is unconstitutional to expunge any 
part of any record of either House.^ 

March 4, 1834, Polk reported from the Committee on 
Ways and Means on the removal of the deposits, sup- 
porting Jackson and Taney in all their positions. He 
offered four resolutions, which were passed, April 4th; 
as follows: (1) that the bank ought not to be re 
chartered, 132 to 82 ; (2) that the deposits ought nol 
to be restored, 118 to 103 ; (3) that the state bankb 
wught to be depositories of the public funds, 117 to 105 ; 
(4) that a select committee should be raised on the 
bank and the commercial crisis, 171 to 42. The com- 

1 There was a case of expunging; in Jefferson's time. A res- 
jlution which had been passed contained a statement that cer- 
tain filibusters thought that they had executive sanction. This 
was expunged. (1 Adams, 439.) A case is mentioned in Massa- 
chusetts. Qiiincy's resolution against rejoicing in naval victoriea 
iras expunged. (Ingersoll, 23.) For a discussion of other prec© 
itints see the t^peeches of Eives and Leigh. (50 Niles, 168, 173. 



REPORTS OF 1834. 315 

mittee last mentioned reported May 22d.* The ma- 
jority said that the bank had resisted all their attempts 
to investigate. They proposed that the directors should 
be arrested and brought to the bar of the House. The 
position of the bank seemed to be, at this time, thai 
since the bank charter was to expire and the deposits 
had been withdrawn, any further investigations were 
only vexatious. The minority of the committee (Ed- 
ward Everett and W. W. Ellsworth) reported that the 
committee had made improper demands, and that thf 
instruction given to the committee to examine the banJ 
in regard to the commercial crisis was based on \m 
proper assumptions. The Senate, June 30th, instructec 
the Committee on Finance to make another investig* 
tion of all the allegations against the bank made bj* 
Jackson and Taney in justification of the removal. Tha* 
committee reported December 18, 1834, by John Tyler.* 
The report goes over all the points, with conclusions 
favorable to the bank on each. The time was long gone 
by, however, when anybody cared for reports. 

The excitement about the removal of the deposits was 
greatly exaggerated. The public was thrown into a 
panic, because it did not quite see what the effect would 
be. It is untrue that the bank made a panic, and it is 
untrue to say that there was no real crisis. The statistics 
^i loans, etc., which the hostile committees were fond of 
gathering, proved nothing, because they proved anything. 
If the bank loans increased, the bank was extending 
its loans to curry favor. If they decreased, the bank 
was punishing the public, and making a panic. As bank 
'oans always fluctuate, the argument never slackened. 
The figures appended to Tyler's report cover the whole 
1 46 Niles. 221, 225. - Document I. 



316 ANDREW JACKSON. 

history of the bank. There are no fluctuations ther« 
which can be attributed to malicious action by the bank 
The root of all the wrong-doing of the bank, out ol 
which sprang nearly all the charges which were in any 
measure just, was in the branch drafts and the bad 
banking in the West. The loans increased up to May, 
1832, when they were $70.4 million. The increase, so 
far as it was remarkable, was in the Western branches. 
The operation of the " racers " is also distinctly trace- 
able in the accounts of the parent bank and some of the 
branches. The effect of the general restraint imposed 
can also be seen, and the movement can be traced by 
which the bank, drawing back f^^om the perilous position 
into which it was drifting in 1832, got its branches into 
better condition, and improved its whole status from 
October, 1832, to October, 1833. It was this course 
which afforded all the grounds for the charge of panic- 
making. 

The bank was very strong when the deposits were 
removed. The loans were $42.2 million; domestic 
exchange, $17.8 million ; foreign exchange, $2.3 mill- 
ion ; specie, $10.6 million ; due from state banks, 
$2.2 million ; notes of state banks, $2.4 milHon ; pub- 
lic deposits, $9 million ; private deposits, $8 million ; 
circulation, $19.1 million. It also held real estate 
worth $3 million. During the winter of 1833-34 there 
was a stringent money market and commercial distress. 
The state banks were in no condition to take the public 
deposits. They were trying to strengthen themselves, 
and to put themselves on the level of the Treasury re- 
quirements in the hope of getting a share of the dep'osits. 
[t was they who operated a bank contraction during" tha* 
winter. It was six months, and then only by the favo? 



COMMERCIAL CRISIS. 317 

and concession of the Treasury, before the local banks, 
*' pet banks " as they soon came to be called, could get 
into a position to take the place of the Bank of the 
United States. This was the " chaos " into which 
Duane, like an honest man, and man of sense, had re- 
fused to plunge the fiscal interests of the country. 
The administration, however, charged everything to 
Biddle and the bank. Petitions were sent to Congress. 
Benton and the others said that there was no crisis, and 
that the petitions were gotten up for effect, to frighten 
Jackson into restoring the deposits. The proofs of the 
genuineness and severity of the crisis, in the forty-fifth 
volume of " Niles's Register," are ample. In January, 
1834, exchange on England was at one hundred and 
one and a half (par one hundred and seven) ; capital 
was loaning at from one and a half per cent to three per 
cent per month ; bank-notes were quoted at varying 
rates of discount.^ Delegations went to Washington to 
represent to Jackson the state of the country. He be- 
came violent ; told the delegations to go to Biddle ; 
that he had all the money ; that the bank was a " mon- 
Bter," to which all the trouble was due. In answer to 
a delegation from Philadelphia, February 11, 1834, Jack- 
son sketched out the buUionist progi-amme, which the 
administration pursued from this time forth as an off- 
set to the complaints about the removal of the deposits.^ 
Up to this time it had been supposed that Jackson 
rather leaned to paper-money notions. He now pro- 
posed, as an " experiment " (so he called it), to induce 

1 « Niles, 133. 

* Taney made the first offic.al statf ment of the plan of tlie ad- 
luiiilstration in a letter to the Committee ^n Wa/s and Means, 
'^.l)rii 15, 1834. 



S18 ANDREW JACKSON. 

the banks, by promising them a share in the deposits, to 
give up the use of notes under $5.00, later to do away 
with all under $10.00, and finally to restrict bank-notea 
to $20.00 and upwards, so as to bring about a circulation 
of which a reasonable part should be specie. The no- 
tion was good as far as it went, but had precisely the 
fault of a good financial notion in the hands of incompe- 
tent men ; the scheme did not take into account all the 
consequences of distributing the deposits as proposed. 
It persuaded the banks to conform to external rules 
about circulation, but, under the circumstances, these 
rules did not have the force they were supposed to have, 
and the bank loans were stimulated to an enormous in- 
flation, which threw the whole business of the country 
into a fever, and then produced a great commercial 
crisis. For a short period, in the summer of 1834, the 
currency was in a very sound condition. The Bank of 
the United States was, by the necessity of its position, 
under strong precautions. The state banks, by their 
efforts to meet the Treasury requirements, were stronger 
than ever before. The pojDular sentiment, however, had 
now swung over again to the mania for banks. Each 
district wanted a deposit bank, so as to get a share in the 
stream of wealth from the public Treasury. If a deposit 
could not be obtained, then the bank was formed in 
order to participate in the carnival of credit and specu- 
lation, for a non-deposit bank could manage its affairs 
as recklessly as it chose. The deposit banks speedily 
drew together to try to prevent any more from being 
admitted to share in the public deposits. The mania 
for banking was such that formal riots occurred at thft 
subscription to the stock of new banks.^ The favored 

1 42 Niles, 257 ; 44 Niles, 371. See some of these facts an^ 
f^ke nse made of them in Brothers's Uniiof^ S*n/.es p. "ji 



MANIA FOR BANKS. 319 

few, who could subscribe the whole, sold to the rest at 
ftn advance. To be a commissioner was worth from 
$500 to $1,000.^ There was a notion, borrowed per- 
iiaps from the proceedings of the government of the 
United States in the organization of both national banks, 
that to make a bank was a resource by which a group of 
insolvent debtors could extricate themselves from their 
embarrassments. The Tammany society being in debt, 
a plan was formed for paying the debt by making a 
bank.^ When the great fire occurred in New York, De- 
cember, 1835, a proposition was made to create a banls 
as a mode of relieving the sufferers. " To make a 
bank," said Niles, " is the great panacea for every ill 
that can befall the people of the United States, and yet 
it adds not one cent to the capital of the community." ^ 
The effect of this multiplication of banks, and of the 
scramble between them for the public deposits, was that 
an enormous amount of capital waa arbitrarily distrib- 
uted over the country, according to political favoritism 
and local influence, and in entire disregard of the in- 
dustrial and commercial conditions. The public debt 
was all paid January 1, 1835. After that date the pub- 
lic deposits increased with great rapidity, and there was 
no occasion to spend them. The state of things was 
therefore this : an immense amount of capital was being 
collected by taxes, and then was being distributed to 
favored corporations, as a free loan for an indefinite 
period, on which they could earn profits by lending it 
at interest. No monster bank, under the most malicious 
management, could have produced as much harm, either 
political or financial, as this system produced while it 
Wsted. 
I 46 NUes, 188. 2 Mackeinzie, 70. » 49 Niles, 298. 



320 ANDREW JACKSON. 

November 5, 1834, Secretary Woodbury informed 
tlie Bank of the United States that the Treasury would 
not receive branch drafts after January 1, 1835. Tliis 
led to a spirited correspondence with Biddle, in which 
the latter defended the drafts as good, both in law and 
finance.^ In the message of 1834 Jackson recapitulated 
the old complaints against the bank, and recommended 
that, on account of its " high-handed proceedings," its 
notes should no longer be received by the Treasury, and 
that the stock owned by the nation should be sold. The 
session of 1834-35 was, however, fruitless as to banking 
and currency. January 12, 1835, on Benton's motion, 
the Committee on Finance was ordered to investigate 
the specie transactions of the bank. Tyler took fire at 
this, because it reflected on the report which he had just 
made. In view of subsequent liistory, it is worth while 
to notice the profession of faith which was drawn from 
Tyler at this time. He said that he was opposed to any 
national bank on constitutional grounds, but that he was 
free from Jacksonism, and that he wanted to be just to 
the existing bank. January 10th Polk introduced a bill 
to forbid the receipt of notes of the Bank of the United 
States at the Treasury, unless the bank would pay at 
once the dividend which had been withheld in 1834. 
Bills were also proposed for regulating the deposits in 
the deposit banks. No action resulted. 

In the message of 1835 Jackson referred to the war 
which (as he said) the bank had waged on the govern- 
ment for four years, as a proof of the evil effects of such 
an institution. He declared that the bank belonged to 
B, system of distrust of the popular will as a regulator of 
political power, and to a policy which would sujiplan/ 
1 Docameut J. 



REVIEW OF THE BANK WAR. 321 

our system by a consolidated government. Here, then, 
at the end of the bank war, we meet again with the sec- 
ond of the theories of the bank which Ingham formulated 
in his letter to Biddie of October 5, 1829,^ at the be- 
ginning of the bank war. Ingham said that some peo- 
ple held that theory. The assumption that the bank 
held that theory concerning itself had been made the 
rule of action of the government, and the laws and ad- 
ministration of the country had been made to conform 
to that assumption as an established fact. At the ses- 
sion of 1835-36 an attempt was made to investigate the 
transactions of members of Congress with the bank. 
It was abandoned when Adams declared that a similar 
attempt in 1832 had been abandoned, because it cot 
both ways. 

^ See page 240. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

IPECULATIOISr, DISTRIBUTION, CURRENCY LEGISLATION 
AND END OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES. 

In the spring of 1835 the phenomena of a period oi 
speculation began to be distinctly marked. There was 
great monetary ease and prosperity in England and 
France, as well as here. Some important improvements 
in machinery, the first railroads, greater political satisfac- 
tion and security, and joint stock banks were especially 
favorable elements which were then affecting France 
and England. The price of cotton advanced sharply 
during 1834-35. Speculation seized upon cotton lands 
in Mississippi and Louisiana, and on negroes. Next it 
affected real estate in the cities at which cotton was 
handled commercially. The success of the Erie Canal 
led to numerous enterprises of a like nature in Pennsyl- 
vania, Maryland, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Ca^Dital 
for these enterprises was not at hand. The States en 
deavored to draw the capital from Europe by the use 
of their credit. The natural consequence was great 
recklessness in contracting debt, and nuicli "• financier- 
ing " by agents and middle-men. The abundant and 
cheap capital, here and abroad, of 1835-36 favored all 
the improvement enterprises. These enterprises were, 
however, in their nature, investments, returns from 
which could not be expected for a long period. In 
the mean time, they locked up capital. It appears 



I 



SPECULATION, 1835-36. 323 

that labor and capital were withdrawn for a lime from 
agriculture, and devoted to means of transportation. 
Wheat and flour were imported in 1836.^ The land of 
the Western States had greatly risen in value since the 
Erie Canal had been open. Speculation in this land 
became very active. Timber lands in Maine were an- 
other mania. ^ The loans of capital from Europe in- 
creased month by month. The entire payment of the 
public debt of the United States had a great effect upon 
the imagination of people in Europe. It raised the 
credit of the United States. It was thought that a 
country which coidd pay off its debt with such rapidity 
must be a good country in which to invest capital. The 
credit extended to the United States depressed the ex- 
changes, and gave an unusual protection to the excessive 
bank-note issues in the United States. Those issues 
sustained and stimulated the excessive credit which the 
public deposits were bringing into existence. The banks 
had an arbitrary rule that a reserve of specie for one 
third of the circulation would secure them beyond any 
danger. So long as the exchanges were depressed by 
the exportation of capital from Europe to America, no 
shipment of specie occurred, and the system was not 
tested. All prices were rising ; all was active and 
hopeful ; debt was the road to wealth. If one could 
obtain capital for margins, and speculate on differences 
in stocks, commodities, and real estate, he had a chance 
to win enormous profits while the credit system went 
on. Large classes of persons were drawn to city occu- 
pations, exchange, banking, and brokerage, because these 
industries were most profitable. Cities grew, rents ad- 
vanced, real estate rose in value. Down to October 1, 
1 50 Niles, 50, 74; 51 Niles, 17 ^ 43 js^Qeg, 167. 



824 ANDREW JACKSON. 

1836, the following States had forbidden notes undei 
$5.00 : New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia, Lou 
isiana, Indiana, Alabama, New Jersey, Maryland, North 
Carolina, Tennessee, Kentucky, and Maine. It appears, 
however, that small notes of earlier issue were still in 
circulation, and the state of things which the legislation 
meant to bring about never was reached, so far as one 
can now learn. 

In the autumn of 1835, the money market became 
more stringent. This fact was charged to the pet banks 
and to fears of trouble with France.^ The pet banks 
had every interest to arrest inflation. If they were held 
to conservative rules, while the non-deposit banks about 
them were not so held, the former only left free room 
for the latter, and then the former had to receive the 
notes of the latter. In January, 1836, the rate of dis- 
count at Philadelphia was two per cent per month.^ 
Banks were still being multiplied.' During 1836 prices 
continued to rise, speculation was active, rates for cap- 
ital increased ; there was complaint of a scarcity of 
money, and a demand for more banks. Governor 
Marcy, of New York, in his message for 1836, pointed 
out the " unregulated spirit of speculation " which pre 
vailed, and he warned the Legislature against the falla- 
cies involved in the demand for more banks.* In April 
the best commercial paper was quoted, at New York, 
at thirty per cent to forty per cent per annum ; second 
rate, at one half of one per cent per day.^ At Boston 
the rate was one per cent per month. Exchange or 
England at New York was one hundred and five (par 

1 49 Niles, 225, 281. ^ 49 ^iles, 313. 

5 49 Niles, 435. * 2 Hammond, 449. 

Evening Post, in 50 Niles, 134. 



LAND DISTRIBUTION. 325 

one hundred and nine and three fifths), showing the cur- 
rent of capital in spite of the inflation. In May Niles 
said, " There is an awful pressure for money in most 
of the cities," ^ yet he also describes the unprecedented 
activity of business in Baltimore. 

In the first message after his reelection, in 1832, Jack- 
son proposed, in regard to the public lands, that they 
should be sold to the new States and to actual settlers at 
a very low price. December 12th of that year Clay re- 
introduced his land bill.^ He succeeded in getting it 
passed, but it was sent to the President within ten days 
of the end of the session. Jackson did not sign it. In 
December, 1833, he sent in a message stating his rea- 
sons for not doing so. He objected especially to the 
policy of giving away the proceeds of the lands while 
levying heavy duties on imports. The session of 1833-34 
was fully occupied with the bank question and the re- 
moval of the deposits. At the session of 1834-35 Clay 
again brought in a land bill, but no action was taken. 
Relations with France occupied the attention of Con- 
gress during that session, which was a short one. At 
the session of 1835-36 Clay introduced a bill to dis- 
tribute the net proceeds of the lands, after taking out ten 
per cent for the ten new States. Calhoun introduced a 
joint resolution to amend the Constitution so that the 
surplus revenue could be distributed among the States. 
He also introduced a bill to regulate the public deposits. 
A bill to distribute the surplus revenue was also intro- 
duced. The land bill passed the Senate May 4, 1836, 
by 25 to 20. It was tabled in tlie House, 104 to 85, 
June 22d. The distribution bill and the deposit bill 
h'ere consolidated into one, and paseed by the Senate 
I 50 Nileg, 185. "^ See page 1 9a 



326 ANDREW JACKSON. 

June 17th, 38 to 6. On the 20th of June, in the House, 
an effort was made to divide the bill, so as to separate 
the regulation of tlie deposits from the distribution, but 
the effort failed. The House then changed the plan of 
distributing the surplus to the States as a gift into a 
plan for "' depositing " it with them subject to recall, 
[n this shape the bill passed, 155 to 38, and became a 
law by the concurrence of the Senate and the President. 
The " Globe " ^ said that Jackson would have vetoed 
the biU as it came from the Senate. He thought the 
plan of " depositing " the surplus was free from consti- 
tutional objections, but the " Globe " gave notice to all 
whom it might concern that the President would not 
sign any biU the effect of which would be to raise 
revenue by federal taxation, and distribute the proceeds 
among the States. The distribution measure was one 
of those errors which are apt to be committed on the 
eve of a presidential election, when politicians do not 
dare to oppose measures which gratify class or local 
feelings or interests. Webster opposed distribution, un- 
less the land income could be separated. He said that 
taxes must be reduced even at the risk of injuring some 
industries.^ It was provided in the bill that there 
Bhould be in each State a deposit bank, if a bank could 
be found which would fulfil the prescribed conditions. 
Each of these banks was to redeem all its notes in specie, 
and to issue no notes foi" less than S5.00 after July 4. 

1836. The Treasury was not to receive, after that date, 
the notes of any })ank which did issue notes vmder $5.00. 
IL was to pay out no note uiulev ^>i().()0 after the passage 
i)f the act, and no note under S^20.()0 after March 3 

1837. If the pubHc deposits in any bank should ex 
1 50 Niles. 281. « 1 Curtis's Webster, 537. 



THE DEPOSIT AND DISTRIBUTION ACT. 327 

ceed one fourth of the capital of the bank, it was to pay 
two per cent interest on the excess. No transfer of de 
posits from bank to bank was to be made by the 8ec» 
retary, except when and because the convenience of the 
Treasury required it. In that case, he was to transfer 
from one deposit bank to the next deposit bank in the 
neighborhood, and so on ; i. e., not from one end of the 
country to the other. As to distribution, the bill pro- 
vided that all the money in the Treasury, January 1, 
1837, in excess of $5 million, was to be deposited with 
the States in the proportion of their membership in the 
electoral college, and in four instalments, January, April, 
July, and October, 1837. The States were to give nego- 
tiable certificates of deposit, payable to the Secretary or 
his assigns on demand. If the Secretary should negoti- 
ate any certificate, it should bear five per cent interest 
from the date of assignment. While not assigned, the 
certificates bore no interest.^ 

In his message of 1836 Jackson offered a long and 
very just criticism on this act. His objections were so 
pertinent and so strong that we are forced to believe 
that he did not veto only on account of the pending 
election. A number of doubtful States were " improve- 
ment States ; " that is, they had plunged recklessly into 
debt for canals, etc., which were not finished, and credit 
was declining while the money market was gTOwing 
stringent. Those States were very eager (or, at least, 
many people in them were) to get the money in the fed- 
eral Treasury with which to go on with the works. 
Jackson argued in favor of the reduction and abolition 
of all the taxes wdth which the compromise tariff allowed 
Congress to deal, and he exposed completely the silly 
1 50 Niles. 290 



828 ANDREW JACKSON. 

device by which the whigs tried to justify distribution ; 
separating the revenue in imagination, and pretending 
to distribute the part which came from land. Jackson 
made a lame attempt to explain the recommendations 
which he had made in his early messages in favor of dis- 
tribution. He gave a table showing the effect of dis- 
tribution according to the ratio of membership in the 
electoral college as compared with that on the ratio of 
federal population. The small and new States gained 
enormously by the plan adopted. 

The best that can be said in excuse for distribution is 
that the surplus was doing so much mischief that the 
best thing to do with it was to throw it away. Unfort- 
unately, it could not be thrown away without doing 
other harm. We have already noticed the shocks given 
to the money market by the debt-paying operation.^ The 
removal of the deposits took place before that was com- 
pleted, and produced a new complication. The credit 
relations formerly existing towards and around the great 
bank were rudely cut off, and left to reconstruct them- 
selves as best they could. As soon as the new state of 
things had become a little established, there was an accu- 
mulation of a great surplus, nominally in the deposit 
banks, really loaned out to individuals, and fully en- 
gaged in speculative importations with credit for duties, 
or in speculative contracts payment on wliich was to be 
received in state bonds and scrip, or in still other inde- 
scribable repetitions of debt and contract. The capital, 
when thus fully absorbed, was next all called in again, 
in order to be transferred to the States. The States did 
not intend to loan the capital, they intended to spend it 
in public works ; that is, for the most part, corsidering 
1 See page 271. 



STATE LEPOSIT FUNDS. 329 

the acttrtil facts as they existed, to sink it entirely. In 
one way or another these funds were squandered by all 
the States, or worse than squandered, since they sei*ved 
corruption and abuse. In 1877 it was declared that the 
Controller of New York did not know what had become 
of the deposit fund of the State. For many years the 
commissioners of only nine counties had made any re- 
port. The Controller asked for $15,000 with which to 
find out what had become of the $4 million which was 
the share of New York. The fact that the funds were 
squandered was the least of the purely financial evils at- 
tendant on distribution. The effect on all the relations 
of capital, credit, and currency, that is, the effect on 
every man's rights and interests, was the most far-reach- 
ing and serious consequence. 

On the 1st of June, 1836,^ the deposit banks stood 
thus : capital, $46.4 million ; due to the Treasurer of 
the United States, $37.2 million ; due to public officers, 
$3.7 million; circulation, $27.9 million; other depos- 
its, $16 million; due to other banks, $17.1 million. 
Contra : loans, $71.2 million ; domestic exchange, $37.1 
million ; due from banks, $17.8 million ; notes of other 
banks, $10.9 million ; specie, $10.4 million. It appears 
then that these banks owed the United States $41 mill- 
ion, wliile their whole capital was only $46 million ; 
that is to say, the public deposits furnished them with a 
capital nearly equal to their own. If their " other depos 
its " had been aU cash capital deposited, four eleventh? 
of all their loanable funds would have been public de- 
posits, which would have been " called " by the act of 
June 23, 1836. It is also noti-eabie what a large sum 
is due to and from other banks. The feeUng that banki 
1 50 Niles. 313. 



S80 ANDREW JACKSON, 

ought to forbear demands on each other seems to hare 
been an outgrowth of the war against the Bank of the 
United States. The consequence was that the banks 
were all locked together, and when the trouble came 
they all went down together. 

In December, 1836, Calhoun introduced another dis- 
tribution bill to distribute any surplus which might be in 
the Treasury on January 1, 1838. It was finally added 
as a "rider " to an appropriation bill, providing money 
for fortifications. The Senate passed the bill and rider, 
but the House rejected the whole. Clay also intro- 
duced another land distribution bill. Schemes of dis- 
tribution were great whig measures down to Tyler's 
time. 

The first and second instalments of the distribution 
of 1837 were paid in specie, in January and April. 
The commercial crisis began in March. The banks 
suspended in May. The third instalment was paid in 
notes in July. Before August the Treasury, which was 
giving away $35 million, was in the greatest straits. 
Van Buren was forced to call an extra session of Con- 
gress. That body had no more urgent business than to 
forbid the Secretary to negotiate any of his " deposit " 
certificates, or to call on any of the States for the money 
deposited with them. The payment of the fourth in- 
stalment was postponed until January 1, 1839. At 
that date there was debt, not surplus, and the fourth 
instalment never was paid. Congress has never re- 
called any part of the other three instalments. Even 
when the civil war broke out, it would not venture to do 
ihis. Tlie amount of the three instalments, $28 mill- 
ion, stands on the books as unavailable funds. The 
Secretary of the Treasury was obliged to draw his firs? 



SPECIE CURRENCY. 331 

Ihree instalments where he could get them, so he drew 
them from the North and East, the banks of the South- 
west being really ruined. The fourth instalment re- 
mained due from the banks of the Southwestern States. 
It was years before any part of it could be recovered. 
The Southwestern States participated in the distribu- 
ion of the three instalments.^ 

Reference has been made above ^ to the plans of the 
administration for a specie currency, as a complement 
or offset to the removal of the deposits and destruction 
of the bank.^ Benton, who was the strongest bullionist 
in the administration circle, was under an exaggerated 
opinion of the efficacy of a metallic currency to prevent 
abuses of credit. A metallic currency is not liable to 
certain abuses, and it requires no skill for its inanage- 
ment. In contrast with paper, therefore, it is surer and 
safer. It, however, offers no guarantees against bad 
banking. At most it could relieve the non-capitalist 
wage-receiver from any direct share or risk in bad bank- 
ing. In contending against plutocracy democracy ought 
to put a metallic currency liigh up on its banner. The 
most subtle and inexcusable abuse of the public which 
has ever been devised is that of granting to corporations, 
without exacting an equivalent, the privilege of taking 
out of the circulation the value currency, for which the 
public must always pay, whether they get it or not, and 
putting into it their own promises to pay. The subtlety 
of this device and the fallacies which cluster about it and 
impose upon uneducated people are a full justification 
for men of democratic cenvictions, if they say : We 
do not understand it well enough to control it. We 

1 See table, 53 Niles, 35. ^ See page 317. 

» The Globe in 46 Nilea, 331. 



882 ANDREW JACKSON, 

cannot spend time and attention to watch it. "We will 
not allow it at all. Such confession of ignorance and 
abnegation of power, however, is hardly in the spirit of 
democracy. As a matter of history, the bullionist ten- 
dencies of a section of the Jacksonian party were at war 
with other parts of the policy of the same party, notably 
the distribution of the public deposits in eighty banks, 
with encouragement to loan freely. 

The opposition party, on the other hand, took up 
cudgels for banks and bank paper, as if there would be 
no currency if bank paper were withdrawn, and as if 
there would be no credit if there were no banks of 
issue. In their arguments against the bullionist party, 
they talked as if they believed that, if the public Treas- 
ury did its own business, and did it in gold, it would get 
possession of all the gold in the country, and that this 
would give it control of all the credit in the country, 
because the paper issue was based on gold. 

In 1834 the administration was determined to have 
a gold currency. The Committee on Ways and Means 
reported, April 22, 1834,^ that it was useless to coin 
gold while the rating remained as it was fixed by the 
laws of 1792 and 1793. The coinage law had often 
been discussed before. Lowndes studied it and re- 
ported on it in 1819 ; J. Q. Adams in 1820. In 1830 
Sanford, of New York, proposed a gold currency with 
subsidiary silver. In the same year Ingliam made a 
report, recommending the ratio 1 : 15.625. In 1831 a 
coinage bill passed the Senate, but was not acted on in 
the House. At the session of 1831-32 Wliite and Vei> 
planck, of New York, wanted silver made sole money 
()n account of the difficulty and delicacy of the subjeei 
^ 46 Niles, 159. 



BULLION MARKET. 333 

HO action had been reached. In 1834 a new interest 
eame in. The gold product of the Southern Alleghanies 
was increasing. In 1832 there came to the mint from 
that region $678,000 value of gold, and in 1833 
$868,000. There was a protectionist movement in be- 
half of gold, the interest of which was that gold should 
supplant silver, to which end an incorrect rating was 
desired.^ By the laws of 1792 and 1793 the gold eagle 
weighed 270 grains and was |^ fine. The silver dollar 
weighed 416 grains and was ^|f f fine, giving a ratio of 
1 : 15. The market ratio was, from 1792 to 1830, about 
1 : 15.6. Therefore gold was not money, but merchan- 
dise. From 1828 to 1833 the average premium on gold 
at Philadelphia was 4| per cent.^ The reports before 
Congress in 1834 showed that the real ratio was be- 
tween 1 : 15.6 and 1 : 15.8. The mint put 1 : 15.8 as 
the highest ratio admissible. Duncan, of Illinois, in a 
speech, showed that the ratio since 1821 had been, on an 
average, 1 : 15.625.* These authorities were all disre- 
garded. 

The administration politicians had determined to have 
gold as a matter of taste, and the Southern gold interest 
wanted it. The law of June 28, 1834, made the gold 
eagle weigh 258 grains, of which 232 grains were to be 
pure ; fineness, .8992. The silver dollar was unaltered. 
The ratio of gold to silver, by this law, was therefore 
1 : 16.002. The old eagles were worth in the new ones 
$10,681, or old gold coins were worth 94.827 cents per 
pennyweight in the new. Taking gold to silver at 
1 : 15.625, an old silver dollar was worth SI. 024 in the 
new gold one, and as the silver dollar had been the 
standard of prices and contracts, and tae new gold one 

1 Raguet, 236. * Raguet, 250. » 47 Niles, 89 



334 . ANDREW JACKSON. 

now was such, the money of account had been clepre' 
elated 2\ per cent. In the new standard a pound ster- 
ling was worth, metal for metal, $4.87073, and if the 
old arbitrary par, £1 = $4.44|, were 100, the true par 
of exchange would be 109.59. Of course the supposed 
gain to the gold producers from the incorrect rating was 
a pure delusion. They got no more goods for their gold 
than they would have got before, save in so far as the 
United States added some small increment to the 
previous demand in the whole world for gold. The 
bullion brokers won by exchanging gold coins for silver 
fcoins and exporting the latter. 

In December, 1834, Woodbury, who had become 
Secretary of the Treasury, gave the following statistics 
of the circulation on December 1st : state bank paper, 
from S57 million to $68 million ; Bank of the United 
States paper, $16 million ; gold, $4 million ; silver, 
$16 million ; total active circulation per head, $7.00. 
In bank : specie, $18 1; million ; paper, $35 million ; 
grand total per head, $10.00.* The currency was then 
in a very sound condition "^ 

The bank paper increased before the gold could be 
brought into circulation, and the gold currency never 
was made a fact. Silver rose to a premium, and was 
melted or exported.* The new mint law therefore 
produced the inconvenience of driving out silver just 
when the administration was trying to abolish small 
notes. A gold dollar had been proposed in the new 
^w, but the provision for it was stricken out. The 
Bilver dollars then on hand appear to have been aL 
clipped or worn.* The first which had been coined sine* 

1 Document K. p. 64. 2 gpe p^^e 318. 

» 47 NJles, 147. * 37 Niles, 393. 



THE ''SPECIE CIRCULAR." 335 

1805 were coined in 1836.* They could not, however^ 
be kept in circulation. By the act of January 18, 1837, 
two tenths of a grain were added to the pure contents of 
the eagle. This made the fineness just .900. The pure 
contents of the silver dollar were left unaltered, but the 
gross weight was reduced to 412^ grains, so that the 
fineness of this coin also was .900. The ratio of the 
metals in the coinage was then 1:15.988. One pound 
sterling was then worth $4.8665, or, if $4.44| be as- 
sumed 100, par of exchange was 109|. As soon as the 
crisis broke out, in 1837, all specie disappeared, and 
notes and tickets for the smallest denominations came 
into use. 

At the session of 1835-36 Benton tried to get a reso- 
lution passed that nothing but gold or silver should be 
taken for public lands. He did not succeed. After 
Congress adjourned, July 11, 1836, the Secretary of the 
Treasury issued, by the President's order, a circular to 
all the land offices, known afterwards as the "specie 
circular," ordering that only gold, or silver, or land 
scrip should be received for public lands. The occa- 
sion for this order was serious. The sales of public 
lands were increasing at an extraordinary rate. Lands 
were sold for S4.8 million in 1834 ; for $14.7 million 
m 1835 ; for $24.8 million in 1836. The receipts for 
the lands consisted largely of notes of irresponsible 
banks. Land speculators organized a " bank," got it ap- 
pointed a deposit bank if they could, issued notes, bor- 
rowed them and bought land ; the notes were deposited, 
they borrowed them again, and so on indefinitely. The 
guarantees required of the ieposit banks were idle 
%gainst such a scheme. There was, of course, little 
1 51 Niles 241. 



536 ANDREW JACKSON. 

specie in the West on account of the flood of papei 
there. The circular caused inconvenience, and bad 
temper on the part of those who were checked in their 
transactions. It also caused trouble and expense in 
transjDorting specie from the East, and it no doubt 
made a demand for specie in the East against the banks 
there. In the existing state of the Eastern banks, this 
demand was probably just the touch needed to push 
down the rickety pretense of solvency which they were 
keeping up. Specie could not be drawn in from Europe, 
excejit by a great fall in prices and a large contraction 
of the currency. Either thi'ough demand for specie or 
fall in prices, the inflated currency must collapse, and 
the crisis was at hand. Moreover, the banks were un- 
der notice to surrender, on January 1st, one fourth of 
the public deposits. Thousands of people who were 
carrying commodities or property for a rise, or who 
were engaged in enterprises, to finish which they de- 
pended on bank loans, found themselves arrested by the 
exorbitant rate for loans. The speculative period in 
England had also run its course, and the inflation here 
could no longer be sustained by borrowing there. Frona 
aU these facts, it is plain that the specie circular may 
have played the role of the spark which produces an ex 
plosion when all the conditions and materials have been 
prepared ; but those who called the circular the cause of 
the crisis made a mistake which is only too common in 
the criticism of economic events. A similar circular 
was issued in Adams's administration, which has hardly 
been noticed.^ There was a great deal of outcry against 
he President for high-handed proceedings in this mat- 
tef, but without reason. There were only two forms o 
1 7 Adams, 427. 



WINDING UP THE UNITED STATES BANK. 887 

rurrency which were at this time by law receivable for 
,an(ls, — specie and notes of specie value. ^ The notes 
w^hich were being received in the West were not of 
Bpecie value. 

A bill to annul the specie circular passed the Senate, 
41 to 5, and the House, 143 to 59. The President sent 
it to the State Department at 11.45 P. m., March 3, 
1837, and filed his reasons for not signing it, it having 
been sent to him less than ten days before the end of 
the session. His reason for not signing the bill was that 
it was obscure. 

The charter of the Bank of the United States was to 
expire March 3, 1836. The history of the internal 
affairs of the bank, after Tyler's report in 1834, was 
not known to the public until 1841, when committees of 
the stockholders published reports, from which we are 
able to state the internal history of the bank in its true 
historical connection. March 6, 1835, by a resolution of 
the directors, the exchange committee was directed to 
loan the capital of the bank, so fast as it should be re- 
leased, on call on stock collateral. The exchange com- 
miteee, from this time on, secured entire control of the 
bank. During the year 1835 branches were sold for 
bonds having from one to five years to run. Down to 
November, fifteen branches had been sold.^ In No- 
vember projects began to be talked about for getting a 
state charter from Pennsylvania.^ There was a great 
deal of jealousy at this time between New York and 
Philadelphia. There was a proposition for a great fifty- 
million-dollar bank at New York, and it seemed that if 

1 Report by Silas Wright, May 16 .838, with history of the 
taws about currency receivable at the Treasury, 55 Niles, i\)6 

2 49 NUes, 182. » 49 Niles, 162. 

'22 



338 ANDREW JACRSOtf. 

Philadelphia lost her bank, and New York got one, th* 
financial hegemony would be permanently transferred 
In December, 1835, after the great iii-e in New York, 
the Bank of the United States was asked to give aid. It 
did so by opening credits for $2 million in favor of the 
insurance companies.^ 

The act of the Pennsylvania Legislature, by which 
the United States Bank of Pennsylvania was chartered, 
is, on its face, a piece of corrupt legislation. Its cor- 
ruption was addressed to the people of the State, not to 
private individuals. It comprised three projects in an 
obvious log-rolling combination, — remission of taxes, 
public improvements, and bank charter. The bank was 
chartered ^ for thirty years. It was to pay a bonus of 
$2| million, pay $100,000 per year for twenty years for 
schools, loan the State not over a million a year in tem- 
porary loans at four per cent, and subscribe $640,000 
to railroads and turnpikes. Personal taxes were re- 
pealed by other sections of the bill, and $1,368,147 
were appropriated, out of the bank bonus, for various 
canals and turnpikes. Either this bill was corruptly 
put together to win strength by enlisting local and per- 
sonal interests in favor of it, or else the Pennsylvanians, 
having got their big bank to themselves, set to work to 
plunder it. The charter passed the Senate, 19 to 12, 
and the House, 57 to 30.^ Inasmuch as the democrats 
aad a majority in the Senate, it was charged that private 
eorruption had passed the bill. An investigation re- 
sulted in nothing. There was found, in 1841, an entry, 
of about the date of the charter, of $400,000 expendi- 
ture, vouchers for wliich could not be produced.^ Biddle 

i *: Niles, 307. 2 49 ^iles, 377, 396. 

49 Niles, 434. ^ Second report, 1841, 60 Nilea, 20a 



RETROSPECT OF THE BANK WAR. 388 

represented the case as if the proposition that the State 
Bhoiild charter the bank had oi-iginated witli leading 
members of the Legislature, who asked the bank if it 
would accept a state charter.^ The act was dated 
February 18, 1836. The bank accepted the charter, 
and presented a service of plate to Biddle.^ 

In the story of the bank war, which has been given 
in the preceding pages, the reader has perceived that 
the writer does not believe that Jackson's administration 
had a case against the bank, or that the charges it made 
were proven. To say this is to say that Jackson's ad- 
ministration unjustly, passionately, ignorantly, and with- 
out regard to truth assailed a great and valuable 
financial institution, and caluminated its management. 
Such was the opinion of people of that generation, at 
least until March 3, 1836. Jackson's charges against 
the bank were held to be not proven. The effect of 
them naturally was to make confidence in the bank 
blind and deaf. In January, 1836, when it was ex- 
pected that the bank would wind up in two months, its 
stock stood at 116. For four years afterwards, nothing 
seemed able to destroy public confidence in the bank. 
One thing alone suggests a doubt, and makes one hold 
back from the adoption of a positive judgment in favor 
of the bank, even down to the end of its national char- 
ter : that is, a doubt of Biddle's sincerity. If he was 
not sincere, we have no measure for the degree of mis- 
'epresentation there may have been in his plausible 
statements and explanations, or for how much may have 
been hidden under the financial expositions he was so 
fond of making, and which were, like the expositions ol 
a, juggler, meant to mystify the audience still more. 

I Biddle to Adams, 51 Niles, 230. ^ 49 Niles, 441. 



340 ANDREW JACKSON. 

The final catastrophe of the bank has always affected 
the judgment which all students of its history have 
formed of the merits of its struggle with Jackson. The 
Jackson men always claimed that the end proved that 
Jackson and his coterie were right all the time. Thia 
has probably been the general verdict. The whigs felt 
the weight of the inference, and they tried to distin- 
guish between the Bank of the United States and the 
United States Bank of Pennsylvania. A little reflec- 
tion will show that both these views are erroneous. A 
bank may go on weU and be sound for twenty years, 
and then go wrong. It may make mistakes and re- 
cover, and then make more mistakes and perish. We 
must go by the facts all the way along. The state banlc 
and the national bank of the United States had an 
unbroken life. The attempt to save one and condemn 
the other, aside from an investigation of the merits, is 
a partisan proceeding. It is not sound historically or 
financially. We have now reached as just an opinion 
as we can form about the bank up to the time of its 
state charter. 

The bank started on its new career under very bad 
auspices. It never threw off the suspicion which at- 
tached to its legislative birth. It was too large for its 
new sphere, yet pride prevented its reduction. It had 
other aims than to win profits by sound banking. It 
wanted to prove itself necessary, or to show itself a 
public benefactor, or to sustain the rivalry of Philadel- 
phia with New York. Biddle, freed from the restraints 
of the old organization, launched out into sensational 
banking, and tested his theories of banking to the 
utmost. There is scarcely anything vicious and un 
Bound in banking which the great bank did not illustrate 



UNITED STATES BANK OF PENNSYLVANIA. 341 

during- the next five years. Its officers plundered it. 
Its end was so ignominious that no one wanted to re- 
member that he had ever believed in it. 

On the 1st of February, 1836, the account of the 
bank ^ showed a surplus of $7.8 million, which was ex- 
pected to pay off the bonus, notes, etc. There were $20 
million loaned on stocks, and there was the state bonus, 
the government stock, and the circulation of the old 
bank to be paid. New stock was sold to pay off the 
government stock. £1 million were borrowed in Lon- 
don, and 12.5 million francs in Paris.^ Jaudon was 
sent to England as agent of the bank. In May, the 
money market at New York being very stringent, the 
bank was asked for aid, which it gave.* By an act of 
June 15, 1836, Congress repealed the 14th section of 
the bank charter. This put an end to the receipt of 
the notes of the old bank by the Treasury, and crippled 
the circulation of the bank. In October there was a 
report that the bank would surrender its state charter 
if it could get back its bonus.* In that same month, 
however, Biddle wrote another letter to Adams to show 
the wrong of trying to repeal the state charter. June 
23d, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Treasury 
to treat with the bank for the payment of the govern- 
ment stock. No agreement was reached, but, February 
25, 1837, the bank sent a memorial to the Speaker, in 
which it offered to pay off the public shares, at $115.58 
per share, in four instalments, September, 1837—38— 
39-40. This proposition was accepted March 3, 1837, 
ind the instalments were all paid. 

In his message. 1836, Jacksou discharged a last 

1 60 Niles, 106. 2 pij-gt report, 1841, 60 Niles, 105. 

« 50 Niles, 267. * 51 Niles, 113. 



342 ANDREW JACKSON. 

broadside at the bank. He seemed to be as angry that 
the bank had escaped annihilation as he was in 1818 
that Billy Bowlegs got across the Suwanee river. He 
complained that the bank had not paid off the public 
stock, and was reissuing its old notes. This latter pro- 
ceeding was stopped by an act of July 6, 1838. The 
bank failed tlu'ee times during the years of commercial 
distress which followed, namely, May 10, 1837, with all 
the other banks ; October 9, 1839, when it carried dow^n 
with it all which had resumed, except those in New 
York and a few in New England ; February 4, 1841, 
when it was entirely ruined. Its stockholders lost all 
their capital. 

Biddle had resigned March 29, 1839, but he had been 
BO identified with the bank that its ruin was attributed 
to him. He fell into disgrace. He was arraigned for 
conspiracy to plunder the stockholders, but escaped on 
a technicality. He died, insolvent and broken-hearted, 
February 27, 1844, aged fifty-eight.^ 

Webster declared, in 1842, that a bank of the United 
States founded on a private subscription was an " obso- 
lete idea ; " '^ but perhaps the unkindest cut of all was 
that the Whig Almanac for 1843 could refer to " Nick 
Biddle " as a rascal, and to " his bank " as one which 
was " corruptly managed." 

1 Ingersoll, 285 ; a very touching description of Biddle'a last 
'ears. 
« 2 Webster's Works, 135. 



CHAPTER XV. 

THE SEW SPIRIT IN YARIOUS POINTS OF FOREIGN ASTD 
DOMESTIC POLICY. 

The neglect of France to fulfil the stipulations of the 
treaty of July 4, 1831, offered the occasion for the most 
important diplomatic negotiation in which Jackson was 
engaged. In his message of 1834, he gave a full ac- 
count of the treaty and of the neglect of the French 
Chambers, at two sessions, to approj^riate money to meet 
enoaorements which had been made, on behalf of the 
French nation, by the constitutional authorities of 
France. The King had shown strong personal interest 
in the matter,^ and had exerted himself to secure a 
satisfactory settlement and to prevent any bad feeling 
from arising between the two nations. In the mean 
time the United States had reduced the duties on wine, 
according to the engagement in the treaty, by an act of 
July 13, 1832, and France was getting the benefit of the 
treaty without performing her share of it. It seemed to 
Jackson that this state of things called for spirited 
action. Moreover, Livingston wrote a very important 
dispatch from Paris, November 22, 1834,^ in which he 
laid that there was a disposition in France to wait and 
iee what the message would be ; also that the moderate 

- Livingston's dispatch, 47 Niles, 417 Rires came home in 
1831. Livingston went out in 1833. 
« 47 Niles, 417. 



B44 ANDREW JACKSON. 

tone of the United States up to this time had had a bad 
effect. " From all this you may imagine the anxiety I 
Bhall feel for the arrival of the President's messasfe. 
On its tone will depend very much, not only the pay- 
ment of our claims, but our national reputation for 
energy." If Jackson had made a bad effect by toe 
great moderation, that vi^as precisely the error he knew 
how to correct, and our " reputation for energy " was 
just what he was prejjared to sustain. Accordingly he 
prepared his message for 1834. The Due de Broglie, 
the French minister, afterwards declared that the ap- 
propriation would have been passed in December, 1834, 
if copies of tliis message had not been just then received. 
Jackson was under erroneous information as to the time 
of meeting of the French Chambers. The Due de 
Broglie had also, in the March previous, when the bill 
drawn by the American Treasury went to protest, found 
fault with the American government for selling the bill 
to a bank, instead of receiving the money through a 
liplomatic agent.^ He argued that the United States 
Dught not to have regarded the treaty as definitive until 
all the organs of the French government had assented to 
it. In his message, before mentioned, Jackson suggested 
that, if Congress inferred from the inaction of France 
that she did not intend to fulfil the treaty, it might pro- 
ceed to measures of coercion, amongst which he men- 
tioned, as suitable and " peaceable," reprisals. He 
proposed that a law should be passed authorizing re- 
prisals, if France should neglect the fulfilment of the 
reaty beyond a certain time. He added that this sug 
gestion ought not to be regarded by France as a 
'* menace." Chevalier thought that Jackson, haying 
1 47 Niles, 327. 



RELATIONS WITH FRANCE. 345 

had his bout with the imllifiers, found liis blood heated 
iind his appetite for war reawakened ; that lie satisfied 
this appetite first in the bank war, and then in the 
difficulty with France.^ 

The message caused great excitement in France. 
The French journals all regarded it as a menace. 
1 he feeling was aroused that France could not then pay- 
without dishonor.^ Additional embarrassment arose 
from the fact that the King's active interest was re- 
vealed by the documents published in America. The 
bad temper of the French was still further increased 
when they read Rives's letters, in which he seemed to 
boast of having outwitted the French minister, and 
Livingston's letter, in which he suggested that France 
never would pay unless the message brought her be- 
havior before Congress in a spirited way. The Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations of the Senate made a 
report,* in which they expressed full agreement with the 
President on all the essential points, but they regarded 
the proposition to employ reprisals as premature, and 
likely to embarrass the negotiations. In the House two 
reports were made,* but they were not important. The 
Senate voted unanimously, January 14, 1835, that it 
was not expedient to adopt any legif ' ative measures in re- 
gard to the relations vdth France. In the House, J. Q. 
Adams took the lead in sustaining Jackson's position, 
and was largely influential in securing the adoption by 
the House, unanimously, March 2, 1835, of a resolution 
that the execution of the treaty should be insisted on. 
The French minister to the United States was recalled. 

1 Chevalier, 177. See his estimate of Jackson's character. 

2 French newspapers quoted, 47 Niles, 327. 

■ 47 Niles, 344. * 48 Niles, 5 and 6. 



846 ANDREW JACKSON. 

His final note of January 14, 1835, was not received by 
Jackson, but was referred back to the French govern 
ment. They approved of it. 

In December, 1834, the French Chambers rejected a 
bill appropriating money to j^ay the indemnities. A 
cabinet crisis followed, not on account of this vote, but 
also not entirely, as it appears, without reference to it. 
The Due de Broglie, however, returned to office with 
the understanding that provision was to be made for 
fulfilling the treaty. April 25, 1835, the French 
Chambers passed the appropriation, but with a condi- 
tion that no money should be paid until " satisfactory 
explanations " of the President's message of 1834 
should be received. The original condition in the law 
was, " until it shall have been ascertained that the 
government of the United States has adopted no meas- 
ures injurious to French interests ; " ^ but it was after- 
wards changed to the other form ^ by amendment. 
Livingston wrote a note, April 25, 1835, declaring that 
the message was a domestic document, for which no 
responsibility to any foreign power would be admitted ; 
that the message of 1834 itself contained a sufficient 
disclaimer ; and *^^hat the condition which had been in- 
corporated in the act of the French Chambers would pre- 
vent it from being a satisfactory settlement.^ He then 
came home. In Congress, whose session ended March 
4th, an amendment to the usual appropriation bill for 
fortifications was proposed, by which $3 million were 
appropriated for extraordinary expenditures for defence, 
in case such should become necessary before the next 
session. The whole bill was lost, borne down, as it ap 
pears, by this amendment. As the relations with France 
1 47 Niles, 436. 2 43 Niles, 220. « 48 Niles, 318. 



RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATION!,. 347 

*rere still more critical when Congress next met, and 
nothing had been done for defence on account of the 
failure of that bill, a great deal of crimination and re- 
crimination took place in an effort to fix the blame 
and responsibility. No result was reached. It is an 
interesting instance of the working of the element of 
responsibility under the American system.^ 

In the message of 1835 Jackson reviewed the whole 
affair, insisted that he had never used menace, and 
alluded to Livingston's final note to the French minister 
as having clearly so stated. He said that he would 
never apologize. A long dispatch of the Due de Brog- 
lie to the French chargi here, in June, 1835, set forth 
the French case. It was read to Forsyth, but he de- 
clined to receive a copy.^ Jackson directed Barton, 
charge d'affaires at Paris, to make a specific inquiry 
what France intended to do. The Due de Broglie re- 
plied that France would pay whenever the United 
States would say that it regretted the misunderstanding, 
that the misunderstanding arose from mistake, that the 
good faith of France had not been questioned, and that 
no menace was ever intended. This question and 
answer were exchanged in October, 1835.^ Barton 
came home in January, 1836, and Pageot, the French 
charge, was recalled at the same time, so that diplomatic 
relations were entirely broken off. 

January 18, 1836, Jackson sent in a special message 
on the relations with France,^ sending copies of Bar- 
ton's correspondence. Livingston toned down ^ this 
message somewhat from the first intention ; nevertheless 
Jackson again recommended coercive measures. He 

1 49 NJles, 446. 2 49 j^rqes, 353. '^ 49 Niles, S47. 

* 49 NUes 345. ^ Huni's Livingston, 428. 



S48 ANDREW JACKSON. 

proposed to exclude French ships and products from the 
ports of the United States ^ that is to say, his reserve 
of force by which to sustain his spirited diplomacy was 
the old, imbecile, and worn-out device of a commercial 
war. He said that France was strengthening her navy ; 
if against us, an apology from us was out of the ques- 
tion. 

Thus this question had been pushed into the worst 
kind of a diplomatic dead-lock, out of which neither 
party could advance without fighting, and neither could 
recede without (supposed) dishonor. That is the evil 
of spirited diplomacy, for good diplomacy would avoid 
Buch a dead-lock as one of the worst blunders possible 
in the profession. The English government now inter- 
vened, and offered its good offices as mediator. The 
French government declared to the English that the 
President's message of 1835 had removed the bad im- 
pressions of that of 1834. This declaration was made 
known to Forsyth by the English minister at Washing- 
ton, and was transmitted to Congress, with a message, 
by the President, February 22, 1836.^ It was very 
good-natured of France to regard the message of 1835 
P.S compliance with the demands wliich had been made 
to Barton in October. She simply covered her retreat, 
for she had been in the wrong on the merits of the 
question from the beginning, and she justly bore half 
the blame of the diplomatic dead-lock. March 19, 
1836, the King of France ordered four instalments of 
the indemnity to be paid at once, in order to settle the 
matter down to date, according to the terms of the 
treaty 

Barry, the Postmaster-General, was the only membej 
1 49 Niles, 442. 



THE POST OFFJCE DEPARTMENT. 349 

of the cabinet retained in 1831. In his hands the ad- 
ministration of the Post-Ofiice Department, both in its 
business and its finance, steadily declined. The com- 
plaints in 1834-35 of the irregularity and delay of the 
mails were very numerous and bitter. The department 
was also running in arrears in its finances. Both Houses 
of Congress, at the session of 1834-35, investigated the 
department. Barry's personal honesty does not seem 
to have been questioned, but his chief clerk, Rev. 
Obadiah B. Brown, ^ became for the time a very distin- 
guished man, on account of relations with mail contract- 
ors, which, if imiocent, were very improper. The 
contractors had made use of familiar devices, " straw 
bids," " unbalanced bids," " expedited service," etc., if 
not of corrupt influences on subordinates in the depart- 
ment, by which devices shrewd men take advantage of 
inefficient public officers.^ Barry refused to answer 
some of the questions put to him, and, after the fashion 
of the time, published an "Appeal to the American 
People," * instead. Brown resigned in an official docu- 
ment, imitated apparently from Van Buren's resignation 
of 1831.'* He also published an " Appeal," etc. Jack- 
Bon selected Kendall for Barry's successor. May 1, 1835. 
Kendall's administrative ability was great, and he 
Bpeediiy reorganized the department, and restored its 
efiiciency. There was great doubt, however, when he 
. was appointed, whether he woidd be confirmed. Barry 
was sent as minister to Spain, but died on his way 
thither. 

The emancipation of the slaves in the British West 
Indies in 1833 gave a great impulse in the United 

1 See pa^e 377. * 47 Niles, 381, 393. 

8 46 Niles. 338. * 47 Niles. 39f/. 



350 ANDREW JACKSON. 

States to abolition sentiment and effort, which had not 
been active since the comjDromise of 1820 was adopted 
The new spirit was manifested in the organization of 
societies, distribution of pamphlets and newspapers, peti- 
tions to Congress to abolish slavery in the District of 
Columbia, and other forms of agitation. The first 
efforts of this kind were frowned down all over the 
North, but the general movement grew. The senti- 
ments of democracy and of religion were both against 
slavery, and every step which was taken to arrest the 
agitation — the gag law in Congress, by which peti- 
tions about slavery were practically shut out, and the 
mob violence wliich was employed against the agitators 
— only strengthened it. Towards the end of Jackson's 
second administration the antislavery agitation was a 
real growing movement, and an element in the social 
and civil life of the nation. The story of these things 
has been often told in detail, and may be passed over 
here. The history of the United States has, in fact, 
been studied by the present generation chiefly with re- 
gard to the slavery question. Jackson's administration 
was not called upon to act on the slavery issue save in 
one or two points. 

The abolition societies adopted the policy of sending 
documents, papers, and pictures against slavery to the 
Southern States. If the intention was, as was charged, 
to incite the slaves to revolt, the device, as it seems to 
us now, must have fallen far short of its object, for the 
chance that anything could get from the post-office into 
the hands of a black man, without going through the 
hands of a wliite man, was poor indeed. These publica 
tions, however, caused a panic and a wild indignation in 
the South. The postmaster at Charleston, being lee* 



KENDALL'S ORDER ABOUT THE MAILS. 351 

ared by the people there on his duty, turned to tlie 
Postmaster-General for orders. August 4, 1835, Ken- 
dall gave an ambiguous reply, so far as orders were 
concerned. He, however, threw the postmaster on his 
own discretion, and then said for liimself, " By no act 
or direction of mine, official or private, could I be in- 
duced to aid, knowingly, in giving circulation to papers 
of this description, directly or indirectly " (i. e., papers 
alleged by the postmaster to be " the most inflamma- 
tory and incendiary, and insurrectionary to the last 
degree "). " We owe an obligation to the laws, but a 
higher one to the communities in which we live, and, if 
the former be perverted to destroy the latter, it is pa- 
triotism to disregard them. Entertaining these views, 
I cannot sanction, and will not condemn, the step you 
have taken " [in refusing to deliver certain mail-matter]. 
August 22d Kendall wrote a long letter to Gouverneur, 
postmaster at New York, elaborating and defending his 
position.^ Politics were already combined with the 
slavery question in this incident. Kendall's confirma- 
tion by the Senate was very doubtful, and Van Buren's 
Southern support was ready to abandon him at a mo- 
ment's notice if slavery came into account. Kendall 
won enough Southern votes to carry his confirmation. 

When J. Q. Adams, in 1819, was negotiating with 
the Spanish minister the treaty by which the western 
boundary of the United States was defined, he could get 
no encouragement from Monroe or any of his ministers 
to try to push the boundary westwards.^ Monroe ap- 
peared to think the United States would be weakened 
by including territory west of the Sabine.* It was not 
Jong, however, before the Southern slave-holding in 

» 49 Niles. 8. 2 gee page 67 » U Adama 348. 



352 ANDREW JACKSON. 

terest began to see the error of this view of the matter 
After the Missouri Compromise was adopted, it appeared 
that wild land for the formation of new free States was 
owned north of that line from the Mississippi to the 
Pacific, while south of that line similar land, available 
for new slave States, extended only to the Sabine and 
the 100 degree meridian. Only a few persons, however, 
as yet perceived this view of the matter. In 1819 (June 
23d), one James Long proclaimed the independence of 
Texas.^ In 1821 Austin colonized three hundred famil- 
ies in Texas, by permission of Mexico. In 1826 some 
American immigrants at Nacogdoches declared Texas 
independent. In 1824 the Emperor of Russia tried to 
establish exclusive control over the Northern Pacific, 
and the attention of the most far-seeing statesmen was 
drawn to the interests of the United States in the North- 
west and on the Pacific. It seems necessary to bear in 
mind, all through the history of the annexation of Texas, 
the connection of that question with the acquisition of 
California, including the port of San Francisco, which 
was then the chief reason for wanting California. 
Adams, when President (1827), sent to Poinsett, min- 
ister of the United States in Mexico, orders to try to 
buy Texas for a million dollars. Poinsett did not 
make the attempt. He gave as his reason the danger 
of irritating Mexico by a proposition which was sure to 
be rejected."^ 

In 1824 Mexico took the first steps towards the aboli- 
tion of slavery. By a decree of September 15, 1829 

1 17 Niles, 31 ; Jay. 

2 The attempt to buy Texas seems to have been Clay's act 
C£. 7 Adams, 239, 240; 9 Adams, 379; especially 11 Adams 
948. 



SLAVERY IN TEXAS. 853 

slavery was definitively abolished. In the mean time, 
A-mericans had emigrated to Texas, chiefly from the 
Southern States, and had taken slaves thither. They 
resisted the abolition decree, and the Mexican govern- 
ment saw itself forced to except the State of Texas 
from the decree. It, however, united Texas with Coa- 
huila, as a means of holding the foreign and insubor- 
dinate settlers in check. The abolition of slavery by 
Mexico affected the Southern States doubly : first, it 
lessened the area open to slavery ; second, it put a free 
State on the flank and rear of the slave territory. The 
interest of the Southwestern States in the independence 
of Texas, or its annexation, was at once aroused. A 
fanciful doctrine, in the taste of the Southwestern states- 
men, was immediately invented to give a basis for 
stump-speaking in defence of a real act of violence. It 
was declared that the United States must RE-annex what 
had once been maliciously given away by a Northern 
statesman. The gravity and care with which re-annex- 
ation was talked about had its parallel only in the 
theatrical legislation of nullification. In 1780 Spain 
claimed that the eastern boundary of Louisiana was such 
as to include nearly all the present State of Alabama, 
and the Hiawasee, Tennessee, Clinch, and Cumberland 
rivers through what is now Tennessee and Kentucky.^ 
Inside of this claim she would take what she could get. 
The boundaries to the westward were still more vague. 
Therefore, any one who chose to dabble In the author- 
ities could prove anytliing he liked, and think himself 
no contemptible scholar into the bargain. " Texas," as 
ft State of fhe Mexican confederation, embraced only 

1 Ramsey, 523 
88 



354 ANDREW JACKSON. 

the southeastern corner of the territory now included 
in the State of that name.^ 

In the summer of 1829 Van Buren sent instructions 
to Poinsett to try to buy Texas, and five million dollars 
were offered for it. In 1830 Mexico, which had at first 
welcomed the immigrants, forbade Americans to settle 
in Texas. Of course this law had no effect. 

We are indebted to a Dr. Mayo, who was a hanger-on 
at Washington during Jackson's time, for a little book 
in which most of the Texas intrigue is laid bare. Mayo 
was in the way of picking up certain information, and 
more came to him by accident. He gives also many 
documents. He was intimate with ex-Governor Samuel 
Houston, of Tennessee, an old companion in arms of 
Jackson, who came to Washington in 1829 to get Jack- 
son's connivance at an enterprise which Houston had 
in mind for revolutionizing Texas. That Jackson did 
connive at this enterprise, just as he supposed Monroe 
connived at his own proceedings in Florida, cannot be 
established by proof, but it is sustained by very strong 
inference.^ 

April 5, 1832, two treaties with Mexico were pub- 
lished, — one of commerce and one of boundaries, — 
confirming the boundary of the Florida treaty. 

In 1833 a revolution broke out in Mexico, which 
threw the whole country into anarchy, Texas witli th«^ 
rest. Santa Anna gradually established his authority. 

1 Carey & -Lea's Atlas, 1822. Cf. Carey's map of 18U, on 
which Texas aeems to be delineated as extending from the Nue- 
ces to the Sabine. 

2 See 11 Adams, 41, 347, 357, 363; and his fifteen Day 
Speech, of June, 1838. Wise {Decades, 148), affirms it very pos. 
itively. • He is better authority on this point than on some other* ^^, 
about which he is very positive, e.g., the Adams-Clay bargain. 



INDEPENDENCE OF TEXAS. 35o 

In the autumn of 1835 he tried to extend it over 
Texas, but he met with armed resistance, and was de- 
feated. In July, 1835, Jackson authorized an offer of 
an additional half million dollars if Mexico would allo'.v 
the boundary, after the cession of Texas, to follow tlu 
Rio Grande up to the thirty-seventh degree, and then 
pun on that parallel to the Pacific.^ All propositions 
to purchase failed. After the Texans proved able to 
beat the Mexicans in battle, no further propositions of 
that kind were made. 

March 2, 1836, a Declaration of Independence, on 
behalf of Texas, was adopted. March 6th the fort of 
the Alamo was taken by the Mexicans, and its de- 
fenders massacred. On the 27th Colonels Fannin and 
Ward, with other Texan (or American) prisoners, were 
massacred. On the 17th of March the Constitution of 
Texas was adopted. It contained the strongest pro- 
visions in favor of slavery. The massacres aroused 
great indignation in the Southwest, and hundreds of 
adventurers hastened to Texas, where Houston was now 
chief in command, to help him win independence.^ The 
decisive battle was fought at San Jacinto April 21st, 
when Santa Anna was routed and captured. He prom- 
ised everything in captivity, but cancelled his promises 
after he was released. In June, 1836, Judge Catron 
wTote to Webster, from Tennessee, that the spirit was 
abroad tlu'ough the whole Mississippi Valley to march 
to Texas.* Perhaps the disposition to march was not 
BO strong elsewhere, but immense speculations in land 
had abeady been organized, and great speculations in 

1 11 Adams, 362. ^ Jay, 28. 

* 1 Webster's Correspondence, 523. 



356 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Texan ^ socui-ities soon after began, which enlisted the 
pecuniary interests of great numbers of people in the 
independence of Texas. 

A correspondence now began between the representa- 
tives of the governments of the United States and 
Mexico, which no American ought to read without 
shame. It would be hard to find an equally gross in- 
stance of bullying on the part of a large State towards a 
small one. Jackson had ordered that General Gaines 
shoukl enter the territory of Texas, and march to 
Nacogdoches, if he thought there was any danger of 
hostilities on the part of the Indians, and if there was 
suspicion that the Mexican general was stirring up the 
Indians to war on the United States. Here we have 
another reminiscence of Florida revived. Gaines under- 
stood his orders, and entered the Mexican territory. 
Understanding also, no doubt, that the Jacksonian pro- 
ceedings of 1818 had now been legitimized as the cor- 
rect American line of procedure for a military officer, 
he called on the governors of the neighboring States for 
militia. Although companies were forming and march- 
ing to Texas under full organization, this " call " was 
overruled by the War Department. The energetic re- 
monstrances of the Mexican minister finally led to an 
>rder to Gaines to retire from Texan territory, not, 
jiowever, until after the Mexican minister had broken 
off di})lomatic relations. 

In July, 1836, both Houses voted, the Senate unani- 
mously, that the independence of Texas ought to be 
acknowledged as soon as Texas had proved that she 

The first issue of Texan bonds was authorized in Noveml)e? 
1336. The first Treasury notes were issued November 1, 1837 
f Gouge 'b Texas, 57, 71.) 



DEFINITION OF " TEXAS. " 357 

toiild maintain it. Texas was already represented by 
agents applying for annexation. Jackson recommended 
longer delay in a message of December 21, 1836. The 
fact was that the geographical definition of " Texas " 
was not yet satisfactorily established, and it was not de- 
sirable to have annexation settled too soon. An act 
was passed by the Legislature of Texas, December 19, 
1836, by which the Rio Grande was declared to be the 
western boundary of Texas. In liis message of Decem- 
ber 22d Jackson submitted the report of his agent that 
the boundaries of Texas, before the last revolution, were 
the Nueces, the Red, and the Sabine rivers, but that 
Bhe now claimed as her boundary the Rio del Norte to 
its source, and from that point eastward and south- 
ward the existing boundary of the United States.^ That 
is as if Maine should secede and claim that her boun- 
daries were the Alleghanies and the Potomac. Jackson's 
message distinctly pointed out that in taking Texas then, 
or later, the United States would take her with her new 
boundary claims. That is as if Maine should join the 
Dominion of Canada, and P^ngland should set up a claim 
to the New England and Middle States based on the 
" declaration " of Maine above supposed. The policy 
was to keep the Texas question open until California 
eould be obtained. The Mexican war ultimately be- 
icame necessary for that purpose, and for no other ; for 
Texas, even to the Rio Grande, could have been ob- 
tained without it.^ Another reason for delay was that 
opposition to the annexation of Texas had been aroused 
in the North, and there was not }A strength enough to 
carry it. May 25, 1836, Adams ^ mad« a speech against 

1 Doc'unieut L. 

2 3 Von Hoist, 67, 81, 103, 108, 112; Jay, 130 

« 50 Niles. 276 



358 ANDREW JACKSON 

a war with Mexico to conquer Texas, which had great 
influence in the North. 

March 1, 1837, the Senate recognized the indepen- 
dence of Texas, 23 to 19. The House did not concur in 
full form, but in effect. 

In 1836 the government of the United States opened 
a new battery against that of Mexico in the shape of a 
series of claims and charges. The diplomatic agent of 
the former power, Powhatan Ellis, performed his duties 
in such a rude and peremptory manner that one is forced 
to suspect that he acted by orders, especially as his 
rank was only that of charge d'affaires. The charges 
were at first 15 in number, then 46, then 57. They 
were frivolous and forced, and bear the character of at- 
tempts to make a quarrel.^ Ellis abruptly came home. 
In August, 1837, the agent of Texas, Memucan Hunt, 
made a formal proposal for annexation. Van Buren 
declined it. Mexico next proposed a new negotiation 
with arbitration in regard to the claims and charges 
made against her by the United States. The opposition 
to annexation in the North had grown so strong that de- 
lay was necessary, and negotiations were opened which 
resulted in the convention of August 17, 1840. Mexico 
i',ould not fulfil the engagements she entered into in that 
treaty, or in a subsequent one of 1843, and so the ques- 
tion was reopened, and finally was manceuvred into a 
war. It appears that Van Buren had the feeling which 
any President will be sure to have, adverse to any war 
during his administration. The Mexican war was forced 
wn by a cabinet intrigue, and Tyler forced it on Polk. 

The Texas intrigue and the Mexican war were full of 
facksonian acts and principles. There are constai^ 

1 Jay, 36 fg. 



BRISCOE vs. BANK OF KENTUCKY. 359 

•utcroppiugs of the old Seminole war proceedings and 
ioctvines. The army and navy were corrupted by 
swagger and insubordination, and by the anxiety of the 
office/s to win popularity by the methods of which Jack- 
Bon had set the example.^ The filibustering spirit, one 
!aw for ourselves and another for every one else, gained 
a popularity for which Jackson was much to blame. 
During the Texas intrigue Jackson engaged in private 
and personal correspondence on public questions with 
diplomatic agents, who were not always accredited, after 
the fashion of Louis XV. in the King's Secret.^ His 
" spirited diplomacy " was reduced to a farce when two 
Buch men as Polk and Buchanan tried to employ it in 
ihe Oregon question. 

In 1834 the case of Briscoe vs. The Bank of the Com- 
monwealth of Kentucky was argued before the Supreme 
Court.^ Briscoe and others gave a note, in 1830, 
which they did not pay at maturity. In the state Cir- 
cuit Court, Briscoe pleaded " no consideration," on the 
ground that the note was given for a loan of notes of 
the Bank of the Commonwealth, which were " bills of 
credit " within the prohibition of the Constitution, and 
therefore of no value. The state court found for the 
bank. The state Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. 
The case was carried to the Supreme Court of the 
United States on a writ of error. Tlie court consisted, 
m 1834, of Chief Justice Marshall, of Virginia, ap- 
pointed by Adams in 1801 ; and Associate Justices 

1 In 1824 Commodore Porter was g:uilty of an outrage at 
Foxardo, Porto Kico. When coiut-martiidled, he made an 
elaborate comparison of Vis jjroceediugs with those of Jackson io 
Florida, by way of defence. ^-1% Niles, 370., He was cashiered. 

a 11 Adams, 357. * 8 Peters, 118. 



800 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Johnson, of South Carolina, appointed by Jefferson in 
1804 ; Duvall, of Maryland, appointed by Madison in 
1811 ; Story, of Massachusetts, appointed in the same 
year by the same ; Thompson, of New York, appointed 
by Monroe in 1823 ; McLean, of Ohio, appointed by Jack- 
Bon in 1829 ; and Baldwin, of Pennsylvania, appointed 
by Jackson in 1830. Johnson was absent all the term. 
Duvall was absent part of the term. Of the five who 
heard the argument in Briscoe's case, a majority thought 
that the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth were 
bills of credit under the decision in Craig vs. Missouri,' 
but there were not four, a majority of the whole, who 
concurred in this opinion. The rule of the court was 
not to pronounce a state law invalid for unconstitution- 
ality unless a majority of the whole court should concur. 
Hence no decision was rendered. 

The Circuit Court of Mercer County, Kentucky, de- 
cided in 1834, under the decision in Craig vs. Missouri, 
that the notes of the Bank of the Commonwealth were 
bills of credit.^ 

Judge Johnson died in 1834. Duvall resigned in 
January, 1835. Wayne took his seat January 14, 1835. 
Hence there was one vacancy in 1835, and Briscoe^s 
case went over. Marshall died July 6, 1835. In 1836 
there were only five judges on the bench of the court. 
Taney was confirmed March 15, 1836. P. P. Barbour, 
of Virginia, was confirmed on the same day. This made 
the court complete again. Three changes had taken 
place since 1834, and five of the seven judges were now 
Jackson's appointees. 

Briscoe vs. The Bank was decided in January, 1837 
Vhe decision was by McLean. It was held that a bil 

1 See page 135. - « 46 Niles, 210. 



DEFINITION OF BILLS OF CREDIT. 361 

df credit " is a pajier issued by the sovereign power, 
containing a pledge of its faith and designed to circulate 
Rs money." Notes, to be bills of credit, nuist be issued 
by the State and bind the faith of the State. Coniniis- 
Bioners of issue must not impart any credit by signature, 
nor be resj)onsible. Hence it was held that the notes of 
the Bank of the Commonwealth were not bills of credit. 
Story rendered a very strong and unusually eager dis- 
senting opinion. In it he gave a summary history and 
analysis of " bills of credit " as they existed before the 
Revolution, and as they were understood by the Consti- 
tution-makers. He explicitly referred to the former 
hearing of the case, and said that Marshall had been 
in the majority against the constitutionality of the is- 
sues. 

The decision in Briscoe's case marks the beginning of 
«, new era in the history of the constitutional law of the 
United States. Up to that time the court had not 
failed to pursue the organic development of the Consti- 
tution, and it had, on every occasion on wliich it was 
put to the test, proved the bulwark of constitutional 
liberty, by the steadiness and solidity of judgment with 
which it had established the interpretation of the Con- 
stitution. Our children are familiarized, in their school- 
books, with the names of statesmen and generals, and 
popular tradition carries forward the fame of men who 
have been conspicuous in public life ; but no one who 
really knows how the national life of the United States 
has developed vs^ill dispute the assertion that no man can 
be named to whom the nation is more indebted for solid 
and far-reaching services than it is to John Marshall. 
The proceedings of the Supreme Court are almost always 
overlooked in ordinary narrations of liistory, but he who 



362 AND HI: n' JACKSON. 

looks for real construction or growth in the institutioas 
of the country should look to those proceedings first oi 
all. Especially in the midst of a surging democracy, 
exposed to the chicane of political mountebanks and 
the devices of interested cliques, the firmness and cor- 
rectness with which the court had held its course on 
behalf of constitutional liberty and order had been of 
inestimable value to the nation. The series of great 
constitutional decisions, to which reference has been 
made in the preceding pages, have now entered into 
the commonplaces of our law. They have been tested 
through three quarters of a century. To see in the ret- 
rospect that they were wise, and that the contrary decis- 
ions would have produced mischief, is one thing ; to see 
at the time, in the heat of controversy and under the 
clamor of interests, what was the sound and correct in- 
terpretation, and to pronounce it in spite of abuse, was 
another thing. 

In Briscoe's case the court broke the line of its de- 
cisions, and made the prohibition of bills of credit 
nugatory.^ If the degree of responsibility and inde- 
pendent authority which the directors of the Bank of 
the Commonwealth of Kentucky possessed, and the 
amount of credit they gave to the notes aside from the 
credit of the State, was sufficient to put those notes out- 
side the prohibition of the Constitution, then no State 
could find any difficulty in making a device for escaping 
the constitutional prohibition. Wild-cat banking was 
granted standing ground under the Constitution, and the 

1 "A virtual and incideutal enforcement of the depreciated 
notes of the state banks, by their crowding out a sound medium 
fchoxioh a great evil, was not foreseen." (Madison to C. J. Ingei 
•oil, February 22, 1831 ; 4 Elliott, 641.) 



EFFECT ON THE COURT. 36 S 

boast that tlie Constitutional Convention had closed and 
barred the door against the paper money with which the 
colonies had been cursed was without foundation. The 
great " hanks " set up by the southwestern States be- 
tween 1835 and 1837 were protected by this decision. 
They went on their course, and carried those States 
down to banla^uptcy and repudiation. The wild-cat 
banking which devastated the Ohio States between 1837 
and 1860, and miseducated the people of those States 
until they thought irredeemable government issues an 
unhoped-for blessing, never could have existed if Story's 
opinion had been law. The legal-tender notes of 1862 
and the decisions of the Supreme Court on the constitu- 
tionality of the legal-tender act must have borne an 
entirely different color, if Marshall's opinion had pre- 
vailed in Briscoe's case. 

Jackson's appointments introduced the mode of action 
by the Executive, through the selection of the judges, 
on the interpretation of the Constitution by the Supremti 
Court. Briscoe's case marked the victory of Kentucky 
relief finance and state-rights politics over the judiciary. 
The effect of 23olitical appointments to the bench is al- 
ways traceable, after two or three years, in the reports, 
which come to read like a collection of old stump 
speeches. The climax of the tendency which Jackson 
inaugurated was reached when the court went to pieces 
on the Dred Scott case, trying to reach a decision 
which should be politically expedient, rather than one 
which should be legally sound. A later and similar 
instance is furnished by the legal-tender cases. As for 
the immediate effect of Jackson s appointments, it may 
06 most decorously stated by quoting from Story's 
reasons, in 1845, for proposing to resign : " I have been 



?64: ANDREW JACKSON. 

long convinced that the doctrines and opinions of the 
old court were daily losing ground, and especially those 
on great constitutional questions. New men and new 
opinions have succeeded. The doctrines of the Consti- 
tution, so vital to the country, which, in former times, 
received the support of the whole court, no longer main- 
tain their ascendency. I am the last member now 
living of the old court, and I cannot consent to remain 
where I can no longer hope to see those doctrines 
recognized and enforced." ^ 

Dui'ing Jackson's second term the growth of the 
nation in wealth and prosperity was very great. It is 
plain, from the history we have been pursuing, in spite 
of all the pettiness and provincialism which marked 
political controversies, that the civil life of the nation 
was growing wider and richer. It was just because 
there was an immeasurable source of national life in the 
physical circumstances and in the energy of the people 
that the political follies and abuses could be endured. 
If the politicians and statesmen would only let the 
nation alone it would go on, not only prosperously, but 
smoothly ; that is why the non-interference dogma of the 
democrats, which the whigs denounced as non-govern- 
jaent, was in fact the highest political wisdom. On re- 
flection it will not be found strange that the period 1829 
to 1837 should have been marked by a great deal of 
violence and turbulence. It is not possible that a grow- 
ing nation should spread over new territory, and feel 
the thrill of its own young energies contending success- 
fully with nature in all her rude force, without social 
commotions and a certain recklessness and uproar. The 
'contagion of these forms of disorder produces other and 
1 2 Story's Story, 527. 



VIOLENCE. 365 

less excusable forms. On account of the allowance to 
be made for violence and lawlessness under the circum- 
stances, and also on account of the disagreeableness of 
recalling, if it can be avoided, old follies, no recapitu- 
lation of the outrages, mobs, riots, etc., of the period will 
here be attempted. Suffice it to say that they were 
worse and more numerous than either before or since. 
Brawls and duels between congressmen, and assaults on 
congressmen by persons who considered themselves ag 
grieved by words spoken in debate, were very frequent 
at Washington. The cities possessed, as yet, no police. 
The proposition to introduce police was resented as an 
assault on liberty. Rowdies, native Americans, protest- 
ants, firemen, anti-abolitionists, trades-unionists, anti- 
bank men, etc«, etc., in turn produced riots in the streets 
of the great Eastern cities. From the South came 
hideous stories of burning negroes, hanging abolition- 
ists, and less heinous violence against the mails. From 
Charlestown, Massachusetts, came the story of the cruel 
burning of a convent. Niles, in August, 1835, gathered 
three pages of reports of recent outrages against law and 
order.^ A month later he has another catalogue, and 
he exclaims in astonishment that the world seems upside 
down.^ The fashion of the time seemed to be to pass at 
once from the feeling to the act. That Jackson's char- 
acter and example had done something to set this 
fashion is hardly to be denied. Harriet Martineau and 
Richard Cobden, both friendly critics, were shocked and 
disappointed at the social condition. Adams, in 1834, 
wi-ote thus: "The prosperity of the coantry, indepen- 
de/it of all agency of the government, is so great that the 
people have nothing to disturb them but their own way- 
1 48 NUes, 439. ^ 49 Nilea, 49. 



366 ANDREW JACKSON. 

wardness and corruption. They quarrel upon dissen? 
Bions of a doit, and split up in gangs of partisans of A, 
B, and C, without knowing why they prefer one to 
another. Caucuses, county, state, and national conven- 
tions, public dinners and dinner-table speeches, two or 
three hours long, constitute the ojierative power of 
electioneering ; and the jiarties are of working men, 
temperance reformers, anti-masons, Union and state- 
rights men, nullifiers, and, above all, Jackson men, Van 
Buren men, Clay men, Calhoun men, Webster men, 
and McLean men, wliigs and tories, republicans and 
democrats, without one ounce of honest principle to 
choose between them." ^ In his long catalogue he yet 
omitted abolitionists and native Americans, the latter of 
whom began to be heard of as soon as foreign immigra- 
tion became great. Great parties did not organize on 
the important political questions. Men were led off on 
some petty side issue, or they attached themselves to a 
great man, with whom they hoped to come to power. 
The zeal of these little cliques was astonishing. One 
feels that there must have been a desire to say to them : 
No doubt the thing you have taken up as your hobby is 
fairly important, but why get so excited about it, and 
why not pursue your reformatory and philanthropic 
*vork outside of politics ? Why not go about your pro- 
posed improvement soberly and in due measure ? The 
truth was that nearly all the cliques wanted to reach 
their object by the short cut of legislation, that is, to 
force other people to do what they were convinced it 
was a wise thing to do, and a great many of them also 
wanted to make political capital out of their " causes.'' 
There was something provincial about the gossip an^ 
1 9 Adams, 187. 



ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF JACKSON. 307 

Dews-mongering over small things, and about the dm- 
ners and ovations to fourth-rate men. One wonders if 
the people had not enough interesting things to occujw 
them. Thev could not have been very busy or hard- 
worked, if they had time to spend on all these things. 
There was something bombastic, too, about the way in 
which an orator took up a trifle. Everything in the 
surroundings forced him to be inflated and meretricious, 
in order to swell up to the dimensions of the occasion 
the trifle with which he was forced to deal. At the 
same time serious things, like nullification, were treated 
by the same inflated method, which made them ridicu- 
lous. On every occasion of general interest the peo- 
ple ran together for a public meeting. Their method 
of doing their thinking on any topic seemed to be to 
hear some speeches about it. No doubt this was onc^ 
reason why there was so much heat mixed up with all 
opinions. 

The prevailing disposition to boast, and the over- 
sensitiveness to foreign criticism which was manifested, 
were additional symptoms of immaturity. 

January 30, 1835,^ Jackson attended the funeral, at 
the Capitol, of Warren R. Davis, of South Carolina. 
As he came out through the rotunda, a man named 
Richard Lawrence snapped two pistols in succession at 
him. Neither was discharged. Lawrence gave half a 
dozen inconsistent reasons for the act. He was plainly 
insane. Jackson immediately gave the attack a political 
significance. Some days after it occurred Harriet Mar- 
tineau called upon him, and referred to the " insane at- 
tempt." " He protested, in the presence of many 
strangers, that there was no i'lsanity m the case. I was 
1 47 Niles, 340. 



ftfiS ANDREW JACKSON. 

silent, of course. He protested that there was a plot, 
and tliat the man was a tool." ^ He went so far as to 
name Senator Poindexter, of Mississippi, as the insti- 
gator. He was at feud with Poindexter, although the 
latter had been with him at New Orleans, and had de- 
fended him in Congress in the Seminole war afEair. 
Harriet Martineau says it was expected at Washington 
that they would have a duel as soon as Jackson's term 
was out. Tliis was probably based on a reputed speech 
of Poindexter, to which the " Globe " gave currency.^ 
That paper, nearly a month after the attempted assassina- 
tion, treated the charge against Poindexter as not at all 
incredible. Poindexter obtained an investigation by the 
Senate, when the charge was, of course, easily proven to 
rest upon the most frivolous and untrustworthy asser- 
tions, no one of which would bear the slightest exami- 
nation, and some of which were distinctly false. The 
incident, however, illustrated one trait of Jackson's char- 
acter, which has been noted several times before. The 
most extravagant and baseless suspicion of a personal 
enemy in connection with an injury to himself struck his 
mind with such a degree of self-evident truth that ex- 
ternal evidence to the contrary had no influence on him. 
In the present case, this fault laid him open to a charge 
of encouraging persons who had committed perjury and 
suborned others to do so. Lawrence, on his trial, con- 
tinually interrupted the proceedings. He was acquitted 
ind remanded to custody as an insane person. 

A faction arose in New York city in 1834—35, whick 

1 1 Martineau, Western Travel, 102. She was in the Capita 
wrhen the attack occurred. 
« 48 Niles, 33. 



THE EQUAL RIGHTS PARTY. 369 

called itself the " equal rights party," or the '' Jeffer- 
Bonian anti-monopolists." The organization of the 
Tammany Hall democrats, mider Van Buren and the 
regency, had become rigid and tyrannical. The equal 
rights faction revolted, and declared that Tammany 
was aristocratic. They represented a new upheaval of 
democracy. They took literally the dogmas which had 
been taught them, just as the original Jackson men had- 
done ten years before, only that now, to them, the Jack- 
son party seated in power seemed to have drifted away 
from the pure principles of democracy, just as Monroe 
had once appeared to the Jackson men to have done. 
The equal rights men wanted " to return to the Jeffer- 
sonian fountain " again, and make some new deductions. 
They revived and extended the old doctrines which 
Duane, of the "Aurora," taught at the beginning of the 
century in his " Politics for Farmers," and similar 
pamphlets. In general the doctrines and propositions 
might be described as an attempt to apply the procedure 
of a township democracy to a great state. The equal 
rights men held meetings at first secretly, at four differ- 
ent places, and not more than two successive times at 
the same place.^ They were, in a party point of view, 
conspirators, rebels, — " disorganizers, " in short ; and 
they were plotting the highest crime known to the polit- 
ical code in which they had been educated, and which 
they accepted. Their platform was : No distinction be- 
tween men save merit ; gold and silver the only legiti- 
mate and proper circulating medium ; no perpetuities 
or monopolies ; strict construction of the Constitution ; 
no bank charters by States (because oanks of issue 
favor gambling, and are " calculated ta build up and 
1 Byrdsall, 16. 
24 



370 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Btrengthen in our country the odious distribution ol 
wealth and power against merits and equal rights ") ; 
approval of Jackson's administration ; election of Presi- 
dent by direct popular vote. They favored the doc- 
trine of instructions. They also advocated free trade 
and direct taxes.^ They had some very sincere and 
pure-minded men among them, a large number of over- 
heated brains, and a still larger number of demagogues, 
who were seeking to organize the faction as a means of 
making themselves so valuable that the regular managers 
would buy them. The equal rights men gained strength 
BO rapidly that, on the 29th of October, 1835, they were 
able to offer battle to the old faction at a primary meet- 
ing in Tammany Hall for the nomination of a con- 
gressman and other officers. The '' regular " party 
entered the hall by the back entrance, and organized 
the meeting before the doors were opened. The anti- 
mono})olists poured in, nominated a chairman and 
elected him, ignoring the previous organization. The 
question of " equal rights " between the two chairmen 
was then settled in the old original method which has 
prevailed ever since there has been life on earth. The 
equal rights men dispossessed the other faction, and 
BO proved the justice of their principles. The non- 
equal rights party then left the hall, but they " caused " 
the equal rights men " to be subjected to a deprivation 
of the right " to light by turning out the gas. The 
equal rights men were thus forced to test that theory 
of natural rights which affii-ms that said rights are 
only the chance to have good things, if one can get them. 
In spite of their dogma of the equality of all men, whick 
w^ould make a prudent man no better than a careless 
1 Bvrdsall, 103. 



THE ''LOCO-FOCOS." 371 

Dne, and a man with capital no better than one without 
itapital, the equal rights men had foreseen the emer- 
gency, and had provided themselves with capital in the 
shape of candles and loco-foco matches. They thus 
established their right to light, against nature and 
against their enemies. They duly adopted their plat- 
form, nominated a ticket, and adjourned. The regular 
leaders met elsewhere, nominated the ticket wliich they 
had previously prepared, and dispensed, for that occa^ 
sion, with the ornamental and ceremonious formality of 
a primary meeting to nominate it. 

On the next day the " Courier and Enquirer " dubbed 
the equal rights party the loco-focos, and the name 
clung to them.^ Hammond quotes a correspondent ^ 
who correctly declared that " the working-men's party 
and the equal rights party have operated as causes, 
producing effects that will shape the course of the two 
great parties of the United States, and consequently 
the destinies of this great rei^ublic." The faction, at 
least in its better elements, evidently had convictions 
and a j^rogramme. It continued to grow. The " Even- 
ing Post " became its organ. That paper quarrelled 
with the administration on Kendall's order about the 
mails, and was thereupon formally read out of the party 
by the " Globe/' ^ The loco-focos ceased to be a re- 
volting faction. They acquired belligerent rights. The 
faction, however, in its internal economy ran the course 
of all factions. It went to extremes, and then began 
to split up. In January 1836, it declared its indepen- 
dence of the democratic-republican party. This alienated 
j,U who hated the party tyranny, but who wanted re- 

1 49 Niles, 162. '^ 2 Hammond, 503. 

« 49 Kiles, 78. 



372 ANDREW JACKSON. 

form in the party. The faction declared itself opposed 
to all acts of incorporation, and held that all such acta 
were repealable. It declared that representative insti- 
tutions were only a practical convenience, and that 
Legislatures could not create vested rights.^ Then it 
went on to adopt a platform of " equality of position, as 
well as of rights." 

In October, 1836, Tammany made overtures to the 
equal rights men for a reunion, in preparation for the 
presidential election. Some of the loco-focos wanted 
to unite ; others refused. The latter were the men of 
conviction ; the former were the traders. The former 
called the latter " rumps ; " the latter called the former 
" buffaloes." ^ Only one stage now remained to com- 
plete the old and oft-repeated drama of faction. A 
man named Slamm, a blatant ignoramus, who, to his 
great joy, had been arrested by order of the Assembly 
of New York for contempt and breach of privilege, 
and who had profited to the utmost by this incident 
to make a long " argument " against the " privilege " 
of an American Legislature, and to pose as a martyr 
to equal rights, secured his own election to the posi- 
tion of secretary of the equal rights party. He then 
secured a vote that no constitutional election could be 
held unless called by the secretary. He never would call 
one. There were those who thought that he sold out 
the party. 

Thus the faction perished ignominiously, but it was 
not without reason that its name passed, a little later, 
to the whole Jackson- Van Buren party ; i, e., to the rad 
«cal anti-paper currency, not simply anti-United States 
Bank, wing of the national democratic party. The 
1 Byrdsall, 41. 2 Byrdsall, 178. 



INFLUENCE OF THE LOCO-FOCOS. Zlo 

equal rights men maintained impracticable doctrines of 
civil authority and fantastic dogmas about equality, but 
when these were stripped away there remained in their 
platform sound doctrines and imperishable ideas. They 
first put the democratic party on the platform which for 
five or six years it had been trying to find. When it 
did find that platform it was most true to itself, and it 
contributed most to the welfare of the country. To- 
day the democratic party is, by tradition, a party of 
hard money, free trade, the non-interference theory of 
government, and no special legislation. If that tradi- 
tion be traced up to its source, it will lead back, not to 
the Jackson party of 1829, but to the loco-focos of 
1835 



CHAPTER XVI. 

SPHE ELECTION OF 1836. EXD OP JACKSON's CAREER. 

The attempt was made in 1834 to unite and organize 
the whole opposition to Jackson. Niles first mentions 
the party name "whig" in April, 1834.^ He says 
that it had come into use in Connecticut and New York. 
It was adopted with antagonistic reference to the high 
prerogative and (as alleged) tory doctrines of Jackson. 
The anti-masons and national republicans ultimately 
merged in the new whig party, but time was required 
to bring about that result. In 1834 it was impossible. 
The anti-masons insisted on acting indej^endently. Their 
candidate for President then was Francis Granger.^ 
Clay would not run in 1836 because he could not unite 
the opposition. He was disgusted with public life, and 
desired to retire.^ 

The administration party, on the other hand, was 
perfectly organized. The corps of federal office-holders 
had been drilled by the " Globe " into thorough disci- 
pline and perfect accord of energy and will. Each offi- 
cer was held to " revere the chief," and to act in obedi- 
ence to the indications of his will which came through 
the " Globe." They did so. There was no faltering. 
There was only zealous obedience. It caused some 
tewilderment to remember that this was the party which 
had denounced Adams for using the federal officers to 

» 46 Niles, 101. ^50 Niles 234. « 9 AdauuJ, 170. 



DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION— 1835. 375 

electioneer. Lewis had been known to interfere di- 
rectly in elections, and Blair had done the same in liis 
private capacity.^ The party had been wonderfully held 
together. In 1830 there were only four anti-»Jackson 
Legislatures in the Union, namely, Vermont, Massa- 
chusetts, Connecticut, and Delaware. In the six years 
from 1830 to 1835, both inclusive, twenty-seven States 
held 162 sessions of their Legislatures. Of these 116 
had Jackson majorities, 40 anti-»Jackson, and 4 Cal- 
houn.*^ There was some talk of a third term for Jack- 
eon, but it never grew strong. The precedents were 
cited against it. Jackson's bad health and Van Buren's 
aspirations were perhaps stronger objections. Adams 
says that Jackson had " wearied out the sordid subser- 
viency of his supporters." ^ That is not at all improb- 
able. 

The democratic convention was held at Baltimore, 
May 20, 1835. Jackson had written to Tennessee 
recommending that a convention should be held of 
" candidates fresh from the people." There were not 
wanting those who called this convention a caucus, and 
said that it was the old congressional monster in a new 
mask. Tennessee did not send any delegates. Even 
Jackson could not bring that State to support Van Bu- 
ren. Tennessee was a whig State until 1856. Her 
hostility to Van Buren was adroitly combined with that 
of Pennsylvania, in 1844, by the selection of Polk as a 
candidate, to defeat Van Bnrpn. In 1835 a caucus of 
the New Hampshire Legislature, which nominated Hill 
for Governor, passed a resolution begging Tennessee not 
to divide the party.'* Tennessee, however, had another 

1 40 Niles, 299. ^ 63 Niles, 308. 

8 9 Adams. 312. * ^ Niles. S22. 



876 ANDREW JACKSON. 

very popular candidate, Hugh L. White, a former friend 
of Jackson, whom Jackson now hated as a traitor and 
renegade.^ John Bell, the Speaker, was a supporter of 
White, and he and his friends claimed that they were 
not in opposition ; that they and White were good repub* 
licans, and that they preferred White to the man whom 
Jackson had selected.^ The " Globe " attacked Bell 
with bitterness. Jackson was gTcatly enraged, and ex- 
erted himself personally and directly against White.^ 
One Tennessee man, being in Baltimore when the con- 
vention was held, took upon himself to represent that 
State. His name was Rucker, and to "• ruckerize " 
passed into the political slang of the day, meaning to as- 
sume functions without credentials. 

The Baltimore convention was largely composed of 
office-holders. Twenty-one States were represented.* 
Andrew Stevenson, of Virginia, was chairman. The 
two-thirds rule was adopted, because Van Buren was 
sure of two tliirds. He actually got a unanimous vote, 
265. For Vice-President, R. M. Johnson, of Kentucky, 
got 178 votes; W. C Rives, of Virginia, 87. The 
Virginia delegation declared, on the floor of the con- 
vention, that Virginia would never vote for Johnson, be- 
cause he favored tariff, bank, and internal improve- 
ments, and because they had no confidence in his 
principles or character.^ Van Buren, in his letter of 
acceptance, ^ said that he had been mentioned as Jack- 
son's successor " more through the ill-will of opponents 
than the partiality of friends." That statement was 
?o adroit that it would take a page to tell whether !♦ 

1 See page 312. ^ Bell's speech in 48 Niles, 334. 

» 49 Niles, 35, * 48 Niles, 207, 227, 244. 

* 48 NUes, 248. « 48 Niles, 257. 



CANDIDATES AND PLATFORMS — 1836. 377 

was true or not. He made a full and eager declaration 
that lie had asked for no man's support. He said that 
he would " endeavor to tread generally in the footsteps 
of President Jackson, — happy if I shall be able to per- 
fect the work which he has so gloriously begun." 
Johnson, in his letter of acceptance,^ declared that he 
was opposed to the old bank, or to one like it, but 
thought that such a bank as Jackson talked of in his 
earliest messages might be a good thing. On tariflE and 
internal improvements he said that he agreed with 
Jackson. Van Buren was fifty-four years of age and 
Johnson fifty-six. Johnson had been in Congress ever 
since 1807, except during the second war with England, 
when he took the field. He served with some distinc- 
tion, but a ridiculous attempt to credit him with the kill- 
ing of Tecumseh has caused his real merits to be for- 
gotten. As a public man he managed to be as near as 
possible to the head of every popular movement, and to 
get his name connected with it, but he never contrib- 
uted assistance to any public business. His name is 
also met with frequently as a messenger, middle-man, 
manipulator, and general efficiency man of the Jackson 
party. He made a report, in 1829, on the question of 
running the mails on Sunday, which was one of his 
claims to fame. It was written for him by the Rev. O. 
B. Brown.^ A chance was found in tliis report to utter 
some noble sentiments on religious liberty, and to lay 
down some specification of American principles in that 
regard which were not likely to provoke contradiction. 
This valuable production was printed on cloth, and hung 
ap in stage offices and bar-rooms all o-er the country 

1 48 Niles, 329. 

« See page 349. Kendall's Autobiography^ 107. 



378 ANDREW JACKSON. 

Johnson had nourished presidential aspirations for some 
years. He did not abandon them till 1844. 

The anti-Jackson men, in 1834-35, were opposed, on 
principle, to a national convention. They said that 
the convention was King Caucus revived. The anti- 
masons held a state convention at Harrisburg, Decem- 
ber 16, 1835.^ It was decided not to call a national 
convention. They thought the free action of the people 
would be best brought out by state conventions. They 
nominated William H. Harrison by 89 votes to 29 for 
Webster and 3 for Granger. For Vice-President, 
Granger got 102 votes ; Hugh L. White, 5 ; William 
Slade, of Vermont, 5 ; and William A. Palmer, of Ver- 
mont, 7. The whigs of Pennsylvania adopted the nom- 
inations of the anti-masons, and coalesced with them. 
Webster was very anxious, at this time, to be nominated 
and supported by the whigs. It pleases some people to 
think that Webster ought not to have had this ambition. 
He was a strange compound of the greatest powers and 
some mean traits. To such a man the presidential am- 
bition is very sure to mean moral shipwreck. Still it 
was not wrong for Webster to want the insignia of suc- 
cess in his career. His dissatisfaction was well-founded 
when, after his splendid services, he saw William Henry 
Harrison preferred before him ; and it is a point which 
deserves careful attention, that, if Webster's just am- 
bition had been fairly gratified, he would have been a 
better man. He was nominated by the Legislature of 
Massachusetts. 

Hugh L. White, of Tennessee, was nominated by tlie 
Legislatures of Alabama, Tennessee, and Illinois. Judge 
McLean was nominated in Ohio. He had had presi 
' 49 Niles, 265, 287. 



ADMISSION OF MICHIGAN. 379 

dential aspirations ever since 1828.'^ The Northern 
wbigs supported Harrison, and the Southern -vvhig-s sup- 
ported White. Thus the opposition went into the cam- 
paign disorganized and devoted to defeat. 

Harrison and White were of the same age, sixty-three. 
Harrison was a man of no education. He had done 
some good service as an Indian fighter. The anti-Jack- 
son men, who had derided Jackson's candidature be- 
cause he was not a statesman, selected, in Harrison, the 
man nearest like him whom they could find. They 
hoped to work up a popularity for him on the model of 
Jackson's popularity.'* Harrison answered the anti- 
masons that he was not a mason, and did not like 
masonry, but that the federal government had nothing 
to do with that subject. This did not satisfy Thaddeus 
Stevens, who wanted Webster.^ White has been men- 
tioned several times. He had a fair education, a good 
character, and was very much respected, but he was a 
man of only ordinary ability. 

During the winter of 1835-36 there was a great strug- 
gle in the House over a contested election in North Car- 
olina. It was thought very probable that the presiden- 
tial election might be thrown into the House, and the 
vote of North Carolina might decide the result. The 
sitting member (Graham) was unseated, and the case was 
referred back for a new election. 

There were two States whose admission was pending 
when the election approached, — Arkansas and Michi- 
gan. In 1835 Michigan became involved in a boundary 

1 Kendall's Autobiography, 304. 

2 For an estimate of Harrison, written in 1828, which is per- 
haps too highly colored to quote, see 7 Adams, 530. 

>^9 Adams, 273. 



880 ANDREW JACKSON. 

dispute with Ohio. The act which organized the teni 
toiy of Michigan, January 11, 1805, described, as its 
Bouthern boundary, a due east and west line running 
through the southernmost point of Lake Michigan. The 
Constitution of Ohio gave that State, as its northern 
boundary, a line drawn from the southernmost point of 
Lake Michigan to the northernmost cape of Maumee 
Bay. Indiana's northern boundary had been described 
as a due east and west line ten miles north of the 
southernmost point of Lake Michigan. The northern 
boundary of Illinois had been placed on the parallel of 
42° 30'. Michigan, therefore, found her territory re- 
duced. Jackson, at first, on the advice of Butler, the 
Attorney-General, took the side of Michigan. The peo- 
ple of Michigan held a convention in September, 1835, 
and framed a Constitution, which was to go into effect in 
November. In October, the Assistant Secretary of State, 
Asbury Dickens, wrote, at the President's orders, that 
no such reorganization of the government could take 
place without the consent of Congress. In 1835-36 there 
was some dansfer of an armed collision between Ohio and 
Michigan ; but it is not easy, on account of the rhetoric 
which was then in fashion, to judge how great this dan- 
ger was. June 15, 1836, Arkansas and IVIichigan were 
admitted together; but Michigan was put under the 
condition that she must accept the southern boundary 
which resulted from the northern lines of Indiana and 
Ohio, and accept compensation on the peninsula north of 
Lake Michigan. The Legislature of Michigan, in July, 
called a convention, which met September 26th, and re- 
jected the condition. On the 5th and 6th of December^ 
by the spontaneous action of the people, delegates wer% 
elected to a convention, which met December 14, 1836 



THE VOTE IN 1836. 381 

and assented to the condition. Jackson, in a message, 
December 26th, informed Congress of the action of 
Michigan.^ Michigan was admitted January 26, 1837. 
She offered a vote in the presidential election. In an- 
nouncing the vote, the vote of Michigan was included in 
the alternative form. 

In the spring of 1836 Sherrod Williams interrogated 
the candidates for President. Harrison ^ favored dis- 
tribution of the surplus revenue and of the revenue from 
lands ; opposed internal improvements except for works 
of national scope and importance ; would charter a bank, 
but with great reservations ; thought that neither House 
of Congress had a right to expunge anything from its rec- 
ords. Van Buren opposed national bank, internal im- 
provements, and all distribution. The equal rights men 
interrogated the candidates. The committee reported 
that they were greatly pleased with Johnson's replies, 
but that Van Buren's were unsatisfactory. Many " ir- 
reconcilable " equal rights men refused to vote for Van 
Buren. Later, however, he became fully identified with 
that wing of the national democratic party wliich took 
up the essential features of the loco-foco doctrine. 

In the election * Van Buren received 170 votes, count- 
ing 3 of Michigan ; Harrison, 73 ; White, 26 (Georgia 
and Tennessee) ; Webster, 14 (Massachusetts) ; W. P 
Mangum, of North Carolina, 11 (South Carolina). Van 
Buren's majority over all was 46. Van Buren's and 
Harrison's votes were well distributed geographically. 
Van Buren carried Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Isl- 
and, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, 
North Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi^ Louisiana, Illi 
ftois, Missouri, Arkansas, Michigan. Harrison carried 

1 51 NUes, 278. ^ 51 N'les, 23. » 58 Niles, 392. 



382 ANDREW JACKS oy. 

Vermont. New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky 
Ohio, and Indiana. The popular vote was : for Van 
Buren, 761,549 ; for all others, 736,656 ; Van Buren's 
majority, 24,893.* For Vice-President, R. M. Johnson 
got 147 votes ; Francis Granger, 77 ; John Tyler, 47 ; 
William Smith, of Alabama, 23 (Virginia). As no one 
had a majority, the Senate elected Johnson. In Janu- 
ary, 1837, Webster wrote to Massachusetts ^ that he 
should resign his seat. He intended to retire from pub- 
lic life, at least temporarily. 

Van Buren was now at the height of his ambition ; 
but the financial and commercial storm which had been 
gathering for two or three years, the accumulated result 
of rash ignorance and violent self-will acting on some of 
the most delicate social interests, was just ready to burst. 
High prices and high rents had already before the elec- 
tion produced strikes, trades-union conflicts, and labor 
riots,^ things which were almost unprecedented in the 
United States. The price of flour was so high that 
493,100 bushels of wheat were imported at New York 
in 1836, and 857,000 bushels before April, in 1837." 
Socialistic notions of course found root, and flourished 
like weeds at such a time. An Englishwoman, named 
Fanny Wright, became notorious for public teachings of 
an " emancipated " type. The loco-focos were charged 
with socialistic notions, not without justice. There were 
socialists amongst them. The meeting held in the City 
Hall Park, at New York, February 13, 1837, out of 
wrhich the " bread riots " sprang, was said to have beec 

1 American Almanac for 1880. The figures in Niles are full o' 
3bvious errors. 

2 2 Webster's Correspondence, 25 fg. 

« 48 Niles, 171 ; 50 Niles, 130. ♦ 52 NUes, 147. 



THE BREAD RIOTS. 38a 

lalled by them. They certainly had habituated the city 
populace to public meetings, at which the chance crowd 
of idlers was addressed as " the people," with all the 
current catch-words and phrases, and at which blatant 
orators, eager for popularity and power, harangued the 
crowd about banks, currency, and vested rights. Oi 
course in these harangues violence of manner and lan- 
guage made up for poverty of ideas, and the minds of 
the hearers were inflamed all the more because thev 
could understand nothing of what the orators said, except 
that they were being wronged by somebody. On that 
day in February the crowd got an idea Avliich it under- 
stood.^ Some one said : Let us go to Hart [a provision 
merchant], and offer hiin eight dollars a barrel for his 
flour. If he will not take it — ! In a few hours the 
mob destroyed five hundred barrels of flour and one 
thousand bushels of wheat. The militia were needed to 
restore order.^ The park meetings were continued. 

The commercial crisis burst on the country just at 
the beginning of March, when Jackson's term ended. 
There was a kind of poetic justice in the fact that Van 
Buren had to bear the weight of all the consequences of 
Jackson's acts which Van Buren had allowed to be 
committed, because he would not hazard his standing 
in Jackson's favor by resisting them. Van Buren dis- 
liked the reputation of a wire-puller and intriguer, but 
\ie had well earned his title, the " little magician," by 
the dexterity with which lie had manoeuvred himself 
across the slippery arena of Washington politics and up 
to the first place. He had just the temper for a poli- 

1 Byrdsall (103) says the riot was not ^,ne fault of the loo© 
focos. 

2 51 Niles. 403. 



884 ANDREW JACKSON. 

kician. Nothing ruffled liim. He was thick-skinned, 
elastic, and tough. He did not win confidence from 
anybody. He was, however, a man of more than aver- 
age ability, and he appears to have been conscious of 
lowering himself by the political manoeuvring which he 
had practised. As President he showed the honorable 
desire to have a statesman-like and high-toned adminis- 
tration, and perhaps to prove that he was more than a 
creature of Jackson's whim. He could not get a fair 
chance. The inheritances of party virulence and dis- 
trust which he had taken over from Jackson were too 
heavy a weight. He lost his grip on the machine with- 
out winning the power of a statesman. He never was 
able to regain control in the party. American public 
life is constituted out of great forces, which move on in 
a powerful stream, under constantly changing phases 
and combinations, which it is hard to foresee. Chance 
plays a great role. If a man, by a chance combination 
of circumstances, finds himself in one of the greater 
currents of the stream, he may be carried far and high, 
and may go on long ; but if another chance throws him 
out, his career is, almost always, ended forever. The 
course of our political history is strewn with men who 
weve for a moment carried high enough to have great 
ambitions and hopes excited, but who, by some turn in 
the tide, were stranded, and left to a forgotten and dis- 
appointed old age. Van Buren illustrated aU these 
cases. 

Parton quotes a letter of Jackson to Trist,^ written 

March 2, 1837, in which he says : " On the 4th I hopfl 

to be able to go to the Capitol to witness the glorious 

scene of Mr. Van Buren, once rejected by the Senate, 

1 3 Parton, 624 



JACKSON'S LAST DAYS. 885 

iworn into office by Chief Justice Taney, also being re- 
jected by the factious Senate." The election of Van 
Buren is thus presented as another personal triumph of 
Jackson, and another illustration of his remorseless pur- 
suit of success and vengeance in a line in which any one 
had dared to cross him. This exultation was the temper 
in which he left office. He was satisfied and triumph- 
ant. Not another President in the whole list ever went 
out of office in a satisfied frame of mind, much less 
with a feeling of having completed a certain career in 
triumph. 

On the 7th of March Jackson set out for Tennessee. 
He was surrounded to the last with affection and re- 
spect. On his way home he met more than the old 
marks of attention and popularity. He was welcomed 
back to Nashville as he had been every time that he 
had returned for twenty years past. These facts were 
not astonishing. He retained his popularity. Hence 
he was still a power. It was still worth while to court 
him and to get his name in favor of a man or a measure. 
Parton says that office-seekers pursued and pestered 
him up to his last days. Politicians sought to get let- 
ters from him which they could use for their purposes. 
In 1843 a letter was obtained from him favoring the 
annexation of Texas, which was then being pushed for- 
ward by a new intrigue in and around Tyler's cabinet. 
This letter was evidently prepared for Jackson after the 
fashion of Lewis. It was held back for a year, and 
then published with a false date. So Jackson was used 
by the annexation clique to ruin his friend Van Buren. 
The party which he and Van Buren had consolidated 
passed, by the Texas intrigue, away from Van Buren 
Mid under the control of the slavery wing of it. The 
25 



B86 ANDREW JACKSON. 

last-mentioned letter of Jackson brought him again into 
collision with Adams, for in it Jackson repeated his 
former assertions that he had always disapproved ol 
the treaty of 1819, and of the boundary of the Sabine. 
Adams produced the entries in his " Diary " as proof to 
the contrary. Jackson lent all his influence to Polk in 
1844. Probably he was mortified that Tennessee voted 
for Clay, although by only 113 majority in a vote of 
120,000. Letters signed by him favoring Polk were 
constantly circulated through the newspapers, and they 
no doubt had their effect. This was his last public ac- 
tivity. He died June 8, 1845. He had had honors 
beyond anything which his own heart had ever coveted. 
His successes had outrun his ambition. He had held 
more power than any other American had ever pos- 
sessed. He had been idolized by the great majority of 
his countrymen, and had been surfeited with adulation. 
He had been thwarted in hardly anything on which he 
had set his heart. He had had his desire upon all his 
enemies. He lived to see Clay defeated again, and to 
help to bring it about. He saw Calhoun retire in de- 
spair and disgust. He saw the bank in ruins ; Biddle 
arraigned on a criminal charge, and then dead broken- 
hearted. In his last years he joined the church, and, 
on that occasion, under iSie exhortations of his spiritual 
adviser, he profe'ssed to forgive all his enemies in a 
body. It does not appear that he ever repented of 
anything, ever thought that he had been in the wrong ic 
anything, or ever forgave an enemy as a specific indi 
fidual. 



yULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFEERED TO IN THI!5 
VOLUME, IN THE ALPHABETICAL ORDER OF THE 
SHORTER DESIGNATIONS BY WHICH THEY HAVE 
BEEN CITED. 

Adams : Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions 
of his Diary from 1795 to 1848; edited by Charles Francis 
Adams. 12 vols. Lippincott : Philadelphia, 1876. 

American Annual Register for 1796. Philadelphia. 

American Register. 7 vols. 1806-1810. Conrad: Philadelphia 

Annual Register : The American Annual Register. 8 vols, 
[numbered for the purposes of the present work as follows] : 
L 1825-6; II. 1826-7; III. 1827-8-9, Part L; IV. 1827-8-9, 
Part IL ; V. 1829-30; VL 1830-1; VIL 1831-2; VIIL 
1832-3. 

Benton : Thirty Years' View ; or, A History of the Working of 
the American Government for Thirty Years, from 1820 to 1850; 
by a Senator of Thirty Years [Thomas H. Benton]. 2 vols. 
Appleton : New York, 1854. 

Binns : Recollections of the Life of John Binns ; written by him- 
self. Philadelphia, 1854. 

Brothers : The United States of North America as They Are, 
Not as they are Generally Described : Being a Cure for Rad- 
icalism ; by Thomas Brothers. Longman & Co. : London, 
1840. 

Byrdsall : The History of the Loco-Foco or Equal Rignts Party ; 
by F. Byrdsall. Clement & Packard : New York, 1842. 

Carey's Letters : Nine Letters to Dr. Adam Seybert ; by Mat- 
thew Carey. Author: Philadelphia, 1810. 

Carey's Olive Branch : The Olive Branch ; or, Faults on Both 
Sides, Federal and Democratic ; by Matthew Carey. Author : 
Philadelphia, 1818. (1 0th Edition. ) 

t. hevalier : Society, Manners, and Politics in the United States : 

Being a Series of Letters on North America; by Michael 

^evalier (translated). Weeks, Jordan & Co: Boston, 1839 



588 FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO. 

Cobb : Leisure Labors ; or, Miscellanies, Historical, Literary, and 

Political, by Joseph B. Cobb. A^.^leton : New York, 1858. 
Cobbett's Jackson : Life of Andrew Jackson ; by William Cob 

bett. Harpers: New York, 1834. 
Collins : Historical Sketches of Kentucky ; by Lewis Collins, 

Cincinnati, 1847. 
Colton's Clay : The Life and Times of Henry Clay ; by C. Col 

ton. 2 vols. Barnes : New York, 1846. 
Curtis's Webster : Life of Daniel Webster ; by George Ticknoi 

Curtis. 2 vols. Apple ton : New York, 1870. 
Documents Relating to New England Federalism, 1800 to 1815 

edited by Henry Adams. Little, Brown & Co. : Boston, 1877 
Document A, 15th Congress, 2d Session, Reports, No. 100. 
Document B. 22d Congress, 1st Session, 4 Reports, No. 460. 
Document C. 22d Congress, 1st Session, 2 Reports, No. 283. 
Document D. 22d Congress, 2d Session, 1 Exec. Docs. No. 9. 
Document E. 22d Congress, 2d Session, Reports, No. 121. 
Document F. 23d Congress, 1st Session, 1 Senate Docs. No. 17. 
Document G. 23d Congress, 1st Session, 1 Senate Docs. No. 2. 
Document H, 23d Congress, 1st Session, 1 Senate Docs. No. 16. 
Document I. 23d Congress, 2d Session, 1 Senate Docs. No. 17. 
Document J. 23d Congress, 2d Session, 1 Exec. Docs. No. 9. 
Document K. 23d Congress, 2d Session, 2 Senate Docs. No. 13. 
Document L. 24th Congress, 2d Session, 2 Exec. Docs. 
Document M. 23d Congress, 1st Session, Senate Docs. No. 238. 
Drake's Tecumseh ; Life of Tecumseh, and of his Brother, the 

Prophet, with a Historical Sketch of the Shawanoe Indians; 

by Benjamin Drake. Morgan: Cincinnati, 1841. 
The Duplicate Letters, the Fisheries, and the Mississippi ; Docu- 
ments Relating to Transactions at the Negotiation of Ghent ; 

Collected and Published by John Quincy Adams. Davis & 

Force: Washington, 1822. 
Duane : Narrative and Correspondence Concerning the Removal 

of the Deposits and Occurrences Connected Therewith. [W 

J. Duane.] Philadelphia, 1838. 
Duane's Pamphlets : Duane's Collection of Select Pamphlets 

[W. Duane.] Philadelphia, 1814. 
F.aton's Jackson : The Life of Andrew Jackson ; Commenced by 

John Reid, Completed by John H. Eaton. Carey : Fhilade^ 

phia. 1817. 



FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO. 389 

Edwards: History of HHnois, from 1778 to 1833; and Life and 
Times of Niuian Edwards ; by his Son, Ninian W. Edwards. 
Illinois State Journal Co. : Springfield, Illinois, 1870. 

Elliott : The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution. 4 vols. Edited by 
Jonathan Elliott: Washington, 1836. 

Folio State Papers : American State Papers ; Documents Legis- 
lative and Executive of the Congress of the United States from 
the 1st Session of the 18th Congress to the 1st Session of the 
20th Congress. Gales & Seaton : Washington, 1859. Subdi- 
visions : Finance, Indian Affairs, etc., etc. 

Galhitin : Considerations on the Currency and Banking System 
of the United States ; by Albert Gallatin. Carey & Lea : 
Philadelphia, 1831. Eeprinted from the American Quarterly 
Review for December, 1830. 

Gallatin's Writings : The Writings of Albert Gallatin ; edited by 
Henry Adams. Lippincott : Philadelphia, 1879. 

Garland's Randolph : The Life of John Randolph of Roanoke ; 
by Hugh A. Garland. 2 vols. Appleton: New York, 1851. 

Gibbs : Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and 
John Adams ; edited from the Papers of Oliver Wolcott, 
Secretary of the Treasury ; by George Gibbs. 2 vols. New 
York, 1846. 

Goodrich: Recollections of a Life-Time; by S. G. Goodrich. 2 
vols. Miller: New York, 1851. 

Goodwin's Jackson : Biography of Andrew Jackson ; by Philo A. 
Goodwin. Clapp & Benton : Hartford, 1832. 

Gouge : A Short History of Paper Money and Banking in the 
United States; by William M. Gouge. Collins: New York, 
1835. 

Gouge's Texas : The Fiscal History of Texas ; by William 
Gouge. Lippincott : Philadelphia, 1852. 

Greeley : The American Conflict ; by Horace Greeley. Case • 
Hartford, 1873. 

Hamilton's Works : The Works of Alexander Hamilton. Fran- 
cis : New York, 1851. 

Earamond : The History of Political Parties in the State of New 
York, from the Ratification of the Federal Constitution to De- 
cember, 1840. 2 vols. By Jabez D Hammond, fourth Edi- 
tion, with notes by General Root. Phinuey : Buffalo, 1850. 



390 FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO. 

Hammond's Wright : Life and Times of Silas Wright ; by 

Jabez D. Hammond. Barnes : New York, 1848. 
Harpers's Calhoun : Life of John C. Calhoun. (Anonyraoui 

Pamphlet.) Harpers : Ncav York, 1843. 
Hewitt : An Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the 

Colonies of South Carolina and Georgia. 2 vols. Anony- 
mous [Alexander Hewitt]. Donaldson : London, 1779. 
Hodgson: The Cradle of the Confederacy, or the Times of 

Troup, Quitman, and Yancey by Joseph Hodgson, of Mo- 
bile. Register Office : Mobile, 1876. 
Howard : Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Su- 
preme Court of the United States. 
Hunt's Livingston : Life of Edward Livingston ; by Charles 

Havens Hunt. Appleton : New York, 1864. 
Ingersoll : Historical Sketch of the Second War between the 

United States of America and Great Britain • by Charles J. 

Ingersoll. Events of 1814. Lea & Blan chard • Philadelphia, 

1849. 
Jay : A Review of the Causes and Consequences of the Mexican 

War ; by William Jay. Mussey : Boston, 1849. 
Kendall's Autobiography : Autobiography of Amos Kendall ; 

edited by his Son-in-law, William Stickney. Lee & Shepard : 

Boston, 1872. 
Kendall's Jackson : Life of Andrew Jackson, Private, Military, 

and Civil ; by Amos Kendall. Harpers : New York, 1843. 

(Unfinished.) 
Kennedy's Wirfc : Memoirs of the Life of William Wirt ; by 

John P. Kennedy. 2 vols. Lea & Blanchard : Philadelphia, 

1849. 
Latour : Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and 

Louisiana in 1814-15; by Major A. L. Latour. Conrad: 

Philadelphia, 1816. 
Lodge's Cabot : Life and Letters of George Cabot ; by Henry 

Cabot Lodge. Little, Brown & Co. : Boston, 1877. 
Macgregor : The Progress of America, from the Discovery by 

Columbus to the Year 1846 ; by John Macgregor. 2 vola 

Whittaker : London, 1847. 
ftlackeinzie: The Lives and Opinions of Benjamin F. Butler 

and Jesse Hoyt ; by William L. Mackeinzie. Cook & Co 

Boston, 1845. 



FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO. 391 

itfartineau's Society, etc. : Society in America; by Harriet Mar 

tineau. 2 vols. Saunders & Otley: New York and London, 

1837. 
Martineau's Western Travel: Retrospect of Western Travel; 

by Harriet Martineau. 2 vols. Harpers : New York, 1838. 
Mayo: Political Sketches of Eight Years in Washington; by 

Robert Mayo : Baltimore, 1839. 
Memoirs of Bennett : Memoirs of James Gordon Bennett and 

his Times ; by a Journalist. Stringer & Townsend : New York, 

18.55. 
Morse's Adams : John Quincy Adams ; by John T. Morse, Jr. 

Houghton, Mifflin & Co. : Boston, 1882. 
Niles: Niles's Weekly Register, 1811 to 1848. 
Opinions of the Attorneys-General : Official Opinions of the 

Attorneys-General of the United States. Washington, 1852. 
Parton : Life of Andrew Jackson ; by James Parton. 3 vols. 

Mason Brothers : New York, 1861. 
Perkins : Historical Sketches of the United States from the 

Peace of 1815 to 1830; by Samuel Perkins. Converse: New 

York, 1830. 
Peters : See Howard. 
Pickett : History of Alabama and Incidentally of Georgia and 

Mississippi, from the Earliest Period ; by A. J. Pickett. 3 

vols. Walker & James : Charleston, 1851. 
Pitkin : A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United 

States of America; by Timothy Pitkin. Durrie & Peck : Nevf 

Haven, 1835. 
Plumer's Plumer : Life of William Plumer ; by his son, William 

Plumer, Jr. Phillips, Sampson & Co. : Boston, 1856. 
Putnam : History of Middle Tennessee, or Life and Times of 

General James Robertson ; by A. W. Putnam. Nashville, 

1859. 
Quincy's Adams : Memoirs of the Life of John Quincy Adams ; 

by Josiah Quincy. Phillips, Sampson & Co. : Boston, 1858. 
Raguet : A Treatise on Currency and Banking ; by Condj 

Raguet. Grigg & Elliott • Philadelphia, 1839. 
Ramsey : The Annals of Tennessee to tne End of the Eight- 
eenth Century ; by J. G. M. Ramsey. Russell : Charleston, 

1853. 
Rush : Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of Loudon ; by 



392 FULL TITLES OF BOOKS REFERRED TO. 

Richard Rush. I. Key & Biddle : Philadelphia, 1833. IL 

Lea & Blanchard: Philadelphia, 1845. 
Bargent : Public Men and Events from the Commencement ol 

Mr. Monroe's Administration in 1817 to the Close of Mr. Bill 

more's Administration in 1853 ; by Nathan Sargent. 2 vols. 

Lippincott : Philadelphia, 1875. 
Seybert: Statistical Annals of the United States from 1789 to 

1818; by Adam Seybert. Dobson : Philadelphia, 1818. 
Sparks's Morris : Life of Gouverueur Morris, with Selections 

from his Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers ; by Jared 

Sparks, 3 vols. Gray & Bowen : Boston, 1832. 
[The] Statesman's Manual. 3 vols. Williams : New York, 

1854. 
Stevens : A History of Georgia from its First Discovery by 

Europeans to 1798 ; by William Bacon Stevens. 2 vols. 

Butler: Philadelphia, 1859. 
Story's Story : Life and Letters of Joseph Story ; by his Son, 

W. W. Story. Little, Brown & Co. : Boston, 1851. 
Telegraph, Extra : United States Telegraph, Extra ; March to 

November, 1828. Weekly. Green & Jarvis : Washington. 
Tyler's Taney ; Memoirs of Roger Brook Taney ; by Samuel 

Tyler. Murphy: Baltimore, 1872. 
Von Hoist : The Constitutional and Political History of the 

United States ; by Dr. H. von Hoist (translated). 3 vols. 

Callaghan : Chicago, 1878-81. 
Webster's Correspondence: The Private Correspondence of 

Daniel Webster ; edited by Fletcher Webster. 2 vols. Little, 

Brown & Co. : Boston, 1857. 
Webster's Works : The Works of Daniel Webster. 6 vols. Lit- 
tle, Brown & Co. : Boston, 1851. 
Wheaton : See Howard. 
Whig Almanac : The Whig Almanac (from 1838). Horace 

Greeley : New York. 
Wilson's Works : The Works of James Wilson, LL. D. 3 

vols. Philadelphia, 1804. 
Wise : Seven Decades of the Union ; by Henry A. Wise. Lip 

pincctt. Philadelphia, 1872 



INDEX. 



A. B.," 83. 

Aberdeen, Lord, 169. 

A.bolition. See Slavery. 

A.ccommodation paper, 268 294. 

Adair, General, 40, 12*. 

Adams, John, 27, 29, 118, 145, 171, 
215, 302. 

Adams, J. Q., 47-386 jjoisim. 

' Addresser," 83. 

Alamo, the, 355. 

Alien act. See Law. 

Almanac, the Whig, 342. 

Ambrister, R., 59, 60, 62. 

Amelia Island, 54 

Amendment of the Constitution, 104, 
106, 128, 325. 

American, the N. Y., 139. 

'American System," 194, 19S, 198, 
212 222 

Amiens, peace of, 19. 

Ancestry, Jackson's, 1. 

Animosity, Jackson's, 68, 91, 291, 
298. 

Anti-bank, 120, 234, 259, 272, 274. 

Anti-masons and -masonry, 252-255, 
379. 

Anti-relief. See Relief. 

Appalachicola, 62, 53. 

Appointments, 104, 105, 106, 112, 
148 ; correspondence of Jackson 
and Monroe on, 50, 51, 79, 297. 

Arbiithnot, A., 58, 59, 60, 62, 66. 

Argus, the Albany, 87, 88, 117. 

Argus, the Frankfort, 142, 159. 

Aristocracy, colonial, 4. 

Arkansas, 379. 

Army, the, 68, 109, 359. 

Arrogance, Jackson's, 278. 

issassination, attempted, of Jack- 
son, 367. 

Assault on Jackson, 301. 

ithens, Ga.,216. 

. action, 76. 

Auctioneering, 47. 

Aurora, tlie, 151, 296, 369. 



Austin, S. F., 852. 
Autobiography, Kendall's, 242. 

Bache, 116. 

Balch, 152. 

Baltimore, 231, 254, 273, 325, 376. 

Bank : of Cairo, 122 ; of the Corn- 
monwealth of Kentucky, 124-134, 
142, 159, 247, 361, 362, (vs. Wister) 
135, (Briscoe vs.) 859-363 ; of Eng- 
land, 228, 298 ; of Illinois, 122 ; of 
Kentucky, 120-125, 261 ; Manhat- 
tan Co. , 307 ; of the Metropolis, 305, 
306 ; of North America, 227 ; State, 
of Illinois, 122 ; of Tennessee, 122 ; 
Union, of Maryland, 307; of the 
United States (the first), 12, 41, 83, 
84, 227-229, 232 ; (the second), 88, 
121-123 128, 129, 132, 142, 159, 191, 
231-249, 257-272, 274, 275, 278, 291- 
310, 315-320, 330, 337-341; (of 
Pennsylvania), 338, 340-342, 886, 
(vs. Halsted) 128, (vs William Ow- 
ens) 261, {vs. Planters' Bank) 129, 
135, see Recharier and Removal; 
charters, 230, 231, 245, 246 ; demo- 
crats, 259; contraction, 316; ma- 
nia, 120, 229, 318, 323, 324 ; na- 
tional, 13, 82, 224, 225, 232, 234, 
246, 257 275, 305, 320, 342 ; notion 
of a, 230, 319 ; proposed by Jack- 
son, 244, 246, 248, 258, 274 ; re- 
striction, 13; swindles, 134, 230, 
234, 335 ; theor^ of a national, 
240,241, 321; war, 241, 246, 257, 
261, 320, 321, 339, 345. 

Banking, 119, 232, 233, 234, 312, 331, 
340, 362. 

Bank-notes 229, 230, 234. 269, 270, 
317, 32?, 324, 331, 362, 369. 

Bankruptcy, 109. 

Banks, 41, 132, 363,369; "the for- 
ty," of Kentucky, 12U-124 ; local 
or state, 275, 301,305, 309, 316, 318, 
331, 336; the " pet" or deposit, 
•306-307, 317, 318, 324, 328, 329, 



S94 



INDEX, 



335 : and politics, 227, 228, 237- 
239, 241, 259, 275,276, 305-308,311 ; 
safety fund, 275, 276, 301. 

Banquet, Jefferson's birth-day, 156, 
157. 

Ban(iuo's ghost, 152. 

Barbour, P. P., 236. 

Bargain, 98 ; between Clay and Ad- 
ams, 90-96, 106, 139, 152, 354. 

Baring Bros., 292, 293. 

Barrv, W. T., 127, 135, 141, 144, 160, 
297, 348. 

Barton, T. P., 347. 

Batavia, N. Y.,250. 

Bell,. J., 376. 

Belligf'rentregulations, 13, 27. 

Benton, Jesse, 3 1. 

Benton, T. IL, 30, 31, 88, 91, 96, 97, 
105, 106, 108, 145, ln4, 178, 188, 
190, 24S, 257, 260, 271. 272, 297, 
311, 313, 317, 320, 331, 335. 

Berrien, J M., 141, 160, 173, 216. 

Beverly, Carter, 94. 

Bibb. G. M., 190, 312. 

Bidflle, Nicholas, 234, 237-240, 248, 
257, 259-275, 292-296, 304,311,312, 
317, 320, 321, 338-342, 386. 

Biddle, Thomas, 263, 264. 

Billiard-table, 115. 

Binney, IL, 235. 

Binns, J., 112-114,148,244. 

Birth-place, Jackson's, 1. 

Black George, 101. 

Black-leg, 101. 

Blair, F. P., 92. 159, 160, 243, 259, 
278, 280, 297, 298, 375. 

Blifi], 101. 

Blount, Governor, 8, 10 

Boleck, 58, 66, 342. 

Boss, 102. 

Boston, 137, 221, 230. 

Boundary : of Florida, 19 ; of Loui- 
siana, 67, 353 ; of Michigan, 379. 

Bowlegs. See Boleck. 

Bi-anch.J., 141, 160. 

branch drafts, 235, 236, 261-270,315, 
320. 

Briscoe vs. The Bank of the Com- 
monwealth. See Bank. 

Broglie, Due de, 344, 346, 347. 

Brokers, 334. 

Brooke, F., 92. 

Brown, General, 68. 

Brown, Rev. 0. B., 349, 377. 

Buchanan, James, 94, 174, 359. 

Buck tails, 74, 252, 253. 

Buffalo, 239. 

" Buffaloes," 372. 

Bullion ism See Currency, specie. 

Bund, the German, 131. 

Burke, E., 118. 

Burr, A., 19, 21, 33, 104. 



Butler, missionary, 181 
Butler, B, F., 247, 380. 

Cabal, 298. 

Cabinet, 137, 140 ; paper read in the 

303, 304, 309, 310 ; the kitchen 

140, 141, 157, 159, 264, 272, 273 

298. 
Cadwallader, General, 291, 292. 
Caesar, 277. 

Calhoun, J. C., 51-336 passim. 
Calhoun, Mrs. J. C, 150. 
California, 352, 357. 
Cailava, 69-71. 
Cambreleng, C. C, 152, 261. 
Campaign methods, 112, 114, 115. 
Campbell, G. W., 22. 
Campbell, Rev. Mr., 150, 162. 
Canada, 29, 40, 168, 357. 
Canal, the Erie, 86, 110, 322, 323. 
Candles, 167. 

Canning, George, 168, 169. 
Capital, 224, 225, 319, 322 
Carey, M., 229. 
Cass, L., 162, 248, 297. 
Catron, Judge, 3')5. 
Caucus: 102, 313, 375; congrea 

sional, 73, 79, 84, 85, 100, 254,375 

state, 80, 156; "King," 100, 103 

378. 
Censure. See Resolutions. 
Central America, 107. 
Ceremonies, 137. 
Charleston, S. C, 5, 10, 112,220,283 

350. 
Charlestown, Mass., 365. 
Charter, 130. See Bank. 
Chatham, Lord, 118. 
Chattahoochee, 177. 
Cherokees, 49, 138, 174-183, 277. 
Chevalier, M., 312, 344. 
Cheves, L., 234, 235, 265. 
Chickasaws, 179. 
China, 264, 265. 
Choctaws, 53, 179, 183. 
Cholera, 266. 
Circulation, 318, 323, 334. See Cut 

rency. 
Civil service, 83, 103, 116, 118, 145. 

147. See Patronage. 
Civilization of Indians, 178. 
Clark, Judge, 125. 
Clay, 11., 29-386 passim. 
Clayton, A. S., 180, 182, 216, 2«i0. 
Clayton, J. M., 270, 286, 291. 
Clinton, George, 229. 
Clinton, De Witt, 80, 86, 89, 100,25a 

254. 
Clintonians, 74, 252, 253. 
Coahuila, 353. 
Cobb, T. W., 216. 
Cobden, R., 365 



INDEX. 



395 



Cochrane, Admiral, 42. 

Code of honor, 17. 

Coffin hand-bills, 114. 

Cohens vs. Virginia, 130. 

Coin, 262. 

Coleman, Dr., 76; letter to, 139 

Colombia, 105. 

Colonial system, 164. 

Colonies, Spanish, 20. 

Colon izatioi! Society, 216. 

CoUimbia, S. 1 , 282. 

Columbia, District of, 295 350 

Columbian Observer, 92. 

Committee, party, 102, 103. 

Common sense, plain, 312. 

Community, frontier, 2, 3, 5, 16, 17, 
251. 

Compromise, the Missouri, 350, 352; 
tariff. See Tariff of 1833. 

Concord, N. II., 2.38. 

Congress : American, 107, 108 ; of 
the United States, 101, 104, 105, 
108, 330 ; Jackson a membei: of, 
10-13. 

Connecticut, 254, 267, 374. 

Conscription, 41. 

Constitution, the, 97, 104, 109, 128, 
130-132. 212-216, 246, 255, 278, 283, 
298, 311, 361-363 ; the English, 
138 ; state, 137. 

Constitutional theories, 285, 286. 

Constitutionality, 119, 128-130, 173, 
360. 

Continental system, 170. 

Contracts, 119, 121, 130. 

Controller of New York, 73, 74. 

Controversy between Adams and the 
federalists, 116. 

Convention: 87, 102, 216; anti-ma- 
sonic state, 253, 378 ; the cons.,itu- 
tional, of 1787, 363 ; free trade, 
220 ; Ilarrisburg tariff. 201, 204 ; 
Hartford, 41, 50, 157, 213; nullifi- 
cation, 219, 281, 290 ; protectionist, 
220; union, 282.; national, 254, 
378 ; of anti-masons, 254, 255 ; of 
democrats, 273, 375 ; of national 
republicans, 258, 273. 

Coosa, 177 

Coppinger, 71. 

Corn laws, 202, 203, 206. 

Correspondence of Jackson and Mon- 
ro*. See Appointments. 

Corruption, political, 105, 329. 

Cotton, 136, 322. 

Countervailing, 164, 165, 168, 170, 
195, 197, 198, 206. See Reciprocity. 

Courier and Enquirer, 114, 155, 156, 
243, 263, 271. 

Dourt : contempt of, 46, 173, 174, 
282 ; supreme, of the United States, 
128, 132, 277, 369, 361. 



Craig ^5. Missouri, 135, 360. 

Crawford, \V. H., 49, 51, 65, 68, 82 
83, 86, 89, 99, 101, 109, 111, 113. 
152-158, 193, 216, 229, .307. 

Credit : 226, 265, 328, 332 ; abuse of 
5, 16, 126.2.34, 323; bills of, 1.35, 
3.59-362 ; for duties, 76, 206, 271, 
288, 328; public, 12, 119, 231 
system, 123, 323. 

Creeks, the, 32, 35, 37, 38, 49, 52, 65 
60, 63, 174-183. 

Crisis: commercial, 229, 318, 336; 
of 1798, 13,17; of 1819. 75, 234: 
of 1825, 197 ; of 1834, 315-317 ; of 
1837, 330, 383. 

Crittenden, J. J., 290. 

Cumberland Road, 191, 192. 

Currency, 229, 312, 331. See Circu- 
lation ; of Europe, 12, 75 ; of th« 
States, 16, 120, 134, 135 : of the 
United States, 41, 75, 76, 229, 231- 
234, 243-245, 318, 332, 334, 336 ; 
specie, 317, 331, 332, 334, 369; 
value, 331. 

Curtis, G. T., 290. 

Dallas, G. M., 47, 87, 116, 259. 

Damages. See France, Draft on. 

Dancing Rabbit Creek, 183. 

Dartmouth College, 142; vs. Wood- 
ward, 129. 

Davis, \V. R., 367. 

Dearborn, H. A. S., 221. 

Debt : 121, 126, 222, 256, 260, 322 ; 
the public, 110, 189, 220, 266, 272, 
319 323 

Debtors^ 119, 124, 126-128, 319. 

Defaulter, 74, 116, 145. 

Democracy, 7, 97, 127, 136, 157, 234, 
241, 280, 299, 310-313, 331, 332, 350 
362, 369. 

Democratic Press, 113. 

Democrats. See Party. 

Deposit Act of 1836, 325, 326. 

Deposits : the public, 228, 232, 240, 
243, 265, 271, 272, 276, 292, 295, 
298, 299, 304, 307, 316-319, 326, 
329, 332, 336, see Removal ; regu- 
lation oi the, 305, 306, 320, 325, 
326. 

Desertion, 68. 

Desha, Governor, 132, 133. 

Diary of J. Q. Adams, 95, 160, 300, 
386. 

Dickens. A., 380. 

Pickenson, C, 18. 

DifferenHal duties, 165,166, 168,206 

Dinsmore, S. , 22. 

Directors, government, 308, 309. 

Di.-organizers, 79, 87, 152, 253, 369. 

Distributiou, 189, 193, 325-330 

District attorney, Jackson, 8. 



396 



INDEX. 



Dividend withheld. See France, 

Draft on. 
Divorce, 8, 9. 
Donelson, J., 8 
Done I son, Mrs. A. J., 150, 
Doael.^on, Mrs. ,)., 8. 
Do elson, Rachel, 8. 
Drayton, \V., 4it, 5^, 163. 
Dred Scott case, 363. 
Diiaue, VV., 120, 296, 369. 
Duane, W. J., 296, 298 300, 802, 303, 

312, 817. 
Duel, 18, 52, 101. 
Duncan, J., 333. 

East Room, the, 114. 

Eaton, J. H.,91, lu5, 141, 144, 148- 
153, 160-162, 272, 273. 

Eaton, Mrs. J. II., 149-153, 161, 162, 
273, 278. 

Editors, 145, 148, 159. 

Education, Jackson's, 2. 

Edwards, N., >-3. 

Election : 79, 97, 98, 116, 118, 127, 
182, 242, 313, 326 ; contested, 379 ; 
presidential, of 1796, K" ; of 1800, 
104 -, of 1808, 49 ; of 1S12, 29 ; of 
1816, 49; of 1820, 73, 76; of 1824, 
89, 90, 98, 105, 151 ; of 1828, 105, 
106, 116, 242, 253 ; of 1832, 182, 
221, 223, 249,250-276 ; of 1836,372, 
379 ; of 1844, 375, 386. 

Electioneering, 77, 91, 106, 112, 113, 
146, 152,308,311,366,375. 

Electors, 87. 

Ellis, P., 358. 

EUmaker, A., 254. 

Ellsworth, W. \X., 315. 

Ely, Rev. Mr., 150. 

Embargo, 13, 27, 28, 75, 83, 210. 

Emissaries, 67, 59, 63. 

Emphasis, 185, 252, 312, 367, 383. 

Empire, the democratic, 299. 

Encroachments, federal, 133, 135. 

Eneigy: Jackson's, 33, 34, 38, 43, 
170 ; .\uierican, 136. 

Enforcement Act, 285, 287, 289, 290. 

England: 11, 13, 17, 27, 57, 62, 66, 
161, 165, 167-169, 174, 357; King 
of, 16:3. 

English, the, 2,, 52, 53, 58. 

Enquirer, the Richmond, 263. 

Epitaph, 139. 

Era of good feeling, 101. 

Etiquette, 82, 137, 149. 

Etowah, 177. 

Everett, A. IL, 220. 

Everett, Edward, 315. 

Exchange committee, the, 267. 

Exchanges : the domestic, 233 ; for- 
eign, 317, 323, 324. 

■Exchequer bills, 2'13. 



Execution, sales under, 122, 124, 129 

Executive, the, 107, 217, 278, 299 

305, 311, 363. 
Expedition : Burr's, 21 ; Miranda's 

20 ; the Nickajack, 15. 
Experiment, 315, 317. 
Expunging. See Resolution. 
Extravagance, 113. 

Factions, 74, 76, 77, 101-103, 109, 110 
139, 151, 155, 249, 366, 371. 

Fair-traders, 196. 

Fannin, Colonel, 355. 

Federalism, 214, 282. 

Federalist, 88, 213, 228, 297. Se« 
Party. 

Filibusters, 53, 314, 359. 

Financiering, 322. 

Finances, public, 41. 

Fine, Jackson's, 47- 

Fire at-New York, 319, 338. 

Fisheries, 81, 95. 

Flint River, 177. 

Florida : 19, 36, 37, 52, 54, 56, 153 
157, 159, 162, 354,356,359; cession 
of, 69 ; invasion of, 60-65, see War 
Seminole; Jackson governor of. 
68, 70, 71,242; laws for, 69 ; pur- 
chase of, 20, 67, 69, 246. Sm 
Treaty of 1819. 

Foot, S. A., 166. 

Forbes, firm of, 70. 

Forsyth, J., 153, 154. 347, 348. 

Fort : Bowyer, 37, 40 ; Jackson, 85, 
44 ; Minis, 32 ; Negro, 52, 53 ; Ni- 
agara, 250 ; Scott, 56. 

Fortifications, 109, 330, 346. 

Fowltowu, 55, 56, 63. 

Foxardo, 359. 

France : 13, 17, 27, 170, 171, 295, 324 
325, 343-348; draft on, 295, 303 
309, 320, 344, 345 ; King of (Louii 
Philippe), 343, 345, 348. 

Franklin, 7. 

Freemasons and masonry, 250, 252. 

Free trade, 76, 166, 167,210, 217, 220 
289, 370, 373 ; convention, 220. 

Fromentin, E., 70, 71. 

Frontier, 2, 5, 35, 251 

Funding, 12. 

Funds, state deposit, 329. 

Gaines, General, 53-55, 356. 

Gales and Sea ton, 263. 

Gallatin, \., 14, 41, 42, 86, 164, 168 

191,220, 228, 307, 308. 
Galphinton, 175. 
Gardner, J. B., 147. 
Georgia, 53, 56, 84,' 117, 175-183,215 

218 283 
Ghent,"40, 41, 46, 59, 60, 81, 84, 8« 

96.231 



INDEX. 



397 



libbons vs. Ogden, 130. 

Hies, Vf. B.,116. 

Hliuer, Governor, 181, 216. 

rlol)e, the, 156, 159, 160, 273, 
326,368,371, 374,376. 

iold, 332-334. 

iouge, \V., 125,264,271. 

iJouvHMueur, S. L.,351 

iovernuient : constitutional, 97 
tenuil, 109,258; personal, 277 
280, 299, 302, 309, 314 ; non-i 
fereuce theory of, 256, 277, 
299, 364, 373. 

Granger, F., 374, 378. 

Ireat Britain. See England. 

Greeley, 11., 182. 

Jreen, Duff, 104, 105, 140, 143, 
159, 263. 

areen vs. Biddle, 129. 

iruudy, F., 286. 



280, 



; pa- 

279, 

uter- 

279, 



157, 



Habeas Corpus, 46, 70, 72. 

Halifax, 165. 

Hall, Judge, 46. 

Hamilton, A., 11, 41, 227, 230, 231, 

308. 
Hamilton, James, 212, 289. 
Ila.milton, James A., 152, 153. 
Hammond, J., 371. 
Hard Times, 75, 204. 
Harper, R. G., 104. 
Harrison, W. H., 378, 379, 381. 
Harvard College, 254, 300. 
Ilayne, R. Y., 152, 190, 198, 217, 284, 

289. 
Health, Jackson's, 34, 154, 300. 
Hiawassee, 177, 353. 
Hickory Ground, 35, 177. 
Hill. L, 140, 143, 148, 157, 163, 237- 

239, 242, 248, 259, 278, 375. 
Ilillis Hajo, 58. 
HimoUemico, 58. 
Holston, 176. 
Holy Ground, 35. 
Honorable, title of, 137. 
Hopewell, 175. 
Hor.<e Shoe Bend, 35. 
Hottinger, 295. 
House of Representatives, 64, 190, 

230 ; on the Bank, 247, 248, 274, 

814 ; power of, to elect President 

97. 
Houston, S., 354, 355. 
Hunt, M.,358. 
Huskisson, W., 167, 197, 198. 
Huyghens, Mrs., 150. 

tLUNOis,122, 189, 380. 
lUiteracj', Jackson's, 15, 49. 
.mmaturity, 367. 
Immigration, 110. 
'mpea^nmeut, 174, 302, 303, 311. 



Impressment, 30, 43. 
Improvements, internal, 77, 81, 82 

109, 188, 191-194, 216, 221, 256,262 

278, 279, 327. 
Inaugural, Adams's, 104. 
Inaugural, Jackson's, 139, 145. 
Inauguration, Adams's, 93. 
Inauguration, Jackson's, 138. 
Incendiary publications, 350. 
Indiana, 189. 380. 
Indians, 174-183, 219, 283; aggres- 

sions by or on, 14, 31, 54, 55, 175 

356 ; treaty rights of, 181. 
Indian Spring, 177, 178. 
Indian Territory, 179, 180, 183. 
Indian title to land, 13, 176. 
Inflation, 120, 236, 261, 270, 318, 324 

325. 
Ingham, S. D , 116, 141, 160,162,236- 

242,261,321,332. 
Insolvent laws, 128. 
Institutions, representative, 280,313 

372. 
Instructions, 96, 108, 212, 243, 278 

313, 370 ; to McLane, 161, 169. 
Insubordination, 33, 34, 44, 359. 
Interference theory. See Govern- 

metit. , paternal. 
Intrigues, 90. 
Iron, 206. 
Irreconcilables, 13. 

Jackson, A., Sen., 1. 

Jackson, A., Jr., 2. 

Jackson, Mrs. A., Jr., 9, 18, 49, 139 

149. 
Jacksonism. 320. 
Jacobinism, 11, 215. 
Jaudon, S.,341. 
Jay, J., 11, 41. 
Jefferson, T., 10,12, 14, 22, 27-29,33, 

41, 72, 88, 104, 115, 127, 145, 156 

171, 174, 213, 215, 228, 314. 
Jeffersonians. See Party. 
Jeffersonian school, 131, 256. 
Jingo policy, 108. 
Johnson, R. M., 73, 128, 139, 145,260, 

376, 377, 381. 
Johnson, W. C, 273. 
Jones, W.,308. 
Jamaica, 166. 
Judge, Jackson a, 14. 
" Judge-breaking," 125, 127. 
Judiciary, the, 119, 120, 126, 127, 863 ; 

the federal, 109, 127-130, 136, 171- 

174, 180. 
Judiciary Act, 130. 

Kendall, A., 1, 5, 8, 15, 140, 142, 143 
146. 148,157, 159.160,242, 243,248, 
259, 273 278, 'J9Q4o^ 349, 361, 
371. 



898 



INDEX. 



Kenhigee, 54. 

Kentucky, 9, 19, 21, 96, 119, 121,123, 

126, 128, 129. 132, 193, 204, 211, 222, 

242, 257, 353. 
King's Chapel, 137 
Kremer, G., 92. 

Lacock, a., 67, 258. 

Land, 16, 17, 69, 109, 184-186, 191, 256, 
325, 335. 

Latoui-, 39. 

I AW, alien and sedition, 13, 213-215 ; 
coinage, 332-334 ; constitutional, 
131, 361: endorsement and replevin, 
122, 124-126, 129, 133 ; the " gag,'- 
350 : homestead, 186, 189 ; insol- 
Tent, 128 ; international, 62, 107; 
martial, 38, 45, 46 ; merchant, 296 ; 
occupying claimant, 129, 133 ; rev- 
enue, 69 ; student, Jackson a, 2 ; 
the study of, 3, 4 ; Spanish, 69. 

Lawless, L., 174. 

LawTence, R., 367, 368. 

Laws, Jackson a Doctor of, 300. 

Lawyers, 4. 

Lee, II., 49, 91, 105, 144, 147, 153. 

Legal-tender, 125 ; act, 363 ; cases, 
363 ; notes, 363. 

Leigh, B. W., 313, 314 

Letcher, J., 95, 96, 129. 

Letters, campaign, 76, 93. 

Lewis, W. B., 49, 50. 76-79, 91, 93, 105, 
140-145, 151-162,'243, 248, 273,278, 
282, 296, 297, 299, 375, 385. 

Lexington, Ky., 121, 294, 303. 

Liberty, constitutional, 99, 132, 224, 
279, 283, 361,362 ; religious, 377. 

Liquidation, 16, 234. 

Livingston, K , 11, 38, 45, 49, 91, 105, 
145, 162, 214, 274, 282, 343, 345- 
347. 

Loco-focos. See Party. 

(iOg-rolling, 191 

Long, J., 352. 

Louaillier, 38, 46. 

Louisiana, 19, 20, 67, 98, 201, 246, 
28*^ 32'^ 353 

LouitxiV., 99; XV., 359; Philippe, 
170- See France, King of. 

Louisville, Ky., 121. 

Lowndes, VV., 332. 

MACaiHE, 79, 84. 

Madison, J., 29, 30, 145,191, 193,214, 

215, 230. 
Madisonian federalism, 214, 282. 
Mails, incendiary documents in the, 

350,372: Sunday, 377. 
tfaine, 179, 323, 357. 
Major-ganeral, Jackson a, 15, 36. 
Majority, the, 157, 210, 217, 224. 
Vlallary, R. C, 200, 202-204, 219. 



Manners, Jackson's, 14, 88, 138 

Marcy, W. L., 162, 247, 324. 

"Marmion," the, 130. 

Marriage, Jackson's, 9, 115. 

Marshall, J., 131, 182, 309, 361. 

Martin vs. Hunter's Lessee, 130. 

Martineau, IL, 284, 365, 367. 

Maryland, 98. 

Mason, J., Ill, 144, 236-239. 

Masons. See Freemasons. 

Massachusetts, 254, 314, 378. 

Massacre, 32, 55, 355. 

Mayo, Dr., 354. 

Mcbulloch vs. Maryland, 128, 246. 

McDuffie, G., 207, 219. 221, 222, 24: 
259, 260, 295, 308. 

McGillivray, 175. 

McGregor, 54. 

Mcintosh, 177. 

McLane, L., 161, 162, 169, 190, 223 
249 296 297. 

McLean, J., 112, 116, 141, 254, 378. 

McNairy, J.,5, 18. 

Message, 280 ; Adair's, 126 ; Adams's 
108; Desha's, 132; Jackson's, o 
1829, 179, 189, 193, 243, 244, 247 
of 18:^0, 248 ; of 1831, 222, 248, 249 
257 ; of 1832, 285, 292 ; of 1833, 308 
of 1834, 344, 346, 348 ; of 1835, 347 
348 ; of 1836, 341 ; special, on French 
relations, 347, 348 ; special, on 
Texas, 357. 

Metcalf, Governor, 135. 

Methodists, 116. 

Mexico, 107, 264, 352-359 ; mission to 
72, 89. 

Michigan, 379-381. 

Military service, Jackson's, 61. 

Militiamen, " the six," 44. 

Minimum, 199, 200, 205, 2«». 

Missionaries, 181, 182. 

Mississippi, 180, 183,322; river, 10 
19, 20, 42, 81, 95, 352 ; valley, U9 
134, 355. 

Missouri, 96, 135. 

Mitchell, ex-Governor, 54, 55. 

Mobile, 21, 30, 36, 37. 

Money, 16 ; money-market, 231, 266 
267, 271, 272, 301, 324, 327, 328, 341 
" money power,'" 225-230, 312. 

Monroe, J., 42-193 passim, 361, 354 
369. 

Monroe doctrine, 108. 

Morgan, W., 250-252, 255. 

Mortgage, 122, 124, 128, 135. 

Muter, Judge, 120. 

Nacogdoches, 352, 356. 

Napoleon Bonaparte, 21, 26, 27, 3j 

42, 170, 277, 279. 
National character, 136. 
National Intelligencer, 263 



INDEX. 



399 



Nashville, 5, 8, 270, 294. 

Natchez, 9, 30, 33. 

Naval school, 109. 

Navigation system, 164, 167, 168. 

Navy, the, 40, 41, 359. 

Negro fort, 53, 59. 

Negroes, 52, 57, 130. 

" New Court," 127, 133, 242. 

New England, 28, 76, 82, 198, 204, 

211, 3U0. 
New Hampshire, 82, 144,273. 
New Jersey , 98. 
New Orleans, 19. 30, 36, 38, 42, 44, 

48, 112, 242, 368 ; battle of. 39. 
Newspapers, partisan, 35, 103, 104, 

112, 115, 148. 
New York city, 67, 82, 337, 338, 840. 
New York State, 85, 100, 147, 179, 254, 

272, 329, 374. 
Nichols, Colonel, 57. 
Niles, II., 52-374 passim. 
Nomination of Calhoun, 1822, 82; 

of Clay, 1832, 258, 274 ; of Jackson, 

1822, 79, 87 ; 182o, 104 ; 1832, 154- 

i5tj ; of Van Buren, 1832, 154, 161, 

272, 273. 
Nominations by Jackson, 147. 
Non-intercourse, 75. 
Non-interference. See Government. 
Non-user, 263. 
North Carolina, 7, 8, 79, 98, 216, 218, 

220, 379. 
Nova Scotia, 168. 
Nueces, 357. 
Nullification, 154-159, 183, 207-223, 

281-291, 300, 345, 353 

Oaklet, T. J., 193. 

Obligations, international. 1.30. 

Occupying claimant, 129, 132, 133. 

Office-holders, 145, 160, 374, 376. 

Office-seekers, 145, 385. 

Ohio, 121,204, 254, 257, 380. 

" Old Court." See " New Court.''^ 

Oligarchy, 102. 

O'Neil, Peggy. See Mrs. J. H.Eaton. 

"Onslow," 111. 

Order, Jackson's departmental, 51 ; 
Jackson's general, 68 ; Kendall's 
mail, 350, 371 : in council, 30, 166 
1IJ8. 

Oregon, 359. 

Organ, li)4, 143, 148, 159, 160, 280. 

Osborn vs. United States Bank, 128 

Overton, Judga, 155. 

Owena, 183. 

Pacific, the, 352. 
Palmer, \V. A., 378. 
Pamphlets, 114,267, 276. 
Panama Congress, lU6-108i 
»*anic, 304, S08, 315, 316. 



Paper money, 119, i21, 122, 126. 230. 
246,303. ' » . . 

Parliament, Act of, 165, 167, 168. 

Parton, J., 1, 3, 15, 21, 23, 49, 70, 76, 
79, 117, 151, 154, 159, 160, 162, 273. 
2'Jl, 296, 3.84, 385. 

Party, 28u ;_ the anti-.Tackson, 250, 
256, 374, 378, 379 ; the anti-masonic, 
253-255, 374 : the anti-monopoly, 
see the equal-rights ; the demo- 
cratic-republican Jeffersonian, IL 
13 21, 26, 27, 29, 41, 50, 80, lOl! 
102. 106, 120, 136, 144, 173 191 
228-230, 234, 253, 371, 372; the 
equal-rights, or loco-foco, 369-373 
381, 382: the federal, 11, 12, 2ft 
50, 96, 101, 102, 112, 115,116,139 
144, 238, 252 ; the Jackson, 139 
154, 173, 188^205, 236, 248, 256, 257, 
313, 374, 375 ; the Jackson- Van 
Buren, 372; the national republi- 
can, 139, 187, 374 ; the nullifica- 
tion, 212; the people's, 86; the 
whig, 328, 330, 332, 340, 374, 379 j 
the union, 163; discipline, 248, 
313 ; exigency, 109, 192 ; hatred, 
300, 384 ; policy, 221 ; strife, 139. 

"Patrick Henry," 111. 

Patriot, the New Hampshire, 143 ; th 
Baltimore, 146. 

Patronage, 102, 106, 112, 116, 118, 147, 
149. See Civil Service. 

Peck, Judge, 173. 

Pennsylvania, 82, 117, 147, 155, 187 
188, 204, 205, 211, 227, 254, 257 
272, 278, 337, 375. 

Pennsylvania Reporter, 156. 

Pennsylvanian, the, 311. 

Pensacola, 30, 36-38, 53, 56, 60, 64, 
67, 70. 

Pension, 120, 221 ; agency, 238, 248, 
310. 

People, will of the, 96-98. 

Perdido, 20. 

Personal feeling, Jackson's, 23, 24, 
65, 156, 162, 219, 272, 313, 314. 

Phi Beta Kappa, 254. 

Philadelphia, 10, 14, 80, 87, 112, 116, 
231, 233, 254, 324, 337. 338, 340. 

Pickering, T., 96. 

Pinckney, T., 35. 

Pinkney, W., 43. 

Pioneers, 6, 33. 

Piracy, 54. 

Pitkin, T., 228, 231. 

Planter, Jackson a, 16, 17 

Plaster trade, 197. 

Platform, 253. 

Plumer, \V., 27, 73, 144,238. 

Plutocracy 225, 331. See JMbiwy 
power. 

Pouxdexter, Q., 368 



400 



INDEX, 



Poinsett, J. R., 352, 354. 

Police, 365. 

Political philosophy, Jackson's, 277. 

Politico, li'4 ; domestic, 26 ; national, 

119 ; New York, 102, 103. 
Polk, J. K., 292, 314, 320, 358, 359, 

375, 3S6. See Report. 
Popularity, Jackson's, 14, 15, 31, 34- 

36, 43, 49, 63, 64, 68, 72, 78, 100, 

135, 156, 187, 259, 279, 297, 379, 

385. 
Porter, P. B., 179 ; Commodore, 359. 
Portsmouth, N. U., 236, 238, 239, 248, 

261. 
Post, N. Y. Evening, 371. 
Post-office, 349-351. 
Potomac, 117, 357. 
Powers, implied, 109. 
Presidency, the, 47, 100, 102. 
President, the. See the Executive. 
Press, the, 263. 
Prices, 121, 382. 
Primary, 87, 102. 
Principles, political, 138, 246, 286. 
Printing, public, 148, 160. 
Privateers, 53. 
Privileges, 130. 
Procedure, 172. 173. 
Proclamation, anti-nullification, 282, 

289 ; on West India trade, 169 ; 

Monroe's, 165. 
Prohibitory taxes, 221. 
Proscription, party, 102, 111, 112,141, 

144-146, 149 ; of the federalists, 

96; of printers, 148. 
Prosperity, 110, 121, 364, 865. 
Protectionists, 167, 170, 187, 209,212, 

216, 220, 291. 
Protective duties, 75, 81, 84, 196, 206, 

220, 221, 223, 326 ; system, 166, 168, 

188, 207, 208, 210, 285, 286, 288-290, 

3.33. See Tariff. 
Protest, Jackson's, 311. 
Proxies, 85. 

Public prosecutor, 5, 7. 
Puritan, 101. 

Quarrel, 52 ; of Jackson and Cal- 
houn, 158, 160. 

Quarrelsomeness, Jackson's, 17, 47, 
52, 60, 67, 72, 80. 

Quincy, J., 314. 

Rabun, Governor, 60 
•Riice-horse bills," 236, 294, 302, 

316. 
Radicals, 109. 
Randolph, J., 88, 101, 102, 111,174, 

284 ; Lieutenant, 162, -301. 
Ratio of value, gold to silver, 333. 
Becharter of the first national bank, 

U, 83. 84, 228, 229, 245, 248 ; of the 



second, 244, 257, 259, 260, 272, 274 

275, 304, 308. 

Reciprocity and retaliation, 164^ ISB* 
168, 195-197. See Countervailing. 

Redrawing, 293, 294. 

Red River, 357. 

Red Sticks, 65. 

Reelection, Jackson's interpretation 
of his, 277, 278. 

Reform, 113, 117. 

Regency, 86, 87, 369. 

Register, the Annual, 19, 105, 110 
118, 202, 203; the MobUe, 72; 
Niles's, 85, 200, 301, 317. 

Reid, Major, 141. 

Relief system, 122, 124, 126, 127 
132-135, 142, 159, 172, ^^41, 242,363. 

Removal, from office, 106, 113, 118, 
145, 147; of judges, 125, 127, see 
^^Judge-breaking;'''' of the public 
deposits, 232, 240, 241, 295-304, 
306-315, 325, 328, 331. 

Rents, 382. 

Report, on the bank, 247, 259, 260, 
268, 292-294, 295, 308, 315, 33< ; on 
manufactures, 221 ; on the Mor- 
gan outrage, 251 ; on the removal 
of the deposits, 308; on the Semi- 
nole war, 64, 67, 258 ; on the tariff, 
207, 223. 

Republicans. See Party. 

Resignation, Jackson's, of senator- 
ship, 104; Clay's, 374; Webster's, 
378. 

Resolutions, Virginia and Kentucky, 
212, 213, 215; Calhoun's, 287; 
Clay's, censuring Jackson, 310- 
313 ; Benton's expunging, 313, 314. 

Responsibility of the President, 245, 
310. 

Resumption of specie payments, 231, 
233. 

Retaliation. See Reciprocity and 
Countervailing. 

Retrenchment, 113. 

Revenue taxes, 221, 223; surplus. 

Revolutions, 170, 268, 354. 

Rhea, J., 56, 65, 167, 158. 

Rights, belligerent, 63; protection 

of, 126; natural, 370; notiona 

about, 230, 260 ; vested, U9, 133 

372. 
Ringold, 153. 

Rio Grande del Norte, 357. 
Riots, 318, 382,383. 
Ritchie, T., 263. 
Rives, W. C, 170, 312-314, 343, Stf 

376. 
Roane, A., 15. 
Robards, L., 8,9. 
Robards, Mrs. L., 8, 9. 



INDEX, 



401 



Robinstown, Me., 191. 
RowiiQ, J., 123, 172. 
Rucker, to " ruckerize," 376. 
" Rumps," 872. 

Ru.^h, R., 66, 111, 16i, 188, 202, 235. 
Russia, Emperor of, 115, 352 ; mis- 
sion to, 72, 102. 

Sabine, 67, 351, 3&2, 357, 386. 

Saddler, Jackson a, 2. 

Sfc. Augustine, 64. 

St. Jolin's, 165. 

St. Mark's, 57-80, 64. 

St. Mary's, Ga., 191. 

Salisbury, N. C.,2. 

Sanford, N., 332. 

San Francisco, 352. 

San Jacinto, 355. 

Santa Anna, 354, 355. 

Sargent, N., 107, 259. 

Sargent, T., 116. 

Scandal, 52. 

Scire facias, 263. 

Scott, General, 51, 88, 282 

Scott, J., 96. 

Sec8.«sion, 116, 216, 282. 

Secessionist, 213. 

Secret, the King's, 359. 

Self-government, 102, 127, 147, 155, 
226. 

Self-will, Jackson's, 278. 

Senate, 67, 106, 111, 113, 128, 147, 
148, 172, 177, 189, 190, 230, 268; 
democracy vs. the, 311 ; on the 
Bank, 247, 248, 274, 275, 315 ; Jack- 
son's quarrel with the, 272, 278, 
314, 384 ; committees of the, 111. 

Senator, Jackson a, 10, 76. 

Sergeant, J., 258. 

Sevier, Governor, 15, 18. 

Seward, W. II., 254. 

Seybert, A., 229. 

Shoulder Bone Greek, 175. 

Silver, 120, 123, 332, 333. 

Blade, U'., 378. 

Slamm, 372. 

Slavery and slaves, 349-352, 355. 

Slave-trade, 23, 54, 69. 

Smith, A., 289. 
.Smith, S., 247 

Socialists, 382. 

South American republics, 84, 105, 
107, 108, 202. 

South Carolina 215-220, 281-291 ; 
police act, 1-30, 173, 215. 

«!overeigutv, 185, 224, 281. 

Spain, 19, 21, 36, 53, 54,57, 62, 64, 66 
107, 353. 

ispecial legislation, 194- 

Specie, 120, 121, 123, 125, 134, 135, 
231. 264, 268, 304, 318, 320, 323, 335- 
337 ; circular, the, 335-337 ; pay- 
26 



ments, 121, 230, 232. See Resump. 

tion, Suspension, and Currency. 
Speculation, 32'^-324 ; Texau land 

and stofk, 355. 
Spencer, A., 255. 
Spencer, J. C., 251. 
Spoils, 103, 146, 147, 162. 
Spoliation claims, 170, 171, 221, 258. 
Stanbaugh, Colonel, 155. 
Standard, the, New York, 311. 
State rights, 82, 109, 123, 130-134, 139 

157, 173, 256, 284, 363. 
Steamboats, 136. 
Stevens, Thad., 254, 379. 
Stevenson, A., 202, 376. 
Stock-jobbing, 13. 
Storekeeper, Jackson a, 16. 
Story, J., 131, 254, 361,363. 
Strict construction, 109, 134, 256. 
Strikes, 382. 
Stump speaking, 6, 113. 
Sturges vs. Crowninshield, 128. 
Suability of a State, 129, 135. 
Sub-treasury, 248. 
Suspension of specie payments, 121 

123, 229, 330. 
Suwanee River, 58, 342. 
Swartwout, 91, 93, 105 

Tammant, 86, 117, 369, 372. 

Taney, R. B., 163, 282, 297, 300-309, 
314, 317, 385. 

Tariff, 188, 194-209, 212, 215, 218, 
221, 222, 279, 285, 286, 288-291, sea 
Protective duties and NuUiJication; 
of 1789, 286 ; of 1816, 75 ; in 1820, 
76 ; of 1824, 76, 197 ; of 1828 {" o£ 
abominations "), 206, 207, 211,212, 
216-220, 281; of 1832, 222, 223, 
281, 288, 290; "compromise," of 
1833, 285, 288, 289-291, 327 ; J. Q 
Adams on the, 81, 109 ; Calhoun 
on the, 82 ; constitutionality of 
the, 220, 285; convention, 220,- 
Jackson on the, 76, 139, 256, 257 ; 
and land, 186, 188, 190. 

Tassel, G., ISO, 181. 

Taxes, 69, 75, 187, 217, 218, see Pro. 
hibitory. Revenue, and Protective : 
levied on the United States Bank 
123, 128, 132. 

Tecumseh, 31, 32, 36, 377. 

Telegraph, the, 104, 114, 148, 155 
159, 160, 263. 

Tellico, 176. 

Tennessee, 5, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 19 
21, 56, 104, 105, 117, 121, 122, 160 
353, 375, 3S6 ; river, 353. 

Texas, 67, 352-359, 385. 

Thames, battle of the, 36. 

Theatricalism in po itics, 77. 

Third term, 376. 



402 



INDEX. 



Three per cents, the, 266, 268, 269, 

291-293, 303, 304, 309. 

Timberlake, Mrs. See ISIrs. J. H. 
Eaton. 

Titles, contested land, 129, 182; of 
courtesy, 137. 

Toast, Jackson's union, 156. 219. 

Tohopeka, 35. 

Toland, II., 292. 

Tomkins, D. D., 73. 

Trade, illicit, 166, 169, 170. 

Trades unions, 382. 

Transfer drafts, 307. 

Treasury, the federal, 74, 114, 115 , 
secretary of the, 232, 302, 308, 311. 

Treaty, with France (1778), 195 : 
with England (1795), 11, 12, 27, 
130; with Spain (1795), 19 ; of St. 
Jldefonso, 19 ; with France (1803), 
186 ; proposed with England (1806), 
28 ; with Spain (1819), 20, 67, 69, 
186,354,386; with France (1831), 
171, 295, 343, 344, 346 ; with Mex- 
ico (1832), 354, (1840 and 1843), 
358 ; commercial, 164, 194, 195 ; 
Indian, 174-183. 

Trist, N. P., 384. 

Troup, Governor, 177, 178, 216. 

Trustee, Jackson a, 15- 

Tyler, J., 47, 313, 325, 330, 358, 385. 

Union, the, 12, 19, 29, 157, 210, 216, 

279, 283-2S5. 
Union, the Nashville, 95. 
University, national, 109. 
Usages, diplomatic, 137. 
Usury, 261. 

Van Buren, M-^M passim. 

Veracity, " adjourned question of," 
95. 

Vermont, 254. 

Verplanck, G. C, 292, 332. See Re- 
port. 

Veto, 124, 134, 193, 194, 230, 274, 275, 
299, 325. 

Vidal, heirs of, 70. 

Vindictiveness, Jackson's, 148, 385. 

Violence, mob, etc., 350, 363, 365. 

Virginia, 8, 9, 85, 129, 130, 218, 288, 
312, 313, 376. 

V^ote for President, 89, 90, 117, 276, 
881. 



Votes cast by Jackson, 13, 77, 139. 

Wages, 136, 186, 189. 

War, 285 ; civil, 133, 282, 330 ; conv 
mercial, 12, 27, 2*8, 348 ; the Creek 
33, 35; with France, 13, 29; In 
dian, 15, 32, 33, 175, 176 ; the Mex 
ican, 357, 358 ; Revolutionary, 2, 3 
62, 174, 361 ; of 1812, 26, 29, 30 
40,.42, 43, 68, 75, 234 ; the Semi- 
nole, 55, 61, 65. 151, 157, 161, 268 
272, 356, 359, 368. 

Ward, Colonel, 355. 

Warren, Admiral, 30. 

Washington, G., 8, 10-12, 27, 146 
175 ; mother of, 301. 

Washington, city of, 33, 37, 42, 48 
70, 105, 138, 143, 145, 149, 155, 166 
221, 231, 239. 

Watkins, T., 146. 

Wayman vs. Southard, 129. 

Wayne, J. M., 216. 

Weatherford, 32. 

Webb, J. W., 263. 

■\Vebster, D., 82-379 passim 

West Indies, 202, 349. 

West India trade, 161, 164-170, 256. 

Whig. See Party. 

-Wheat imported, 323, 382. 

White, C. P., 332. 

White, II. L., 13, 162, 291, 312, 376 
378, 379. 

White Uouse, 114, 115, 150, 160,280. 

Whitney, R. 31., 263, 268, 269, 297 
300, 306. 

Wilkinson, General, 21, 30, 36. 

Williams, J., 76. 

Williams, S., 381. 

Wire-pulling, 77, 154, 273. 

Wirt, W., 72, 130, 173, 235, 254 
255. 

Wood, J., 34. 

Woodbury, L., 115, 162, 236-238,297 
306, 320, 334. 

Wool, 199. 

Woollens, 198, 199, 203, 207. 

Woollens bill, 200, 201. 

^\'orcester, missionary, 181. 

Worthington, 71. 

Wright, Fannv, 382. 

Wright, S., 204, 305. 

Writs of execution, 129, 133, 173; © 
error, 181, 182. 



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